I'd be hesitant to go that far, but you're right about him being a Pietist.

He believed in faith, but wanted it to also be limited by reason, at least by my understanding.

It's his belief, which he doesn't claim is knowledge or necessary but just how he sees things, that we must believe in those three things -- god, immortality, free will -- that makes me think he's a protestant.

Maybe Christian is better. It's more the focus on interiority and belief that made me think protestant.

Yes, there can be mistakes when copying genes — Truth Seeker

If so then @unenlightened's point stands: there can be no mistakes when copying genes since we are not intelligently designed by a God or a team of Gods.

:up: :flower:

British barbers regularly cut their clients throats instead and dispose of their bodies in meat pies, to avoid this sort of difficulty. — unenlightened

The USians contract it out and sell the meat pies to various NGO's funded by grants who distribute it to those "in need"

I second Tom.

I still read you, though often can't respond.

I know we disagree on much, but that, to me, is the point of being here: to hear others.

Such behavior would never be tolerated by Kant scholars!

;) :D


Honestly I think it comes with the territory of reading "the greats" -- they are great because they inspire thought, and you don't really have much of a choice on how much charity or skepticism you want to apply to the greats on a first reading, especially when their idiom isn't easy to comprehend. It's enough of a feat to make it explicitly coherent that criticism of the idea becomes less interesting than what the writing can inspire or which interpretation is better.

Anyway, connections, connections, and I'm planning on coming back to this thread properly shortly - when the planting season and decorating season is past its peak. — unenlightened

Hegel has been here for a couple centuries, give or take, so I'm sure he'll be around after the more important things.

I look forward to reading your posts and talking Hegel.

(Sticking here to the bits where I have sincere commitments)

Have you given examples? I searched for "wants to be" on the first five pages on the thread and didn't find any occurrences. — Leontiskos

Not with those words, no -- to be fair to you I'm trying to make a position mostly to understand the idea, so I'm changing my position as I go along; I'm engaged in a creative endeavor. I don't have some firmly worked out idea here, though through the game we have managed to touch upon some possible interesting avenues of conversation.

The examples I have in mind are the angry man with his friend who he pushes aside, the guilty man apologizing, and the penitent man.

a person who is surrounded by people who shame them can feel guilt for that particular thing and want to change, or they can feel anger and define themselves against that group, and perhaps they can feel both at the same time in roughly similar proportion (and this is where the sense of free will comes from). Each leads to a kind of articulatable ethic that justifies the choice

at least in the sense of using "wants to be". In the scenario where he acts on anger "X wants to be alpha", or perhaps something more personal like the person insulted his wife: "X wants to be defender"

Where he backs down "X wants to be friend" -- he's promised, and friends keep promises.

Where he's guilty "X wants to be accepted"

Either the choice leads to the ethic or attachment to the ethic leads to the choice. It can't be both, because two things cannot simultaneously cause each other. — Leontiskos

Why not?

Gravitation works that way. The earth pulls on the apple, and the apple pulls on the earth -- it's just the earth is bigger so it's a more noticeable pull, but they simultaneously cause each other to meet.

But you aren't appealing to his anger, you are appealing to the justification of his anger, like I said <here>. This is not appeal to emotion; it is appeal to something which justifies an emotion. — Leontiskos

I'm appealing to his anger. It's the right kind of anger. The words we make up after the fact notice the distinction between the right kind and the wrong kind, but the words aren't the appeal.

But this might be back to philosophy of emotions.

So you agree with me that your theory of emotion-subjectivism is not a (cognitive) science? — Leontiskos

Yes. I'd say that one can be a cognitivist without thinking that ethics is a cognitive science. I don't think ethics is a science.

To lay my cards on the table, I don't really want to argue over a thesis that you don't hold, especially when that thesis has no authorities to legitimate it. It doesn't seem to me that it will be fruitful. I would rather talk about a thesis that you actually hold, such as error theory or a theory of emotion or a theory of moral 'oughts', etc. It would be different if the thesis had philosophical authorities behind it, but I don't see that moral subjectivism does. — Leontiskos

Heh, fair. I'll stick to that then. Though it started to feel like I'd be veering off too far from the OP, so now I have ideas for threads. (being a lazy sort, we'll see how long it takes before one gets posted ;) )

I am basically arguing:

P1: Ss relate to Ps in manner R.
P2: All Bs are Ss.
C: Bs relate to Ps in manner R.

Although, this isn’t completely accurate...but the accurate version is what I gave.

If there cannot exist a relation between Ss & Ps and every B is an S, then it plainly follows that the same relation cannot exist between Bs & Ps. — Bob Ross

Mkay, that makes sense to me now.

But then it seems to go back to whether or not the subjectivist would accept P1, or your rendition of P2. While P1 is uncontroversial in a common-sense way, a philosopher may have a reason to endorse truth-coherentism, or a difference in domain between stances and beliefs to claim that P2 is false, and yet All B's are still cognitive for all that.

It seems that if the subjectivist is a correspondence theorist, and they accept P2, then they have an inconsistency. But is that inconsistency fatal to the overall idea?

In my experience, usually not. Though it seems this idea is eluding me.

It seems incomplete: independent...of what? — Bob Ross

I was thinking we can stuff all those details into the name "Independent" -- but I'm mostly just after the basic form because I've been missing it, which you provided in your follow up.

P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is true; and there does not exist any s and p, such that s is a stance about p and s entails that p is false }

P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
{ For every b and p such that b is a belief about p, b is a stance about p. }

C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)
{ There does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is true; and there does not exist any b and p, such that b is a belief about p and b entails that p is false }

The rule of inference is from the existential and universal quantifiers: in short, if there cannot exist some relation for Xs and Ys and all Bs are Xs, then the same relation cannot exist for Bs and Ys. — Bob Ross

OK so...

P1: All B's are X's
P2: X's ~Relate-to Y's
C: B's ~Relate-to Y's

So rather than

All P
All Q

it's

All P
Some Q

(with a middle term relating them)

That work?

(And yes, the sentential form helped a lot -- I was struggling from the plain-language to the logic, and then I was struggling with the predicates because that's all beyond my actual education and only "gleaned" at this point -- usually I just translate predicates into single-variables or bound sentences so it's still propositional just not predicate. And I wasn't see the All/Some or the All/there-exists-a structure until you explicitly pointed it out)

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.


P1: ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ p) && ¬∃sp (Stance<s, p>→ ¬p)
P2: ∀bp ( Belief<b, p> → Stance<b, p> )
C1: ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ p) && ¬∃bp (Belief<b, p>→ ¬p)

Couple things to note:
1. The only part that isn’t just standard predicate logic, is that I am representing the predicate ‘stance’ with two typename arguments: position 1 is what is the stance and position 2 is what the stance is about (e.g., if s is a stance about p, then it is true that Stance<s, p>).

2. The transition, in sentential form, from a ‘something’ to a ‘proposition’ is implicit. As can be seen in the logic, it doesn’t matter if one sticks with ‘something’ or refers to specifically a ‘proposition’.

P2 is a definition; P1 is an assertion about the nature of a stance and how it relates to what it is about. — Bob Ross

How do you feel about this rendition:

All stances are independent
All beliefs are stances
All beliefs are independent

?

That makes sense to me.

I'm not sure what the rule of inference you're using in the formalization. It doesn't appear to follow to me.

The notes help though.

EDIT: Another thought I have is with respect to the domain. P1 seems generally uncontroversial -- our stances towards some proposition don't imply whether that proposition is true or false (although I think I'd carve out the weird sentences for other topics, like the Liar's). So a subjectivist could deny 2 on the basis that beliefs don't imply stances with respect to P -- the belief could be "Everyone deserves q", and the stance could be "As a member of Everyone, John deserves q"

The belief, in this case, while being clearly related to the stance, is different from the stance and so would not fall to the criticism that there's a contradiction.

It is not supposed to: 1 matches P2. P1 is more general: it is the major premise. — Bob Ross

OK, then maybe I'm back to saying it's an instance of begging the question, after all. :rofl: @Lionino

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

I'm (clearly) finding the argument hard to understand.

P1 reads like a definition to me. It defines that a stance-taken within the domain of true/false somethings has the property of independence with respect to that same something (be it propositions or objects, it doesn't matter -- just some true something and stance-taken)

P2 also reads like a definition to me. So in some sense it seems that the concepts, by definition, and through an informal logic, leads to C1. But what if we formalized a bit? How would it read? Syllogistically starting with "A" in P1 and "A" in P2 suggests that the major premise is "Some P" and the minor "Some Q", which is an invalid form.

How would you render it formally? Any logic works for me.

I'll keep it to this because it seems I'm not understanding so I don't want to go off on yet another tangent before I understand.

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

Rereading this argument -- your P1 doesn't match 1 from above it:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false. — Bob Ross

"Cognitive" doesn't necessitate truth-independence. The Liar's sentence, for instance: we can think "This sentence is false", meaning we can cognize it, but the truth, or falsity, of the Liar's sentence is wholly dependent upon how we interpret the sentence.

That we can cognize fantasy and falsity is part of the difficulty with realism.

Also, another thought: What if the MS was a coherentist on truth? In that case beliefs fit within an inferential web, and that web just is what truth is, so they'd claim to be a cognitivist while stating that they do believe that beliefs depend upon one another for their truth or falsity.

Well I tend to agree, but you are the one claiming that feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. :wink: — Leontiskos

I'm claiming that MS is consistent, at least, and making a steel-man attempt at making it plausible to its detractors. My pet theory is error theory just to put my cards out there, but I'm trying to think through the position and see if there's some way to render it coherent, and palatable to those on the other side as an example of the meta-ethic.

Capital-F Feelings are the truth-makers in this hypothetical meta-ethic. The sorts of examples I've given here are "X wants to be Y" -- the emotions arise because of the Feelings, to think of "emotions" as you do here:

Colloquially we have phrases to represent this, such as, "Do not be carried away by your emotions!" When we become pure patients, at the whim of our emotions, something has gone wrong. E-motions are moving forces which are meant to coordinate with our agency, not to override and destroy our agency. — Leontiskos

Feelings are attachments to people, things, ideals, propositions, states of mind, patterns, and, in some cases, morals. And I've also allowed that "Feelings" may be collective, in some sense, to accommodate things like legal and collective -- not just individual -- moral rules. It seems to me that this must be the motivation for the MS position because they want to retain that some moral propositions are true in the way that it's intuitively felt, but don't believe there is an objective science or something along those lines.

Mostly I'll be content with finding a coherent rendition, if there is one, that is accepted as an example by the OP.

If emotions are the things by which we are to know what to do, then what is the thing that tells us to not act on an emotion? — Leontiskos

Another emotion. Anger can arise from an attachment to a self-image as one who doesn't take any guff and being insulted. When a friend intervenes it can remind you of times you've felt guilt when losing your temper and help one to regain control.

Far from being separate from rationality I'd say emotions are part of rationality, so MS doesn't strike me as apparently incoherent. I'd claim that when Jesus expels the money-changers from the temple that he is enacting a rationality because his anger is justified.

Seems like an explicit thread on meta-ethics or the philosophy of emotion might be fun.

It's not an emotion, because emotions don't persuade, they overpower or incline. What I am assuming here is that the experience of the emotion is what constitutes the truth-maker. Of course the emotion-subjectivist could draw up an extrinsic map about which truths are "made" by which emotions, and that map might include, "Anger →
→
do not strike," but this is pretty weird given the fact that the experience of anger tells us to strike. Such a map apparently cannot be emotion-based if it is telling us to act contrary to emotion. (Anger is relevant because I do not think an emotion-based ethic would be able to restrain anger nearly as much as our common, rational ethics do.)

The point here is that whatever it is that establishes the hierarchy, it isn't emotion. Emotion does not do calculus. I am convinced that reason establishes the hierarchy, but I am content with the claim that whatever it is, it isn't emotion. This reduced claim seems sufficient to overcome emotion-subjectivism. — Leontiskos

We've identified a point of explicit divergence! :D

I see no problem in emotions establishing hierarchies on the basis of their intensity.

"Calculus" is confusing on my part -- I just meant in the generic sense where logical symbol manipulation or the operations of a computer are also calculus -- so it need not even be numeric, and can even be a philosophical calculus rather than something truly mathematical. Spinoza's Ethics comes to mind here.

I think this misses the point I have already made about emotion-as-sign vs. emotion-as-cause. To claim that ethics is just emotion-conditioning would be to reject ethics as a cognitive science. — Leontiskos

Isn't the MS doing that?

Though I wouldn't do it for the MS position, I don't think ethics is a cognitive science either. Another reason a meta-ethics thread might be interesting.

"I act this way because my emotions determine me, and my emotions are determined by the conditioning that my parents and society imposed, and their emotions were determined by the conditioning that was imposed upon them, ad infinitum." This is more a theory of emotional determinism than a theory of ethics, and as such it destroys the agency of the human being (as already noted). Ethics involves making choices, not just being pulled around by emotions. — Leontiskos

And another reason for a thread on the philosophy of emotion.

I don't believe emotion eliminates choice, for instance, so that'd be another reason I don't see the MS position as necessarily wrong.

There is causal confusion at play, here. Does the choice lead to the ethic, or does attachment to the ethic lead to the choice? I think the cognitive aspect of ethics is again being trampled, especially if the attachment leads to the choice. Plato would say that reason (choice, deliberation) can be subordinated to the passions, but that this is a form of passion-tyranny. — Leontiskos

Couldn't it be both? Even for Plato -- if one is ruled by Passion then one would choose a Passionate ethic, just as the one who is ruled by Reason chooses the rational ethic, yes?

But what is the "utterance" which can be reduced to, "One ought not lose their temper"? On your theory of emotion-subjectivism an emotion is supposedly translated into moral propositions of this sort, but I'm still waiting for you to cash out this claim that the emotion is the truth-maker for the moral proposition. Prima facie, the claim doesn't make any sense. What is the emotion that translates into the moral proposition, "One ought not lose their temper"? — Leontiskos

"I'm sorry, I won't do it again" or something like that works. The emotion would be guilt. The Feeling would be "I want to be accepted by my friends".

You worried that I am divorcing reason from emotion, but here it seems that you are the one doing that. You contrast four things with philosophy/the cognitive part and assume that they are devoid of reason: recognition, shame, anger, and relief. I don't think emotions are separable from reason in this way. See for example my analysis of fear <here>. — Leontiskos

If they aren't separable, which I agree with, then in speaking about the emotions I am also speaking about reason. They come as a pair.

Recognition requires reason -- I have to see myself, and I have to know what sort of person I want to be, and I have to see that I am not that.

Shame requires reason -- I have to want to please someone(even if that someone is only myself), I have to be able to perceive "good" and "bad" actions

Anger -- I have to be able to recognize a before-and-after of myself. The anger arises because you no longer feel the shame due to forgiveness, but it's a conflict between the old and the new self. One must be able to determine what that old and new self is, which requires a fairly robust set of moral beliefs with emotional attachments.

Relief -- The trial is over and I'll remember the guilt so as to not have to go through it again. This requires memory, a knowledge of narrative, and the idea that one can undergo some kind of change from the act to a person who is forgiven.


The reason all that requires reason is that a person can also, in the same situation, see themselves as justified in their anger, and the person who gets in the way is only an obstacle in the way of what's fair. That's not a friend anymore, that's a pesky and ignorant person getting in the way of what's fair!

Do you see how this isn't a divorce of reason from emotion?

Also... another thread here lol.

I think a shift is occurring here. Instead of trying to support moral propositions in the way that standard ethics does, the moral subjectivist turns to abductive ethical reasoning and combines it with the assumption that whatever best supports moral propositions, sufficiently supports moral propositions. I think the reason moral subjectivism is basically non-existent in professional philosophy is because it is recognized that even if nothing supports moral propositions better than attitudes, it remains the case that attitudes are insufficient to support moral propositions. In that case one turns away from moral cognitivism and classical ethics. — Leontiskos

Oh, it could also just be the hot new thing. You never know.

I just like to explore ideas, be they professional or not, though.

That would no longer be MS, would it? — Lionino

That could be, and @Bob Ross would be a better adjudicator since I clearly didn't understand the distinction up front -- I've tried to make the case to him that this would still count on the basis of the wiki articles criteria for MS since the truth of these propositions is still dependent upon the person's attitude in some necessary way while maintaining some cognitive component. Here thinking "feelings/world" is that our feelings being a part of us, and us being a part of the world makes the feelings, in some sense, a world-reference, though not in the usual straightforward way.

Reducing "oughts" to an is-statement about the speakers moral feelings, however their genuine ethic would define it, and an imperative, so that there is a "binding" part seems to cover the basis of true moral statements, cognitive, and subjective in that it depends upon attitudes (personal, legal, tribal...)

What establishes the hierarchy? What determines when the level of disgust is too high to be tolerated? — Leontiskos

I don't think we know that -- if so the statements would belike Hume's passions which come across as a sort of calculus.

But we don't have the calculus of attachment just yet. Your question is like asking people before Newton "What makes the planets turn like that?", where I'd be totally unqualified to even guess at it :D


Some people want to be better, some don't, some ethics don't even talk in terms of these hierarchies of disgust. In terms of meta-ethics I think that the particular articulation of an ethic is what will determine the hierarchy, though in reality I think the hierarchies are established by the clash of attachments, however that cashes out.

As a kind of story-example to get a gist across:

a person who is surrounded by people who shame them can feel guilt for that particular thing and want to change, or they can feel anger and define themselves against that group, and perhaps they can feel both at the same time in roughly similar proportion (and this is where the sense of free will comes from). Each leads to a kind of articulatable ethic that justifies the choice, so it really would depend upon whether or not the person is attached to this or that ethic if they speak the truth (under the rendition that ought-statements are nothing more than this reduction to an is-statement of attachment, and an imperative, which is what my next chunk is on) -- the MS would only have to find some way to attach any ethical statement's truth or false value necessarily to the attitudes of people.

If what are at stake are truly cognitive truths, then emotion itself cannot establish hierarchies or determine thresholds.

That depends upon what truly cognitive truths are.

If the truth of all moral language just is the day-to-day operations of living, though, then I think emotions are exactly how hierarchies are established. Fear, guilt, and shame are powerful motivators in moral codes, and they are reinforced by social hierarchies established by emotional attachments.

In our example the man wouldn't say "One ought not lose their temper" -- that's goofy as hell for someone to say when they are contrite or angry or whatever genuine expression towards an ethic, and a real person's utterance would express this proposition differently. "One ought not lose their temper" is the proposition which the utterance can be reduced to, for the purposes of making the MS position philosophically palatable, "I feel disgust when I lose my temper and I want to be a better person and everyone else shouldn't either" -- the creed after this can include things like "Because anger hurts others, and we are commanded to love others"

The redemption story is one of recognition, shame, anger, and relief. The cognitive part is all the philosophy, but the reason people seek redemption isn't because of the cognitive part.

It is reason which does all of this, and therefore reason is implicitly assumed in the background. The person who has a hierarchy of emotions has already gone beyond appeal to emotions.

How do you know?

I don't really know what a sentence like this means, and because of that I dislike the word "just." :razz: — Leontiskos

Sorry.

Looking at the wiki definition ---

Ethical subjectivism (also known as moral subjectivism and moral non-objectivism)[1] is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

(1) Ethical sentences express propositions.
(2) Some such propositions are true.
(3) The truth or falsity of such propositions is ineliminably dependent on the (actual or hypothetical) attitudes of people.[2][3]



3's the proposition under dispute for you, I believe.

So for any true ethical proposition the MS would try to demonstrate that its truth is dependent upon the attitudes of people, and the same with any false ethical proposition.

I think that the dependency could even include communal dependency -- resolving conflict would be an interesting place to explore for counter-examples of 3. I think the plausible part of the meta-ethic is that statements of ethics have practical, relational components when they are being followed so there is a sense, if all ethical statements are social creeds and nothing else, then the truth of them, if ethical statements are cognitive, would have to depend upon the attitudes of people because what else is there?

More simply, I don't think feelings are truth-makers for moral propositions. "I should smash this guy across the face." "Why?" "Because I have a feeling of anger." This is incomplete. The feeling of anger does not in itself make the moral proposition true. It may be true, and the anger may signal its truth, but it may also be false, and the anger may be a consequence of stupidity or error. The anger itself is not a truthmaker. — Leontiskos

I think any particular ethic can parse attachments into the good ones and the bad ones, and can parse any emotion into the positive and the negative. So in order for "Because I have a feeling of anger" to be judged as incomplete we have to have some basis of evaluation (which could be a system, or a creed, or a vague desire to be something else, or...)

But most ethics don't justify violence on the basis of anger at an individual. The attachments preached are love, loyalty, and so forth. Striking out of anger is usually shamed, unless there is some justification for the anger, so of course -- due to our attachment to "One ought not strike out of anger" we will follow that to its logical implication and also say to our risible friend "That's not a good reason, let's go cool off outside"

"P2: A feeling is a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition." Again, I don't see how feelings have any more power to make moral propositions true or false than beliefs have. — Leontiskos

A feeling isn't a non-cognitive stance taken towards the trueness or falseness of a proposition. I think the concrete example I gave showed that -- since we're speaking in terms of meta-ethics "Feelings" can take on many interpretations within a particular ethic.

So an attachment to duty, for instance, may cultivate a desire to restrain oneself, or an attachment to family may cultivate a desire to be loyal and fulfill your family role. In each of these scenarios feelings will come into conflict with these moral feelings, but that doesn't change the meta-ethical frame -- any meta-ethical frame worth considering should be able to consider persons who are less inclined to be dutiful and persons who are more inclined to be dutiful, and everything else that's out there in the wild world of humanity.

The Moral Subjectivist would just claim that the truth of the moral statements will come from those who speak those statements and their truth or falsity of their various commitments: you can spot rational inconsistencies in any creed (the cognitive part), but the reason people enact them is due to some attachment, which can include a moral attachment like the example of the person who wants to get over his anger to become better. These sorts of feelings are just as much feelings as the ones which are more commonly named, in this broad use of "Feelings"

I don't hold that reason and emotion map to the objective and the subjective. — Leontiskos

Cool. I should have said that I don't think of reason and emotion in opposition -- I don't see reason or emotion as primary with the other secondary, although where you end that seems like we might agree there.

One way to access Plato's point is to note that an agent can marshal and include emotions within their agency, but someone who is dominated by their emotions is to that extent not an agent at all. They are a patient (hence, "passions"). To grant emotions autonomy in themselves is to have cut oneself off from the ability to distinguish a proper relation to emotion from an improper relation to emotion, and it strikes me as self-evident that there are proper and improper ways to relate to emotion.

I would think that the Moral Subjectivist could agree that being dominated by emotions is a bad thing, though.

Rendering Plato's point in MS for someone who struggles with temper, say: The MS beleives "One ought not act on anger" which means "I feel disgust with myself when I act angry, and I want to be a better person", and if they do, in fact, feel disgust with themselves in that moment and want to be a better person then "One ought not act on anger" is true when that speaker says it.

Given that it's an ought-statement usually the implication is that the speaker holds this advice for others as well, though I don't think that part is truth-apt since it seems to be more of an imperitive than a statement; but I see the rendition of ought-statements as statements about one's feelings about oneself and what they like to be as being plausible interpretations of moral statements, so it seems like I can see a plausible version of MS.
(EDIT: Comically, this reducing ought-statements to the conjunction of an is-statement of a specific domain and an imperative means that while we cannot get an ought from an is, we can get an is from an ought)

More generally: we are simultaneously agents and patients; the emotivist excludes the former and the rationalist excludes the latter.

I like your general statement. It seems to get along with the notion that reason and emotion aren't at odds, except you'd say that agents and patients aren't at odds.

I think we only become patients upon seeking a cure. Before that we may be sick, but we're not patients -- and I think that desire for a cure is an important part of any rational path to self-improvement. At the very least in terms of actually being successful in changing rather than listing things that we should be doing (but won't).

\

P2 would be "A belief is a cognitive stance taken..."

and P3 would be "Feelings make moral propositions true or false"

The feeling is the non-cognitive truth-maker of the cognitive belief.

I'll try to be clearer and shorter.

Under moral subjectivism, the following is true:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.

These two statements are inconsistent with each other, and here’s a quick syllogistic demonstration of why:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent. — Bob Ross

P1 isn't begging the question as much as it's how MS is being rendered -- the MS under attack believes that beliefs are true or false, and the value of T/F is not dependent upon another belief (or itself).

It's 2 that's inconsistent with 1, by the setup. The MS holds that beliefs can and cannot make moral propositions true. But it can be modified pretty easily by noting that 2 can be changed to "feelings/the world make moral propositions true or false", and then there's no contradiction -- at least as I'm seeing it now.

I think it's mistaken but not necessarily inconsistent. — Leontiskos

I'm less certain about it being mistaken, though that does not in turn mean I'm attracted to it either.

I'm still in the "playing around" phase.

I would want to say that emotion often reinforces duty, but does not cause duty. For example, a friendship implies duties to the friend, and there will be an emotional reinforcement of this reality, but it does not follow that the duty derives from the emotion. In this case you have a rational emotion, because it is reinforcing a true duty. But given that there are also irrational emotions, emotion is not the per se thing that informs practical reason. We legitimately act from emotion-as-a-sign, but not from emotion-as-a-cause. We should say, "This emotion probably signifies that I have a good reason to do such-and-such," not, "This emotion proves that I should do such-and-such." A key problem with emotion-based moral theories is that they fail to make sense of the fact that moral obligations sometimes require us to ignore the emotions at play. Going back to Plato, the passions are not primary; they should not constitute the charioteer. They are secondary, and as such can be well-formed or malformed. — Leontiskos

I don't like to separate reason from emotion in such a hard-and-fast manner. There's a difference, but it's more of a difference because we've marked it in English -- the Subjective and the Objective -- but I think there's too much philosophical hay made out of the distinction.

Neither the passions nor the mind are primary -- they form a unity that is the judger.

I took the tone of the thread to be serious — Fooloso4

Fair, I could be the one being too insulting here -- I like these exercizes, but I don't think the categorization of ethical stances is really too serious. Just kind of fun to think through.

Though every once and again I think the categorical exercise can help you trip across something you didn't think of. In a sense the "lightness" allows one to look at what we tend to think of in too serious a manner and look for its flaws more easily.

The original question you are supposed to be addressing is whether or not moral judgements are propositional, true, and objective; and not whether or not people treat moral judgments as if they are propositional based off of their desires. — Bob Ross

I'd say the position I'm forging here believes that moral judgments are propositional, true, and subjective.

"One ought X" means "I feel commitment to Y" (be it due to disgust or love, it doesn't matter, it only matters that there's an attachment).

So "One ought X" can be true or false on the basis of whether or not the speaker feels commitment to Y because that's all that "One ought X" means -- it may look like it's talking about these objective oughts, and due to being in the form of a statement it's true or false, but the statement is actually about feelings of commitment, and it also acts as a sort of imperative: Not only I feel, but because "One ought..." I also feel others should too.

The feeling isn't a proposition, but neither are red cups propositions -- red cups make "The cup is red" true, and likewise, under this rendition, feelings make "One ought X" true, so it fulfills the requirements of being propositional and true, just not being objective -- hence Subjectivism.

I am not following, I guess. Are you saying that moral judgments are propositional, but that they are made true by desires? E.g., "one ought not X" is true or false relative to whether or not "I desire one ought not X"? — Bob Ross

Yes.

If so, then that is plagued by the same issue: a desire about a proposition cannot make it true; and that's why emotivists reject that moral judgments are propositional---they have to.

I don't think the desire is about the proposition, though. In the abstract it's just a desire -- but the object of desire is not the proposition, but rather what the proposition is about. What justifies "One ought X" is that the speaker is sincerely committed to what the proposition is about -- it's the emotional commitment that makes it true, under this rendition.

So what say you?

What you described, is that a belief about a proposition can make that proposition true or false. — Bob Ross

The proposition is "One ought X"

The feeling is not a proposition, and since all beliefs are propositional, the proposition is not being justified by a belief -- the justification is non-cognitive, but the belief, that one ought X, is cognitive.

I think valence of value is confounded by many factors, such as, whether one 'likes' or 'dislikes' something to be valued. Otherwise, it may also depend on the inherentness of a quality or attribute to the ascription of value. Hope that doesn't sound too vague — Shawn

Nope! That helps. To summarize what I'm understanding:

Valence of value is known by liking or disliking or perception of intrinsic value or willing some value

Yes, well I don't have all the answers to your question; but, I can attempt to say that the study of value would lead a person to believe that what they value is in fact a good "thing."
On the contrary I'm hesitant to say that there's a direct correspondence between X and Y. So, what do you think about the association between X and whether it is intrinsically related to Y, as I'm getting hung up on intrinsic goods which have a strict relationship, and instrumental or extrinsic goods with a weaker relationship... — Shawn

I want to reformulate with the above now. I was confused and so wrote some confusing things.

Yet, I find it hard to believe that without knowledge of valence of value, how would anyone know how to appreciate or cherish the good? — Shawn

What if the good is different from knowing value?

That seems to be Petrarch's point.

The good layperson without that knowledge still cherishes good even without that understanding because they just are good -- it's a different sort of knowing from axiological knowing, even in the monastic sense.

If you take a glance at how transient happiness is, then the very notion of what one values would serve as a compass in the fleeting moments of cherishing and loving the good.

I think it does, but the question is -- do these values, or commitments, equate to a knowledge? Or are they just convictions?

I don't know that you deviated from cognitivism. You spoke of "a cognitive expression of feeling," which is a bit opaque but still prima facie cognitive. — Leontiskos

True, but I could see how I slipped from cognitivism at the beginning into emotivism at the end when going back and re-reading, so it was muddled and confusing. I think I'm being clear now.

My point was that whether we are talking about subjectivism (cognitivism) or emotivism (non-cognitivism), they both seem to fail for the same reason. — Leontiskos

I don't think they are truth-makers either. I just don't see how feelings confer moral obligations. I think the burden of proof is on the person who claims that their mere feelings establish moral obligations of some kind. — Leontiskos

Are you just playing devil's advocate, or do you actually believe that feelings can make moral propositions true? I mean, I don't usually say, "I wonder if I have an obligation to do such-and-such? Let me check in with Moliere's feelings to know for sure..." :razz: — Leontiskos

I'm playing with the idea, yeah, but I also genuinely doubt that the position must be internally inconsistent -- usually there's a way to accommodate criticism.

I think people take up duties out of emotional commitments to something or someone, and if they cease to have that emotional tie then the duty loses its appeal and what was a commitment becomes an ideal.

So, in a practical sense at least, our feelings are very important when it comes to moral propositions and maintaining duty.

I think the problem is that those who attempt to reduce moral deliberation to some set of self consistent propositions forget that what is at issue is not an abstracted analysis of the truth of moral propositions, but how our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think. — Fooloso4

How our lives and those of others are benefited and harmed by what we say and do and think is certainly more important to my mind than these exercises in categorization.

But we don't need to be too serious all the time, and there's something fun in the exercise, I think

According to Wikipedia ethical subjectivism is cognitive-propositional, and I have found this to be the case among self-professed subjectivists. I don't think you are disputing this even though your thesis draws near to emotivism, but here is the problem I see with subjectivism and emotivism:

Moral propositions are (meant to be) binding upon oneself and others
Subjectivist and emotivist propositions are in no way binding upon oneself and others
Therefore, subjectivist and emotivist propositions are not moral propositions

(I.e. Subjectivism and emotivism are therefore not moral theories, because they fail to achieve normativity.)

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. Feelings do not seem to be adequate to justify moral propositions. Going back to the OP, I would say that it is not only beliefs that are inadequate to justify moral propositions, but that feelings are also inadequate. — Leontiskos

Thanks for the correction. So a subjectivist must be cognitivist. I didn't understand that.

EDIT: Oh, regarding the end -- what makes feelings inadequate? And what if they aren't justifiers so much as truth-makers?

What you just described is moral non-cognitivism (e.g., emotivism); and NOT moral subjectivism. You have abandoned moral subjectivism for a different position; which, prima facie, is fine but does not contend with my OP. — Bob Ross

Got it.

Then consider this rendition that's not quite emotivism, but is an attempt at reformulating the thesis to avoid your contradiction.

The cognitive aspect is the truth of moral propositions.

Truth isn't a truth-maker, though. In the same way that states of affairs make statements true (but the state of affairs isn't truth) so goes it that the sentiments make moral propositions true.

The moral proposition is still true, but truth is not an emotion, and so it's perfectly fine to claim that emotions are the truth-makers of moral propositions.

"α" is an inconsistent position for a moral subjectivist to hold (and this is the main point of the OP): a proposition cannot be made true or false relative to a belief, and this is why they have to rewrite it as "I believe <...>" as they can't evaluate coherently "<...>" relative to a belief.

For a moral subjectivist to be consistent, they will have to deny that "<...>" is a moral proposition and hold, instead, that "I believe <...>" is the moral proposition. At this point, "β", they have defeated their own position: they were supposed to demonstrating that "<...>" is true relative to a belief and NOT "I believe <...>".

Being that "I believe one ought not torture babies" is "one ought not torture babies"

Those can't be equal: they are obviously not the same proposition. A person who holds this, does not understand what propositions are. "1 + 1 = 2" != "I believe 1 + 1 = 2".

"I believe one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition

Yes, if they do this, then, like I stated above, they have defeated they own position: they were supposed to be arguing that "one ought not torture babies" is a moral proposition and NOT "I believe <...>". — Bob Ross

The internally inconsistent part, is that, in a nutshell, a moral subjectivist claims that moral propositions in the traditional sense (e.g., "one ought not torture babies for fun") can be true or false relative to a belief about it; and results in an inconsistent view, for the vast majority of moral subjectivists, of the nature of a belief and a proposition. The inconsistency is exemplified easily in the way that moral subjectivists readily convert moral propositions into propositions about beliefs while incoherently maintaining that the original moral proposition has been preserved. — Bob Ross

Under moral subjectivism, the following is true:

1. A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition; and
2. Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.

These two statements are inconsistent with each other, and here’s a quick syllogistic demonstration of why:

P1: A stance taken on the trueness or falseness of something, is independent of the trueness or falseness of that something.
P2: A belief is a (cognitive) stance taken on the trueness or falseness of a proposition.
C1: Therefore, a belief about a proposition cannot make that proposition true or false.

P3: Beliefs make moral propositions true or false.
P4: C1 and P3 being true are logically contradictory.
C2: Therefore, moral subjectivism is internally inconsistent.

In short, if a belief is a (cognitive) disposition towards whether or not a proposition is true or false; then it plainly follows that beliefs do not make propositions true or false. Thusly, moral propositions cannot be true or false relative to cognitive dispositions. — Bob Ross

Well, the whole idea behind moral subjectivism being internally inconsistent is that they take (1) beliefs (which are stances) to make propositions true or false, while conceding, in their own rewriting of the propositions, that (2) propositions cannot be made true or false by beliefs; which is self-evident when they rewrite "one ought not torture babies" as "I believe one ought not torture babies".

I don't think that begs the question, but I see why you would think that. — Bob Ross

OK, I have a better idea of what you're saying now -- it's not begging the question, but this is your explicit interpretation of Moral Subjectivism, and you are drawing out implications of these two beliefs which Moral Subjectivists hold to show how they are contradictory.

I think the easier rejoinder might be to let go of one or the other belief, if they agree with the argument, but redefine Moral Subjectivism in a palatable way -- for instance, a Moral Subjectivist will often say that it's not beliefs about the Moral Proposition which make it true, but our sentiments which make it true -- there's not a cognitive justification so much as a cognitive expression of feeling. What makes "One ought not murder the innocent" true is that when a person says

(1) "One ought not murder the innocent",

that statements means

(2) "I feel like murdering the innocent is abhorrent"

where the cognitivist is being confused by the shape of the sentence being in subject-predicate form, the non-cognitivist will insist that these sentences, though they look like statements about oughts, they are statements about feelings, and so the feelings -- the subjectivism -- are what make morals true.

Yet, I find it hard to believe that without knowledge of valence of value, how would anyone know how to appreciate or cherish the good?. — Shawn

Would this relationship hold generally: if and only if a person does not have knowledge of valence of X, then it's hard to explain how they have an appreciation of or cherishing of the Y.

Where, in your example, the variables are set to
X=value
Y=the good

?

If you take a glance at how transient happiness is, then the very notion of what one values would serve as a compass in the fleeting moments of cherishing and loving the good

I agree with your sentiment here. I think what I'm hung up on is whether or not the compass in times of suffering -- what one values -- is a knowledge, and also I'm uncertain what "valence" might mean in relation to value which is why I tried to break out the sentence from the topic at hand to understand your assertion; is there another example for X and Y in the above which would fit within the sentence, or another way to put the sentence with another example?

Or, really, I'm asking after what all these terms mean in relation to one another, or if there's a simpler way to state the belief you find hard to see as false.

So, I take this as a analogy that was provided of the nutritionist. — Shawn

I think Petrarch's different here in that the nutritionist example differentiates goodness from knowledge of goodness, but the layperson ought visit the expert in order to better their chances of becoming good -- that is, there is a knowledge that may not be necessary, and is certainly different from the activity, but it enables that activity.

Petrarch, as I'm understanding the letter -- I'm not expert on him by any means -- prioritizes this activity to the point that even though he clearly loves letters(knowledge), he would trade this knowledge without hesitation for being good. There's a different priority there which, if one could be good without knowledge then it seems one could cherish and appreciate that goodness even though they have no knowledge of the valence of the good.

I wanted it all in context, but I should highlight the portion that's most relevant to the topic and why I started looking it up in the first place:

However, at the same time they claim that I am altogether illiterate,that I am a plain uneducated fellow. This is just the opposite of what men of letters have stated when judging me, I do not care with how much truth. I do not make much of what these,friends deprive me of, if only what they concede me were true.

Most gladly should I divide between me and these brothers of mine the inheritance of Mother Nature and heavenly Grace, so that they would all be men of letters and I a good man. I should wish to know nothing of letters or just so much as would be expedient for the daily praise of God.

His friends criticize him for merely being a good man who does not care for truth. The bits on envy, so I read the letter at least, are very much Petrarch's interpretation of his friends. When I think about what his friends are saying it sounds like his friends are bragging.

But the point with respect to studying axiology I was thinking of is in Petrarch's insistence that being lettered and educated isn't as important as being a good man. Something to note here is how literacy wasn't widespread at the time since this predates the Gutenberg press, and also that Petrarch is clearly a man of letters in this time as demonstrated by his writing. So he's not insulting education or its value, but insisting that it's not the same as being a good man, and that this is more important than being lettered.

Okiedoke.

In that case I agree with:

My criticism is that P1 begs the question. — Lionino

What is of the highest good can only be defined by how you or a group of people value it, no? — Shawn

I suppose the study of value, or axiology, would lead one to appreciate what to value as good. That's why, I am led to believe that axiology must be one of the highest goods, to a philosopher or even a layman. — Shawn

Upon further thought, what I mean by axiology not being exclusive to the philosopher, is meant in not all philosophers being the disciples of Plato that would be well versed in the study of value and goodness of the objects endowed with value. — Shawn

This morning I went chasing a quote and dug up this:
On His Own Ignorance And That of Many Others II, Petrarch

The quote I had in mind was "It is better to want the good than to know the truth", which you can see this English translation doesn't translate it as that, probably going for something less catchy but more accurate :D. But it's relevant, and I thought it'd be cool to bring something textual to think through these questions -- and it's fairly short because it's a letter so it's not a big ask, perfect for TPF. (EDIT: After all, if axiology is the highest good, then we ought to be doing some studying)

This is a letter Petrarch wrote which deals with these themes of knowledge and value -- which seems to relate in that your thesis is that the study of ethics is the highest good, and also because he's clearly more on the medical-type philosophy side.

I'm going to paste the part of the letter which skips the parts that were necessary at the time: the whipping of the self before getting to the point, and the praise of God for loving this insignificant worm after the point just so we can talk about the point and not get lost in the genre. It was the beginning of the Rennaissance so writing conventions differed from ours, plus it is just a letter which has a nice story for thought in it.

Tell me what you think of it whenever you have the time, if you'd like.
*****

As had come to be their custom, there called on me these four friends whose names you need not be told, since you know them all. Moreover, an inviolable law of friendship forbids mentioning the names of friends when you are speaking against them, even if they do not behave like friends in a particular case. They came in pairs, as equality of character or some chance bound them together. Occasionally all four of them came, and came with astonishingly winning manners, with a gay expression on their faces, and started an agreeable conversation. I have no doubt they came with good and pious intentions. However, through some cracks an unfortunate grudge had crept into hearts that deserve a better guest. It is incredible, though it is true--if only it were not too true! The man whom they wish not only good health and happiness, whom they not only love but respect, honor by their visit and venerate, to whom they try with greatest effort to be not only kind but obedient and generous--this very same person is the object of their envy. So full of patent and hidden frailties is human nature.

What is it that they envy me? I do not know, I must admit, and I am amazed when I try to find out. Certainly it is not wealth, for every single one of them surpasses me as much in wealth as "the British whale is bigger than the dolphin," as that man has said. Moreover, they wish me even greater wealth. They know that what I have is moderate, not my own property but to be shared with others. It is not magnificent but very modest without haughtiness and pomp. They know that it really does not deserve any envy. They will not envy me my friends.

The greater part of them death has taken from me, and I have the habit of sharing them willingly, just like everything else with other friends. They cannot envy me the shapeliness of my body. If there was ever such a thing, it has vanished entirely in the course of the years that vanquish all. By God's overflowing and preserving grace it is still quite satisfactory for my present age, but it has certainly long since ceased to be enviable. And if it were still as it was once, could I forget or could I then have forgotten the poetic sentence I drank in as a small boy; "Shapeliness is a frail possession," or the words of Solomon in the book in which he teaches the young: "Gracefulness is deceitful and beauty is vain." How should they then envy me what I do not have, what I held in contempt while I had it, and what I would despise now to the utmost were it given back to me, having learned and experienced how unstable it is? They cannot even envy me learning and eloquence! Learning, they declare, I have absolutely none. Eloquence, if I has is any, they despise according to the modern philosophic fashion. They reject it as unworthy of a man of letters. Thus only "infantile inability to speak" and perplexed stammering, "wisdom" trying hard to keep one eye open and "yawning drowsily," as Cicero calls it, is held in good repute nowadays. They do not call to mind "Plato, the most eloquent of all men," and--let me omit the others--"Aristotle sweet and mild," but whom they made trite. From Aristotle's ways they swerve, taking eloquence to be an obstacle and a disgrace to philosophy, while he considered it a mighty adornment and tried to combine it with philosophy, "prevailed upon," it is asserted, "by the fame of the Orator Isocrates."

Not even virtue can they envy me, though it is beyond doubt the best and most enviable of all things. To them it seems worthless--I believe because it is not inflated and puffed up with arrogance. I should wish to possess it, and, indeed, they grant it to me unanimously and willingly. Small things they have denied me, and this very greatest possession they lavish upon me as a small gift. They call me a good man, even the best of men. If only I were not bad, not the worst in God's judgment! However, at the same time they claim that I am altogether illiterate,that I am a plain uneducated fellow. This is just the opposite of what men of letters have stated when judging me, I do not care with how much truth. I do not make much of what these,friends deprive me of, if only what they concede me were true.

Most gladly should I divide between me and these brothers of mine the inheritance of Mother Nature and heavenly Grace, so that they would all be men of letters and I a good man. I should wish to know nothing of letters or just so much as would be expedient for the daily praise of God. But, alas, I fear I shall be disappointed in this my humble desire just as they will be in their arrogant opinion. At any rate, they assert that I have a good character and am very faithful in my friendship, and in this last assertion they are not mistaken, unless I am.

This, incidentally, is the reason why they count me among their friends. They are not prevailed upon to do so by my efforts in studying the honorable arts or the hope ever to hear and learn truth from me. Thus it comes plainly to what Augustine tells of his Ambrose, saying, "I began to love him, not as a teacher of truth, but as a man who was kind to me"; or what Cicero feels about Epicurus: Cicero approves of his character in many passages, while he everywhere condemns his intellect and rejects his doctrine.

Since all this is the case, it may be doubtful what they envy me, though there is no doubt that they do envy me something. They do not well conceal it and do not curb their tongues, which are urged by an inward impulse. In men otherwise neither unbalanced nor foolish this is nothing but a clear sign of undisciplined passion. Provided that they are envious of me as they obviously are, and that there is no other object of their envy--the latent virus is expanding by itself at any rate. For there is one thing, one empty thing, that they envy me, however trifling it may be: my name and what fame I have already won within my lifetime--greater fame perhaps than would be due to my merits or in conformity with the common habit which but very rarely celebrates living men. It is upon this fame that they have fixed their envious eyes. If only I could have done without it both now and often before! I remember that it has done me harm more often than good, winning me quite a few friends but also countless enemies. It has happened to me as to those who go into battle in a conspicuous helmet though with but little strength: they gain nothing from the dazzling brightness of this chimera except to be struck by more adversaries. Such pesti- lence was once but too familiar to me during my more flourishing years; never was there one so troublesome as that which has now blazed up. I am now an anvil too soft for young men's wars and for assuming such burdens, and this pestilence revives unexpectedly from a quarter from which I do not deserve it and did not suspect it either, at a moment when it should have been long since overcome by my moral conduct or consumed by the course of time. But I will go on: They think they are great men, and they are certainly rich, all of them, which is the only mortal greatness nowadays. They feel, although many people deceive themselves in this respect, that they have not won a name and cannot hope ever to win one if their foreboding is right. Among such sorrows they languish anxiously; and so great is the power of evil that they stick out their tongues and sharpen their teeth like mad dogs even against friends and wound those whom they love. Is this not a strange kind of blindness, a strange kind of fury? In just this manner the frantic mother of Pentheus tears her son to pieces and the raving Hercules his infant children. They love me and all that is mine, with the single exception of my name--which I do not refuse to change. Let them call me Thersites or Choerilus, or whatever name they prefer, provided I thus obtain that this honest love suffers not the slightest restriction.They are all the more ablaze and aglow with a blind fire, since they are all such fervent scholars, working indefatigably all night long.

However, the first of them has no learning at all--I tell you only what you know--the second knows a little; the third not much; the fourth--I must admit--not a little but in such confused and undisciplined order and, as Cicero says, "with so much frivolity and vain boasting that it would perhaps be better to know nothing." For letters are instruments of insanity for many, of arrogance for almost everyone, if they do not meet with a good and well-trained mind. Therefore, he has much to tell about wild animals, about bird and fishes: how many hairs there are in the lion's mane; how many feathers in the hawk's tail; with how many arms the cuttlefish clasps a shipwrecked man; that elephants couple from behind and are pregnant for two years; that this docile and vigorous animal, the nearest to man by its intelligence, lives until the end of the second or third century of its life; that the phoenix is consumed by aromatic fire and revives after it has been burned; that the sea urchin stops a ship,however fast she is driving along, while it is unable to do anything once it is dragged out of the waves; how the hunter fools the tiger with a mirror; how the Arimasp attacks the griffin with his sword; how whales turn over on their backs and thus deceive the sailors; that the newborn of the bear has as yet no shape; that the mule rarely gives birth, the viper only once and then to its own disaster; that moles are blind and bees deaf; that alone among all living beings the crocodile moves its upper jaw.

All this is for the greater part wrong, as has become manifest in many similar cases when animals were brought into our part of the world. The facts have certainly not been investigated by those who are quoted as authorities for them; they have been all the more promptly believed or boldly invented, since the animals live so far from us. And even if they were true, they would not contribute anything whatsoever to the blessed life. What is the use--I beseech you--of knowing the nature of quadrupeds,fowls, fishes, and serpents and not knowing or even neglecting man's nature, the purpose for which we are born, and whence and whereto we travel?

These and like matters I have often discussed with these "scribes" who are most learned, not in the Law of Moses and the Christian Law, but, as they flatter themselves, in the Aristotelian law. I did so more frankly than they were accustomed to hear and perhaps with less caution: talking with friends, I did not think of any harm that might derive from it. At first they were astonished, then they became angry, and, as they felt that my words were directed against their sect and the laws of their father, they set up a council among themselves to condemn for the crime of ignorance--not me whom they undoubtedly love-- out my fame which they hate. If only they had called others to this court! Then there would perhaps have been opposition to the sentence they intended to pronounce. However, to keep the verdict harmonious and unanimous, only these four convened. They discussed many different matters concerning the absent and undefended defendant--not because they disagreed in their opinions, for they all felt the same way and intended to say the same thing, but they were arguing with each other and against their own sentence after the manner of expert judges. Thus they wanted to render a decision with more color by sifting and squeezing the truth through the narrow sieve of contradictions.

As the first point, they said that public renown supported me, but replied that it deserved little faith. So far they did not lie since the vulgar mass very rarely sees the truth. Then they said that friendship with the greatest and most learned men, which has adorned my life--as I shall boast before the Lord--stood against their verdict. For I have enjoyed close friendship with many kings, especially with King Robert of Sicily, who honored me in my younger years with frequent and clear testimonials of my knowledge and genius. They replied--and here I will not say their iniquity but their vanity evidently made them lie--that the king himself enjoyed great fame in literary matters but had no knowledge of them; and the others, however learned they were, did not show a sufficiently perspicacious judgment concerning me, whether love of me or carelessness was the cause.

They then made another objection against themselves, saying that the last three Roman popes had vied with each other in inviting me--in vain, it is true--to a high rank in their intimate household; and that Urban himself, who is now at the head was wont to speak well of me and had already bestowed on me a most affable letter. Besides, it is known far and wide and doubted by no one that the present Roman emperor--for there has been no other legitimate emperor at this time--counts me among his dear familiars and has been wont to call me to him with the weight of daily requests and repeated messages and letters. In all this they feel that some people find some proof that I must have a certain value. However, they resolve this objection too, maintaining that the popes went astray together with the others, following the general opinion about me, or were induced to do so by my good moral behavior and not by my knowledge; and that the emperor was prevailed upon by my studies of the past and my historical works, for in this field they do not deny me some knowledge.

Furthermore, they said, another objection against them was my eloquence. This I do not acknowledge altogether, by God not. They pretend that it is a rather effective means of persuasion. It might be the task of a rhetor or an orator to speak oppositely in order to persuade for a purpose, but many people without knowledge had succeeded in persuading by mere phrases. Thus they attribute to luck what is a matter of art and bring forth the widespread proverb: "Much eloquence, little wisdom." They do not take into account Cato's definition of the oratory which contradicts their false charge. Finally, it was said that the style of my writing is in opposition to their statement. They did not dare to blame my style, not even to praise it too reservedly, and confessed that it is rather elegant and well chosen but without any learning. I do not understand how this can be, and I trust they did not understand it either. If they regain control of themselves and think over again what they have said, they will be ashamed of their silly ineptitude. For if the first statement were true--which I for my part would neither assert nor make myself believe--I have no doubt that the second is wrong. How could the style of a person who knows nothing at all be excellent, since theirs amounts to nothing, though there is nothing they do not know? Do we so far suspect everything to be fortuitous that we leave no room for reason? What else do you want? Or what do you believe? I think you expect to hear the verdict of the judges. Well, they examined each point. Then, fixing their eyes on I know not what god-- for there is no god who wants iniquity, no god of envy or ignorance, which I might call the twofold cloud-shrouding truth--they pronounced this short final sentence: I am a good man without learning. Even if they have never spoken the truth and never shall speak it, may they have spoken it at least this once!

Yes, and the further question asks whether the highest good is the highest good or the study of value (axiology). — Leontiskos

Right!

If "studying the highest good" is going into a monastic life in order to improve oneself and happens to include reading texts then I think I can understand the motivation for the assertion.

But not if it's just straight up reading text books. That's what I was confused by, and am still thinking over.

Even supposing that we have to enter into the study of value to determine the highest good, does it then follow that the study of value is the highest good? It seems to me like saying that the study of nutrition is the most nutritious thing.

Yeah, I agree. One can, by analogy, go to a nutritionist and follow their advice to be nutritious.

I would say that one must study good (or value) in an abstract way, but that this abstraction or reification is not itself the highest good. It seems that it simply cannot be the highest good by the very fact that it is a means to an end. — Leontiskos

I don't know how much study is important at all to the good at a personal level, but I recognize its importance as a discipline. I think that's getting me hung up a bit -- are we meaning the study of value is the highest good for the academic type philosophy, or the medical type philosophy?

The study of nutritious certainly helps us be nutritious, but eating the right foods and not the wrong ones is what makes one healthy.

Yes, I shortened the thesis too much. So, I think the study of value is of the highest good to the philosopher. — Shawn

M'kay.

I can at least think about it now. I was just confused as to what you were saying.

Sweet.

OK, so rephrasing the thesis with justification:

"The study of value is the highest good, because we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good" "

So I'm wondering if the first meaning of "value" is the same as the second? Is the study of value becoming able to value what is good?

Because I had been reading the thesis as "Axiology is the highest good, because..." which I think of as category of philosophy in which questions like "What is the highest good?" are asked, but usually people get by with goods just fine without studying axiology. (which isn't to say I don't find axiology important, but people are able to value good without study, so the thesis seemed confusing to me)

doesn't the situation that you are framing require us to have a way of qualifying what is good by appreciating it? Hence, the presupposition, to me, seems like we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good." — Shawn

That's the start of a reason, I think. I'm reading you as saying "Because we have to be able to value what is good in comparison with other goods to be able to appreciate it as a "good" " -- am I reading you right?

What is of highest good can only be defined by how you or a group of people value it, no? — Shawn

Not "What is of highest good?" -- I'm asking what would it count to be a "highest good" at all? Or, perhaps easier: Why axiology and not something else?

The thesis statement of this thread is that axiology (the study of value) is the highest good. — Shawn

That's the thesis, but where's the reason for it?