Used? So truth only applies to the content of human interaction? — Tate

Not truth, but the meta-predicate "-B", let's say -- to mark its queerness.

Clumsy there -- in text I should be more precise. I continue to mean statements. So of the form of propositions, sure. But that, itself, is just a stipulation if we need to make it -- if "statements" as in "used English statements" is precise enough for us, then that's good enough for me. I'm not writing the tractatus :D

truth is so much more than correspondence
— Moliere

Exactly. — Tate

I'm not sure I'm satisfied with that, especially in part because I don't like the directional metaphor -- more, or less than? Up or down?

I suppose it's better to say that correspondence seems to work-for, but it's not something you'd consider a universal theory of truth, or something. Or, you could, but you could also, with that, build ontologies of tables and not-tables and such. And that's just a bit too much for me.

So stipulating English statements.
— Moliere

What do you mean by "statement"? A proposition? — Tate

I'd settle for any used English sentence, including sentences on this thread.

Point taken. I'm going from secondary sources rather than the horse's mouth. My understanding is that Tarski's truth predicate is entirely formal. It's not truth as it appears in the wild.

So the T-schema could just as easily be a B-schema:

"P" is blob IFF P.

What's blob? It's just a gear in a logic machine. It's a mistake to read folk notions into that. — Tate

I agree with that understanding as you've spelt it out here.

So stipulating English statements.

Tarski's work doesn't really apply to ordinary language use. Whatever we chose to do with the T-schema, as it relates to ordinary language use, will have to be stipulated. — Tate

To what extent I understand that paper, I agree with you. I'm just ripping the schema from Tarski more than applying what Tarski said, and putting together something like a simple logic that I thought might bridge some understandings. I have tried that Tarski paper more than once, and I wouldn't dare tell someone here what it means. :D

The distinction between logic and metaphysics seemed pertinent. So I thought I could "step things down" from abstract-description to something like a logic, a simple set of symbols and their accepted formulae -- away from facts and general pictures of the world (seeing as I, at least, find that inadequate anymore... truth is so much more than correspondence)

How are they both facts? As a result of logical equivalence? — creativesoul

I'd say they are both facts because they are both true statements, and facts are true statements.

At the very least, this is how we talk about them.

So in the case of 3, if we were to set out the T sentence:

" "Snow is white" is true" is T iff "Snow is white" is true.

You can tier this up as high as you like.

I don’t understand the use-mention comparison. If P is the way the world is when “P” is true, this implies that “P” already has a use/meaning. And P’s being a way the world is is not a use of “P” (or a use of language). — Luke

Well, P is not the way the world is. "The way the world is" is part of the metaphysical picture of truth that I posited. In the metaphysical picture you have representation on the left-hand-side, and represented on the right-hand side.

But in the logic you have the mention-operator, variables, the copula, T, and the domain for P (I said sentences, but I should say statements)

Note that in the logic there is no way the world is or isn't or anything. There are only variables that can be substituted for English sentences. (I would accept other natural languages as well, just using English since we're using English) -- that is, this is stripped of the metaphysical baggage. Instead we have a logic with a formula and defined operators and domains, and then we fill in what the predicate T means based on the meanings of English (that you and I already know).

There is no distinction between the way the world is and what the sentence represents if true, — Luke

I'm pretty sure this is what disquotational theories are trying to get at.

So --

but there is a distinction between the way the world is and the sentence that represents the way the world is. If there were no distinction, then the sentence could be neither true nor false. The sentence would be the world.

The distinction between the way the world is and the sentences that represents is

(Sentence-that-represents) is T IFF the way the world is

Breaking out of metaphysical baggage, we'd say

"P" is T IFF P

And replace all instances of P with English sentences, while recognizing that the quotations are an operator on all sentences that these are being mentioned, not used.

Finally, coming to define T as true, but only by understanding the meaning of the previous bits, as well as the iff operator.

Funny thing there, still. We come to understand the predicate T in relation to the actual language introduced in this model I'm proposing. But truth is smuggled in by way of the "iff" connector, since we already understand these connectors to be truth-evaluative.

But I'm unsympathetic to the notion of corresponding facts generally, and even less sympathetic to their being smuggled in by systematic equivocation. — bongo fury

I find it strange that you're not wanting disquotationalism, then. That seems to me to be what is accomplished by the logic -- no sussing out the meaning of correspondence. Simply true sentence on the left-hand side, and used sentence on the right-hand side. Truth is as a meta-lingual predicate of used language.

So yes, there are uses of "truth" that rely on the force of an utterance. There are uses of "truth" that rely on the breach of convention. There are Big Picture uses.

I propose that we might gain a better understanding of these Big Picture uses were we to have a clear grasp of the logic of truth. Tarski, Kripke, and such.

And for my money disquaotation presents that logic. At the least, understanding the logic of truth will underpin any other considerations.

But philosophy is hard, and is found in the detail rather than the trite and trivial. — Banno

This is interesting because the other theories don't seem to present a logic, so much, as a description of truth (hence, substantive) -- but they certainly presume a logic at least. I don't think I would describe the correspondence theory of truth as a logic. I'd say it's a metaphysical description of truth.

(Funny thing here too, given the notion of logic as truth-preservative. You'd have to, I think, come up with another way to think about logic than this common short-hand to talk of a logic of truth. Hence your invoking meaning as a beginning?)



**

I wonder if this is something that's getting lost in the conversation, at this point. So far I think we've been thinking about disquotationalism as a distinct theory from the standards. Might it be that disquotationalism is simply focused on the logic of truth, whereas the others are focused on the metaphysics of truth?

I guess I had more thoughts:

I agree with the notion of the ethical-boundary of truth that's been floated: Since there's no Grand True Unifying Theory of Truth, though the disquotational theory is a good approximation, I ask -- what have I been doing? Surely I understand truth in this pre-theoretic way, as everyone who tells a truth does, but is there a post-theoretic way to understand truth as its being used? (descriptive of the prescriptive, maybe)

And the game of truth-telling, as @unenlightened pointed out, is a good place to start. That's how we'd come to justify what I said above and get at a feel for the meaning of "is true"

And there, I think the main thing that disquotational theories miss is the Big Truth type true. People do in fact mean big-T truth frequently enough that the theory misses out on that meaning. And perhaps we could say, well, that's not the meaning of the philosophers. But it is a meaning that philosophy-types and those so attracted tend to care about, so it's worth mentioning.

Disquotationalism sets out how small-t truth works -- but it doesn't tell us what it means. The game of truth-telling does that.

So can you set out, succinctly, why they are wrong? — Banno

There's a few things that I get stuck on in thinking through this, but I think the most succinct one is this:

Taking meaning as primary, as you note, I think the most succinct refutation is simply "That's not what truth means" -- which others have pointed out, I believe, in this discussion, but then the mistake is going on to try and say too much, which opens the theory to refutation.

But I agree with you and others who have pointed out that said refutation depends upon a sort of pre-reflective understanding of truth. I'm not so sure I'd say unanalysable, either, but it's definitely one of those primitives that can't be rendered so easily as the traditional theories of truth attempt to.

Perhaps it would be most accurate to say that deflationary theories remain incomplete, but offer a better account that any other theories. — Banno

This is how I feel about them.

The only thing wrong with deflationary theories is they are obviously false. But that's a feature, given how the others are inobviously false, and you really get a close approximation.

Well, I would say that I have quite a lot of things I enjoy, but at the end of the day I still question myself whether it´s all worth it. I love my family, friends, have an interesting job, enough money, love long walks, driving, cooking, coffee….but still there’s something at the back of my head saying - is it enough?

Also I do think that preferring “nothingness” is a stupid concept, because for me there’s nothing after death, no “you” to “enjoy” the preferred nothingness :roll: . For now suicide seems irrational.

So therefore the question why go on or better yet how to go on, what to strive for? — rossii

You mentioned depression, so I'm responding with that frame in mind - I'm speaking from the perspective of one who manages his own depression.

I know what I'd say to myself if I couldn't come up with something more but just felt a kind of malingering malaise that asks if I need or want more -- but I couldn't answer that question for you. And if your question is as general as, what should I strive for? Then even more so, no one could answer that question for you. If anything, I'd say I'm done with striving -- I'm sick and tired of trying. I like not-trying. I like not-doing. It's the best place to be. Striving is hard. not-doing is relaxing. But I don't recommend that as a universal tonic. It's just what I want now.

I'm trying to be careful to be sure I'm only speaking for myself; to not give advice, because *if* your feeling is more than a philosophical wondering about "the point of it all", then none of us are in a good position to offer anything that might really help. All I can do is say I know what causes that feeling in me, and note that you're not alone in feeling it. But the actual resolution of or living with these feelings isn't a well known or even presently knowable process, at least in a general way. We understand diabetes better than we do depression, because at least we know how to manage diabetes if the person is able to habituate themselves to it.

(I mean it still could be just symptoms of depression, but who knows :confused: )

I feel like noting: there's the word "Just" again -- as if to say these feelings are only something. I don't think that's the case at all. After all, here you are talking about it. If they were only something, then you could shrug it off, right? Even if depression is the underlying causal explanation, it's not necessarily satisfying to have a causal explanation for the way we feel. Sometimes we're looking for something a little more meaningful than "the atoms move around and stuff happens, whadya want?" or "you experienced trauma and learned bad habits, so unlearn those and you'll be cured" -- sometimes there isn't a cure. Sometimes it's just nice to talk about what you feel, even if it seems a bit crazy.

But these feelings are never "just" something else. Our feelings are important, good, bad, and ugly.

Meaning is just another invention we make to trick ourselves into believing life is worthwhile. — Darkneos

There's that word "just" again --

any one name is easy to put aside, when you have another set of names and operators.

{J}(NAME) -> "just an invention/trick/illusion"

So there's what's apparent, and then there's what is real. For any named reason one will reduce said reason with the above "just" operator, categorizing the reasons people give as apparent.

The real, here, is . . . well, what, precisely?

Let's just say whatever it is, it certainly isn't any possible reason someone might give that they feel life is worthwhile. You see the real, and these all fall to the above described operator.

But unlike Plato, who talks of a light -- a knowledge of the good, the beautiful and the true -- you just say "I want you all to feel life is not worthwhile!" -- why would we do that?

Well I’m in my early thirties, and i’m really looking for a compelling reason/argument to live (and how to live) that would at least work for me. Suicide has been on my mind for a quite some time, but I really don’t want to cause suffering to people around me. That’s why the search for a reason to live or argument why not suicide. — rossii

I feel like everything used to justify the will to keep going is more just our survival instinct trying to rationalize things. — Darkneos

I'd question this desire for something more than survival instincts. Our attachment to life isn't "just" survival instinct, it's a complex of attachments and emotions and history and future and present and...

A complex, I think, is a good description -- leaving open what precisely makes us tick, while noting that it's not simple.

So coming to understand how or why we might come to desire death -- while still being alive! -- will also be complicated.


To the refrain "but this is not enough to justify going on":

Whether it is or isn't enough really is up to you. It's your relationship to the world, to yourself, to your emotions and needs and people. There is no "reason" someone can give you to make you feel any differently about those. The unjust thing about this world is that it's probably not even your fault you feel this way -- but because it's your life, your emotions, your desire, well... it still falls to you to learn how to live with it.

I think there are not "foolish" question when someone is asking with aim of learning... — javi2541997

True, you're right.

I should say it is a foolish question to believe you can have an answer to.

The desire to know, and intellectual curiosity, are good things!

But it is possible for human beings to want to know something that they are unable to know.

I think that questions asking after ultimate foundations are like that.

what we should consider as "fundamental" which predicates it all? — javi2541997

I think the question is a bit foolish and undecidable. There is no fundament or ultimate principle that all knowledge can be derived from. Knowledge is hard won, slow, painful, and limited. In order to be able to derive such a principle, and be certain that it is true, we would have to be able to check all knowledge -- be omniscient. Otherwise, you just fall into metaphor and traps of reason (as we blabber-apes tend to)

I'm not sure I understand. I took that to mean he's rejecting any solution to the question which proposes contraries, like the-Many/the-One, rather than proposing a first principle here.

I'd hesitate to put it in the terms of "axioms" though. And even logic, because this is dealing with questions of first philosophy rather than reasoning what statement necessarily follows from premises, by necessity.

He's using logic here, of course, and perhaps the first principle would fit the form you're talking about -- a universal affirmation.

I'm not sure how I'd parse the god of the philosophers thinking the universe into the logical form, though -- and it wouldn't be a syllogism, I don't think either, because you'd actually construct syllogisms that terminate in the first principles, right?

But then with the examples that he's using, he just names things proposed as fundamental -- and as I understand the system, God thinking the universe and himself into existence is the unmoved mover, and would seem to count, right? But that's not exactly a universal affirmation, ala the logic.

It's a metaphysical proposition about the nature of reality and how everything relates back to something fundamental that predicates it all.

Completely agree and you are, of course, on the right path because the paper I have read was referring and quoting to The Metaphysics. So, I appreciated all the big quotes you shared with us. The paper I used is not that complete and drafted. — javi2541997

Heh, these are pretty hastily pulled, I'll admit -- so this is more at the idea-bouncing phase than carefully pulled quotes, just to give a little context. And the last time I read Aristotle in real depth was over 10 years ago. I did, however, check the physics and the prior analytics for "first principles" as well, just out of curiosity, and didn't find as much that seemed to grab me as relevant.

A) Which are the “first principles” Aristotle is referring to? — javi2541997

link

Part 1

"THERE is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes
which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not
the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these
others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of
being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the
mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the
first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some
thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those
who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same
principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of
being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is
of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes...."

In part 2:

"...And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance, so that there must necessarily be among them a first philosophy and one which follows this. For being falls immediately into genera; for which reason the sciences too will correspond to these genera. For the philosopher is like the mathematician, as that word is used; for mathematics also has parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within the sphere of mathematics."

"Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed to unity-and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not present in some particular class; in the latter case difference is present over and above what is implied in negation; for negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted):-in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts we named above, the other and the dissimilar and the unequal, and everything else which is derived either from these or from plurality and unity, must fall within the province of the science above named." — Aristotle, Metaphysics Book IV

Part1

WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise, all these sciences mark off some particular being-some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence-some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis-they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.

"And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker-it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer-viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter. Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of 'whats', some are like 'snub', and some like 'concave'. And these differ because 'snub' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement-they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the 'what' in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter.

"That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations. Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science,-not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect,-geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being-both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being. — Aristotle, Metaphysics VI

Part 1
"REGARDING this kind of substance, what we have said must be taken as sufficient. All philosophers make the first principles contraries: as in natural things, so also in the case of unchangeable substances. But since there cannot be anything prior to the first principle of all things, the principle cannot be the principle and yet be an attribute of something else. To suggest this is like saying that the white is a first principle, not qua anything else but qua white, but yet that it is predicable of a subject, i.e. that its being white presupposes its being something else; this is absurd, for then that subject will be prior. But all things which are generated from their contraries involve an underlying subject; a subject, then, must be present in the case of contraries, if anywhere. All contraries, then, are always predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, but just as appearances suggest that there is nothing contrary to substance, argument confirms this. No contrary, then, is the first principle of all things in the full sense; the first principle is something different. — Aristotle, Metaphysics XIV

I'm just pulling quotes from The Metaphysics which mention first principles and first philosophy, because that's what I thought was referred to by Aristotle as "the first principles"

I imagine the unmoved mover would probably count -- but notice in these examples (and in the text surrounding the quotations) what Aristotle does to refute first proposed first principles, like atoms or water/earth/fire/air or the One or Contraries, to get a better notion of what he means by "first principles". They seem to be at the top of the species-genus chain, and somehow explain how everything is made of or comes from some primary thing, and if we take it in conjunction with the logic, then I think it'd be fair to say it was be a Subject, and not a Predicate.

Glad to find some common ground :)

Labor never had the power to do that. When unions were strongest, it was when the government had a policy of backing labor. When the government withdrew it's support, when Reagan shot down the air traffic controller strike, the tide turned against them and they're gone now. — Tate

How do you think the NLRA was passed?

I agree that Reagan was a major turning point in the labor movement. Although I actually put it down to Carter who started the whole "bail out business" thang. Reagan is the spiritual successor of that line of thought, but Carter seemed to be fine with neo-liberalism.

What should we do? — Tate

People who aren't in that situation should be supportive of unionization. Even in the bread-and-butter sense of unions - and really, anyone who has to work for a living is in that situation. No matter how much you make. There are obvious hierarchies and so forth worth recognizing. But, as far as I'm concerned at least, anyone who has ever had to work for a living should be a part of the labor movement.

Well, then I'd say I think you're an engineer who has decided to edit the history books to suit your preferred outlook, and that you do not want to know that working people *forced* the government to help them in far-reaching ways. It was only because of the movement, though.

I don't mind the federal government helping unions in far reaching ways, personally. If anything, I want them to do more.


-- to me what you're describing sounds similar to when nurses organize. They can't deny their labor, because that would mean dead people, but they still gain power through organization.

You were a cog in a grand machine. And you managed to make it work for you. Cudos!

But there are people who are still cleaning, stocking, etc. And they are suffering.

No. What is it?

Eh, you're a scab.

What do you know of "really powerful unions"?

"really powerful" ? Naw.

Unions have had higher participation rates prior to the neoliberal assault. But the government has never been anything but pro-capitalist— including FDR. — Xtrix

Heh. I was attempting a softer approach, but yes, I agree.

Obviously I disagree.

But I'm not sure that it's an interesting disagreement for myself.

As long as you agree "since the 1980's" then you see what I'm talking about, I think. And what happened before? Just some stories that people like to tell.

No. But I understand that a story on the internet is just a story, yeh? So I won't press the point.


These were victories which were hard fought. To the point of people being shot by Pinkertons etc. The government, in the USA at least, has been mostly anti-labor and pro-capitalist. Even the relatively conservative Foner would confirm this.

But it's ok -- I had to read them books cuz I was taught wrong too. So there's that.

I don't blame you. That's the story I was told too.

I'd just say it's only a story.

If you are a person who must work to live, then the labor movement is for you. Even in this era, with service-sector work being primary in the imperial core.

There is a bloody conflict, but the blood spilt is by the boss -- and the boss spills the blood of the worker.

I believe you'd disbelieve these as metaphorical expressions. And so I feel the need to relate a personal experience: I have met people physically disabled by Starbucks. They qualified, even in this regressive government, for disability. Serving coffee.

If you own a shop, then sure -- this is nonsense. But if you actually have to sell your labor... it aint.

One thing you do need to understand about the American labor movement is that it only existed in the first place due to federal backing, originally by Teddy Roosevelt and then Wilson. In Wilson's case it was in line with his progressive Christianity. — Tate

I am not trying to be aggressive, but I will say that this is wrong.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knights_of_Labor

The labor movement was inspired by industrialization, as @unenlightened said.


But there is a longer history to it.

Glad to hear it. I make no promises on my rate of reading due to the chaos of life, but I look forward to discussing these texts.

In my view unions are more of a vessel for the employee to face the employer with more weight than just by being individual employees. That hasn't anything to with private property. In fact, many free market libertarians don't have any problem with trade unions... those that aren't mesmerized by the imagination of Ayn Rand. — ssu

Historically the US labor movement has been composed of both radical and bread-and-butter elements. Without the bread-and-butter unionism you can't succeed -- the material conditions of the members are the primary focus of a local, which in terms of US unionism usually just means you have some administration around a contract, and the union is the business which services that contract.

However, without the radical element the labor movement dies -- we see that in the United States as labor bureaucrats pushed out the radical elements in response to anti-communist propaganda. Labor feared being labelled communist and castigated, so they castigated their communist and socialist members to save themselves.


I agree partly with you. Bread and butter issues are the main forces of a union. But, as we see from the decline of the AFL-CIO from the 50's onward, if you kill the heart of the movement you die.

I'd say this isn't lost on the majority of union people. I know that my preferred way of looking at unions is as institutions for working people to obtain power over the economy -- that is, a kind of socialism. I don't have a finger on the pulse anymore so I couldn't say what the beliefs are, but bread-and-butter unionism was the most popular form of unionism in the USA when I was still in the game.

I agree - good catch!

So far what I have heard being left out, and agree with: Akrasia, the needs of others, and now death.

I found this today and it's definitely part of what I'm going to be reading.

https://www.amazon.com/Levinas-Reader-Emmanuel/dp/0631164472


The rest of the list so far: Totality and Infinity, and Anthony Burgess' A Clockwork Orange, which I hadn't made the connection to before but actually is a great story for exploring Totality and Infinity since the main character sort of makes the arc which Levinas is describing in the essay. Also, specifically referencing the book since it includes the crucial 21st chapter, which Kubrick cut out for a nice bit of drama (but totally changing the meaning of the story!)

Progress. I think, thanks to yourself and everyone here, I skipped a few false thoughts.

As always, thanks to everyone who responded.

It's about the only good news I see anymore. The IWW has been pushing for unionization efforts in the service sector since at least the late 90's, and I'm very happy to see these fruits -- many failed efforts are finally starting to pay off.