Do you always deflect from challenges by not answering questions?

I disguise it by bringing the topic up?

How does that observation relate to the money behind Trump?

A consistent feature of your program is that the clear connection between the very wealthy and the "effete political class" never appears in your analysis. Private interests can and do direct public affairs. The shock you delight in the discomfiture Trump elicits has nothing to do with why he is an asset for certain interests.

Wittgenstein does not say that the picture that presents the facts is something in the mind. — Fooloso4

I would go further and say that Wittgenstein is opposed to the framework of things in themselves versus things for us.

Kant's depiction of intuitions, as the portal of experiencing what exists, can be imagined as a condition of the person. In the Tractatus, the vivacity of perception is expressed as an observation that does not require that set of assumptions:

3.1. In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. — ibid.

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says:
— Paine

I apologize, I must have been unclear in my writing. I was trying to say that, from Russell's perspective, such seems to be the case. I do not agree with Russell on this point. — 013zen

When you said:

Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems. — 013zen

Do you agree with Bertie that Witt disregarded his own statements?

For my part, I disagree with a particular observation made by Russell:

That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure. — ibid. emphasis mine

Russell is reading an isomorphic mirroring where Wittgenstein is not. The problem is not with correspondence between separated items but the nature of representation. Before propositions are discussed in Tractatus, depictions are observed from different points of view.

One feature of the following statements is that they condition each other as well as build to a larger argument.

2.151. What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

2.141. A picture is a fact.

2.151. Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.

2.1511. That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

2.172. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it. — ibid.

The mutual conditioning here is important because taking "a picture is a fact" out of context would seem to collapse the difference between the depiction and what is depicted. But the limit to depicting a "pictorial form" restores the distance from "reality." The act of making pictures is one of the events that happen. The problem is that we lack the vantage point to make a picture of making a picture using that process. The statement is not reversible, allowing one to say: "a fact is a picture." Saying that would void the quality of "reaching out" to what it is not. Observations like these are explicit claims by Wittgenstein of "expressiveness" and not a resort to mysticism as Russell describes.

Stating what cannot be represented qualifies all the assertions about what can be. Talking about "possibility" keeps returning to the limits of what the argument can uncover. The following are examples of this boundary:

4.0312. The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives.
My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts. — ibid.

4.12. Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world. — ibid.

4.121. Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it. — ibid.

It can be (and has been) argued that articulating the boundary in this way is a paradoxical attempt to stand both "inside" and "outside" the world despite arguing it cannot be done. But that aspect is quite different from Russell's suggestion that ideas banned from entering through the front door are sneaking in through the back.

Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems. — 013zen

That suggests you agree with Russell in a way that I do not. Russell says:

The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given the syntax of language, the meaning of a sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the component words is known. In order that a certain sentence should assert a certain fact there must, however the language may be constructed, be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory. That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure. — ibid.

The text does not support this addition to the thesis. The portion I quoted brings the "same structure" idea into question.

PI is, I personally think, an attempt to say something similar but, in his own style, so to speak. While structurally, the works are very similiar, the manner in which the ideas are presented is clearly not only written for people like Russell and Frege. — 013zen

On this point, it is worth mentioning that Russell was not a supporter of the thesis of Tractatus but hoping it was not true. From Russell's introduction:

"What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit. The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions. His defence would be that what he calls the mystical can be shown, although it cannot be said. It may be that this defence is adequate, but, for my part, I confess that it leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort."

I don't think Russell understands what is being attempted. The scope of the work is mischaracterized when he says:

"Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense."

The relationship between a means of expression and what is shown by it is what is being discussed. Russell treats it like an inventory being smuggled in through a sleight of hand. Wittgenstein speaks of language in the context of it doing something. The propositions within 3.4 and 4.0 do not reflect Russell's description. 4.002 has this:

Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes. — ibid

Since you take an approach where philosophical positions can be precisely located in an encyclopedic fashion, consider this entry from an encyclopedia:

Logical empiricism is a philosophic movement rather than a set of doctrines, and it flourished in the 1920s and 30s in several centers in Europe and in the 40s and 50s in the United States. It had several different leaders whose views changed considerably over time. Moreover, these thinkers differed from one another, often sharply. Because logical empiricism is here construed as a movement rather than as doctrine, there is probably no important position that all logical empiricists shared—including, surprisingly enough, empiricism. And while most participants in the movement were empiricists of one form or another, they disagreed on what the best form of empiricism was and on the cognitive status of empiricism. What held the group together was a common concern for scientific methodology and the important role that science could play in reshaping society. Within that scientific methodology the logical empiricists wanted to find a natural and important role for logic and mathematics and to find an understanding of philosophy according to which it was part of the scientific enterprise. — SEP, Logical Empiricism

Regarding the last sentence, the Tractatus argues for a cesura between strictly scientific matters and the problems of philosophy where thinkers like Whitehead and Russell do not.

Yes. Arguably, that was Plato's big mistake. The relationship between part and whole is quite different in the two cases. He assumed it was the same. — Ludwig V

There are problems with making the argument that justice is the same in the individual and the city. My point is that the individual is seen as being made up of components that have different means and ends. A consistent theme throughout the Dialogues is that the best relationship amongst these parts is the source of virtue and true happiness. The pursuit of that relationship is deemed more worthy than the expression of traditional norms.

And so we have Socrates goading Antyus:

Soc: Isn’t it obvious that, if excellence can be taught, this man would never have had his own children taught these subjects whose instruction costs money, 94D and not have had them taught the very subjects that produce good men, when that instruction costs nothing? Or was Thucydides perhaps a mediocre fellow after all, who did not have so many friends among the Athenians and her allies? He also belonged to an important family, and he had great influence in the city and throughout the rest of the Greek world. So, if excellence were indeed teachable, he would have found someone to make good men of his own sons, some fellow-citizen or some stranger, 94E if he did not have time to do it himself because of his civic concerns. In any case, friend Anytus, it seems that excellence is not teachable.

Any: Socrates, you seem all too ready to speak ill of people, so I would like to give you some advice, if you are prepared to heed me. Be careful, because in any city it is probably easier to do a person harm rather than do them good, but this is especially 95A so in this city. But I think you know this yourself. — Meno, 94C

Again, I am just looking for a specific country that is a good example of his theory. — Fermin

I am not familiar with the text of this summary you refer to but Hobbes lived through the English Civil War and justified the monarchy on the basis of that experience. It was not a thought experiment for him.

Neither does the Republic. I have a feeling that he didn't recognize that society is for the benefit of the individuals comprising it, not the other way about and I mind a great deal about that. — Ludwig V

The dialogues are a far cry from stating "All men are created equal." There are many contested "histories" looking into how that talk came about. The dialectic did not start there.

But I disagree with saying that the benefits of individuals were not of paramount concern.

The opening dispute in the Republic is over whether the administration of justice is an arbitrary rule disguised as a universal truth. The model of the good city is built from the analogy of a person living the best possible life, not the other way around.

The limits to our knowledge of the Good expressed in the Republic are echoed in the Laws.

The discussion of pleasure in the Philebus is centered on the intersection of universal conditions and the experience of an individual human being.

The resistance to the philosophers as an assault upon traditional values was expressed in many different ways by different authors at the time. Talk about educating children was itself found to be offensive. The Meno gives a taste of that.

My two drachmas. Er, four, to be exact.

It does indeed point to the threshold between public and private aspects, or at least between what should be prescribed and what left up to the parties. (I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the reference to the OP.) — Ludwig V

It seems to me that the acknowledgement of not being able to explain the peculiar alchemy that brings a benefit (both publicly and privately) to children speaks to an awareness counted by Midgley to be a terra incognita for bachelors like Plato.

It's one thing to recommend marrying prudently or at least taking prudence into account. But it's quite another to prioritize the "city" in making the decision. — Ludwig V

The City has the prerogative to expect that from citizens. There is a tension in Plato about how love and friendship occur within this prerogative. The personal dynamic seen in Phaedrus and Symposium is absent in Laws except as horizons.

Observing this tension caused me to recommend The Care of the Self to the discussion. As a "history of philosophy", Foucault directly addresses how ideas about marriage changes through different articulations. It is a condition with a history and future challenges.

He did, however, on Plato's telling have some concern for the welfare of his children. I don't know if there is a correlation with his teachings, but it does seem that he preferred to hang out in the marketplace rather than at home with her. — Fooloso4

There is a correlation in Laws, where the qualifications for a suitable bride is discussed:

So when any man, having turned twenty-five years of age, upon due consideration by himself and by others, believes 772E he has found a bride that suits him personally, and is also suitable for companionship and for begetting children, he should marry, indeed everyone should do so before they turn thirty-five. But first he should be told how to find a suitable and fitting bride, for as Cleinias says, every law should be preceded by an introductory preamble of its own. — Plato, Laws, Bk 6, 772D

The matter of a union beneficial to the City is discussed as a balance of dispositions of the couple as well as the development of the children:

Ath: It’s nice of you to say so. Now, to a young man, from 773A a good family we should say the following: you should enter into the sort of marriage that meets the approval of sensible folk. These people would advise you neither to shun marriage to a poor family, nor chase eagerly after wealthy connections and, all other considerations being equal, always prefer to enter a union with someone who has less resources. For this approach would be beneficial both to the city itself, and to the families involved, since balance and proportion are much more conducive to excellence than unbridled excess. And someone who realises that he himself is too impulsive and hasty in all his actions should look for 773B connections to a well behaved family, whereas someone with the opposite natural tendencies should pursue connections of the opposite sort. And there should be one rule for all marriages: each person is to seek a marriage that is beneficial to the city, not the one that pleases himself. Everyone is always drawn somehow, by nature, to a person who is most like himself, and so the city 773C as a whole develops an imbalance of wealth and character traits. That’s how the consequences we wish to avoid in our own city, certainly befall most other cities. Now to prescribe explicitly, by law, that the wealthy are not to marry the wealthy, the powerful are not to marry the powerful, that the slower characters have to look for marital unions with the quick witted, and the quicker with the slower, would not alone be ridiculous but would anger a lot of people. For it is not easy to appreciate that a city should be 773D blended after the manner of a wine bowl, in which the wine, when first poured, seethes madly, but when it is restrained by the good company of another, more sober god, it forms a good, duly measured drink. Now it is virtually impossible for anyone to discern that this is happening in the case of the blending of children, and that’s why we should omit such matters from our laws. We should try instead to charm each person into placing more value upon the equipoise of their own children, than the marital property equality which is insatiable, using words of reproach to deter anyone who is intent upon marrying for money, rather than forcing them via a written law. — ibid. 772E

The limits of legislation noted here is quite different from the language of the Republic. It does echo the concern for the children's well-being in Phaedo. It also points to the threshold separating the public and private aspects of marriage addressed by the OP.

One element to note is that the phrase "social contract" was coined by Rousseau. Applying that idea to what Hobbes was saying overlooks the "I won't kill you if you don't kill me" deal Hobbes was talking about.

Please link to the collection.

What do you think about it?
Are you reading the Leviathan or something else?

Have you read Hobbes?

Are you writing a college essay?

I like the idea of an art of partnership. But the themes you mention seem to me to be more about what partnership should be than what it is. Would that be unfair? — Ludwig V

Results do vary. I have had enough good fortune to say it is true. I have had enough bad fortune to deeply appreciate what "lack of care" is like. One of the virtues of Foucault's book is that he constantly attends the consequences of things going south.

There is that matter of expectation to consider regarding bachelors' options, but one interesting element of Foucault's analysis is that couples have more power than singles in shaping the possibilities in particular places. Having patrons or an institution to help a single makes a big difference.

I also like it a lot. But commitment is tricky. I don’t think one can do it in advance. No matter what ceremony is supposed to establish the commitment, it needs to be maintained, or perhaps performed from day to day and even from hour to hour. If and when circumstances change, it may need to be renewed – life throws things you did not sign up for at you. — Ludwig V

This reminds me of Foucault, who speaks of the "art of partnership" in his Care of the Self. Foucault traces the changing ideas about marriage from the Classical writers to contemporary thinkers. One theme he develops is how the reciprocal nature of companionship leads to its own recognition of the "solitary" as a matter for care. Respect for the other strengthens the union in the business of the world as well as personally improving the life of the mate.
The book argues that the "art of partnership" has its own life in the different ethical standards it works within. But it does not live outside of those.

In terms of being a bachelor, Foucault depicts them as being less restrained than married men but still living in the fabric of the social reality continued through marital life. Not too many accounts of bachelorettes tripping the lights fantastic, however.

Curiously, Dostoevsky didn't refer to religious themes in this novel. I can say the plot is 'secular' if we compare it with other of his works. — javi2541997

I think of the difference between the religious and the psychological as a dynamic that plays different roles in different novels. When comparing The Idiot to The Brothers Karamazov, for instance, the differences collide but never resolve into a single measure of experience. The psychological, by itself, does not have all of the same problems.

The interviews with people who were recused from the current Trump trial are interesting. Finding the limits to one's own objectivity is such a New York City thing.

Thank you for the considered response. I agree that there is a departure from Russell and Frege in the work but see it from a different angle.

I, too, am working, so will elaborate when free.

Regarding perception, the NYC entrepreneurial set of Trumpsters do expect a direct benefit from tax changes in one fashion or another. Moves to change how LLCs operate and the Democratic effort to develop new corporate taxation make these folk nervous. Efforts to make the IRS more effective is also muttered about.

Well, I was reporting perception, not actual policy on taxes. I take your point on the cost of trade wars.

The culture wars issue sounds more like offering rhetorical support. — Relativist

Not sure what you mean by that, but many people are invested in that view of conflict. I have a lot of family in Texas who are mostly concerned about those issues.

From my encounter with Trump voters, in my family and work life, there is a difference between those who are mostly concerned with having the least amount of taxes charged against them as possible and those who want more control of cultural institutions. I have met people who want both of those agendas but plenty more who do not care about the other side of the politics.

The case is about attempts to squash negative accounts before the election. The law involved concerns efforts to change perceptions of the electorate through illegal means. What actually happened sexually no longer matters.

Leibniz did present a 'universal character' suitable for a principle of sufficient reason to be up to the task of sorting out what things are. Or at least provide a ground for talking about the fundamental elements in a coherent way.

The challenge of the Tractatus begins with separating 'facts' from 'things'. That seems like a clear withdrawal from a "correspondence theory". In that regard, Wittgenstein is taking a step backwards. Regrouping after failed attempts.

What is wrong with assuming the previous statements have been read and understood? Did I leave something out?

Lame response, considering what you have claimed.

So, you have none?

But you claimed that the apparent attempt by T to overturn the election results was a plot perpetrated by Biden. Those are your words. Are your words only something that are claimed afterwards?

I accept your withdrawal from your thesis.

Not even the part where Biden engineered the whole event?

The confluence of efforts to change the electoral votes combined with the support given on the day by T and afterwards, in the form of referring to the participants as hostages, and what not.

It is your narrative. Are you asking me to explain your theory to you?

Contrary to what?

That narrative would have some teeth if the evidence to the contrary was not so obvious to all who observed the incidents as they happened in real time.

Your story will have to explain how that was engineered.

Are you saying that you have never hurt another person for the benefit of yourself?

Never lied to avoid suffering the consequences of honesty?

Never pretended to be who you were/are not?

Never taken what was not yours?

Never broken a promise, made either implicitly or explicitly?

Not supported a loved one when they needed that?

I will presume you get the general idea.