I'm not saying that we ought select from publicly available narratives, I'm saying we do. I'm making an empirical claim about the way the human psyche works. We do not construct unique and detailed identities from scratch through some internal interrogation. We pick from the stories we see around us, the identities, like parts in a play. I'm not making an ethical claim. You are ethically free to construct your identity from scratch. I don't believe you either can or will. — Isaac
I agree that identity doesn't come from scratch. Though I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say that identity comes from the human psyche, either -- the subject is constituted socially, in my view, but that doesn't make it any less real (and it also doesn't mean that someone else is in a better position to declare the identity of another) Rather than a claim about the general structure of the human psyche this is an aspect of humanity that is largely social: a kind of reason that's beyond the brain, shared across bodies and brains through our practices.
It's not an 'or else' but yes, I'll stand by that. We have a victim culture, and I believe guilt is at least a major part of the reason. We all know how much better off we are and we all know it's grossly unfair. If that didn't have an effect we'd be zombies, and if that effect was universally positive we'd be saints. I don't believe we're either. — Isaac
I don't know if we all really do know that in the sense of who is culpable. My point in bringing up the popularity of Marxism was that this claim of guilt largely depends upon a person's relationship to Marxism -- for most they'll accept the line that capitalism is what will set us free, and that it's just a matter of progress and time for the less fortunate to be lifted up by its magic insofar that we're able to curb the excesses of capital (themselves measured by a nationalist, rather than internationalist, measure)
A usual component of guilt, perception of one's self-culpability in doing wrong, just isn't there for most people. They'll look at you like you look at the gender-benders, complete with stories as to why you'd commit yourself to an unpopular worldview.
I don't think we have a victim culture in the sense of desiring to be a victim, except perhaps for those bored enough to really crave pain -- but rather I think there really are just that many victims. Capital is violent.
Your second second half belies the first. You claim "we utilize it not on the basis of our shared language, but on a day-to-day basis for understanding one another and ourselves". That's a scientific claim. It's making a statement about how humans (a clearly empirical object) think. You can't claim the concept isn't scientific and then give a detailed account of how it works. — Isaac
I can if the detailed account is not scientific, which I've been denying. History is empirical, but not scientific -- so just that something is empirical is not enough to qualify it as a scientific subject.
Plumbing is the example Massimo Pigliucci likes to use to distinguish between know-how and science, and how empiricism is much wider than scientific practice -- it requires concepts, it requires testing out the pipes, and doing plumbing requires some knowledge of scientific concepts but the trade itself isn't exactly a science in the sense that we usually mean. But it's certainly knowledge.
In fact it's my position that most of our world, which is real, isn't really amenable to scientific practice, given how science relies upon prediction and universality for its force of persuasion. Anything that is real, not-universal and not-predictable will escape its purview, and as it happens a lot of the things we care about seem to fit in there -- plumbing, politics, how to drive a care, how to ride a bike, conversing, politicking, acting, the law... much of our performances, be they on the world-stage or a venue, fit here. Which is exactly the sort of practice I imagine the identity is -- real, but not-scientific.
So I'm guessing that we also have different notions about science's relationship to ontology and philosophy in addition to our respective stances on The Subject.
I don't see how language could possibly work that way. We'd never understand what each other were saying if we just allowed new meanings to constantly spring forth. I wouldn't get five minutes into my day if those I'm speaking to had no foundation to judge my meaning. Sure, language evolves, but that's not that same as saying anything goes. Some neologisms take, others don't. None just spring forth fully formed from day-to-day. — Isaac
The problem with transcendental arguments is that they can always be constructed in reverse.
We'd never deal with novelty if we were stuck using the same words, and so on.
But what if language is always-already this ambiguous judgment between what has been and what will be? And what if lowering surprise isn't the social goal for linguistic use? Most of the time, in creative use, we look for what will surprise rather than what will conform. The dance between conformity and novelty is a social dance, which just so happens to also include language (as a social practice).
And why does 'charity' get invoked with new meanings but not with the retention of old ones?
Because even using the old meanings in a new context is already a new meaning, under my notion of language at least. So it's a failure of charity on both parts, in terms of mis-communication at least.
But also sometimes people revoke charity because they've had enough, and decide that you're not part of the language-group they are. That is the words are not
conceptually incommensurable, but the practices are. We understand one another just fine. We just disagree. (and some, recognizing that, simply refuse to extend charity -- they're not interested in understanding in that case, and language ceases to work)
But that's not what's happening here. I'm not being asked to merely understand a new use of gender terms, I'm being asked to partake in it. And not just that, I'm being asked to entirely replace my previous use with this new one, and further in many cases being accused of hate speech and bigotry if I don't.
I really think it's stretching credulity to lump all that under mere request for charitable interpretation. — Isaac
In terms of language use I think that's exactly what sees us through, though. What charity explains is why miscommunication occurs here -- it's because charity is
not being offered that language breaks, and language-games become incommensurable through the
practices they are a part of.
The new gender-bender sees the old uses as bad, and has a community that understands the value of the new uses.
You don't have to convert to the new religion. But you might need to offer some persuasion as to why the old system which punished people for being themselves is preferable in order to earn any charity to be extended to the old uses. In general the radicals tend to see the old world as basically bad, so it's an uphill sell. And on the whole people who adopt new ways don't see much value in the old ways, almost like they were already dissatisfied with how the old language-game played out and from that dissatisfaction crafted a philosophy that expresses that dissatisfaction.
But me -- I think there's value across generational divides, and that we'll be able to work out our differences. And at least you have being a Marxist going for you
;). Hence my pointing out the need for charity. But if you don't want to offer it, I don't think anyone can force you to. That's the way conversations work. I don't think we can say at this time that it's a lack of understanding one another, though. I've provided a schema complete with a marker that says "this is what needs more work". We understand one another fine. What we disagree upon is which way is a better way for our life-practices -- which language-game of gender should we play? Well, I'll pick the language-game that recognizes who I am. And being the bridge-builder that I tend to be I'll play the old game for as long as needed to catch people up to the new game. I don't think it's
quite as much on its way out as I put it before -- religions have a way of sticking around even after they fragment, and I'm thinking gender is much like religion in its social dimension.
Yes, were on the same page here. It's why I'm comfortable saying there's no such thing. Identity isn't a psychological state one 'discovers' by interoception, it's part of our naming and storytelling practices, like 'hippy', or 'geek'. We collect performances into useful groupings and name them. The utility is about them playing a role in our stories so they're less surprising, and that works both ways - it's not imposed, it's agreed upon. — Isaac
I definitely don't think identity is a
thing -- hence my rejection of the Cartesian subject. More like a collection, but not a bundle. It's a specific collection that's important to whatever identity is.
I agree identity is not a psychological state one discovers by interoception. That's maybe a first step for some, but not all -- what's important is how one comports themselves with others. My thought is identity is a social creation entirely, but that it's also entirely real and we can be right or wrong about it. The person whose in the best position, most of the time, for making that judgment is the person whose identity it is.
My claims come back to whether you accept there is a standpoint for identity, rather than the metaphysical claim, or even empirical claim, about identity.
Yes, I agree. There's a tension between the expectations of public roles and the utility of having them at all. It's not all one way though. Knowing what to do next is fiendishly complicated and fraught with uncertainty. A device for resolving some of that uncertainty isn't always a bad thing. — Isaac
Cool. Then while we began with trans identity, it might be better to finish with some other kind of identity -- like identity in general (as if that were easy....) -- because I think our disagreements are very much philosophical. And not finish in this thread -- just more like bookmarking "OK, interesting ideas to explore are identity in general, the relationship between science and ontology or philosophy, and the significance of science at large"