I have provided evidence in support of my claim that you got him wrong. But you just skip over that as if it is just a game you don't want to play.

This is why I said that it is very much like a programmer writing a language setting out how the language will operate so that it doesn't run into errors. — schopenhauer1

He is not writing a language. He is using the German language.

In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.

(5.5563)

Sure, but imagine if any other thinker said that he doesn't have to explain themselves any further.. — schopenhauer1

Since you believe so strongly in comparing styles and content you should know that we don't have to imagine it. Other thinkers, both ancient and contemporary, have based their explanations on reality being granular. It seems likely that Wittgenstein was influenced by Plato's account in Theaetetus. (201d)

It just seems like a strange thing to NOT demand from a thinker trying to give you such a comprehensive take on the world. — schopenhauer1

It just seems strange to believe than any thinker could provide a comprehensive take on the world. In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein says:

... the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.

and toward the end he says:

We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of
life remain completely untouched.

(6.52)

The problems of life are not scientific problems. They are not problems that can be solved scientifically. Or by propositional analysis. The focus of Wittgenstein's concern is not ontological or epistemological. He points to the limits of logic in order to safeguard ethics and aesthetics which lie outside its domain. To put it differently, his concern is not with what is on the table, but what we bring to it.

With the purpose of obtaining a one-substance cosmology ... — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead

Why should that be our purpose? Why one substance and not two or two million or no substance?

But it does start with a generalization of Locke's account of mental operations. — Process and Reality- A.N. Whitehead

Why should we start with Locke's account of mental operations? Why not start with whatever it is that makes mental operations possible?

Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. — Kant- Critique of Pure Reason

Why? Because Kant says so?

we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. — schopenhauer1

Why should we begin with an exposition of the conception of space?

the representation of space must already exist as a foundation. — schopenhauer1

Why should a representation of space be the foundation of anything?

... this external experience is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation. — schopenhauer1

The luggage will either fit in the trunk of the car or it won't. It won't fit in this space because you can represent it as fitting.

We just accept that these statements must be true without why, how, what for, etc. — schopenhauer1

The same should be asked of a Whitehead and Kant fanboy.

Any philosopher writing on some topic has a different degree of assumptions, taken as starting points without need for explication. These are the bedrock of the discussion and represent the general positions of some tradition...in Witt’s case, its the assumption that one could, in theory, develop a logical notation capable of syntactically only admitting of true statements, with which you could then use to calculate what must be true, necessarily, without appealing back to ordinary language.

Leibniz first postulated the idea, calling is the “characteristica universalis”. This is chiefly what influenced Frege, and why he developed his concept-script which postulated simple objects in functional relations as underlying and furnishing the logic of our general language.


I called attention earlier, to a commonality I see between the two positions in this thread, namely that Witt seems to want to ultimately criticize the project, despite still seeing some utility in its development. The analysis of language can never furnish us with anything new – we cannot, for example, discover what’s true after the fact, so to speak. There are no surprises in logic. If we understand the premises, the conclusion is always obvious. We do not, therefore, discover what is true from analysis.

I get the sense that the work is set up sort of like an argument from contradiction. He starts by assuming the general framework of the analytic project, simply stating some common assumptions that school of thought takes, before showing that this line of reasoning admits of a contradiction, namely that:

1. analysis should tell us what's true, by culling any signs which don’t represent aspects of reality
2. analysis does not tell us what's true, rather, it tells us what’s possible. Truth seems to come before analysis.

Truth is presupposed, not proven by logical analysis. That some propositions are true, and others false, must be determined outside of logic.

Why does this matter?

Again, the entire tradition was geared towards trying to guarantee what we can know. Can we know whats true of the world? Hume said, only insofar as we can experience it, and there’s no guarantee. Kant said we could know whats true, even beyond experience, and there could be some guarantee. But, we don’t directly experience reality, like Hume thought.

Witt seems to want to say that “truth” is nothing more than a manner of situating things in the world based on what we perceive as logically possible. Not only do we not experience reality directly, but we are also incapable of knowing whether our picture is true or not, because its exactly that, just one picture of reality.

This is why Witt seems to make comments regarding solipsism, and the individual being a microcosm. We are each, individually, limited by how we can logically situate things...this is why some things “make sense” to some people, and are utterly nonsensical to others. It’s not that some additional facts are needed on one side or the other, rather a way of seeing the facts and situating them.

The development of a new theory, like evolution, didn’t discover, for example, the differences and similarities between species – that was always apparent. Rather, it considered as possible a relation between them that wasn’t considered possible before.

Witt seems to want to say that “truth” is nothing more than a manner of situating things in the world based on what we perceive as logically possible. — 013zen

What is true is what is the case. There are things that are logically possible but not true.

we are also incapable of knowing whether our picture is true or not — 013zen

What leads you to say this? He does say:

It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.

(2.224)

But this does not mean we are incapable of knowing whether it is true or false. In order to determine if it is we must compare it to reality-.

A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

(2.21)

In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.

(2.223)

Reality is compared with propositions.

(4.05)

A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.

(4.06)

Rather, it considered as possible a relation between them that wasn’t considered possible before. — 013zen

More specifically, differences are not differences in kind but differences in degree.

What leads you to say this? He does say:

It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false. — Fooloso4

This is what I'm trying to get at. He's doesn't seem to be putting forth a correspondence theory. At least not in the traditional manner. He seems to want to say that while we might measure a proposition against reality in order to determine whether or not it's "true", we don't ever get, say capital T "truth" insofar as the picture tells you nothing about the reality it presents.

I can, for example, refer to electromagnetic "waves" as waves, and it seems true to refer to them as such. It seems obvious, in fact. But, calling them waves is just a way we conceptualize what's going on, and it seems to in some sense get at what's occurring, but we can be almost certain that they aren't behaving like traditional waves.

Perhaps this is a bad example, but hopefully you can understand what I'm trying to get at. Or I'm not making sense... I'm tired, I was out late last night lol

Leibniz did present a 'universal character' suitable for a principle of sufficient reason to be up to the task of sorting out what things are. Or at least provide a ground for talking about the fundamental elements in a coherent way.

The challenge of the Tractatus begins with separating 'facts' from 'things'. That seems like a clear withdrawal from a "correspondence theory". In that regard, Wittgenstein is taking a step backwards. Regrouping after failed attempts.

Sorry, I've been busy with work lately.

Leibniz did present a 'universal character' suitable for a principle of sufficient reason to be up to the task of sorting out what things are. Or at least provide a ground for talking about the fundamental elements in a coherent way. — Paine

To my understanding, Leibniz did at least provide the coherent framework for what he envisioned. So, in that sense, I agree. He tried to express what he imagined as being possible. Thinkers definitely tried to develop this, with Frege being one of them; other thinkers, like Mach, might have even been influenced by this, because I know that he, like Leibniz, thought this "possible language" should be something like differential equations.

Wittgenstein is taking a step backwards. Regrouping after failed attempts. — Paine

I get the sense that Witt might be trying to challenge the idea a bit. He seems to follow after Frege's and Russell's attempt, but ultimately seems to conclude that the idea is actually incoherent. It seems, at face value, that the idea has merit, but if you try and develop something of the sort, you're left with nothing more than a framework for parsing language syntactically, but you don't learn anything new, like Leiniz envisioned. I can only show you, for example, that an argument is valid - that it has the proper truth preserving form - but, I cannot determine its soundness; I only fancy it sound if already presuppose its truth.


Anyways, interesting post :)

Again, I want to emphasize that I do think that Witt saw value in the project, but maybe had his doubts regarding it being possible in the sense that Leibniz and perhaps Frege envisioned such a language. They thought it could do more work perhaps?

I think Witt def shows us certain things - the isomorphism between thought, language, and reality.

Language can be analyzed into atomic statements featuring simple objects that are indefinable, and to these can correspond simple parts of thoughts - logically simple thoughts. But, knowing this doesn't teach us anything new or helpful...except, perhaps, for clarification purposes.

What's the point of "objects" for Wittgenstein, if he already has "atomic facts" as the primary constituents of his language?

"Objects" indicates a metaphysics beyond the linguistic. Since there is a distinction between objects and atomic facts, there must be a reason why it is important to note. And if it is important, why is more not said about objects (entities, things, as he "clarifies")? It seems like a metaphysics shoe-horned into something that is intended to be completely about how language describes the world...

And if we want to go around the merry-go-round again we can discuss how objects don't have to be physical. Right.. but then later he distinguishes between concepts proper (things of the world), and formal objects (their signs in formal language), and pseudo-objects, (abstracted objects that are neither true or false).

Thank you for the considered response. I agree that there is a departure from Russell and Frege in the work but see it from a different angle.

I, too, am working, so will elaborate when free.

What's the point of "objects" for Wittgenstein, if he already has "atomic facts" as the primary constituents of his language? — schopenhauer1

From my understanding...

Objects form the substance of the world. Witt tells us:

"Substance is what exists independently of what is the case" (2.024).

And several lines later:

"The object is the fixed, the existent; the configuration is the changing, the variable" (2.0271).

Consider it this way...

Pseudo concepts are in some sense, fixed. What can fall under them is changing and variable, and this is what's shown in atomic facts.

I can say: "Socrates is mortal" or "schopenhauer1 is mortal" or "013zen is mortal" the logic expressed by the atomic sentence these analyze into is the same; it exists beyond individual instances of the atomic sentence.

A particular atomic fact either obtains or it does not obtain. We can imagine it obtaining, even if it doesn't. But, there are possible atomic facts outside of our imagination, and yet the logic will persist to cover those new examples when we discover them. The "objects" reach past our experience, and past the atomic facts. This allows the pseudo-concept to be open to change and creation.

Suppose we had a world with 1 ball. We'd have perhaps a handful of atomic facts.

One about a ball existing, one about its shape (identifying it as a ball), one perhaps about its color. We'd have simple pseudo-concepts that supply the base level of the analysis. Things like existence, shape, color, number, would be within the pseudo-concept's logical framework, so to speak, ..if, somehow later on, some other entity came into existence, the simple pseudo-concepts would still contain the new complex object. The logic pervades all possible reality, in a sense. I cannot imagine an entity without some shape if it exists in space. I cannot imagine an entity existing without being able to count it.

Or consider hearing a melody. There is a specific vibration in your ear translated by a particular agitation in the air. This same agitation can be translated onto a record which is just scratches in a record caused by the agitation as translated by some device. We can also write the melody out on a musical score. In each instance, we can imagine the atomic facts associated with 1.) the original sound wave 2.) the vibration on your ear drum 3.) the scratches in the record 4.) the written notes of the musical score.

each has its own associated atomic fact, but the form between them must be the same, right? The logic of the scratches in the record must correspond to the logic of the air molecules being agitated by a sound wave, as must it correspond to the logic of a particular vibration on the meaty apparatus of your ear drum, or notes on a written musical score. To wildly different atomic facts, belong the same internal logic between individual aspects that compose the atomic facts.

I want to state that I am still working through this, so don't take what I am saying as definitive in any sense, but thus far this is how I am imagining it.

I'm sorry, none of this makes much sense and the only way to make sense of it is to "reach beyond what Wittgenstein provides" (to borrow your phrasing of objects :wink:). What you do state I feel can better be described by other metaphysical/epistemological systems more clearly...ironically.

From what I can gather, what you state coincides with my interpretation more-or-less.. That is to say, Wittgenstein views objects of the "aboutness" of the atomic facts. That is to say, the atomic facts has to be about something (the substance of the world), and so he proposes an anemic metaphysics (objects), which is scarcely explained, but is considered sort of fundamental and brute and simple.

One can say that he doesn't have to explain it because he didn't care about it. Or, one can say that his whole point was to not explain things that could not be analyzed any further, and thus he left it brief and moved forward with propositions being built of atomic facts that represent states of affairs of the world. Perhaps trying to explain objects further would be going beyond what he thinks is legitimate for language to describe.

As just an audience and someone who also likes to think about the world, this picture he is providing just doesn't give me much to hang my hat on. Maybe it's just me and my reaction to it. I don't see much "there" there. It seems like an interesting attempt at something, but a mere outline based on some form of logical analysis of objects and their attributes (predicates), but I am really not seeing its greater significance. One problem is that since it is not situated in a framework of what it sets out to disprove (i.e. other theories that are competing with it), I am not really sure what he is trying to prove. He can say something like, "The world is facts" etc. but without explanation of what this is set against, it is rather lost on me why it should be important or interesting. If he went on about how previous to him, or other philosophers think x, y, and z, I could more clearly see what he is trying to set his view against.

Sure, we the audience can try to do that for him, but then, you can say that about anyone. I can write an obscure or obtuse paragraph and say that you should just read up on a bunch of other stuff to really "get me", and I think that is not fair to the interlocutor or audience and is possibly even writing out of bad faith towards one's audience to make them do the job you are supposed to be doing. If I make something just obscure enough, I can always claim you don't "really" get me, or some such.

I'm sorry, none of this makes much sense and the only way to make sense of it is to "reach beyond what Wittgenstein provides" (to borrow your phrasing of objects :wink:). — schopenhauer1

Haha, perhaps you're right. I may be taking certain liberties with my current thinking, but once I have more time, I'll dig back into the text properly :P But, I think that we've come a long way, and the discussion has taken interesting avenues! I certainly have a fuller appreciation, and thinking regarding the work, than i had previously, I think. Hopefully, the same is true of you, as well.

I think its interesting that you find we, more-or-less have similar ideas regarding the text, when you also admit that I might be reaching a bit here and there :P I have nothing much to say about that, I just wasn't expecting you to say that after starting out by saying the first part lol

Anyways, to your point...

Wittgenstein views objects of the "aboutness" of the atomic facts. That is to say, the atomic facts has to be about something (the substance of the world), and so he proposes an anemic metaphysics (objects), which is scarcely explained, but is considered sort of fundamental and brute and simple. — schopenhauer1

I don't think this is quite right. Remember, Wittgenstein gave clear examples of atomic sentences; they have to do with the underlying logic of propositions. Proposition are about something...an atomic fact is merely the underlying logical form of that "about" relation, as stated by the proposition. A Wittgensteinian object is a logical object, or rather, the manner in which its discussed is meant to show what he has in mind as his focus.

Consider one of the areas of the work associated with dispelling "Russell's paradox". The "paradox" that caused Frege to have a nervous breakdown and, more-or-less resign his attempts at constructing a type-script in Leibniz's vision. The colloquial take:

The barber shaves every man that does not shave himself. Does the barber shave himself? We know either leads to a contradiction. But this was a contradiction that first showed up in Russell's logical notation, and also occurred in Frege's.

Wittgenstein's response is to look at the atomic propositions associated with the paradox. Suppose some set f(x) containing only men that do not shave themselves. Then the barber shaving them would add: F(fx). Now, if we supposed this set could contain itself, we'd write F(F(fx)). But, Wittgenstein remarks that this can't be correct, because while these two "F"'s have different meaning's entirely. By re-writing the atomic facts in his own notation:

(∃ϕ) :F(ϕu) . ϕu = F u

He says the paradox vanishes.

Russell originally thought about the problem as:

{x | x ∉ x}

The set of all sets that don't contain themselves. Does it contain itself? If it does, then it doesn't and if it doesn't it does.

Using Wittgenstein's comments, we see that he find's Russell's take rather wrong headed. We must conclude

1. The original set has one meaning, and the outer an entirely different one, but the two sets are equal to one another: they contain the same members.

2. Because of this, we cannot even ask the question that lead Russell to the paradox in the first place: "Is the set a member of itself?" Well, if you're asking about all the sets that do not contain themselves, I'm not sure what you even mean. A set is a mathematical concept containing elements. Russell supposed that any set could have the property of either containing itself or not. While weird, it doesn't appear wrong. We can, actually, think of sets that either contain themselves, or not. Okay, whatever, so what? Well, could we have a set of all sets that don't contain themselves? Wittgenstein says this doesn't even make sense to ask. If so, containing is being used in two different senses, but nonetheless, the members between the two sets is equal.

In the barber example, we see when it's drawn out properly...

The set of men shaved by the barber has a different meaning than the set of all men that do not shave themselves, and are also shaved by the barber. They may have the common expression "shaved by the barber", but really, they are two different sets, in a logical sense.

I think Wittgenstein thought the "paradox" itself was a great example of an instance of unclear thinking leading to too much time and effort on the part of his mentors.

I think that at Wittgenstein's time, there was a huge identity crisis in mathematics, science, and philosophy...an erosion that took centuries to wear away at the foundations of some of these disciplines.

Serious scientific and philosophic metaphysics was reduced to postulations of "simple elements" composing an experience of reality divorced from the reality which its supposed to be an experience of.

Wittgenstein's approach suggests, despite not overtly saying that much of the concerns at this time were ill-founded. We might not experience reality "directly", but how we experience it shares the same logic. We can be certain that we will not discover a paradox in reality, only a paradox in our understanding. But we can tease it out by properly analyzing what's going on. Russell's hiccup was in some sense, short sighted. The question was formulated incorrectly.

Perhaps the same is true of the simple objects of Mach which influenced Russell. We might not be able to say what the ultimate constituents of reality are, but we can be certain that their logic will be contained in how the operate within our minds if and when we understand them. In some sense, the question doesn't make sense: "Is my experience of reality identical to reality?" Of course not, but whatever you understand of reality at least came from reality, and therefore must contain the same logical relation amongst its parts. The sets contain the same logical relation amongst elements, but the sets are different.

I don't think this is quite right. Remember, Wittgenstein gave clear examples of atomic sentences; they have to do with the underlying logic of propositions. Proposition are about something...an atomic fact is merely the underlying logical form of that "about" relation, as stated by the proposition. A Wittgensteinian object is a logical object, or rather, the manner in which its discussed is meant to show what he has in mind as his focus. — 013zen

But then why even bring up "Substance of the world" in relation to objects? This puts it in the metaphysical camp, not simply "logical object". Which is it? You seem to mix form (the relation of objects to predicates.. how they "hang together"), and the objects themselves. And perhaps Wittgenstein is doing the same.

Objects form the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot
be compound.
2.0211If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had
sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true
or false).
2.022 It is clear that however dierent from the real one an imagined
world may be, it must have somethinga formin common
with the real world.
2.023 This xed form consists of the objects.
2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form and not
any material properties. For these are rst presented by the
propositionsrst formed by the conguration of the objects.
2.0232 Roughly speaking: objects are colourless. — Tractatus

To me that is a very anemic, yet present metaphysics in what he is conveying. Objects are the "real", so-to-speak, and he provides his "reason" for it (2.0211-2.0212). He also says they are "simple". Again, another metaphysical claim.

As for resolving Russell's paradox by regrouping them, cool. I think of this as clever mathematical parsing- computer programming or mathematical proofs. Perhaps there are some interesting philosophical applications, but I haven't encountered where yet. When I do, I will thank Wittgenstein for providing a context for answering it I guess.

But then why even bring up "Substance of the world" in relation to objects? This puts it in the metaphysical camp, not simply "logical object". Which is it? You seem to mix form (the relation of objects to predicates.. how they "hang together"), and the objects themselves. And perhaps Wittgenstein is doing the same. — schopenhauer1

Remember, objects may be the “substance of the world”, but “the world” exists in logical space (1.13).

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. Nowhere in the text does Wittgenstein say that objects form the substance of reality...its only ever tied to the world.

To me that is a very anemic, yet present metaphysics in what he is conveying. — schopenhauer1

Well, let’s be clear.... Metaphysics is an attempt to acquire knowledge of reality above, or beyond, what we can directly experience. To present a metaphysical thesis is to attempt to explain some phenomena by appealing to extrasensory reasoning. This is precisely what Newton did with his theories, and why he was taken as exemplary of proper metaphysics, despite having many critiques.

After Kant’s noumena left scientists truly left to concede that we have no, direct, access to reality folks were left to wonder how we could be certain of even Newton’s ideas. Einstein, still feeling the positivists ripples, wrote his theory of relativity to challenge the metaphysically bankrupt notion of “absolute space”, for example.

My point is, whether or not anything has any philosophical merit depends entirely on it being a commentary on the ideas of its time. We don’t study Aristotle’s metaphysics because we think he was right about nature being made of fire, water, earth, or air. We read him to see how we have thought about these problems in the past, and take from them lessons which are applicable to our thinking today. Sometimes we do read a thinker because we think they got something right despite disregarding mostly everything else they said.

I think, at least, we can see Witt wrestling with the ideas of his time, and he does a decent job of capturing the common-place ideas held by his contemporaries but also offers his own approach. That is philosophy, after all. Now, whether it offers us anything useful? I think yes.

I think by applying some of his ideas, we can derive useful thought processes that aren’t nearly as anemic.

If I’m puzzled about how its possible that a person can read a musical score and sing into a microphone, and have that sound be translated into electrical signals, which are then translated into vibrational energy before being re-translated into etchings on a material surface….and that we could then put a needle attached to another machine that would translate those patterns back into electrical signals and then back into sound again I can understand that there is a logical relation that must be what's common between them. What do I mean by logical relation? Well, in the Tract, Witt says that we can only think of uniform relations...that is logically uniform relations. To each note a specific sound wave must correspond, and to that a specific electrical signal, and a specific material vibration, and to that a specific etching on a material surface. And the total number of notes are same same total number of sound waves, and electrical signals, etc.

Notice how the explanation makes sense because of that logical balance between parts. That’s at least a step in the right metaphysical direction when trying to understand the phenomenon.

Anyways, you keep referencing a less anemic metaphysics, and I’m curious which might apply? Certainly by anemic you don’t mean simply more robust at the expense of being...to put it bluntly, misguided?

At least what little Witt does provide can be reasonably said to be, like, well, “yea”, from our contemporary standpoint. Perhaps it was less so in the past, I don’t know.

Remember, objects may be the “substance of the world”, but “the world” exists in logical space (1.13).

There is a distinction being made between reality and the world. The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. Nowhere in the text does Wittgenstein say that objects form the substance of reality...its only ever tied to the world. — 013zen

This is even more perplexing then. Whence objects? Why propose them other than the circular reasoning that it is needed to support a theory of objects. It just belies further explanation. If Schopenhauer had a few sentences about "The world is will and my representation".. I would indeed say that he also had an anemic metaphysics. However, he wrote four volumes elaborating on it. Perhaps he put too much stock in presuming the noumena of Kant (being Will), but I can point to where he might have gone wrong rather than wring it out from sparse text.

Here is ChatGPT on the world being relations rather than objects in the style of Tractatus:

The world is not a collection of objects, but rather a dance of processes.
1.1 To understand reality, one must grasp the ceaseless flow of events.

1.11 A process is not a thing, but an unfolding narrative of change.

Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must process.
2.01 The limits of my language are the boundaries of my processing.

2.011 What we cannot process, we must dance around in uncertainty.

The meaning of life is not found in static truths, but in the dynamic interplay of processes.
3.01 Life is not a puzzle to be solved, but a dance to be experienced.

3.1 To live is to engage with the ongoing performance of existence.

3.141 Procession is all there is; to step outside it is to step into the void.

The process of understanding is not to arrive at final conclusions, but to embrace the continual unfolding of insights.
4.01 Language is not a tool to capture reality, but a medium to navigate the currents of experience.

4.1 To speak is not to assert, but to participate in the ongoing dialogue of existence.

4.2 The meaning of a sentence lies not in its structure, but in the rhythm of its processing.

What can be processed at all, can be processed humorously.
5.6 To laugh is not to mock, but to celebrate the absurdity of our existence.

Whereof one cannot dance, thereof one must laugh.
6.42 The process of philosophy is not to solemnly ponder, but to playfully engage with the cosmic comedy.

The process of writing philosophy is not to construct impenetrable tomes, but to craft invitations to join in the dance of understanding.
7.001 My propositions serve as signposts, not as stone tablets of truth.

7.0011 To read between the lines is to catch the rhythm of the universe.

7.5 To conclude is not to end, but to pause before the next movement begins.

7.51 The silence between words is pregnant with possibility, awaiting the next burst of meaning.

Now talk amongst yourselves for decades about this.

This is even more perplexing then. — schopenhauer1

It's not particularly perplexing, I don't think. Considering it from the perspective of the idealism/realism debate, which was contemporaneously relevant. It's a commentary on that distinction, ultimately saying that logic bridges the gap, therefore there need not be that debate as to where we ultimately derive our knowledge from. Whether or not he is right about that is another question, but ultimately he is simply restating what he takes the dominant views of his audience to be. He isn't trying to explain every aspect of these views...this is why he says in the preface:

"[The Tractatus] is...not a text-book".

The work is written in a manner that its meant for those who can understand it without extra teaching...

"This book will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts".

He understand that it won't be for everyone, and that ultimately he failed to accomplish what he set out to do with the work.

But he does explain why he doesn't provide sources or exegetical remarks:

"How far my efforts agree with those of other philosophers I will not decide. Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by another".

Whether or not you, personally, think its fine for someone to choose to write a text in that manner in personal predilection. But, you can't conclude that this is a fault with the text when he states that he won't be digging into certain things too deeply in the preface to the work. He admits not everyone will understand it, or see the value in it.

He thinks there is value insofar as he is, after all, doing philosophy - thinking through ideas that his contemporaries were dealing with.

"If this work has a value it consists in two things. First that in it thoughts are expressed, and this value will be the greater the better the thoughts are expressed. The more the nail has been hit on the head.

Here I am conscious that I have fallen far short of the possible. Simply because my powers are insufficient to cope with the task. May others come and do it better".

That's how he ends his preface. His only wish for the text was that others come and do better than he did. Not that it somehow settled "metaphysics" for everyone. He is expressing his ideas, and as it turns out is reading and commenting on the ideas of others is philosophy.

He is expressing his ideas, and as it turns out is reading and commenting on the ideas of others is philosophy. — 013zen

As are we...

As are we... — schopenhauer1

Yes :grin:

The world is made up of pictures in our mind; reality is not made up of pictures and certainly not pictures in our mind. — 013zen

I don't think this distinction is correct.

The world is all that is the case.

(1)

All that is the case is not a picture in our mind. The world is not a picture of the world.

And of course, doesn't all of this rely upon Wittgenstein's presupposition of what a "fact" is? Doesn't Wittgenstein himself later overturn the logic of the Tractatus once he realizes the inherent bias in his presupposition? Melanie Klein, for example, her discovery of partial objects shows that objects don't always have a fixed static form.

I don't think this distinction is correct. — Fooloso4

Which distinction? The one between reality and the world?

"The total reality is the world" (2.063).

This would make no sense to say if there were no distinction between the two.

Or do you mean how I am interpreting the distinction? This might be fair...my only real thinking about it stems back to a work Frege wrote on the topic of "thoughts". I think that Witt might have something similar in mind, but I can't be certain.

↪013zen And of course, doesn't all of this rely upon Wittgenstein's presupposition of what a "fact" is? — DifferentiatingEgg

A fact, is what is the case.

What do you think that a fact is? :razz:

Doesn't Wittgenstein himself later overturns the logic of the Tractatus once he realizes the inherent bias in his presupposition? — DifferentiatingEgg

Later in Wittgenstein's life, while translating the Tractatus to English he went through the work line by line with Frank Ramsay....Wittgenstein, after much frustration with Ramsay, does say in his diaries that he saw certain errors, but he never says what those consisted in.

In the Philosophical Investigations, he overtly refers to the Tractatus only a handful of times, and its rarely to outright dismiss a previous idea. If anything, he occasionally provides some commentary on previous remarks.

The idea that Witt had a distinct early and late period wherein he outrightly dismissed his previous work developed when there was still good reason to wonder if the work was "pro-positivistic"....which the PI clearly is not.

In modern discussions of the work, which take him to either be taking a "therapeutic" approach to philosophy or a truly "constructive" one, these two camps really see more commonalities between the PI and Tractatus than was previously thought.

This also makes more sense, and passes the "smell" test, so to speak. Typically, people expand on, and make corrections to previous thoughts, rarely outright rejecting entire mindsets. PI is, I personally think, an attempt to say something similar but, in his own style, so to speak. While structurally, the works are very similiar, the manner in which the ideas are presented is clearly not only written for people like Russell and Frege.

A fact, is what is the case. — 013zen

What is the case is often subject to perspective.

The idea that Witt had a distinct early and late period wherein he outrightly dismissed his previous work developed when there was still good reason to wonder if the work was "pro-positivistic"....which the PI clearly is not. — 013zen

If PI was clearly not pro-positivistic, but Tractatus is, then doesn't that espouse more than a marginal shift in stance?

I said that it used to be thought that the Tract was pro positivist, which is where that belief comes from...it does seem there is a shift, if you read that Tract in that manner. But, nobody really sees Witt as espousing a pro-positivist framework in the work any longer.

See how facts change? The fact: Tractatus is positivism simply by the first few lines. And according to sources it was only ever hailed as a masterpiece of philosophy by Positivists. Saying it's not positivism, at least to me, is like suggesting you're not a Christian for following the doctrine of Christ. They may not be a "church going Christian" but they're still a "Christian." A pig is a pig regardless of its make up. If it's not positivism, defend how it's not with something other than a deflection? Show us how it's not.

Which distinction? — 013zen

Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind.

Since you take an approach where philosophical positions can be precisely located in an encyclopedic fashion, consider this entry from an encyclopedia:

Logical empiricism is a philosophic movement rather than a set of doctrines, and it flourished in the 1920s and 30s in several centers in Europe and in the 40s and 50s in the United States. It had several different leaders whose views changed considerably over time. Moreover, these thinkers differed from one another, often sharply. Because logical empiricism is here construed as a movement rather than as doctrine, there is probably no important position that all logical empiricists shared—including, surprisingly enough, empiricism. And while most participants in the movement were empiricists of one form or another, they disagreed on what the best form of empiricism was and on the cognitive status of empiricism. What held the group together was a common concern for scientific methodology and the important role that science could play in reshaping society. Within that scientific methodology the logical empiricists wanted to find a natural and important role for logic and mathematics and to find an understanding of philosophy according to which it was part of the scientific enterprise. — SEP, Logical Empiricism

Regarding the last sentence, the Tractatus argues for a cesura between strictly scientific matters and the problems of philosophy where thinkers like Whitehead and Russell do not.

PI is, I personally think, an attempt to say something similar but, in his own style, so to speak. While structurally, the works are very similiar, the manner in which the ideas are presented is clearly not only written for people like Russell and Frege. — 013zen

On this point, it is worth mentioning that Russell was not a supporter of the thesis of Tractatus but hoping it was not true. From Russell's introduction:

"What causes hesitation is the fact that, after all, Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the skeptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit. The whole subject of ethics, for example, is placed by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mystical, inexpressible region. Nevertheless he is capable of conveying his ethical opinions. His defence would be that what he calls the mystical can be shown, although it cannot be said. It may be that this defence is adequate, but, for my part, I confess that it leaves me with a certain sense of intellectual discomfort."

I don't think Russell understands what is being attempted. The scope of the work is mischaracterized when he says:

"Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense."

The relationship between a means of expression and what is shown by it is what is being discussed. Russell treats it like an inventory being smuggled in through a sleight of hand. Wittgenstein speaks of language in the context of it doing something. The propositions within 3.4 and 4.0 do not reflect Russell's description. 4.002 has this:

Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes. — ibid

What is the case is often subject to perspective. — DifferentiatingEgg

What is the case, is the case. What I believe to be the case is subject to perspective, hence the word subjective, as opposed to objective.

↪013zen See how facts change? — DifferentiatingEgg

A fact did not change, a belief did. The fact are the definite, unchanging, words that compose the Tractatus, in this case. What we believe about those facts, is another question entirely.

Tractatus is positivism simply by the first few lines. — DifferentiatingEgg

If you would like to believe that the work is positivistic, that's okay. I believe that you will have a difficult time maintaining that belief once you take into account more than the first few lines :razz:

If it's not positivism, defend how it's not with something other than a deflection? Show us how it's not. — DifferentiatingEgg

Well, there have been a few points brought up in this thread already on that subject. There are clear historical records, commentary, and textual evidence which suggests otherwise.

With that being said, I have no interest in defending anything. I am, however, interested in discussion on the matter. It's not my responsibility to show you anything about the text; I can only provide quotes and my own thoughts on the matter. Whether or not those incline you to change your own views, is neither here nor there, in my opinion.

Between the world as pictures in the mind and reality as not made up of pictures in our mind. — Fooloso4

"The world is the totality of facts, not of things" (1.1).

"The facts in logical space are the world" (1.13).

"We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (2.1).

"The picture presents the facts in logical space" (2.11)

"The picture is a fact" (2.141)

"Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it" (2.1511).

"It is like a scale applied to reality" (2.1512).

I hope this helps.

To your point, Witt never thought that Frege or Russell understood the work. The historical account, as documented by Ray Monk, shows he was devastated that neither understood it, which is the only reason he even sought to translate it, and have it published.

Russell, again as you mention, had a particularly positivistic take on the work (since he himself, at the time, was more or less one). He, like many early commentators, see the work as trying to establish the logical empiricist agenda, which was born from positivism, and had many of the same tenants. From that perspective, Witt does seem to disregard his own statements, and say quite a bit about what shouldn't be said...but, that's because this isn't the agenda of the work, despite discussing many relevant positivist ideas, and problems.

The relationship between a means of expression and what is shown by it is what is being discussed. — Paine

Wittgenstein speaks of language in the context of it doing something. — Paine

This is one reason why I, personally, see a common thread between the earlier and later work. The distinction between saying and showing in the Tractatus is reestablished in the PI by the fact that the meaning of a word is its use; how it is used shows us what it means, despite perhaps it overtly saying something else.

In the Tract Witt says:

"The sign determines a logical form only together with its logical syntactic application" (3.327).

The sign, aka what an expression says, doesn't determine meaning...only together with how its being used, can we glean its meaning - what it shows through its use, or "logical syntactic application".