You're making the very simple, complicated. these are not equations, but evaluations of f for all the possible values of a & b. the right hand side in each case is the result of simplifying the left — unenlightened

Ahhhhh.... OK I think it clicked now. I figured out my mistake. I was treating "m" in (3) as embedding the crosses to its left, but in fact it's alongside the crosses rather than embedded and so I was just doing the evaluation incorrectly. Then upon finding the wrong answer I tried to come up with various other possible ways to evaluate, which I've already shared at length, and now I see how they simplify.

So due to Theorem 2 I can easily simplify (1) and (3) -- an empty cross next to any combination of expressions simplifies to the empty cross, and m is an empty cross. (within the cross, so cross-cross = the unmarked state)

That leaves (2) and (4).

For (2):

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fm \,}}\! \right|n \,}}\! \right|$

Let f = m, and mm = m, therefore we are left with the marked state.
Let f = n, and nm = m, and we have the same.

But for (4) when we do this the evaluation comes out m or n.

Thanks for the help. I made a small mistake along the way and it resulted in a lot of confusion.

I think the changing scenery, the rhythm of breathing and walking, and the relative lack of things to pay attention to in particular is what makes walking good for thinking. I share the habit! I've noticed that I tend to have more focused thoughts when walking.

Wait, I think i see what you are doing - treating each line as an equation, and then substituting the right back in for f. — unenlightened

Yup. The first line states what f is and that's how I was treating it.

You don't want to do that! Each line is a result for a combination of an and b. There is no working shown, and almost none to do. so for (2):– — unenlightened

$\left. {\overline {\, fm \,}}\! \right|$ = $\left. {\overline {\, m \,}}\! \right|$

and the re-entered f can be ignored.

Cool. So with this solution the trouble I have is with (4). n-cross-m-cross is three crosses and so should equal m, but (4) equals n.

Right before these lines GSB states:

We can now find, by the rule of dominance, the values which f may take in each possible case of a,b.

And the rule of dominance doesn't care about the infinite depth it cares about S-sub-0, the pervading space. For solution 2 I was treating "m" as the marked space and putting an "m" then "n" alternatively as I filled out the expression. For solution 4 I'm ignoring m and n and simply marking S-sub-0 with the next letter that follows. That works for (1) through (4), but (5) it would simply be equal to "m" rather than m or n by this procedure.

But this is me explaining my failed evaluations trying to figure out how to get to a successful one. (I've actually typed out a few of these puzzlers before only to find the solution at the end and delete the puzzler in favor of the solution... but this time I was still stuck at the end of my post)

And if I follow GSB's outline for (5) and apply it to (4) I'd say we have two expressions that evaluate to m or n -- because if f equals m, then you get mn-cross-m-cross, which is m-cross-m-cross, which is an even number of embedded crosses that gives you n, but if f equals n then you get nn-cross-m-cross, which is an odd number of embedded crosses so you get m.

The other three work out that way.

Basically I'm treating all 5 as test cases for understanding how to evaluate an expression's value which has re-entry and each time I try to use one of these solutions one of the equations comes out differently from what's written in the book.

So these are my failed evaluations which I'm sharing because this time by typing it out I haven't figured out how to do it right.

Cool. I think that's enough of the concrete side of things for me to feel like I have a footing again. Thank you again for your explanations @wonderer1.

I'm really just inching along in this chapter. Every page presents a problem. Now I feel I have a handle on how we get to infinite expansions but I'm stuck on Re-entry on page 56-57 (I realize now before I was citing the pdf pages rather than the book pages. These are the book pages)

So I looked back at the rule of dominance because that's how we're meant to determine the value of infinitely expanding functions for the various values of a or b being either m or n. I went back to the rule of dominance because it seemed like basic substitution didn't work. But as I apply the rule of dominance I'm getting different values at each step of E1 in chapter 11.

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fa \,}}\! \right|b \,}}\! \right|$ = $f$

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fm \,}}\! \right|m \,}}\! \right|$ = $n$ (1)

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fm \,}}\! \right|n \,}}\! \right|$ = $m$ (2)

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fn \,}}\! \right|m \,}}\! \right|$ = $n$ (3)

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fn \,}}\! \right|n \,}}\! \right|$ = $m$ or $n$ (4)

So I've tried three different things in trying to get all the equations to equal what they state here:

1) substituting the marked state for m and the unmarked state for n while expanding each instance of "f" with one more iteration so you'd have, in the case of (1): m-cross-m-cross-m-cross-m-cross. Since you have an even number of crosses all embedded within one another you get n -- the unmarked state. But then if I try this on (2): m-cross-n-cross-m-cross-n-cross: we have an even number of crosses embedded within one another so it should reduce to the unmarked state, but (2) reduces to the marked state.

2). The rule of dominance. You begin at the deepest depth which would be "f" in each case and alternate putting m or n next to the next depth-level. So starting with (1):

$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fm \,}}\! \right|m \,}}\! \right|$ (1)
$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fmm \,}}\! \right|m \,}}\! \right|$ (1.1)
$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fmmn \,}}\! \right|m \,}}\! \right|$ (1.2)
$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fmmn \,}}\! \right|mm \,}}\! \right|$ (1.3)
$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fmmn \,}}\! \right|mmn \,}}\! \right|$ (1.4)
$\left. {\overline {\, \left. {\overline {\, fmmn \,}}\! \right|mmn \,}}\! \right|m$ (1.5)

and by the rule of dominance I get m because that's what sits in the pervading space.

But that's not the right way to apply the rule, then, since we must get n from the procedure for (1). Which brings me to:

3) Substitution from the Sixth Cannon where :

$\left. {\overline {\, m \,}}\! \right|$ = $n$
$\left. {\overline {\, n \,}}\! \right|$ = $m$

But then for (3) I get m, because n-cross equals m and m-cross equals n and that leaves m after substituting.

While writing this out I came up with a 4th possibility: just mark the next m or n, as you'd do with the rule of dominance, and take the value in the outer space. But then (5) is equal to m, and not m or n, except in a fancy way of interpreting "or" which I don't think is what's going on.

So, as I said, I'm inching along and every page presents a problem. :D This is as far as I got this morning. (EDIT: Changed the number-names of each step to conform with the thread)

To be fair I was just trying to parse the argument as is rather than trying to interpret it in terms of Kant.

It's always easier to moralize than it is to be moral. — Pantagruel

Yeah, but....

1
"Do not judge, or you too will be judged.
2
For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you.
3
"Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother's eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye?

I'd say it's Heidegger that has the plank in his eye. He didn't fail to embody his own ideals. What he ultimately deemed as authentic living was just a bad ideal that he successfully lived up to.

But, as @Joshs has already pointed out -- Levinas and Derrida have more right to condemn Heidegger than me, and they both use his philosophy. So, for better or worse, I think he's worth reading. (as a Marxist, that's damning praise, but praise all the same)

For Laws of Form Relays may be the better bit of technology to look at, though they function the same as the transistor. Looking through wikipedia at all this stuff I noticed the paragraph at the end sounded pretty similar to the basic operation in Laws of Form:

Latching relays require only a single pulse of control power to operate the switch persistently. Another pulse applied to a second set of control terminals, or a pulse with opposite polarity, resets the switch, while repeated pulses of the same kind have no effects. Magnetic latching relays are useful in applications when interrupted power should not affect the circuits that the relay is controlling. — wiki

The SR f!ip-flop circuit is symmetrical, so it is somewhat arbitrary which output is chosen to be Q and ~Q. However, the Set pin is defined as the input that can cause Q to produce a 1 (5V) output. So one could swap Q and ~Q, but to be consistent with the conventions for SR flip-flops one would also need to swap which input is labeled S and which R. So like the stoplight it is a matter of convention. — wonderer1

OK, cool. That was what I was thinking, but realized I didn't know. Given the topic of the book -- a kind of proto-logic prior to logic, or from which logic emerges (with a practical basis in sorting out electrical work and inventing a logic for that) -- it seemed important to me.

Also, flip-flops themselves don't perform logical operations. They just serve as memories that can be used to provide inputs to logic gates (or combinations thereof), and store outputs from logic gates.

Got it. This is a memory, and not an operating circuit. So it holds a 1 or a 0, and it's by convention that a side of the flip-flop is treated as a 1 and the other as 0, and it behooves us to be consistent because then we can start doing cool things like reducing our number system to binary and having circuits perform operations faster than we can.

If you wanted to count a hundred objects you could put them in a pile, and move them one by one to another pile, making a mark for each move. Then if you wanted to add another pile of, say, thirty-seven objects you just move those onto the pile of one hundred objects, again marking each move. And then simply count all the objects or marks. — Janus

Being able to count "1" is significant, as is being able to recognize when you have 0 of something. Then the journey from 1 to 2 is the act of grouping -- absence, presence, and sameness. A nothing, a something, and a set. After you have a set then I think the successor function makes perfect sense -- keep doing the thing you already did, add 1 and go to the next spot. I'm not so sure before that.

Also: division is what allows us to start asking things like "What about the numbers in between 1 and 2?" -- before that we'll just be dealing with wholes. Then we start adding all kinds of numbers to what appeared to be nothing but counting and moving stones. But that we can divide sets into equal portions, or set up ratios between numbers, I'd say is distinctly not counting as much as comparing, because some of the numbers in between 1 and 2 cannot be represented with a ratio of stones. The square root of two cannot be represented by a ratio of stones in the numerator and denominator, so it can't be counted to by counting two ratios, but it's still a number between 1 and 2. We only get there through operating on the numbers, rather than counting. But it's still arithmetic because we're just dealing with constants and what they equal.

Basically I'd say that arithmetic is more complicated than counting.

This is great. Thanks again for taking the time to write out these explanations.

At this point it is pragmatic to jump up a level in abstraction and think in terms of logic gates instead of transistor circuits. — wonderer1

Of course, though, this is what I want :D

I think what I'm wanting to settle, for myself, is whether or not the circuits are in turn being interpreted by us, or if they are performing logical operations. What makes Q and ~Q different other than one is on the left side, and the other on the right side? Do we just arbitrarily choose one side to be zero and the other side to be 1? Or do the logical circuits which have a threshhold for counting do it differently?

To my mind the circuit still doesn't really have a logical structure anymore than a stop light has the logical structure of Stop/Go without an interpretation to say "red means stop, green means go". So are we saying "Q means 1, and ~Q means 0"?

That's remarkably clear.

I've struggled to put together a QM primer before only to put it aside because it's hard to even understand, and so even harder to simplify. Plus the class I took was explicitly taught in the Copenhagen interpretation, and a lot of the discussions around here try to differentiate between the interpretations and, at least as I learned it, there wasn't really a way to differentiate between the interpretations. (though maybe that's changing now)

For chemists you're just expected to pick up the math along with the class :D. And then, to top it off, I went biochem since it seemed more employable -- and sometimes QM matters there, but not often. A rough hand-wavey understanding, or some of the simpler technically not true theories, of bonding are adequate for the predictions there.

Addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are all, as far as i can see, basically counting, and counting is basically naming different quantities. Think about the abacus. — Janus

The abacus might be a bad example for me because it would emphasize what I've said: I can certainly count the beads on an abacus, but I don't know how to do the arithmetic operations with an abacus. I never learned how to use it.

Similarly we can count marks, or we might know the the arabic numerals, but we may not know how to solve an addition problem without some sort of knowledge of figuring sums. That ability might even be relative to the numeral symbols we use -- thinking here about the trick of stacking numbers on top of one another and adding them by column from the right. Seems like that'd be difficult to do with Roman numerals.

Hrm! That helps me understand the feedback part very well -- so thank you again for taking the time. When Set is grounded the voltage from R3 no longer gives the voltage necessary for the transistor to be in the "on" state, but the parallel circuit through R2 does so the circuit flips over to Tr2. Since Tr1 is now off that means 5V goes to Q as the path of least resistance. The same holds for reset and the blue state.

And that helps me understand how it has a memory -- when you come back to it it'll be in one state or the other, so there are two possible states for the circuit to be in when at equilibrium.

And I can now see how they are switches thanks to your explanation, which was a bit of a mystery to me before.

Thanks! I'm going to type out what I understand from your explanation and the diagram and guess work, and I looked at this website too.

The story of a hole in a state of flow with an innumerable number of other holes towards ~Q: We start at 5 V and move through R1 to TR1 because the voltage at Q is lower than the voltage at ~Q (assuming we're already in a steady state), then we go through the unmarked resistor on the other side of the transistor, up through R3 and out ~Q. If you touch "Set" to the zero volts line than you ground the flow causing the voltage to switch over to R4-T2-R2-Q.

Based on the website I linked it looks like Q and ~Q are out of phase with one another. So the memory comes from being able to output an electrical current at inverse phases of one another? How do we get from these circuits to a logic? And the phase shift is perhaps caused by subtle manipulations of the transistor?

I have not understood how essences as definitions differs in salient ways from essences in terms of necessary properties. Isn't a definition a set of necessary and sufficient properties? — Banno

Me either, which is what I was trying to get at by asking for a criterion of quiddity.

As I'm reading Fine a definition is necessary, because Fine accepts the argument that if something is not necessary then it is not essential, but necessity is not sufficient.

Or, if we're going by way of Aristotelian essence, then I'm not sure "sufficiency" is the conceptual mark we should be using at all (hence my divergence into Aristotelian causes for determining whether something named has an essence at all)

But I believe you, @Leontiskos, have started to give an answer here:

One way to cash this out is to say that risibility or the ability to learn grammar supervene on rationality, and it is rationality that belongs to the essence because it is explanatorily fundamental. Thus a human being is not defined as "A risible animal" or "An animal capable of learning grammar," but rather, "A rational animal." This contains and explains the others.

Aquinas claims that, in a similar way, delight supervenes on happiness, for happiness is essentially the possession of a fitting good and not the possession of delight, and yet delight always follows upon and attends happiness such that they appear indistinguishable.

I should point out yet again that it is one thing to disagree with some real definition and another to disagree with essentialism itself. The latter is much more contentious and difficult, and would seem to involve the claim that no properties are explanatorily prior or posterior. — Leontiskos

A definition is a true description of an essence, which is a property which is explanatorily prior to other properties, including the necessary ones (like the Singleton Socrates). "Prior" is unspecificed at this point, but that's the beginning of something: definitions are meant to explain something, and the explanation is one of a priority of properties.

@Leontiskos do you accept the argument that if some predicate is not necessary of a name that then that same predicate is not an essence of the name? (only asking because then we could add to this list to say that essences are necessary, though there are necessary predicates which are not essential)

Are you looking at the 9th canon where he constructs an ever deepening series of nested a's and b's? Page 55 in my version?
If so, you just take the whole right hand expression of a & b as = r. and use J2 in reverse. — unenlightened

Yup, that's the one! Thanks.

That worked. I already became stuck on the next step. :D -- but I figured it out by going back to the demonstration of C4 and using its steps rather than the demonstrated equality between the expressions.

Then it's pretty easy to see the pattern after that: it's the same pattern as before, only being iterated upon a part of the expression in order to continue the expansion.

I can say I'm stuck with your last reported place that you're at. At least, this morning I am.

Wow, if someone implemented something like that we could have computers and an internet!

Sorry, couldn't resist. — wonderer1

This is part of my interest here -- something I've always struggled with is understanding the connection between circuits and symbols. I'm sure I don't understand how a circuit has a memory, still.

What is marriage to you? — NOS4A2

To me personally? The most current, but clearly inadequate, means for our society to answer the question "By Whom and how are these children going to be taken care of?" -- it's a legal entity for the economics of the family home which gets interpreted in various ways in their particular instances.

For purposes of this discussion I'd just focus in on the legal aspects, which will vary depending on where we're at, but the specifics shouldn't matter here. In focusing in on what can be seen, and on individuals, your account is very vague when it comes to one of the most important social realities we live with: property. Even individuals own property, but only by law -- which cannot be seen, is not flesh-and-blood, is seemingly abstract and yet seems causal in that the reason people act in such-and-such ways is because of how property is treated within the legal system.

This is what I meant by "history", I think, the culmination of our interactions with one another. That is the extent of our relationship.

Only these types of interactions, in combination with the accounts of those involved, can determine what kind of relationship — NOS4A2

Hrm -- I'm reading you as going back to your original post, then, whereas before I was reading you as allowing that marriage is real.

So a marriage is the entire list of interactions between two people, and these interactions in combination with accounts from the two people involved in the marriage determines that they are interacting in marriage-wise ways, but they have no bond or connection with one another (except for the children who had an umbilical cord when they are born) and the marriage itself is not real. "Marriage" is just shorthand for a long list of interactions between two people.

By this then even ownership can't be real, I'd say: that was the point of my example, along with the obvious bit that they're a collective. When a marriage dissolves what's at stake is who owns what. Before a marriage is dissolved you have an example of collective ownership. But if the only real things are interactions between individuals, then I'd say there's no such thing as property because it's only acted upon by individuals. The house is not flesh-and-blood, after all, and property rights are only established by law (which doesn't exist in your accounting).

Or, at least, this is where my mind goes with what you've said so far. I'm not sure if it's something you'd avoid or accept.

I'm a bit pressed for time today, but for Aristotle the fundamental issue is that a kangaroo has an essence whereas a hammer does not, and this is because only the first is a cohesive thing (substance) with its own proper mode of being and acting (and this also includes teleological considerations). A hammer is an aggregate of substances thrown together for a human purpose.

A simpler example would be a horse-and-rider. A horse-and-rider is not a substance, and it has no essence. Instead it is a composite of two substances (a horse and a human rider). We can talk about the essence of a horse-and-rider in an analogical way, as if it were just a single thing, but technically this is not quite right.

I am not opposed to talking about the "essence" of a hammer or the "essence" of a named individual, just so long as we do not forget that for Aristotle there are no such essences. More broadly, it makes sense for the Aristotelian to say that the human has being in a more primary sense than the hammer does; or that the name attached to a perceptual 'description' is more primary than the name attached to the conceptual 'description' (and that the latter should take its cue from the former). Such a distinction may seem quite odd to the modern mind, but it may also be at the root of some of these issues. — Leontiskos

I think that it's worth asking, in that case, what is the criterion of quiddity, what-it-is-ness, such that we can have names with and names without an essence? What's the criteria by which you judge an individual to have an essence? I take it your beliefs are Aristotelian-inspired, but since you're also saying "for Aristotle" it seems you may also be thinking about your account as different.

From what I read of you it comes down to whether something is a substance or is composed of substances. I'm not sure exactly how to parse that -- I put teleology as a criteria because I understand activity to be central to the essence of beings in Aristotle, and teleology is the kind of cause which is self-caused towards something -- so an olive is a seed with a teleology of becoming-tree, where its material cause is its is its plant-like embryonic structure, efficient cause would be water, soil, and nutrients, and formal cause would be the owner who planted the olives (or, in the wild, the form within the mind of God who thinks the seed-to-tree into being)

I'm going back to the four causes because it seems to me that hammers have a definition, and so I would have said that a hammer has an essence on that basis from my understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence. But you're saying that it doesn't, so I'm starting to rely upon my understanding of Aristotle's physics as a basis for differentiating what truly has a substance from that which is merely composed of substances. It seems to me that the lack of a teleological cause might be a basis for making this claim -- basically anything which is a natural kind would participate in all four causes. (the strange thing here being that the basic materials participate in teleology by having a proper place to be in the stack... which clearly goes against how we understand matter to operate today)

Moliere began a discussion of essences with the example of hammers. This is a strange move from the perspective of an Aristotelian, because hammers have no real essence. A hammer is a derivative being, a human artifact. Hammers should always be studied in relation to humans, because their existence is dependent upon humans. — Leontiskos

The discussion has moved to other considerations, but I have some thoughts here.

Aristotle is conceptually rich, so this is very much a guess in the dark:

Perhaps individual human activity, like hammering, is strange in Aristotle because he offers an ontology that has a kind of cause that accounts for the change of individuals over time such that they're still the same object while undergoing change because of the kind of object they are --- teleology. The hammer doesn't fit very well because it's not a biological entity or a natural kind -- its teleology is directed by an individual, and so its purpose is relative to the ends of not even a species but of an individual of the species. All tools are such that they are always relative to some other being's usage, and so they don't have a teleology at all -- they don't have an activity that their kind strives towards which makes them what they are.

It seems your account must have named objects without real essences alongside what has essences -- and maybe what you say here has something to do with why Heidegger used the example of hammering in putting the question of the meaning of being back on the table for philosophical investigation.

If hammers don't have essences, then what does? And on what basis are we to exclude tools from having being (or, perhaps they have being, but no essence?)?

Isn't counting adding 1 to the previous number? — RogueAI

I think "counting" is almost a primitive. It's such a simple operation or concept that we'd have a hard time defining it rigorously. But I'd put "counting" as more primitive than addition, because addition holds for more domains than counting -- such as fractional numbers that fall in-between the counting numbers.

Without defining the domain counting is strange. You can't count to the square root of 2 on the natural numbers, for instance. Counting will never get you to the real number line. And if we allow division, at least, it's pretty easy to operate on the natural numbers such that we need more numbers than what we count. One might say a difference between quusing and adding is that adding is a part of all arithmetic, and so we have access to division, where quusing is the same as addition up to a certain point but what makes it different are the rules and the domain.

Quaddition is clearly a philosophical toy, but modular arithmetic works similarly in that there is no number beyond a certain point within the mod space. Quaddition just defines, arbitrarily, what happens after you reach the end.

I think I'd respond by saying you're doing counting, which is neither addition nor quaddition. Counting is an entirely different, third rule where you count, rather than add or quus. If you were quussing you'd stop the moment you counted up to 5', the 5 beyond all 57's.

In counting we need symbols to begin to understand just how much we have of something. Hence learning the base-10 system, and having to memorize the order of numbers prior to being able to count to 57 -- we're already using a number system by the time we're counting, and so counting presupposes understanding the domain of numbers with some kind of symbolic system. Counting is tied to the natural numbers, where in quussing we're clearly in a different domain -- but all three rules, counting, adding, and quussing all look the same up to the number 57 because that's where the domains of interest are the same, and the operations are similar and so the outputs are the same within that small domain, and because we're using the same number system to represent the numbers. Not that changing bases would matter, I just mean we have a number system with bases, rather than a number system that consists of "one, two, three, and many" or something like that.

Quusing is clearly derivative of adding, and so it seems a bit silly -- but I'd say there's no fact to the matter between choosing between, say, counting on the natural number line or counting on the rational number line until you get to a point where there is a difference, like the square root of 2 and suddenly you see that you have a new kind of number to deal with. But for all that there is still a difference between these sets, it's just not in the rules of counting, adding, or quusing.

You’d be surprised to hear I don’t believe in law either. — NOS4A2

Metaphysically speaking I am unable to reduce a marriage to anything between two people, especially when it appears there is nothing between them, connecting them, and bonding one to the other. It also appears they are not “in” anything of the sort. I would say each of them relate to one another, or at least I would recognize that one is speaking figuratively when using such language. That isn’t to say one should never use the word “marriage” or “relationship”—abstractions, generalizations, universals are necessary to speak and think about the world—it’s just that one ought not to include them in his ontology, metaphysically speaking. As such he should not apply his politics to them. — NOS4A2

They are not only nominally or proximally bonded, but have a history together. — NOS4A2

I think you've changed your position a little, then. You're allowing some aggregates to have real relations, and claiming that there are some times when a person claims there to be a real relation when there is not a real relation. Here the case of the family is a real relation because they have a history together rather than merely being named as together, like an abstract relationship.

At one end of a possible spectrum I'd say there are pure abstractions -- the set of all people such that they are in the set named "424", which may have real applications when discussing the tenants of a building but is a bit accidental about who the members of that set are.

But along comes an organizer knocking on the doors of the old 424, and eventually the group of people decide to form a tenant union. Now they have a history together, in your terms -- they've voluntarily joined together into a group and have real relations. (and so are now at the other end of the spectrum from abstract to concrete)

From what I can see you're objecting to, say, the nation as a real relation because it's not individually voluntarily agreed upon. So the law, because it's not individually voluntarily agreed upon, is not a real relation, but an abstraction of some other real.

Whereas I'd say that the law is real, but it's an odd duck. (which is why social ontology is interesting -- it's full of odd ducks that are hard to deal with)

But you raise some good questions in regards to political subjects (the people, the nation, the workers, the race, society). What sort of bond or relationship can we infer between the aggregate parts of these sets? Are these bonds actual? Or are they assumed and imposed? If they are not there, is it the goal of the politician to create them? — NOS4A2

It seems to me that you're willing to accept some social bonds as real, and some as not-real -- a realist account. It's the criteria of real-ness that you're using which is at odds with... well, everyone who has posted so far :D

At least if I'm right about the criteria of a real relationship being having a history together, which in turn seems rely upon individual voluntary agreement. A basic individualistic libertarian norm. The problem with it being -- well, what about all the relationships which may be abstractions but still influence our life? Why bother calling them not-real while we still have to account for them, seeing as we don't live in the individualistic libertarian world? Are they illegitimate reals, in which case the problem isn't metaphysics, but ethics or politics?

I'm looking at Chapter 11 again this morning, and having taken a break for the nitty-gritty I wanted to see if I could understand the derivation of infinitely iterating functions to get a better grip on time and oscillations in the book. I'm having trouble, on page 81, of understanding the third step where J2 is called.

Anyone else work out this demonstration yet?

Heh. I suppose I'd say that it's only us chickens that have to step up, and that's the real problem. We're the leaders we have been waiting for -- we're just not as good as we want our leaders to be, so we feel inadequate to the task.

But all the other leaders from before that we honor were in similar shoes at one point.



That's because duty sucks. ;)

If a couple is married and owns a house, does the nominalist say "no one owns the house" because ownership is jointly owned by two members of the set?

I don't think so. I think the nominalist would say something like the couple is arranged marriage-wise, that it reduces to a relationship between them -- but the relationship is still real for all that, it's just not the set that's real. They both own the house would be the answer, just not in virtue of being a real set.

But you also say

In applying this subject to objects and entities outside another’s conceptual space, one would be hard-pressed to find and/or point to anything of the kind, and it would be difficult to discern what it is in the world he is actually talking about. — NOS4A2

So it would be more apt to say that if a couple is married and owns a house, and they talk to nominalist aliens about what they own then it wouldn't make sense to the aliens until they spell out that the couple is in a relationship arranged marriage-wise.

I agree that classical logic doesn't deal with time very well. That's part of what allowed Kant to distinguish between Logic As Such, and Transcendental Logic. As well as providing a conceptual entry into Hegel's philosophy.

To evaluate the difficulty of logic, on the whole, dealing with time I'd have to do more homework on logic. Just looking over this: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-temporal/ -- but it could be that GSB's logic would fit in here, and so "difficulty" is what's being dealt with in Laws of Form. In that case there'd be choices to make on which logic, and I'm not sure how I'd make a choice. (More homework necessary on my part, basically) ((EDIT: Though I should note that it's necessary on my part specifically because of what I'm interested in. I don't think because I'm wanting to bridge these things that means much about GSB's book -- it's more a me thing))

Here's another related piece, fairly short and understandable.
http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/TimeParadox.pdf — unenlightened

Another good read. It hits a lot of points of interest for me -- the liar's paradox is one of those I keep going back to, and I found the dual-functions which iterate back and forth in a time series really interesting, and it's interesting how Kauffman links all of these things back to GSB.

I found this summary fairly interesting: https://www.projectenportfolio.nl/images/1/16/Robertson-Laws_of_Form.pdf — Count Timothy von Icarus

That helped me -- it's nice to have an interpretation that's been worked through by someone else. I didn't realize that GSB's algebra is formally equivalent to Boolean logic (although now that I'm saying that I'm beginning to ask myself, just what *is* formal equivalency? I've sort of just taken that assertion at face value from people more knowledgeable than I). Also I didn't pick up the similarity between self-reference and re-entry.

Side note: It's interesting that Brown was working on network issues. I've seen some articles on information theoretic/categorical models of quantum mechanics that attempt to explain physics as a network. This in turn, allows us to recreate standard QM in a different language, but also explains entanglement in a more intuitive network-based model (or so the author claimed, I did not find anything intuitive about the paper lol). I do find the idea of modeling reality as networks or possibility trees interesting though. But again, it's easier to conceptualize the network as a fundamental thing, rather then that the network simply is a model of process and relation, which seems to be the true basic entity! — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yup, I find that part of what's fascinating in the book. Since the logic was developed in tandem with a practice I'm interested to know it from that practical angle more.

But the first distinction is made by the first cell, and then the first re-entry of the first distinction into itself by the first language speakers, and then...

The Observer is the observed.
— Krishnamurti

Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world.
— The Grateful Dead

I would not say that the world is composed of eyes, but it has eyes, and we are those eyes. — unenlightened

There's a flag I want to put on "first cell", but it feels too off topic.

Granting the first cell making a distinction, which I can agree with, it's interesting how the story can be used for a single developing organism -- a story from birth until here we are talking -- as well as the development of organisms. "then the first re-entry of the first distinction into itself by the first language speakers" helped click some of GSB to his wider, philosophical sense that I haven't been grasping (and, truthfully, I'm still feeling around about).

"The world has eyes" is a nice phrase. It feels mystical in that way that tries to make a reflective statement -- where we talk of the world, which is usually not ourselves, but then it fits us within the world as we see our own eyes in our minds-eye -- that is, through language (or at least with a great deal of assistance from language)

When you finish with your next post: What do you make of 's linked summary?

especially Americans are hung-up on the mob influence on the unions in the past. — Benkei

I think there's been a concerted effort to undermine unions.

There's a lot of images of unions, like the mob (but so, so many others), which are popular because they make a splash and feed into people's preconceptions. There are even law firms dedicated to busting union drives. There's also been a long-term concerted effort to defund unions through what are called "right to work" laws such that people who benefit from a given contract can opt in or out of whether they'll pay union dues, which -- due to human nature -- most people prefer free things to not-free things and it takes about one generation before a union is unable to hire enough staffers to appropriately service the contract and it becomes something of a limping organization that, with appropriate activism, can be strong -- but everyone at this point is used to the more bureaucratic form of labor unions and they really do just want a fee-for-service model (without paying for the fee-for-service model).

And with fewer numbers comes less influence within the political realm, which in turn means that politicians are more likely to ignore the demands of labor even while unions contribute to the democratic political party. It's a feedback loop.

Which is why I say the capitalists have become better at divide and conquer -- that's basically what's happened over the course of the last half of the 20th century as a concerted political effort to undermine the democratic base in favor of capital.

OK So rather than a Cartesian subject: "One is always in one's world" has a phenomenological sound to it. The world is composed of distinctions, in this case, some of which include me (inside) and the rest of which doesn't (outside), but which are still together as one world: the world composed of distinctions. The book is gesturing towards a flow of distinctions upon distinctions with the first distinction holding for all distinctions thereafter.

Not quite clear to me, esp. the last statement, but it's OK. — Alkis Piskas

You make it sound like a simple phsychological game. I'm afraid there's much more to it than just that. One does not risk his job, his income and the support of his family because he gets angry.
(Except if he's a total idiot, of course.) — Alkis Piskas

There are always more details, and often times they're important to a particular circumstance. I presented a simplification which was meant to highlight how emotion, rather than duty, would be the reason a person decides one way or another. The simplification fits with the scenario of a strike.

The "more" would be the lead-up to the strike, what other tactics had been tried, the sorts of demands the workers are making, how long the contract has been in place, what relationships there are between union members, union leadership, and management, what the wider circumstances are in which the conflict is taking place....

In short, the sorts of things that a historical account would take care of better than a hypothetical.

Consistency, authenticity, candor, good intentions, competence, dedication to achieving clear goals that align with your own. The ability to listen. I think it is easy to recognize when someone is showing you the way to what you want, or what you think your nation needs. — ToothyMaw

These all sound good to me. I'd even be able to point to some examples of people that fit.

I'm not sure anyone would disagree with this list. They'd disagree on who fits, though. And I bet we'd be more inclined to put dead figures on the list, too. It's easier to honor the dead than the living.

I suppose I'd just point out that we have quite a few leaders. But I don't recognize your list in many of them. And so this is the cause of doubt: it seems that we already have leaders who believe themselves to be all of these good qualities, but we're lamenting that they don't possess them.

But is it just because certain people haven't seen that it's their duty to lead and influence people towards good ends? We have lots of people attempting to lead and influence, it's just not the right people? Is all that's stopping them is that they don't realize what their duty is?

I should begin by saying that it has been some years since I have worked extensively with Aristotle's primary texts, so a strict Aristotelian may quibble with me on this point or that. Still, I think I will give an accurate account. — Leontiskos

You're in a better position than me. Years ago I read a substantial amount of Aristotle in English, but that's about it.

An essence is what something is in virtue of itself, and the definition describes the essence. It will also be useful to note that for Aristotle the standard beings are substances: things which exist of themselves and which possess their own mode of being and acting. So hammering would be an act of a substance, in particular an act of a human substance. — Leontiskos

A hammer is an artifact, not a substance, but be that as it may, we still need to understand what a hammer is before we use it. For Aristotle definition is not restricted to a means by which one shares knowledge. To understand what something is is to have its definition, and to have partial knowledge about what something is is to have a nominal or partial definition.

So when you approach a hammer for the purpose of manipulation you have already formed a partial definition of it. It is a physical object (which can be manipulated physically). It is graspable by the hand. It possesses a kind of leverage. It has a hard head which can be used to hit things without incurring damage. All of this is part of the definition, and is already implicit in one who manipulates a hammer. For Aristotle it wouldn't make much sense to say that you manipulate a hammer without some understanding of what it is. — Leontiskos

Is it possible to act without knowing?

That seems to be the only condition you'd accept human activity as non-essential, given that any amount of knowledge results in having at least a partial definition or some approximation of an essence.

I believe these two are incompatible with each other as to the direction and recipient of the effect (fear and anger).
Fear works against the employees. Anger --as I can assume from how you put it-- works against the company. So I can't see how you can select between the two ... — Alkis Piskas

"working against the company" is a bit of a stretch, I'd say. "the company" is primarily comprised of employees, after all. But the union is for the employees, so it doesn't make sense to say "against the company" from that standpoint. (against management, now...)

Anger works against fear that management uses in its negotiations. Once you're at the point of a strike that's pretty much the emotional spark which will drive a person to select one side or the other -- or the professionals will stand back and wish people could just get along without acknowledging that there are simply differences in desire due to social position.

For a lot of professionals or independent contractors they have a hard time understanding this stuff because they're simply treated differently than workers who are viewed as replaceable or as not really worth being paid enough to live or just enough to live. They've had roughly fair dealings with employers and opportunities they can move onto if something goes south at their current place of employment. The social position of the workers just isn't something that clicks for a lot of people until they have felt it.

The other thing that's missing from the scenario is the build-up to the strike. By the time you get to a strike you've already exhausted pretty much every other option. What a union really does is negotiate -- striking is just a tactic in that process of negotiation, and it's basically the last resort.

But most negotiations are not conducted on such strong lines that warrant a strike. But by the time you get to a strike... I mean, avoid it at all costs, but my answer remains the same because I prefer to have power in a negotiation rather than not.

My conclusion is that we have to cooperate, because others would see us as "selfish", "traitor", "a black sheep", etc. — javi2541997

Heh. That's an interesting conclusion, at least for myself, because I would push against it while maintaining that we have to cooperate. pointed out how the owners of firms are already incorporated, and the workers are only kinda-sorta incorporated.

If I were the King of Rules, or some such nonsense, I'd say that every firm must be a closed shop.

Or: we have to cooperate because we're human beings.

It is not the same crossing the picket line just because you are afraid of being sacked than having other kind of duties. — javi2541997

I think your first example is a bit of a fiction. It's not the same, but anyone in that situation isn't crossing the picket line because they're afraid of being sacked. I'll bring it back to my opening response: it's because their anger dried out and they've come back to their fear. The scabs believe the boss will win, which sometimes the boss does win, and so they go back over to the boss's side.

But sometimes the workers win too.

(EDIT: And either way, I'm still maintaining that duty can't justify choosing the path of the scab. It's not a duty. It's a selfish action, which we all do all the time. It's merely not dutiful)

I have empathy, but they're still scabs. I understand why they're doing it, but the choice they're making is still "My family is more important than your family".

I don't think we, as philosophers, should give the scabs anything more than the truth. The truth is they are choosing themselves over the other families to the point that they are willing to sacrifice the other families who are benefiting workers for their own family.

That, even if you don't call them such, is a scab. And once the strike is over the scab will get picked off by the boss, eventually, because they already did what the boss wanted, and the new recruits won't remember all the conflict from before.

It's your claim to duty that I'm challenging. I empathize with people lesser because I'm lesser. But I don't claim that I'm good for that reason.

I accept the argument about Socrates and the Singleton Socrates. And I understand the paper to basically be directed towards essentialists (so it's not for me), but rather arguing that this is a better concept of essence than the modal concept, while accepting and explicating their connection.

But I'm not seeing the conclusion very well.

So what is an appropriate specification of the meaning? The only satisfactory answer
appears to be that the specification should make clear what the meaning (essentially) is; it should
provide us, that is to say, with some account of the meaning's essence.

I think I'd just say: I got some unsatisfactory answers to your question.

Carrying over my response here, though I'm fine with moving it back to "Belief" as well.

I'm not sure what it would mean to know something without knowing the essence, and I am not sure what people have in mind when they talk about knowing something without an essence. — Leontiskos

My understanding of Aristotle's notion of essence is that it is a given something's definition.

The first thing that comes to mind is know-how. I know-how to hammer, regardless of what the hammer is pointed at (or even what the hammer is -- animal, vegetable, mineral, or familiar tool). I don't need to know the essence of a thing in order to manipulate it. And a lot of knowledge is at this level of manipulation rather than at a definitional level. The definitions come later when you're trying to put knowledge into some sort of form which can be shared to assist in spreading the knowledge.

At that point definitions are important. They're a wonderful tool for teaching someone differences that were picked up through practice, but would be much more slowly learned without the definitions.

But because definitions are developed from practice I'd say that definitions are not necessary. (What is the essence of "thingy" in "Hand me that thingy over there"?) And if it's not necessary we can conclude definitions are not essential to knowing-how.

I still don't see how that is a lie. They aren't brainwashed; they are convinced that there is a good cause and that they should take it up. I would say manipulation is not always via unsavory means, although it has that connotation. — ToothyMaw

That's at least pretty close to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_lie ? Or not?

It's not brainwashing. It's myth making.

However, go ahead and say what you want about it. I kind of want to know what you were going to say. — ToothyMaw

My first thought is that if duty is real for some and not real for others then there are some people who are not attuned to duty. So who are the dutiful, such that we know they are attuned to duty, and who are those who are not attuned to duty? Or is it not a kind of knowledge at all?

One should lead by example, demonstrating that a cause is worthy even without such an appeal. — ToothyMaw

Seems like it would apply to Donald Trump and to Joe Biden, for instance. At least we can see that there are people who follow either leader, and so believe those leaders to be demonstrating their cause to be worthy. But you're blaming the leaders -- so it's not them.

In fact I think it's no one, if I'm reading you correctly.

So how am I to know this duty when I see it?