Tarski's work doesn't really apply to ordinary language use. Whatever we chose to do with the T-schema, as it relates to ordinary language use, will have to be stipulated. — Tate
I have tried that Tarski paper more than once, and I wouldn't dare tell someone here what it means. :D — Moliere
truth is so much more than correspondence — Moliere
Point taken. I'm going from secondary sources rather than the horse's mouth. My understanding is that Tarski's truth predicate is entirely formal. It's not truth as it appears in the wild.
So the T-schema could just as easily be a B-schema:
"P" is blob IFF P.
What's blob? It's just a gear in a logic machine. It's a mistake to read folk notions into that. — Tate
truth is so much more than correspondence
— Moliere
Exactly. — Tate
So stipulating English statements.
— Moliere
What do you mean by "statement"? A proposition? — Tate
But if it's balking at the limitation of truth to human interaction -- yeah, that's pretty much what this would limit it to. No propositions. The focus is on statements used — Moliere
We should also note that in limiting truth to the content of human interaction, we're making a judgment about a portion of truth predication in ordinary language use.
We're saying that when people speak of truths which have not yet been discovered, they're mistaken, or speaking metaphorically, or are confused.
How should we address that? — Tate
I don't know. There's usually blood and guts everywhere when we try to do surgery on natural language use. — Tate
truth is so much more than correspondence — Moliere
truth is so much more than correspondence
— Moliere
Exactly. — Tate
I suppose it's better to say that correspondence seems to work-for, but it's not something you'd consider a universal theory of truth, or something. — Moliere
That snow is white does not represent a fact; it is a fact. — Luke
And if the truth is what you say it is, does it follow that what you say is true, is true? Can you cast spells? — Banno
Is what I say true, true
I make the performative utterance "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth".
I can then say that it is true that this ship is named Queen Elizabeth.
Is what I say is true, true ?
(What I say is true) is (this ship is named Queen Elizabeth)
So yes, (this ship is named Queen Elizabeth) is true
So yes, what I say is true is true. — RussellA
Beauty is truth, truth beauty, - that is all Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. — John Keats (Ode to a Grecian urn)
No theory of truth is going to cover every use of the concept truth. It seems that most uses of the concept point to a relationship between propositional beliefs, and states-of-affairs. — Sam26
I'll mention it again as it bears repeating.
a) "snow is white" is true iff snow is white
b) "snow is green" is true iff snow is green
However we make sense of the consequent of the T-schema I think it should apply to both (a) and (b). It is not a fact that snow is green. Although there may be times, like with (a), where the consequent is a fact, there are times, like with (b), where it isn't. A rigorous account of the T-schema should cover both cases. — Michael
So, "p" is true iff p. What sort of thing is p? It is not always a fact. Maybe an answer to that will tell us what sort of thing a fact is. — Michael
241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — Philosophical Investigations
108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the moon... — On Certainty (my emphasis)
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