I'd put it that the question which asks about the relationship between logic and being is no longer doing pure logic. The distinction I think of that makes sense of what you're saying is Kant's distinction between logic as such and transcendental logic: Logic as such deals with the forms of inference, whereas transcendental logic deals with the application of logic to our sensible intuition (which turn out to be the categories, much in the vein of Aristotle)

For my part I don't see much need for a transcendental logic because I don't think our sensible intuition conforms to the categories in the manner which Kant seems to believe -- in some sense what Kant does is define the absurd as outside of the scope of cognition, and yet the world remains absurd for all that: We can choose the categories we want to use in describing the world, and they change far more than what is desirable in a logical system.

As evidence of this I reference the difference between Kant's categories and the most general scientific theories -- I don't see any need for a group of categories to make sense of science. I don't think the structure of the mind or the minds relationship to being is the site of knowledge, but of comfort.
 
Basically I see the appeal of Aristotle and common sense as a mistaken appeal -- it makes sense of the world, but need not hold for all empirical cases: There are times when a person is in contradiction with themself, or an organism has a contradictory cancer, or a social organism is composed of two opposite poles (hence Hegel's use of contradiction in attempting to understand a social body or mind).

And I, for one, take up the liar's paradox as a good example of an undeniable dialetheia: A true contradiction.

Especially because the liar's sentence gives justification to P2 in the original argument: No principle holds in complete generality.

I agree.

Being wrong, and realizing it, is like removing a splinter which also gives me a new perspective.

At one point I thought it a pain but I've come to see how being wrong is the better joy than being right.

pretty sure the cracked pots are an exponential function such that if you allow 3 or 4 it's containable, but 6 or 7 might make all the non-crackpots become pots that can be cracked.

F(x) = x^C where "C" is the cardinality of the set of "pots"

That's a super cool video.

More research must be done, but if the idea survives the test of criticism it seems to support punctuated equilibrium.

Right.

So there exist some modern cynics, or some rough equivalent there -- all social backgrounds include people who want drugs or are mentally ill because social backgrounds, or philosophies, don't select for those things.

The rest just want drugs or are mentally ill. — Shawn

I don't think one needs a philosophy or lifestyle to want drugs or be mentally ill.

The discussion would then be ongoing, keeping Logicians in paid work... — Banno

Given the benefits of the various logics I see no downsides.

I am not so confident to become a cynic as of soon. — Shawn

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gutter_punk is the modern phenomena I associate with ancient cynic philosophy.

Overwhelmingly this thread has focused on the foetus, without consideration of the person bearing it. What is at stake in the discussion of abortion is the dignity of the person who is to cary the foetus. Now unlike a blastocyst, there can be no doubt as to their humanity, their personhood. — Banno

That's where I end up in my thinking -- the personhood of a foetus is more in question than the personhood of the mother, and so the rights of personhood should favor the mother when considering which rights to favor.

Personhood is where I start, but in the end I don't think that you can defend the notion without a notion of ensoulment when it comes to the foetus. And, while that is a perfectly respectable position to live it's not good for law because not everyone believes in ensoulment, and the removal of a mole or cyst ought not be a moral conundrum from a materialist point of view.

To answer the titular question:

Post on others' posts. If you start a new topic in the main forum try to utilize some resource or other -- you'd be surprised how many people of thought about similar things to yourself and usually they have insights. Even news articles or wikipedia pages are fine for this.

And The Lounge is pretty free-range -- most anything goes other than explicit rule violations.

And if you think some decision is wrong then that's what the feedback forum is for -- reversing decisions that were wrong.

Any questions?

I'm wrong in saying you're here to promote your website, given what you've done thus far. You convinced me here:

Is it ok if I refer to "Bubblespeak" in the future? I don't mind.
I can unpublish my website, I don't mind.

But people are asking for more information about my project. Even in this thread, unenlightened was asking more. How should I handle that? Earlier I said, look at my profile, you'll find a link. Mentioning that was allowed, according to jamal. I said a few times Google "Babelspeak", maybe that I shouldn't do?

I am reasonable. But please give me a workable solution. — Carlo Roosen

You came up with reasonable solutions and followed through on them. That demonstrates willingness to cooperate, which is good!

As I said, I'm a friend to odd ducks. I'm typing these things to you in the hopes that you can get along with the bunch.

We're all odd ducks, to be frank. And some of your thoughts aren't as original as you think.

But they are philosophical, which is good!

Sounds like my life!

I want you here. New minds and new ideas are good.

We're just trying to teach you how to do it, is all. As philosophers do.

No, I did not read your SEP article yet. I will, a bit later. — Carlo Roosen

Cool!

Let me know what you think after reading it.

I'm here as a friend to odd ducks, and my posts are meant to help.

Some persons are able to put 2 and 2 together in a way that doesn't make sense to others. I'd call this sense-making: Your post had NO mention of your website, but we took a peek at your website before responding and saw how much of it was like your posts.

Changing the name is a good sign, IMO. It means you're not here to simply have the name repeated to make it more popular on the 'net.

Did you read the SEP article I linked?

Your website can be online, it's the promotion of it that's forbidden on the front page. You can keep the website in your profile too! If you look at my profile I have my twitter linked.

One of the things here is -- you're not the first person in the world to have thought about a Super Artificial Intelligence. Especially amongst philosopher-enthusiasts. We are challenging your ideas, in the spirit of philosophy, and it seems you want to double down more than discuss.

No worries. I have my own odd obsessions that I try to avoid in talking to others, too, because I've found that hearing others' viewpoints helps me more than "preaching the word"

And, if you want to "preach the word", at least on a philosophy forum, you ought use philosophy resources. It's not like philosophers decided to stop thinking this whole time, so you could learn something from them. As I noted, they've even been thinking about AI. The thing you're supposedly interested in.

People on the forum said it is not allowed to talk about fundamental reality... — Carlo Roosen

It's allowed, though I'm at least skeptical of the notion.

Others have pointed out how your book has expressed ideas that philosophers have alread thought over.

"What is Fundamental Reality?" would at least be a question to explore.

Talking about "fundamental reality" like you're the one who knows the AI-Human system will SEE THE REAL -- well, philosophers have thought about this before, and this is part of the resistance you are receiving.

Did you read the SEP article I linked?

Is it ok if I refer to "Bubblespeak" in the future? I don't mind.
I can unpublish my website, I don't mind.

But people are asking for more information about my project. Even in this thread, unenlightened was asking more. How should I handle that? Earlier I said, look at my profile, you'll find a link. Mentioning that was allowed, according to jamal. I said a few times Google "Babelspeak", maybe that I shouldn't do?

I am reasonable. But please give me a workable solution. — Carlo Roosen

I think you came up with some workable solutions here. It would be a lot harder to make the argument that you're here for self-promotion if you didn't promote your website, and instead stuck to things like this encyclopedia page, or other sources aside from your website.

Basically if you use philosophy articles to explore the questions you're good, but if you use your website then it seems like you're here to promote your website rather than discuss the philosophical implications of your ideas.

Just because I have a different opinion, that is no reason to ban me. — Carlo Roosen

This is not the reason banning is being considered.

The reason is from the Site Guidelines:

Advertisers, spammers, self-promoters: No links to personal websites. Instant deletion of post followed by a potential ban.

One Simple Trick that Kantians hate!

I said "the opposite is true" because I don't think any experience is inherently the same as another.

A quote buried in II. THE FACTICITY OF THE FOR-ITSELF that seemed to relate to the original question

...
The billiard ball which rolls on the table does not possess the possibility of being turned
from its path by a fold in the cloth; neither does the possibility of deviation belong to the cloth; it can be established only by a witness synthetically as an external relation
...

My thinking here is that insofar that you could establish that a given beast can establish the possibilities of objects like above then perhaps then we'd be dealing with the class of mind to which Being and Nothingness applies. But then there's a part of me that realizes this part is deeply respondent to Descartes, given the context, which makes the question of beasts pretty interesting.

But I think it'd be the sort of thing that needs further research to really ascertain. It's not an easy question you can just look up the answer to.

Makes sense. Truth be told I'm not sure EiH is exactly any of those either or if it's just a softer expression of the same. Part of why I'm revisiting him is to get a clearer understanding between this aspect of existentialism and the phenomenology of Levinas who is softer, but is also linked to Heidegger

(plus I think Sartre's metaphysics get along with absurdism fairly well -- the being-for-itself as human world, and being-in-itself as the absurd, meaningless plenitude)

There is a time for harshness on the path to kindness, I think, so these things aren't totally at odds. What if I'm a natural asshole and it feels good to be an asshole, after all? Then we could say that insofar that we are an authentic asshole we are in good faith. But insofar that this criticism puts kindness above authenticity then the harshness needs to be directed towards that impulse of cruelty.

I'm not sure. I've heard it claimed that he walked back his position from Being in Nothingness in Existentialism is a Humanism because the existentialism of B&N is not as soft or warm and inviting -- i.e. humanistic -- as the existentialism of EiH. Thus far I agree, but I'm also at the beginning parts which are all about the self reflecting on the self, and harsh ("authentic") self-analysis is kind of the uniting theme of the beginning of the book. But there are later chapters which deal with Being with Others which I'm curious if they slot in with EiH.

That's close to my understanding of Being and Nothingness's description of bad faith. Bad faith seems to me to be a uniquely human phenomena, or at least described from that vantage point in the book, because it's all about wondering how a singular self can lie to themself -- if one says to themself that they perform like a waiter because they are a waiter is to reduce oneself to an object-like thing, which is to not recognize one's freedom as a reflecting conscioussness -- or, to frame the explanation that explicitly ignores being-for-itself in favor of being-in-itself, to use the basic metaphysical terms he's developing.

The beasts aren't being considered in the book, at least with where I'm at now. (I just finished the bit on bad faith)

At least in Being and Nothingness Sartre doesn't begin with whether or not God exists as a basis for our freedom. It's a metaphysical question which calls into question Descartes' Cogito by developing a distinction which separates the reference of "I" in "I think" from the reference of "I" in "I am" (rendering "I think, therefore I am an equivocation between being-for-itself and being-in-itself)-- so insofar that animals could use language to confuse themselves into think they are either purely an object or purely a thinking creature and therefore not responsible for their actions because of either belief then we'd be talking about bad faith and the curiosities that Sartre brings up about a being who is in conflict with itself as its being.

The question of animals would be an empirical one, I believe.

Laws are not invented wholesale. Laws are based on an inheritance. Most of that inheritance comes from a time before the United States.

I'm tempted by 's position as a negotiable middle ground.

I reduce the question of abortion to the question of personhood when we want precision in our laws and so forth: But mostly I don't think the law is well equipped for the contexts of life, and so should be permissive. In addition I believe in bodily autonomy: I don't like to phrase it as ownership, but in the legal frame I think every individual owns their body.

Further, most of the laws have been written by men -- I don't see our representative democracy as a palliative for the history of patriarchy that has dominated women's bodies so that men knew that their fucking made a kid.

Somewhere along the line the past women got treated like property, and that still echoes today. The way men look at children isn't the same as women look at children, and I bet the laws would be different if women were the ones with say on the laws (especially if the matriarchy won, but even if we simply restricted such discussions to thems who are more effected today I think)

:D

True.

Good analogue. I had similar thoughts with respect to

Though, to split the difference, I agree with

If someone points out, as @Tarskian did, that the set of unexpressed sentences is larger than the set of expressed sentences I'd agree, but would not come to the conclusion that the title of the OP states.



And I wouldn't bother with making statements about "the overwhelmingly vast majority" after that, as obviously those are the words of the bean counters who want a ledger to prove a point, which philosophy doesn't bother with (when it's good).

I like Erich Fromm's theory of love in The Art of Loving because he casts it as an art that one can learn.

A paragraph on Wikipedia summarizing:

Fromm contrasts symbiotic union with mature love, the final way people may seek union, as union in which both partners respect the integrity of the other.[24] Fromm states that "Love is an active power in a man",[26] and that in the general sense, the active character of love is primarily that of "giving".[27] He further delineates what he views as the four core tenets of love: care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge.[28] He defines love as care by stating that "Love is the active concern for the life and the growth of that which we love", and gives an example of a mother and a baby, saying that nobody would believe the mother loved the baby, no matter what she said, if she neglected to feed it, bathe it, or comfort it.[28] He further says that "One loves that for which one labours, and one labours for that which one loves."[29]

Also, I got many good references the last time I broached this topic, and even though I followed up on those readings the question of love is still one that is philosophically interesting to me.

I wonder if we can get past these factors? I'm framing it as a question, not as a claim. — Tom Storm

I'm hesitant to reduce philosophy to psychology -- whether or not our psychology allows us to examine our own beliefs, it's still a part of philosophy to attempt to do so. The image of philosopher here is of Love as described in Symposium

...
The truth of the matter is this: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.'

'But who then, Diotima,' I said, 'are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?'

'A child may answer that question,' she replied; 'they are those who are in a mean between the two; Love is one of them. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant.
... — Plato, Symposium

Where, as I read it at least, the philosopher is explicitly one who doesn't overcome their folly, but is somewhere between the state of the Gods who know wisdom and the self-satisfied fools.

I don't know how to tell exactly when that's the case, though. Symposium is a mythic dialogue, and the section I'm quoting is explicit myth-making where the philosopher is compared to Love, a god birthed.

On the whole, though, it seems that others' are more inclined to pick apart my beliefs than I am, so the idea of an individual overcoming their biases isn't even necessary because the individual doesn't do that alone.

Well there is no metric for measuring if a belief is correct or not and that is the reason why being neutral while making a decision is important because only 1 belief or a few beliefs regarding a certain topic can be correct and most beliefs are wrong and that's why mathematically being neutral and making decisions without showing baisenes towards your own beliefs is the best option in most of the cases — QuirkyZen

How is "being neutral" not a belief? Is it not a belief of yours that it is better to be neutral in making decisions?

So it seems you have a belief without a metric for measuring your beliefs correctness, in which case you should be neutral towards that belief, which would seem like you ought not have a belief at all about whether one ought be neutral, or let their personal beliefs influence their decisions, or to not let their personal beliefs influence their decisions.

Insofar that scientific description is taken as a basis for ontology: Why not make the claim that the photon demonstrates that we don't need mass for something ot be physical?

That's the attitude I try to adopt. If I find a philosopher uninteresting but others find them interesting I try and figure out what it is about them that's interesting -- usually there's something there and I've just missed it.

But, on the other hand, I can understand people making a choices because there's just a lot of philosophy, so if you get bitten by the bug you'll eventually have to decide what is more or less interesting to you.

But that seems to just come down to preference. I'm not sure there's a reason why this or that is interesting to me outside of my own background or what-have-you.

Though, upon reflection, that indicates that when I learn I learn about something.

I'm not skeptical about realism: only still thinking it through, and mostly tempted by absurdism.

If I were raised by wolves, or not raised at all -- feral children come to mind for me -- then I think my beliefs about directionality would be different, even though I believe there's a non-imaginative, realist metaphysic that I don't know how to articulate.

I think I'm tempted to put that in the same category -- unless someone showed me which was my north hand when then... absolute or relative, I would not have known it without that showing.

It may not be just something I learn, and I suspect that's so. There's a difference that makes a difference.

I wouldn't be surprised, though, if other fellow humans might have developed other ways to talk in this manner -- it's not like space suddenly got divided into quadrants after Descartes; rather, that's an idea for thinking about space (else, how did pre-Cartesians have a notion of space?)

has a point. We can never make up the horrors of the past or the benefits we recieve from it, even if they are unjust. And often reparations can be bungled to a point where the effected parties aren't even helped. (I'm not sure I know of when they were anything elsehurt, but I think un has a point in saying that reparations can be about nothing but white guilt)

The United States has paid reparations, so there is some history to consider. I'm not conversant enough in that history to say which is what; but I agree that we cannot really make up the tragedies of the past, and the only thing we can do is look at how things are now and attempt to make them better. So white people, alive today, could help black people, alive today, rather than pawning it off on some organizations or policy of good will when they have no idea what will come of such things.

What would that look like?

Well, a more honest conversation than "How much money ought the government pay to this group?" I think, though I don't know.

How does habituation work if a person doesn't have any innate sense of leftness vs rightness? I'm asking. — frank

We have to be careful about what we claim to have an innate sense of, I think.

Scientifically speaking we'd be making a claim about what we bring to the table -- but it's not like we're born with beliefs about left/right. Rather, we are rewarded within a social environment when we complete tasks, such as identifying left/right in accord with the social world, because we're a social species who needs to be able to communicate in order to continue our biological cycle.

But "Habituation" need not be biological; it seems psychological but need not be that either. We are creatures of habit in that we repeat actions and through that repetition we learn more. I'd say that I know my left from my right because once upon a time someone told me which was what -- now I have a name for different sides of my body -- than anything else.

Could you lay that out in broad strokes? I don't think a description of chirality will distinguish right from left for you. For that, you need a reference. All reference points are chosen by us for our purposes. — frank

I think you'll find that once you explore the math you mentioned a little further. — frank

I don't think you need a reference as much as a habituation -- "reference frame" is easily handled in mathematics through transformations -- that's the basis of Einstein's paper on special relativity.

The points are chosen, yes -- we can describe space with polar or cartesian coordinates -- and they're tooled to our purposes. I agree with all that.

I don't understand how this relates to left/right-handedness. I think it's only habituation, and nothing else -- nothing about space at all.

It was: how do you tell your left from your right? I don't believe that answer is found in any math, but if you think it is, could you explain how? — frank

For Kant, at least, that there is a mathematical description -- much like Euclid or Pythagoras -- then you have a priori synthetic knowledge. The form of the intuition is structured by that; chirality gives a straightforward example from math which explains how we're able to differentiate left from right.

This isn't a bodily thing, though the question of how our body is able is interesting; I'm fairly certain that my left and right are habituated for the purpose of communicating. So no I don't think I changed my mind. When I say I gravitate towards "it" I mean this pragmatic theory of directionality, and want more arguments for why it should be thought of disappearing when we all die.

I don't think I uniquely endow space with directionality. I think directions come from the fact that each person has a POV from a body that's easily divided into quadrants. — frank

If directions come from the self, or cogito, then I don't think we can rely upon things like "quadrants" -- before Descartes there was no such concept, so the cogito is relevant to note -- mostly these are thoughts that are the result of analysis. Descartes broke the world down into bits to figure out relationships between the bits, and so arrived at I think, therefore I am as the one and only certainty -- from which, to his credit, he built back up to the familiar world from this certainty.

I'd say directions come about because it's useful to be able to know where to go and tell others' the same. "Left" and "right" probably don't even correspond to chirality, exactly, but chirality is the feature of the world that I wanted to point out as both a mathematical and empirical phenomenon which can account for the original question: not that everyone does it this way, but because we can do it this way I gravitate towards it and would prefer the point which seems harder to prove be shown -- the idea that directionality is somehow inhering in us alone, and when we die it all goes away.

Conceptually I think there's something there, but linking the concept to reality is... well, something I think about.