Have you read Camus' The Myth of Sisyphus?

I tried googling for pdf's and only found fragments. But it's not too expensive a book.

And, importantly, it begins with the question of suicide as the first and only question a philosopher must answer: why bother carrying on?

If you're looking for a philosophical approach to your question, that's probably the best book I can think of.

I depend on professors mostly for my translations of German philosophy, so the universities are totally rotted out (I mostly joke, but I don't love stories of professors hounded out.) But I had in mind the larger culture of a free society, to the degree that it's not rotted out by tribal fear and hatred. — plaque flag

Ah, sorry. (tempted to make a pun on "red" and "rot", since "red" is "rot" in German, and I'm a commie)

There's something beautiful and difficult about being an individual --our strange mission in a freeish rational society. Do you know the song Nutshell by Alice in Chains ? Nice ambivalence.

video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AzCj0b4MUU

lyrics:
https://genius.com/Alice-in-chains-nutshell-lyrics — plaque flag

Yup! I heard it many times on the radio in my youth. Though I did not listen to the lyrics.

I agree that it's difficult to be an individual when your individuality goes against the current. And in a free society that ought not be the case. Which is, I think at least, the temptation of foundationalism -- if you're against everything, if you feel you know, if you want something other than what is then how else to pursue that than through a foundationalist philosophy? Or through something like a Marxist philosophy which reduces everything to some other conflict you're interested in?

I don't think you can. And I'd say that it's even a rational move to posit something otherwise, saying "this is rational!" -- after all I believe in more than one rationality, so I have no argument against inventing another one. In fact I believe we ought explore multiple rationalities, because we don't know what the future holds and so we do not know what thoughts will help us most as things change.

Overall our disagreement is very minor, I think though. I just noticed how no one else was picking at this good post, so threw in my 2 cents hoping to make it happen.

Looking around the world today, I'd be tempted to say we are mostly crazy, but there is relatively robust tradition of relative individual freedom which I can't or at least shouldn't take for granted. — plaque flag

I agree with that

I've generally spoken in favor of the academy. I wouldn't have the understandings I do today without having gone. And I wouldn't be able to perceive the world as crazy unless I happened across these paths.

Despite our massive 'internal' complexity, I think we are singular as discursive subjects. At least in a practical life we are. A philosophy forum might give each member two different avatars, expecting them to diverge. I do think Shakespeare, for instance, proves that we are internally multiple. [ I guess I should have started with my agreement, in retrospect. ] — plaque flag

Again I think we're pretty close here. I think we're singular when we are healthy, but that we are often unhealthy. And that could only happen if we are not simple, ala Descartes' subject.

But I'm not sure how to put it. Shakespeare works wonderfully, but most wouldn't listen to theatrical sorts in a philosophical space -- that's just mere art and all that.

Oh no, I hope I don't mix in with the pragmatists. I've never gone down that path! :D Even at my most Marxist I still believe that sentences can be true in a manner that doesn't reduce to the useful, and I believe the party does not know best on truth, because it depends too much on circumstances. You can't escape judgment.

Maybe it's just the word "rationality" that I'm taking umbrage to because it's frequently understood as something opposed to the passions, in the Enlightenment sense. I think we need to recognize how much we, as human beings, are not the Enlightenment's conception of Man as Rational Decider. Which doesn't mean, for me at least, that we should go back to the old ways. I think it's too late for that -- the future is all there is when it comes to decisions. But while we might at first want to be God, I think that our collective nature makes it such that becoming God isn't possible without also destroying that foundation of trust and connection with others. (the birth of class)

Also I don't think we can cast rationality aside. I'd say the sine qua non of philosophy is the appeal to the rational.

So, like I said, I think we agree on a lot. I'm just picking on the things we disagree on.

We are all imperfectly living toward or into some always imperfect grasp of a horizonal ideal which is largely about autonomy. — plaque flag

Now this is definitely something which goes against my notions of rationality, given what I've said thus far. I tend to think of rationality as the tool, ala Hume.

Also it's fun and interesting and everything else that I've always loved about it.

But I've put down the rationalist charge. It's fine that we are not rational. There are some irrationalities that are harmful, and those are bad, but I don't know to what extent a rational ethic -- or theology? -- would really help people because at base I think we're pretty much irrational creatures.

However I think we can imperfectly live towards the horizon of autonomy. And that's certainly an ethical stance. And I'd even go so far as to say that rationality is a tool that can help in that project. I just don't know that I'd put autonomy as the rational -- in a way the rational is dependent upon the horizon you imperfectly live towards.

And if we're not a singular, simple subject, but a bundle (I'm still trying to think of a good way to express The Subject as multiplicity while retaining its coherency) we can even throw ourselves towards multiple horizons. Which is where I think we'd start to see conflicts in rationality, and when we'd have to start making choices between horizons when they come into conflict (if they come into conflict).

EDIT: Which, again, I'm kind of picking up the stuff that we can disagree upon because there's so much agreement that I expect this to be the more interesting avenue for exploration.

I don't think I'm conceding a point, though I could be misunderstanding you.

I'm saying that machine-knowledge is different from human-knowledge, where here we can use "knowledge" because both the machine and the human are demonstrating know-how in a very strict functionalist sense. We can functionally perform the same thing, but we don't do it the same way -- so there's not a common base between the common know-how, which suggests there's no foundation for knowledge (if we're being liberal enough with "knowledge" that we include machine-learning and such)

I can get on board with that, though I'd insist that the ideal doesn't exist :D

I see us as having minor differences here. But in the spirit of the forum I thought I'd offer some criticism rather than just nodding along.

You could probably get a robot to do it now, even. But if you look at the code, while it all has a definite meaning, it won't be clear and distinct how it lines up with the jazz piano -- that is, while the robot might operate on clear and distinct (though elaborate) code, we don't. Reading the code won't give us the knowledge of how to play jazz piano.

I can see a transcendental structure -- the necessary preconditions for rational discourse are such and such, here we are having a rational discussion, therefore we must accept such and such preconditions on pain of contradiction.

There is no ideal rational community which binds our rational discussions, though. I think we can imagine an ideal community and aspire to such a community, but that we're not speaking to it as much as we're speaking with our fellows, all of whom are not ideal -- including myself. Rather we collaborate on what works for our group of seekers. Surely there's the demand to step outside of myself and not just spout my own opinion -- that wouldn't be very interesting after all, since we all have those. And in that demand we get the structure of rationality: but it changes from group to group. There are some generalities that seem the same, but the practices diverge.

Or, at least, this is what my first thought is -- pretty standard. Usually I'm overwhelmed by multiplicity, and find it difficult to generalize at the level of the transcendental. Further I think transcendental arguments, after they are accepted, become self-fulfilling in a way. Now that we know that rationality is such-and-such we can exclude this or that -- but the world changes, and with it so do our practices, and we need that flexibility. But with flexibility comes doubt of transcendental structures.

Or, at least, this is where my thoughts go.

Well the foundation I'm aiming at is the minimal foundation that is already implied in the role of the philosopher. I'm making a transcendent argument as described here (it'll help me to quote.)

As standardly conceived, transcendental arguments are taken to be distinctive in involving a certain sort of claim, namely that X is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y—where then, given that Y is the case, it logically follows that X must be the case too.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/

So Y is 'I'm a philosopher,' and X is the stuff that makes Y intelligible -- basically what Apel said, but it's world, language, justification norms. Crucially, the details are left minimally specified. Because the foundation should be absolutely the least constraint that will work. Ontologists will fight over the details within that undeniable framework. [So I'm being Kantian in a way. ] — plaque flag

Heh. You're speaking my honey, then. I love the transcendental argument. I'm pretty familiar with it.

I've come to criticize it though. I agree it is valid. It's definitely powerful. And in the frame of Kant's philosophy I think it's tempered through the deduction of the categories: you can make the argument, but it must be made to the court of reason, and the court will then decide accordingly. So make it a good argument! Or fail.

But it's so easy to use the form outside of an entire philosophy -- what I believe is a necessary condition for the possibility of Y -- Y=our conversation, therefore what I believe is the case.

I hope not! I'm saying there is more than one rationality, not that rationality is really some other thing. If it were then I'd be arguing there are zero rationalities.

Though your mention of heroism is a point of difference between us. I've come to a place in my life where I don't want the heroes journey. I'm just me doing my things trying to be happy. At this point part of me is being honest, and I like rationality -- but notice how different that is from heroism. Heroes face adversity. I just like these things.

It's a softer version of existentialism.

Hrm!

Well, that wasn't as hard as I thought then. Unless there are lingering doubts out there.

But how do you make that move, maybe? If I were to tell someone in a conversation about democracy "look we understand one another, we're just disagreeing on conventions" -- how do you make that disagreement into a productive disagreement rather than the termination?

Yup.

There's no becoming-animal, if I'm correct about language at least. Once you know how to Write there's no unlearning it while at the same time retaining its lessons (thinking here of lobotomy).

We just have to live with the fact that when we make things up it can lead us to inventions, discovery, fun, darkness, fragmentation -- etc. But we'll keep making things up all the same. It's what we do!

However! With that being said, I really love this:

the embodied-enworlded-'enlanguaged' rational community — plaque flag

I think I'd say that your expression is that embodiment, worldhood, and language are equiprimordial, to use some Heidegger.

That sits well with me. It's the foundationalism that I'm questioning more than the ontology. I'd say we can just begin with this and go from there, but that there are any number of places a philosopher could begin from, and then that would serve as what appears to be a foundation to that philosopher. But I'd call it a jumping off point, or a point of return to home.

Possible objection, your honor. From what perspective can someone claim there are two rationalities ? Only (I think) from a higher and truer 'actual' synthesizing rationality. — plaque flag

Couldn't you do so from an emotive base?

Rationality is motivated in its actual use, after all.

It would have to be a "rational" emotion to count as a rational attack. But that's not too hard. I'd go to aesthetics for a place to think through emotions on the rational level, and there are certainly aesthetic values that can come into conflict with respect to an individual inference.

But then we might say that the aesthetics are not the truly rational rationality :D

But for that I'd just point out the differences between Descartes and Kant -- I'd side more Kant when it comes to the questions of ontology or metaphysics: knowledge requires a justification, and there are no justifications when it comes to ontology. Ontology presupposes its own justifications from the outset.

But I also don't put knowledge as the most important thing in philosophy, so that's why I'm open to ontology at another level. In a way ontology is more proper for philosophy than epistemology -- it's just harder to do well.

Can a unified subject believe in two, truly opposed 'rationalities' ? In opposed inferential norms ?

Hrmm I'm not sure about truly opposed rationalities, though that'd be an interesting case if so. I was thinking more orthogonal rationalities -- like one just doesn't really talk about the same things as the other. Then there's a choice with respect to which rationality one ought to appeal to with respect to the circumstances.

Take Gould's notion of non-overlapping magesteria -- you still have to judge what belongs to each magesteria even though there are different rules for the different kinds of things.

I think the member of one community would have to regard the member of another community with a sufficiently different logic as insane. Banno could maybe add something about our inability to recognize a radically other conceptual scheme. — plaque flag

Only if they were a rationalist ;).

But, no, I'm not reaching for full on incommensurability or conceptual schemes here. It's always a thing in the background of my thoughts, but I pretty much take Davidson's argument on conceptual schemes, which @Banno introduced me to, as basically correct. Or at least in my attacks on it I've never been able to really get around the basic argument around conceptual schemes -- historical schemes, practical schemes, or just difference in general not-conceptual, but I find the argument solid and not easy to step aside.

So the question then becomes, in the case of two rationalities, if its not a conceptual scheme, what is it?

I'm tempted to become a parody of myself and just say "It's the ethical!" :D But I actually don't think rationality is an ethical matter. I think of it as instrumental to whatever it is the human heart wants. And sometimes it doesn't want the rational, and sometimes it wants the rational to be different. It's in this creation of the rational order for different purposes that we can come to have different rationalities, though I agree I'd be surprised if a single subject held two rationalities which are contradictory (unless, of course, they are exploring dialethism -- then, perhaps, there'd be a way to hold two contradictory rationalities at once -- but within a rational frame)

Conditions for the possibility of critical discussion cannot be rationally challenged without performative contradiction. — plaque flag

I think this assumes there's only one rationality. If there are two, though, then you could rationally challenge the possibility of critical discussion on the basis of the rationality chosen without contradiction.

The OP makes sense to me though. Ontology is one of those disciplines that I generally view with skepticism, but from the perspective that our knowledge doesn't touch what the ontologist cares about. If the ontologist is more circumspect in not claiming knowledge, though, then that's where I think ontology begins to be interesting. However, in so doing I think the whole foundational approach is not only made harder, but also it loses its attraction: if knowledge is not necessarily clear and certain, but rather depends upon the kind of knowledge we're dealing with to understand it in its depths (math is clear and certain, but knowing-how to play jazz piano is not as clear), then there is no reason to suppose a general foundation is there -- rather we're just able to do some things that happen to be different from one another, and "knowledge" is the word we use to designate that a person is able (but it depends upon what they're able to do to be able to say anything about the knowledge).

That's my first stab! Basically I think I'd reject foundations, and also I'd loosen the love of certainty (but then the question is how do you maintain discipline such that we are not just daydreamers and mystics?)

That imagination has been most useful in many ways, but when it uses reason as a vehicle, rather than other way around, it drives us into quagmires of weird and twisted thinking. — Vera Mont

Weird, twisted -- and fun ;)

Plus a big, super-convoluted and oxygenated brain. — Vera Mont

I say "trans-genomic-adaptability" because I'm not one to emphasize the brain in the question of mind. That's one likely part in our species' adaptability, but the social aspect is very important too. As you note:

Neither would any human who has not been specifically instructed in arithmetic. — Vera Mont

Of course the instruction needs to be there.

But would you deny the difference? Or would you say:

Yes, that's humans for you! Overcomplicate everything. — Vera Mont

As if to say "Abandon All Hope All Ye Who Enter Here"?

My stance is that within social conventions, yes a definition can be wrong as defined within those social conventions. Different social groups may define the word differently (different dialects, slang, technical jargon, etc).

Outside a social convention, no. — PhilosophyRunner

Conventional (what Grice calls "non-natural") meaning leaves an opening to attach the wrong meaning to an utterance; — Srap Tasmaner

You keep mentioning Grice which makes me want to read him more. Once upon a time I came across his maxims but that's about all I know of him.

This, at least, is a start though: under the condition of social convention a definition can be wrong. Definitions are often a feature of quizzes to see if students bothered reading or understanding the material, and that seems to be the most obvious case of being wrong. Misinterpreting the signs on the literal signs of the road seems an obvious case as well. What girds both is some sort of social project that predates our birth or even decisions -- school for children to develop into adults (and allow the adults to work), and streets to transport. To demonstrate a knowledge of these definitions is to be right about the definitions.

But then when it comes to "democracy" that just is a project that already assumes ends. Even in agreeing we like democracy we can misunderstand one another because we have different conventions in mind (maybe your teacher preferred Rawls, and mine preferred Nozick).

To disagree, after coming to understand one another, on definitions is to disagree upon social convention.

It would be interesting if there were cases of a non-human misinterpreting a signal, or if there were never such cases. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree. That's a good question!

Back to the topic: this might or might not be what Moliere is interested in. D2 did not engage in a misunderstood communicative behavior, but may nevertheless have been misinterpreted. (That's word's a little tendentious, but who cares.) Now if we say that the reason we (a big enough "we" to include cats) interpret each other's utterances is to divine each other's intentions, same as with other behaviors, since utterance is verbal behavior, then what Scruffy did is what we're interested in, since it's where verbal interpretation ends up.*

But there may still be a problem, because D2's behavior, unlike speech, and unlike Scruffy's display and vocalization, was not intended to be communicative. That would seem to put this event outside @Moliere's theme. Unless we want to say something deflationary about communicative intentions, which we certainly could. — Srap Tasmaner

That's useful.

Now if only I was clear enough in my own thinking to say what I'm interested in. :D

Also for @Vera Mont

For one thing I'll be clear that I'm not pursuing a deflationary account of meaning, at least. I'm open to a reductive account, but a deflationary account would be like solving the riddle by saying there's no riddle. Which very well may be the case, but I'd rather not start with that explanation given how it kind of terminates the thought.

But your interpretation of Scruffy works for my purposes of misunderstanding one another: D2 was not challenging Scruffy, Scruffy interpreted it as a challenge and issued their own challenge, D2 shuffled off.

I'm not sure this is exactly right, though -- but I'd say that because my thought has more to do with symbolic meaning than communication: the meaning which signs have. So if someone says "Red means go" that's obviously wrong, because red means stop (in the proper context, etc.).

My thought is that some signs, like democracy or socialism, don't have such a straightforward symbolic meaning, that they have a multitude of associations that make it difficult to pin down something straigtforward.

Cats participate in animal communication -- status within a tribe, territory, or even just grumpiness. My thought is that symbolic meaning can be used for animal communication, but it can be used for more than that. We communicate intentions, animal communication is shared (hell, organismic communication occurs across more than animals, in the sense of a sender, a sign, and a receiver). I'm not interested in putting human beings "above" animal communication.

But even the great apes don't seem to understand that 7+5/12=1, for instance. Or other feats of the human language. It's not a surprise, either, because it's kind of the only thing we have going for us in the big natural world -- our trans-genomic-adaptability is our main advantage, I think. We don't have to have as many of us die in order for the species to "learn" -- which pairs well with our reproductive rates being extremely slow in comparison to other species.

This is I think a good example of what I suggested as elaboration. The multiple people who say "socialism" misunderstand what it is the others are saying. If instead they each communicated a couple of paragraphs explaining exactly what their view of socialism is, will this not reduce the misunderstanding? — PhilosophyRunner

Yup, I think so. People have to want to understand at some level -- so I've been insisting upon trust and charity as interpretive virtues within a conversation, or what is missing if we're mis-understanding one another -- but I think that's a good place to start.

Those people may still disagree on which detailed view is the one we should strive for, but that is then not a misunderstanding of meaning, but a disagreement (in the vein you talked about).

Right.

Maybe the question is -- is there a time when a definition is true? Can we insist that a particular meaning is true of an utterance? Then the disagreement is about the meaning itself rather than, or perhaps also in addition to, disagreeing upon what we should strive for (or whatever it is the dispute is over).

:up: I enjoyed reading.

That story is inaccurate. "We" did nothing. A very long line of mammals before us, birds and reptiles before them, elaborated systems of communication that we, in our superstitious arrogance, didn't take into consideration when contemplating the origins of our language. Much older species have used vocal cues as warnings, threats, alarms, greetings, indications of mood, expressions of satisfaction, pleasure, anger, sorrow, pain, identification or solidarity. The more socially integrated a group of animals is, the better each individual's, especially those of the vulnerable young, chances of survival. The more precise and comprehensive its means of communication, the better that group's social integration and the more efficiently it can coordinate individual efforts. — Vera Mont

Well, I did nothing, that's for sure. And there is no "we" in the sense of a species-across-time, so I'd go that far. If the biological story is accurate then there's not really a hard distinction to be made between species, so it will be a Sorites Paradox if we try to draw a hard distinction.

Even though we share meaning with creatures and are interconnected to the life around us it seems like, say, our ability to compute sums with language is different. And humans can speak like other animals do -- like the mating lures we've created for birds to watch them. Language, in this symbolic sense that allows us to speak as other animals and compute sums, doesn't really seem to take hold with other species very well. To some varying degrees, yes, but it's not the same as what's accomplished by even children.

Which isn't to say we're over and above or somehow separate from nature or other animals. It's just that this is one way in which it seems there's difference that isn't accounted for by animal communication alone. At least, not to me. Rather I'd say the reason we're able to communicate is because we're able to construct meaningful utterances.

Language evolved along with the brain capacity of hominids, for the purpose of uniting and organizing social units and coordinating their individual efforts in defense, food-acquisition, evading predators and rearing the young. — Vera Mont

How do you know?

It would probably help if you gave a worked example. Show us an exchange that you would characterize as people misunderstanding each other, and why you would call it misunderstanding rather than something else. — Srap Tasmaner

Let's take "socialism" -- I'm not sure I could write a dialogue demonstrating, but maybe our experiences with this word could suffice?

What does "socialism" mean?

There's more than one definition that people would offer, even among those who'd say they are socialists.

And there's a strange mixture of misunderstanding and half-understanding and pop-understanding along with more precise understandings of the meaning of socialism.

My thought on the mechanisms of misunderstanding: in a conversation where languages are shared I think it's possible to shore up misunderstanding insofar as there's sufficient trust or charity among the participants. So anything that decreases our desire to offer either would explain misunderstandings of the sort where we both share a language but have that strange feeling that we're not speaking the same language.

Or do you want something more concrete? I started flipping through the news, and then starting thinking back through labor history but then had this thought here. Good call on asking for something concrete, though.

In passing, I'll note that people often feel the impulse to reduce misunderstanding to (unrecognized or unacknowledged) disagreement, and disagreement to (unrecognized or unacknowledged) misunderstanding. There might be a problem with that. — Srap Tasmaner

One thing I've noticed is something like what you say here: there's an important step in a discussion where you have to realize that you understand one another just fine. What you can't do is agree.

But then there's another misunderstanding from that. Just because we don't agree that doesn't mean that's the end of a discussion. There's something fruitful in disagreement. And usually there's more to be said or thought about.

What I think I'd resist with respect to biology is that such explanations don't operate on the same level as these virtues which are solutions to the problem of misunderstanding meaning. From the biological perspective we'd say that misunderstanding is clearly not selected for or against, given how common both are. The evolutionary bar is incredibly low to jump over for any existing species, unsurprisingly -- and given the diversity of lifeforms on our own planet to these pressures it's clear that there are many social forms from the gregarious to the individualistic that clear the bar of evolutionary pressure.

In addition it's worthwhile to point out that the final step in evolution is extinction. From the descriptive angle "survival" isn't even enough, because eventually all species will die. It's not survival as much as species-wide fecundity that's important. What's important about this is that insofar that we're able to take care of our children such that they are able to reproduce we've officially cleared the evolutionary hurdle.

And we've done that not just with different languages, but if we go far back enough then we did it without any language whatsoever -- or, at least, that's how the story goes.

In this way of looking language is just kind of an accident that happened along the way, that came along "for free" but had no purpose at the level of a general description of species-being or speciation.

I am interested in figuring out a framework for people with different politics, values, etc to communicate effectively with each other, and I see this as one of the biggest stumbling blocks. — PhilosophyRunner

A lot of misunderstanding can simply be solved by elaboration. One thing I like about this forum is the elaboration, it certainly helps healthy discussions. — PhilosophyRunner

In order to understand others you have to put yourself in their shoes. See what they see out of their skull holes. Then you hook into their frame of reference and the meaning of their utterances will be obvious.

If a person has a very rigid sense of identity, they can't take up residence in other people's positions. Or maybe they've judged the other to be evil or what not. Then they don't want to be tainted.

This doesn't undermine the idea that meaning is first shared and after that potentially private. It just means sometimes we aren't communicating. We're just talking at each other.

-- the wisdom of Asperger's. — frank

Which is all to say, I think we have good grounds for thinking justice can refer to both our individual sense of justice, social norms, OR a higher form of justice that lies implicit within the logic of being. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm adding you at the end @Srap Tasmaner because it seems like you're part of this thread of thought in mentioning limitations to some of the suggestions above while gesturing towards the biological as a kind of rock bottom for understanding meaning which is where you and I probably diverge the most, so maybe we'll find something here to connect on.

So the problem of meaning, in scope, is the problem of misunderstanding. We frequently understand one another, and frequently don't, and the latter has become more apparent over time -- or perhaps we have actually lost some ability to understand one another too.

I'd call your solution @PhilosophyRunner the philosopher's solution par excellence -- if the people are ignorant of what some other person means then clearly they'll misunderstand, and elaboration is a way of filling in the gaps of that ignorance. And frequently this will actually be the case, that someone has an actively false notion about some other person's belief or expression that needs only be addressed and corrected, and the misunderstanding disappears.

But @frank points out that sometimes it's not a matter of simple ignorance and elaboration. Sometimes we misunderstand because we're simply not able to see what someone else sees, to hook into their frame of reference, for instance if someone has a rigid sense of identity (to imagine that I might be elsewise is to not be me, so I won't imagine it). Basically the meaning is public, in the PLA sense, but there's more to the problem of misunderstanding than what elaboration will address.

Which is where I thought @Count Timothy von Icarus's conclusion shored up some difficulties -- in the appeal to values outside of ourselves, or a notion of justice, or social norms. Something aside from the basic meaning of the words, and something aside from the identities which are in conflict.

I wouldn't be too sure about the "abandonment" in actual practice . . . . down deep scientists have ideas they hope will be substantiated by experiment or shown to be wrong. Preferably the former. They are, by and large, human and hope to get there first. On the other hand pure curiosity can be a driving force. — jgill

Your expression gets at a split in my thinking on the subject that's not easy to negotiate -- there's the historically real science as actually practiced, and then there's the philosophically attractive abstraction of that process which tends to look a lot cleaner than the real deal.

The former is real, the latter is at least questionable to me. But in designating the historical as the real contrast to the ideal -- "Falsificationism" cannot count as a criterion that differentiates the scientific from the not-scientific anymore because it, as a description, fits in the latter -- it's a prescriptive theory of science addressing the problem of induction rather than a descriptive one addressing what scientists actually do.

And yet it's the prescriptions which seem to help a person try and "be objective" -- like it's more of a role rather than a fact. But if that were the case... well then there's no method at all, it's a social designation and function! And whatever those who have that designation or function do is what science is.

And that's the tension in my thinking between these two ways of looking at science.
***

To answer your OP @Mikie -- What I think the take-away is is that "Anything goes" works when we're trying to universalize to a prescriptive theory of science which demarcates science from not-science for all cases of science, but almost always we're not thinking at that level of abstraction where we're comparing historical periods of scientific practice and describing their methods of thought and inference in an attempt to understand why this practice seems so fruitful, or in the case of Popper, how it gets over the problem of induction.

We're instead thinking "What makes it different from..." some other thing, in which case, it seems like we're able to point out methods that differ, or differences along the way. But it won't sound as impressive as a single, rational criterion that demarcates the scientific from the not-scientific. For that I'd just say Popper did a pretty good job, and Feyerabend shows the limitation of that approach. It gets at something, but it misses something too.

Or the penis may become more important because it is always covered up. — BC

True! Especially in self-evaluation we certainly have some kind of attachment to our body.

But unless we actually want men to have penises, we make this judgment sans-knowledge of the physical make-up of most people's sensitive parts. That is the way we normally use the word isn't really in reference to a particular person's genitals (making room for the notion that our judgment of whether a person is a man is in relation to whether he has grown up, i.e., boyhood rather than womanhood)

Too much masculinity is invested in the penis--a mistake. Masculinity is found in the whole body and in the brain. The penis doesn't hang alone as the sole signal of masculinity, and the penis doesn't 'produce' masculinity. Men with big dicks are not more masculine than men with small dicks. — BC

Yup, I agree.

Masculinity, like anything else, stands out against a backdrop of its negation. You'll pick up on your own masculinity when faced with an opposition to it: your wife, mother, daughter, female divinity, female archetype, etc.

Is it a piece of genitalia or genetics that makes the masculine? Yes and no. Imagine that every human has a penis. We reproduce with machines that produce new creatures with penises. Will a penis mean "male?". No, it will just be part of "human "

But in a world with humans who don't have penises, having one means something. It means something. See what I mean? — frank

I generally view your opening with favor -- we come to understand a great deal of our concepts through contrasting them with other concepts: But my contention has been that the backdrop of masculinities' negation is childhood, rather than the feminine.

In a culture which covers up the penis, then the penis isn't as important to gender-identity as many other things that we actually do get to see on the regular.

Now in any given gender-identity -- here speaking in general of a particular identity some individual would affirm they are -- one may be attached to the body in such a way that the identity wants the penis, or identifies with the penis, or is the penis. When speaking of wanting someone in the way that a man wants we usually can pick up on the erotic desire being expressed, and understand that this is an expression of an individual's sexual desire, and if we're sexually active with that person and have pleasured their penis before then, and only then, is the penis a part of our mutual understanding of that gender-identity. In one sense there's the relational element of a self to the body, and then there's the relational element of the penis to a sexual partner who affirms the penis in their desire for it.

But what of the impotent man who, in his manly way, had it blown off by a land mine but still has sexual desires as a man does?

I'd suggest that the bodily attachment is just one way to relate to our masculinity, and that we're not just our penis. In fact we can be a man without it entirely.

In most cases, though, I don't think it's the disagreement itself that alters the meaning of language, but rather the leaders and would-be leaders of a faction, who deliberately distort and misrepresent ideas in order to manipulate their followers. — Vera Mont

The desire to believe their faction's version of reality. The minions are less interested in accurate information than in reassurance and the promise of being made great again - whether they ever had been anything but puny or not. — Vera Mont

On the contrary! Jingo gives them a much louder, more persuasive collective voice than their individual intellect ever could have. Yelling slogans makes people feel strong. — Vera Mont

So in this picture we have a common sense of meaning which is distorted by desire, of a kind -- but the desire is stoked by leaders who know how to speak to people and people who like to be spoken to in a symbiotic relationship of belief-maintenance which in turn has a positive feedback loop from it being an empowering experience -- a place in the world, a social network, power, and a righteous cause all wrapped into one (though with enough moral vagaries that many are dis-affected and simply don't participate).

And we have two camps with that set of motivations disagreeing with one another on the correct way to proceed on... well, lots of things. At base, though, it seems your picture says that it's a conflict of desires to believe such and such means such and such because believing that the words mean this or that is what reassures people of their particular faction's version of reality.

So I suppose where you might see a relatively integral and authentic movement with a sort of media circus mis-portraying it for cynical gain, I see a movement manipulated and altered by the social impact of that media circus such that there's never very much left of the original by the time it's finished with it. — Isaac

Yeah, that sounds like a correct description of our respective views.

Hot damn did we manage to understand one another?

Yes, I think most things boil down to personal preferences and then, often, we select some reasoning as post hoc justifications. I never pursued philosophy, but I did read a little comparative religion and explored a range of spiritual schools 30 years ago. But I've simply found the notion of gods incoherent. The arguments against theism are just garnish. I have come to the conclusion that I simply lack sensus divinitatis - which is probably a Protestant notion more than a Catholic one. — Tom Storm

The philosophy of God, in the big picture of all philosophy, is part of what I like about philosophy -- not irrelevant, but also not the most important thing: just another topic to consider and move on from if it doesn't speak to you. There are certainly theist philosophers, and even the god of the philosophers, but I don't feel a connection to any of that. What I feel a connection to is other people, to their way of life, how they find meaning in it all, and how we can possibly all find ourselves living a meaningful life. It seems important to so many people that I have a hard time simply rejecting the practices.

But that sensus divinitatis stuff? Complete nonsense. At least to me. Surely an experience of the divine isn't a sense -- if it were then there would be about as much agreement on the divine as there is on where the table is at, which we can certainly see is not the case.

I think the arguments for/against the existence of God are falling into a linguistic trap that's easy to fall into -- the notion that names must have this or that predicate, when in fact(at least by my reckoning) there is no such thing as God, and the locution comes to have predicates we admire because we admire God. Things like power, knowledge, and goodness.

Amen, brother.

So "in most cases" -- what's stopping people who are not the leaders and would-be leaders from seeing that ideas or meanings are distorted or misrepresented? Not in a specific way -- cuz then it's easy enough to see why this or that person didn't pick up on the manipulation -- but how does this deliberate distortion become a part of the common lexicon such that people cannot talk?

I'd agree with this but with one huge caveat. There's only one front page and there are things we can do to make it more likely that those with the power to change international conditions are inclined to do so. Those things need some of the oxygen of political discourse, all of which is sucked out at the moment by the minutiae of identity politics.

That, and the fact that solidarity is literally our only weapon and we ought be more precious of it that to descend into tribalism at the slightest hint of dissent in the ranks. — Isaac

My previous post was meant to point out what level of apathy we're really dealing with. And I'd say it's even a rational apathy -- it's only the people who are in positions of power that care if they get enough votes or people out because that's their job. That's how they make money. For the rest? That's an extra effort. (which is a way of saying the professional organizer, contra Lenin, can never be a genuine organizer: payment changes the relationship enough to matter)

My own approach doesn't focus on the front-page, because I know that the front-page is propaganda. The people in charge, at least in the United States, are motivated by things other than the vote -- you can buy votes through propaganda. Election season is just an inconvenient time when you have to lie and say things that people want to hear so you can get back to the real business of governing.

Solidarity is our only weapon, I agree. But we're a bit defenseless at the moment. Thems who own are good areat breaking us apart -- and really I think that given how trans issues have been a historical reality for much longer than in the past few years when they came to prominence, my thought is that the propaganda machine selected for the most controversial issue on the basis of engagement -- and it just happened to be the one.

Then I think we agree. As I've said in my post above, I'm not here making the argument that we must look at matters like identity from a social constructionist, or functionalist, or even behaviourist perspective, I'm only making the argument that because we can do so, our disagreements are philosophical, not ethical. No one is abusing anyone (not here anyway) and people are not oppressed by the fact the others do not agree with their preferred notion of how identity works. — Isaac

I think we're close enough for meaningful discussion :)

I think there's more to the public discussions than the philosophic or scientific basis of inference, though. But philosophically I think our prime disagreement is on whether or not standpoints are worthwhile, and if so when they are.

Firstly let me say I've really enjoyed our discussion and find your approach refreshing and positive. We don't always see things the same way, but we have managed this respectfully. Thank you. — Tom Storm

Same. :)

I love this stuff. Might be a reason why I stick around here.

I don't think we can go and find happiness. I think it happens as a by-product of other thing, when you are not looking, or if you are not too jammed full of expectations and shopping lists of must haves. I also think it is possible to be 'happy' and be a bad person. — Tom Storm

I agree happiness is not a thing one can find. That's part of its elusiveness for the unhappy.

My strategy is your latter -- don't be too jammed full of expectations or shopping lists of must haves. Also, don't even try to be happy. But when you're in pain that's a lot harder to do than say.

And I agree that one can be happy and bad, of course. So there's something to be said for happiness not being the ethical end-all-be-all.

I believe, at least, that happiness curbs some cruelty, and people are more generous when they aren't frustrated. But I recognize there's another side of desire that works differently -- that one can be cruel and happy, and even more satisfied by cruelty than simple desire.

All critical judgements in the end are in relation to held values. — Tom Storm

Yup :). It's inescapable, I think. There's always some value-theoretic commitment to any judgment.

Some clues for me are that marketing and advertising (totalizing approaches which dominate and lubricate our times) are predicated on making people feel deficient. We are groomed to find solutions to problems which frequently don't exist. This sits neatly upon religocultural views which in the West often construct our identity as sinners and unworthy and in need of transformative redemption. We are socialized towards guilt and self-loathing and a search for deliverance, notions which are cradled in a dynamic tension with advertising's driving narrative that 'you' deserve success and prosperity. Etc... — Tom Storm

That's interesting -- and then, upon trying the cure we find it unsatisfactory, so we think "time to try another one" and so the loop continues.

I think I just got stuck on philosophy, basically. I found more satisfying answers, and more importantly questions and methods, there. But also I've never really hidden the fact that my motivations come from a religious background. I have no problem with saying that philosophy operates on a plain in-between the everyday and the spiritual. Bertrand Russell made a similar comment about philosophy that it's somewhere between religion and science.

I think the shopping experience is part of what a free society looks like -- when you have options you try them out. But yeah I'm not too keen on guilt as a motivator. I think it's overused because we want people to be predictable.

The American Republican and Democratic core have already arrived there. — Vera Mont

When we reach a complete mutual understanding, we are of one mind. Nobody wants that, do they? — unenlightened

What enables us to learn another language, or to understand a miscommunication?
— Moliere
The capacity and willingness to learn. An interest in the other group and its culture... or a benefit in interactions with that other group. — Vera Mont

So this is a nice demarcation of scope, to me. Rather than reaching for Big L Language, as I was, this focuses the meaning of meaning, in our case, to meaning in terms of mutual understanding, or meaning in terms of two opposing sides who just seem to refuse to communicate, and asking the far more relevant question: why does disagreement seem to distort meaning to a point that we no longer mean the same things, and are talking past one another?

Some ideas provided here -- no interest in the other group or culture, or no benefit from interaction with the other group or culture, or good old fashioned fun (cooperation is boring! I want to win!)

I don't think this is the rejoinder. There's an assumption implicit here that wisdom and truth bring happiness. I don't agree. Note, I am not saying that wisdom brings unhappiness. I would also say in parentheses that wisdom does not necessarily provide answers or solutions. It's often about developing more probative questions. No one gets out of here alive... Wisdom might involve us living with discomfort rather than with reassuring myths. — Tom Storm

I agree that's my assumption.

Do you have a belief with respect to what does bring happiness?

I'm not sure we can make that distinction. While I agree that there may be good and bad philosophy, who is to say what is in scope and what is not? Some people think Heidegger is an empty charlatan who plays with neologisms, some think he is the greatest philosophical thinker of the 20th century. — Tom Storm

Not in a final way, I agree there -- but also in making the distinction I'm exploring the notion itself. I often wonder about philosophy proper vs. a pop philosophy (non-pejorative) vs. a pop philosophy (pejorative).

In making the argument for or against Heidegger we get to see what the values of philosophy are that people hold, though. Making the judgment is a part of the practice. We recognize that the judgment could be faulty, but it's a place to start.

I'm not sure how many people ever arrive at an insight like this. — Tom Storm

Me either.

But I think that people can come to see it.

I think we live in the cult of personal change and transformation - from social media influencers to Marie Kondo minimalism and the rush to embrace Stoicism. This decade it's Jordan B Peterson, 30 years ago it was Louise Hay. Naturally some people are more sophisticated and read better books, but the idea that we are unhappy, unworthy, not good enough seems to haunt many people's lives. — Tom Storm

That's insightful!

Any idea why?