I don't think so. I like to think that there are others reading but not commenting. I think of the written exchange as only part of it. I do occasionally get a PM from someone appreciating something I said. — Fooloso4

:up:

I always appreciate hearing your perspective.

Making a clown of herself in a field she claims to be a scholar of is far from "succeeding". — Lionino

Thanks for clearing that up for me.

She certainly succeeded in annoying Dawkins. — Ludwig V

To her credit. That line I quoted earlier so succinctly shows the flaw in his approach.

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible. They were too sensitive about its dignity. — Rings and Books

I've italicised that last to emphasis it. Seems poignant.

It was the novelty and promise of 20th century analytic philosophy to which many at Oxford and elsewhere were enamored. A disregard for the history of philosophy at its root. A return to Aristotle was a response to this novelty. — Fooloso4

Mary read Honour Moderations and Literae Humaniore, along with Iris Murdoch, at Somerville. No, she does not disregard the history of philosophy. Indeed, one of the claims of Metaphysical Animals is that the (women) were to a large degree responsible for the rejection of Ayer's positivism and a returned emphasis on the classics. Certainly one would not sensibly claim Anscombe or Foot ignore Aristotle.

So I don't think you are on the right track here.

,

I do occasionally get a PM from someone appreciating something I said. — Fooloso4

Interesting - as do I, and more. The triviality that so often infests the open threads pushes many a discussion into the Inbox. The three more interesting discussions in which I am presently involved are found there, not in the forums. It avoids feeding the "trolls".

As agreed, the check is in the mail.

:ok:

The Stoics and Epicureans did not disregard daily life or human attachments either. — Fooloso4

True. But perhaps their attachment to ataraxia or apatheia shows their attitude to it.

They were too sensitive about its dignity. — Banno

Yes. But I think that putting her point in this rather abbreviated way is a hostage to fortune, given that not all her readers will be sympathetic

A disregard for the history of philosophy at its root. — Fooloso4

They thought they were revolutionizing philosophy - making a new start. So they were aware they had a history. As Russell shows, they read their history entirely in their own terms, which is a sure way to misunderstand it. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that they misinterpreted it, rather than disregarded it?

So I don't think you are on the right track here. — Banno

You have not understood what I said.

Indeed, one of the claims of Metaphysical Animals is that the (women) were to a large degree responsible for the rejection of Ayer's positivism and a returned emphasis on the classics. — Banno

That is my point. Leontiskos said in response to me pointing to Aristotle:

There are many in these parts who fall short for being enamored of novelty. — Leontiskos

As I said to him:

It was the novelty and promise of 20th century analytic philosophy to which many at Oxford and elsewhere were enamored. A disregard for the history of philosophy at its root. A return to Aristotle was a response to this novelty. — Fooloso4

Midgley's "return" was a response to something that was not at issue in Continental philosophy.
In 1924 Heidegger gave an important and influential lecture course: "Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy". The first generation works of his students, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jacob Klein, Hans Jonas, Leo Strauss, and Karl Löwith, have slowly but surely replaced the interpretations found in Angelo schools.

The philosophy of history is the counterpart to the history of philosophy. It is not simply that we should attend to human life, but address the fact that human life is historically and culturally situated. Our interpretation of texts must be informed by this.

You have not understood what I said. — Fooloso4

I'm relieved.

But perhaps their attachment to ataraxia or apatheia shows their attitude to it. — Ludwig V

I agree, [

quote="Ludwig V;897839"]They thought they were revolutionizing philosophy - making a new start. So they were aware they had a history.[/quote]

Yes, a new start. A break with the past. Bringing clarity to what was confusion. There was a thread last year that addressed this:Here

As Aristotle reminds his readers, Heraclitus said to some visitors who were surprised to see him by the oven warming himself:

Here too there are gods.

Cicero said:

Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens… and compel it to ask questions about life and morality.
(Tusculan Disputations V 10–11).

Xenophon wrote the Oeconomicus, a Socratic dialogue about household management.

The Stoics and Epicureans did not disregard daily life or human attachments either. — Fooloso4

Er, except Cicero, Socrates, Xenophon, and Aurelius were all married men. I'm not sure about Heraclitus. The Epicureans were somewhat averse to marriage, so one part of your point does connect with the topic of the OP. Again, none of the arguments you are giving really end up connecting with the conclusion you champion. This seems to be a general problem with your posts. You say something contrarian and then you make "arguments" that have nothing to do with the contrarian outburst. Hopefully you figure this out, because you do seem to have actual knowledge rattling around that head.

Yes, a new start. A break with the past. Bringing clarity to what was confusion. There was a thread last year that addressed this — Fooloso4

I'm sorry I missed that. The idea that the panic about Communism that prevailed in the USA after WW2 affected philosophy is attractive. But it doesn't explain anything that Russell, for example, said before WW2 and the atmosphere was not at all the same in Europe.
They would have done better to reflect on all the new starts in the history of philosophy and formulated something a bit less radical.

I'm not sure about Heraclitus. — Leontiskos

The encyclopedias say that the sources say that he inherited the role of "king of the Ionians". Little (actually, nothing) is known of what this actually involved, but it is known that he resigned the office in favour of his younger brother. One might argue that his philosophy betrays aristocratic, rather than democratic, attitudes.
I'm reminded of the arguments about celibacy between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches about celibacy - and, no doubt, in the Protestant movement. I wonder whether that influenced her in this piece. (The Eastern traditions have views about this as well.)
It seems pretty clear that appeals to biography are not going to yield any secure results if we want an empirical, scientific hypothesis. Yet no-one believes that we do not learn from our experience (i.e. what happens in our lives) and it seems wildly implausible to think that we can sit down and set aside everything that we have learnt - even as a thought experiment.
Whether Descartes is reporting an episode in his life or not, he presents the story in the Meditations as a model. He is not reporting his conclusions, but presenting a model or paradigm of how he reached them and how he solved them and intended us to follow him.
Yet the sceptical conclusions are hard to square with the possibility of the project. I think he was aware of this, and tried to insulate the conclusions as simply a thought-experiment, not just in posing the problem, but in solving it. (One could compare the way the Pyrrhonians dealt with the same issue).
In a way, he seems to have succeeded Everyone has tried to refute scepticism since then. In another way, then, he failed, because so many people since then have not adopted his solution, but tried to work out a better one. One thinks of Berkeley, Hume and Kant - though were they responding to Descartes? I'm not sure about that.

Er, except Cicero, Socrates, Xenophon, and Aurelius were all married men. — Leontiskos

First, this list was prefaced by my saying:

My criticism is not about her misrepresentation of Descartes, it is about her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy. — Fooloso4

The history of philosophy is not the biography of philosophers and their marital status.

Midgley begins by saying:

Practically all the great European philosophers have been bachelors.

Are you able to distinguish a philosopher's marital status by reading his philosophy? What do you know of the married lives of these men? Rather than demonstrating its importance for the history of philosophy it illustrates how misdirected this can be.

In Xenophon's Symposium Socrates is asked by Antisthenes:

how does it come that you don't practise what you preach by yourself educating Xanthippe, but live with a wife who is the hardest to get along with of all the women there are—yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be?

to which he replied:

Because I observe that men who wish to become expert horsemen do not get the most docile horses but rather those that are high-mettled, believing that if they can manage this kind, they will easily handle any other. My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

Is this the kind of married life Mary advocated and you imagine marks an important distinction between philosophers? Do you think Xenophon's Oeconomicus was a marital guide, written for men who were married or intended to marry?

In an earlier post I pointed out a few things that Aristotle said about marriage:

She refers to Aristotle but neglects to address the natural household relation that Aristotle discusses first, namely, master and slave. Nor does she address the numerous problems he discusses regarding marriage including war, destruction of cities, and revolution. Much of what he says regarding marriage centers around the division or labor and property. (Politics, Book 1) — Fooloso4

Midgley says:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

This is not true. The pre-Socratic philosophers were natural scientists, but I admit I have not checked their marital status. Midgley does, however, identify two bachelors by name, Plato and Descartes. Natural science was a part of the studies at Plato's Academy. Descartes wrote on medicine and optics.

Is this the kind of married life Mary advocated and you imagine marks an important distinction between philosophers? — Fooloso4

It seems rather unlikely that Midgley was talking about marriage ancient-Greek-style. Wouldn't the natural assumption be that she meant marriage 20th century style?

Natural science was a part of the studies at Plato's Academy. Descartes wrote on medicine and optics. — Fooloso4

What does that tell us about their philosophy - or indeed about their science?

The history of philosophy is not the biography of philosophers and their marital status. — Fooloso4

Well, we do think it is important to read their work in its context, and sometimes details of their lives give us pause for thought. I'm sure you can think of examples.

It seems rather unlikely that Midgley was talking about marriage ancient-Greek-style. Wouldn't the natural assumption be that she meant marriage 20th century style? — Ludwig V

Well, she does not make the distinction, which is part of the problem with her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy.

What does that tell us about their philosophy - or indeed about their science? — Ludwig V

It tells us that Midgley is wrong when she says:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

No distinction was made between philosophy and science.Science is from the Latin word for knowledge.

Well, we do think it is important to read their work in its context, and sometimes details of their lives give us pause for thought. I'm sure you can think of examples. — Ludwig V

I do not think it is important to determine their marital status in order to read them. Context has more to do with their historical and cultural situatedness than with their marital status. Marriage too must be put in this context, as you point out. With regard to details of their lives, in an earlier post I pointed out that:

What Midgley does not mention is that Descartes' mother died a year after his birth, that he was sent away at about age ten to the Jesuit college of La Flèche, or that he had a daughter, Francis, who died at the age of five. Rather than a deliberate and immature choice to not develop attachments, his attachments were severed from him. — Fooloso4

It may give us pause for thought but I do not think it is that important for reading him. The details are one thing, how they may have influenced someone's philosophical writings something else.

I'm reminded of the arguments about celibacy between the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches about celibacy - and, no doubt, in the Protestant movement. I wonder whether that influenced her in this piece. — Ludwig V

I think it is a very interesting thing to consider () but I don't think it overly influenced her piece, given that she sets monks aside as a different category.

The related idea is that men in ancient times were much more capable of solitude and self-sufficiency than women, combined with the fact that one will tend to become good at whatever they devote their time to. Ergo: ancient men tended to be better at things that require solitude and self-sufficiency, and this would not have been appreciably different in Descartes' time. The question stands as to whether solitude and self-sufficiency caters to philosophy.

Well, she does not make the distinction, which is part of the problem with her misrepresentation of the history of philosophy. — Fooloso4

True. But this is short talk for the BBC, not a scholarly disquisition. So the assumption that her audience would assume that she was talking about marriage as popularly conceived in the mid-20th century is not unreasonable.

No distinction was made between philosophy and science. Science is from the Latin word for knowledge. — Fooloso4

Yes, of course that's true. The sciences did not spin off from philosophy until much, much later. But how does that show that Plato and Descartes, in their different ways, did not both regard the human soul as radically distinct from physical objects? Or, as MIdgley summarizes their philosophies and her objection to them:-

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

Rather than a deliberate and immature choice to not develop attachments, his attachments were severed from him — Fooloso4

Fair point. You seem to be suggesting that this is an alternative explanation for someone having difficulty with interpersonal relations. So the most you can say is that Midgley does not consider that a philosopher might have difficulty with interpersonal relationships for more reasons than one, or even that not being married and liking solitude might not be related as cause and effect, but both have a common cause.
I think it would be reasonable to argue that this is not really a philosophical question, but a psychological question (in our terminology). But that allows that it is, or could be, a question.

Context has more to do with their historical and cultural situatedness than with their marital status. Marriage too must be put in this context, as you point out. — Fooloso4

So we agree on that. But that legitimates asking the question whether they were married or not and considering whether it may have affected their philosophy. It seems likely to me that we would not find a strong correlation between marital status and specific philosophical doctrines, but we need at least to consider the possibility, don't we?

The question stands as to whether solitude and self-sufficiency caters to philosophy. — Leontiskos

Midgley certainly thought it did.

Philosophers need above all to concentrate. They are not like poets (nearly all good poets marry, however madly). What they most need is space for thought.

Virginia Woolf (admittedly not strictly a philosopher) is making a similar point in her famous "A Room of One's Own"
On the other hand, I believe that Sartre and de Beauvoir wrote in a busy café, at least sometimes.

Is this the kind of married life Mary advocated and you imagine marks an important distinction between philosophers? — Fooloso4

Well, I was taken. by this line:

...most people recoil towards experience, and attempt to bring their strengthened self to terms with the rich confusion from which it fled. Marriage, which is a willing acceptance of the genuinely and lastingly strange, is typical of this revulsion. — Rings and Books

A curiously accurate characterisation of marriage. It acknowledges the difference between a flatmate and a partner. There is a very different commitment, the willingness to work together while accepting those aspects of one's partner that are not within in one's control. More than a recognition of the other, marriage seeks the likes of Joy in the presence of the other.

Midgley points out that it is redundant to deduce the existence of one's wife or husband from first principles. Doubt here is absurd.

So the assumption that her audience would assume that she was talking about marriage as popularly conceived in the mid-20th century is not unreasonable. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but: 1) We are not that audience. We could read it as a quaint period piece, but if we are to evaluate it on its philosophical merits we might ask if it stands the test of time. 2) If her intention was to persuade young men to marry it is revisionist history. When she says:

People leading a normal domestic life would not, I believe, have fallen into this sort of mistake.

someone in the mid-20th century hearing this and taking "a normal domestic life" to be the married life of the mid-20th century would be misled and might conclude that if they do not marry they are not normal.

But how does that show that Plato and Descartes, in their different ways, did not both regard the human soul as radically distinct from physical objects? — Ludwig V

This is the claim I was responding to:

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.

As I read it she is claiming a concern to avoid contamination by the world of objects.

You seem to be suggesting that this is an alternative explanation for someone having difficulty with interpersonal relations. — Ludwig V

No. There are various reasons why someone does not marry. It was in response to Midgley's sweeping claims about immaturity and forming attachments.

It seems likely to me that we would not find a strong correlation between marital status and specific philosophical doctrines, but we need at least to consider the possibility, don't we? — Ludwig V

That is something I would judge from the fruits it bears. It would have to go further than just marital status, however. A happy or unhappy marriage, for example, might have to be taken into consideration. See the reference to what Socrates said in Xenophon's Symposium in a previous post.

My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

His course in marrying Xanthippe is similar to that of a horse-trainer breaking a willful horse. It is not marriage he wished to deal and associate with, but mankind at large. We see from Plato's Phaedo that he had no affection toward her. He did, however, on Plato's telling have some concern for the welfare of his children. I don't know if there is a correlation with his teachings, but it does seem that he preferred to hang out in the marketplace rather than at home with her.

More than a recognition of the other, marriage seeks the likes of Joy in the presence of the other. — Banno

Yes, it is like that in some cases. In others it is transactional or a battlefield.

Midgley points out that it is redundant to deduce the existence of one's wife or husband from first principles. Doubt here is absurd. — Banno

As is the assumption that this needs to be pointed out.

As is the assumption that this needs to be pointed out. — Fooloso4

Cast your eye down the list of discussions on the forum home page. While you and I might know better, Cartesian scepticism is unfortunately not uncommon.

Perhaps, but: 1) We are not that audience. We could read it as a quaint period piece, but if we are to evaluate it on its philosophical merits we might ask if it stands the test of time. — Fooloso4

I think that's a false opposition and that the test of time is not so much whether the text is right or wrong, whether on its own terms or ours. It is whether it helps us to understand ideas about philosophical problems that may not take for granted what we take for granted.

2) If her intention was to persuade young men to marry it is revisionist history. — Fooloso4

I don't see any such intention here. Though I agree that the claim that marriage is normal and even mature might lead young men astray (but not, of course, mature people like ourselves).

Philosophers did not want the human soul to be mixed up in the world of objects, as it must be to make knowledge possible.
As I read it she is claiming a concern to avoid contamination by the world of objects. — Fooloso4

Yes, and that is puzzling. It could be a rhetorical gesture towards the detailed argument about dualism. After all, such ideas are present, if only as unacknowledged background. For Plato, for example, it is clearly not an inappropriate description of his story of the ascent of the soul to heaven. For Berkeley, it is very clear, since he says, loudly, that the concept of matter is an excuse for scepticism and atheism and he is motivated by the desire to put paid to it. However, I prefer to think, in this context, that she uses the word to surprise her audience into thinking of a familiar model in a different way. This isn't a scholarly philosophical text.

No. There are various reasons why someone does not marry. It was in response to Midgley's sweeping claims about immaturity and forming attachments. — Fooloso4

Yes, and I agree that those claims are problematic. I just think that there's a baby in the bathwater.

That is something I would judge from the fruits it bears. It would have to go further than just marital status, however. — Fooloso4

I'm very much in favour of judging from the fruits that it bears, though maybe the intentions should also be taken into account - not necessarily as an excuse.

My course is similar. Mankind at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

His course in marrying Xanthippe is similar to that of a horse-trainer breaking a willful horse. — Fooloso4

Socrates doesn't speak of taming Xanthippe, more of getting along with her. Your comment takes us to yet another model - the courtship of Petruchio and Katherina in "The Taming of the Shrew". That is indeed a story of oppression. But it is true that Socrates sounds far too cold-blooded for our expectations. But then, arranged marriages disappoint us Westerners. Yet one can't arbitrarily say that they aren't marriages or even that they exclude the possibility of love.

A curiously accurate characterisation of marriage. It acknowledges the difference between a flatmate and a partner. There is a very different commitment, the willingness to work together while accepting those aspects of one's partner that are not within in one's control. More than a recognition of the other, marriage seeks the likes of Joy in the presence of the other. — Banno

I also like it a lot. But commitment is tricky. I don’t think one can do it in advance. No matter what ceremony is supposed to establish the commitment, it needs to be maintained, or perhaps performed from day to day and even from hour to hour. If and when circumstances change, it may need to be renewed – life throws things you did not sign up for at you.

Yes, it is like that in some cases. In others it is transactional or a battlefield. — Fooloso4

Quite so. We should not say that marriage is like this, or like that, only that it can be like this or like that – even swopping from one to another in the course of a day. What it will be turn out to be may not be what you expect. It is very much down to the complicated interaction between the parties.
Anything is possible when it comes to love. I can’t resist quoting what is probably Catullus’ only philosophical observation:- “I hate, yet love. Perhaps you ask why that is so. I do not know, and I’m in torment.”

And then we might consider the various other kinds of partnership that exist in human life - all different and all important. Friendship, for example, can be a swallow in summer and a life-long relationship. In the latter case, the commitment turns out to be the case, rather than being made in advance, but nonetheless can be as deep as marriage can be. There’s a galaxy of others. We form these relationships, we don’t deduce them, or even sign up for them.

From "Rings & Books" --

..an account of human knowledge which women’s whole experience falsifies is inadequate and partial and capricious. Philosophers have generally talked for instance as though it were obvious that one consciousness went to one body, as though each person were a closed system which could only signal to another by external behaviour, and that behaviour had to be interpreted from previous experience. I wonder whether they would have said the same if they had been frequently pregnant and suckling, if they had been constantly faced with questions like, “What have you been eating to make him ill?”, constantly experiencing that strange physical sympathy between child and parent, between husband and wife, which reveals the presence of an ailment and often its nature when experience is silent; constantly lending eyes and hands to the child that requires them, if in a word they had got used to the idea that their bodies were by no means exclusively their own? That, I suggest, is typical human experience.

So her argument is that traditional philosophy privileges one kind of human experience, typified by Descartes' solitary thinker (and, perhaps Rodin's statue, which also suggests the thinking is a solitary occupation) or Virginia Woolf’s desire for a room of her own. But still, she should have concluded with "That, I suggest, is a typical and equally valid human experience." Her attempts to give a balanced view, acknowledging that solitary thinking has achieved some good results, lead me to think that this is what she was aiming for.

The surprising depth of what is going on here is like Stanley Cavell's project of accepting philosophical scepticism as part of human life and trying to look behind Wittgenstein's gestures towards human practices and human life, to understand what it is about human life that gives rise to scepticism. His work shows that one gets into really messy territory if one pursues that. (Where “messy” is not derogatory, but more like Wittgenstein’s rough ground.) So, in a smaller way, does this piece.

So her argument is that traditional philosophy privileges one kind of human experience, typified by Descartes' solitary thinker (and, perhaps Rodin's statue, which also suggests the thinking is a solitary occupation) or Virginia Woolf’s desire for a room of her own. — Ludwig V

So, philosophy, as the ideas which are produced from the solitary thinker, is a representation of that kind of human being, the solitary thinker. Now, Aristotle shows how contemplation is the highest virtue. So can we conclude that philosophy provides us with the very best ideas?

While you and I might know better, Cartesian scepticism is unfortunately not uncommon. — Banno

I agree, but it is one battle I usually choose not to fight.

Now, Aristotle shows how contemplation is the highest virtue. So can we conclude that philosophy provides us with the very best ideas? — Metaphysician Undercover

It looks like a simple question, but it isn't. I wouldn't want to reply without looking up his argument for a start. One reply might start from the argument here, that solitary thinking (which may or may not be what he is talking about) doesn't produce the best ideas on its own. The answer from that stand-point would be, no. But that might mean rejecting his argument about "contemplation". That is thinkable. I'm not a fan of his hierarchical argument for the Supreme Good.

While you and I might know better, Cartesian scepticism is unfortunately not uncommon. — Banno

I agree, but it is one battle I usually choose not to fight. — Fooloso4

I also agree, though sometimes my conscience pricks me. Someone should, at least from time to time, try to introduce a little doubt into their thinking.

Socrates doesn't speak of taming Xanthippe, more of getting along with her. — Ludwig V

Looking at this again I need to revise what I said.

Xenophon is making a little joke. The name Xanthippe means "yellow horse". Not to push this too far but Xenophon wrote a book "On the Art of Horsemanship". The horseman does not simply get along with a horse. He rides it. It must be broken and taught. Xenophon says the breaking of a horse should be left to an expert trainer and not to the horseman. But teaching the horse is up to the horseman.

This raises the question of whether and in what sense Socrates course is like that of the expert horseman. Is Xanthippe like an unbroken horse? In that case, with regard to her his course is not like that of the expert horseman who deals with horses that are broken. But as he says:

Mankind at large [and not Xanthippe] is what I wish to deal and associate with ...

Of course mankind is not broken either. Perhaps the philosopher can only teach those who have been made ready.

Someone should, at least from time to time, try to introduce a little doubt into their thinking. — Ludwig V

Yes. Introduce a little doubt into there their doubtful thinking, that is, into what is doubtful about their doubting.

Xenophon is making a little joke. — Fooloso4

You could be right. If the name Xanthippe was just dreamed up by Xenophon that the idea that there's something else going on here would have some legs. As it is, I think you are reading too much into this.
What I know of Xenophon doesn't suggest a man likely to make jokes of this kind.

Mankind at large [and not Xanthippe] is what I wish to deal and associate with

I think that this refers to mankind in the sense that Xanthippe is also part of mankind. All he wants to achieve is

I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind.

That doesn't sound like he's thinking of training horses.

Yes. Introduce a little doubt into there their doubtful thinking, that is, into what is doubtful about their doubting. — Fooloso4

Well, Descartes does say that he wants to doubt everything that can be doubted. So I don't doubt that I'm justified in disrupting their doubt.

Perhaps the philosopher can only teach those who have been made ready. — Fooloso4

Ah, now, that's pretty much true. You can take a horse to the water, but you can't make it drink.

It looks like a simple question, but it isn't. I wouldn't want to reply without looking up his argument for a start. One reply might start from the argument here, that solitary thinking (which may or may not be what he is talking about) doesn't produce the best ideas on its own. The answer from that stand-point would be, no. But that might mean rejecting his argument about "contemplation". That is thinkable. I'm not a fan of his hierarchical argument for the Supreme Good. — Ludwig V

For what it's worth, I believe you'll find it in Bk 6 of Nichomachean Ethics. A lot of any such argument is a sort of stipulation of intuitive principles, so of course the premises are debatable. I think the general idea is that contemplation produces the most universal, principles of theory, and these are required to ground practical principles, and practical principles are required for moral actions. Therefore contemplation produces the highest principles because these are a requirement for all the other virtues. So contemplation is the highest virtue. Then, he moves to show how contemplation is consistent with "happiness" at the end of Bk 10.