Sure, me calling it political truth is probably a misnomer, but it's a purposeful one. I have written in a number of discussions that, to me, truth is really only a tool to help us achieve the real goal of philosophy, which is to figure out what we should do next. — T Clark

I want to preserve this notion of theoretical thought. It makes more sense of much of philosophy -- rather than casting Plato's theory of the Forms in terms of a tool, it makes sense to say that Plato believed Truth to be a form which we could reach for. He seemed to also believe that knowing truth was enough to make good people -- in a way he collapses practical concerns into theoretical concerns. What the pragmatist does is the opposite -- truth is a tool to be put towards human ends, and nothing more. But this misses the meaning of truth, and also makes the practical concerns of life difficult to understand. (are we saying what we are saying about philosophy because it is a tool being used towards some end? Or are we implicitly assuming a theoretical notion of truth in setting things out thus and so?)

But with some kind of theoretical notion of truth as being somehow related to knowledge -- without a theory, it does seem we have a pre-theoretic understanding of truth, despite the problems with all theories of truth (including deflationary ones) -- it's easy to be able to say that what we are doing here, in producing knowledge, we can also use these abilities in the pursuit of other goals. One of which is the good life.

I don't want to commit myself to the notion that my normative claim on philosophy is the real goal of philosophy. Rather I think of it is a commitment on my part to what I think is interesting in philosophy for myself and possibly others like me. But it's wholly possible for someone to abandon that precept and engage in philosophy in a purely theoretical manner. In fact, many philosophers do exactly that. If they didn't share my precept, there would be no appeal I could make to them though. And while I think practical concerns are primary, in the sense that I want to intentionally make ethics my first philosophy, I can't deny that there are those with a thirst for truth and knowledge instead.

Perhaps I should note that I don't think of reason as some cold set of rules of inference or Spock-like mentality, too. Reason is wholly motivated towards goals -- it is teleologically structured, and in human beings at least, this means motivation and emotion is part and parcel to reasoning. "Disinterested" takes on a new meaning here -- instead of being some pure archon of truth, a disinterested person is one who is motivated in the appropriate way given their profession or goal. It becomes a project of character building through education to create disinterested individuals who, though we are all motivated by emotion and goals, comes to what we consider to be generally agreeable and reasonable conclusions.

I thought you and I were talking about the same thing. In what way is what you call "practical truth" different from what I call "political truth." I'm not talking about politics as in creating, enforcing, and judging laws, I'm talking about making group decisions about what to do next. — T Clark

I just wouldn't call it truth. I'd say that we're aiming at proper action, rather than true actions. So there is what is true, and then there is what is good (unqualified, but not simpliciter -- just meaning I know that "good" can mean multiple things).

So theoretical reason is the use of reasoning in the pursuit of the goal of truth or knowledge. Whereas practical reason is the use of reason in the pursuit of the goal of the good or proper conduct (be it collective or otherwise).

Truth-as-consensus seems to miss what truth is. Just because a group of people come to an agreement that something is true that does not then mean that what they believe is true. And in politics, where we are making decisions, is it really truth that's being aimed at? In what sense?

I'd say that consensus is a process of justification rather than a defining feature of truth. Actually this is interesting because consensus can play a role in both justifying belief to build knowledge as well as in justifying collective action -- though would it still be proper collective action? Or is the nature of collective action such that it is merely necessary to build consensus in order for it to take place?

The TLP almost reads like a lament to me. I agree with your reading in that it is a treatise on ethics, primarily, and logic secondarily -- there are only a few hints that the treatise is about ethics, mainly when he's talking about the mystical or when a man sees the world right. It's like Wittgenstein wanted to find meaningful ethical content in philosophy but thought that it was impossible, and in fact could only be found outside of philosophy. So the very draw of philosophy ends itself by proving that philosphy cannot settle or expound upon the ethical life, and if one is logical, one should actually believe that ethical statements are not strictly meaningful.

So the 7th proposition, as an ending, reads to me like all the previous explorations of truth, logic, facts, and world are not worth speaking of. We have "climbed the ladder", and now may throw it away.

Some other condition:

In order for an appeal to work it would seem that we would already have to consider the speaker as somehow someone worth listening to. Emotional appeals to shared precepts are not enough, as we can see there are many people who share a tradition but who simply do not listen to one another -- they view others in the light of someone who never says anything worth listening to. Consider, for instance, political parties in a democracy at odds with one another -- there comes a point where appeals are no longer being made. What use words are being put to is as tools of manipulation, as weapons to win, because there is an enemy to defeat. These are not appeals to reason, but strategies of war. All the same the two parties at least claim to have similar precepts.

So mere agreement is not enough. We need to hear another -- an Other? -- in order for an appeal to work. There is something about listening that must be incorporated.

What are they? — Posty McPostface

The slingshot argument, introduced to me on these forums (or the last?), persuaded me of the limitations of the correspondence theory of truth. I found what look to be lecture notes on it here which explains the argument pretty well step by step with examples.

You mean utilitarianism? — Posty McPostface

Not necessarily. Though I don't mean to rule out any normative theory either. I'm more interested in the conditions under which an appeal to act thus and so, rather than otherwise, would work -- and the extent to which reason can influence action, and when it should or shouldn't.

Here I'm just trying to justify the distinction between theoretical and practical reason -- with theoretical reason appeals to emotion don't influence the truth of some proposition so it doesn't make a difference to justification. But in action emotion, pleasure, and so forth, do make a difference to how we actually act. They are important considerations in considering what it means to live the good life.

Interesting. I wonder what kind of eclectic philosophy you have compiled. Let us know so we may benefit too. — Posty McPostface

Heh. Thanks for the encouragement.

I think there's definitely similarity, but I think there's some important differences too. I'm sympathetic to the notion that truth is correspondence, though aware of its limitations. I think that theoretical problems are meaningful. I think there's a distinction to be had between these different appeals to reason -- so, for instance, just because it may make me feel good to believe something is true that does not have any influence upon whether it is true or not. But in the case of practical reason if somethings makes me or others feel good that's pretty darn important to consider.

I'm also drawing my inspiration from different thinkers, which is likely to bring up differences I think. So Aristotle and Kant make hey with this notion of practical reason vs. theoretical reason. And Epicurus sort of calls into question the importance of theoretical reason in his philosophy, as does Levinas, and places more importance on the practical, the ethical side of thinking. These are the thinkers that are on my mind in formulating things this way.

Some remarks:

I think that the question is really too broad to be fairly answered. I'm more than happy to hear input, of course, but I'm also partially using this as a public scratch pad -- if something sparks, then great, but I'm sort of just thinking through things with the hope that input might be received.

Why the question is important: meta-philosophically I've come to believe two things. One, that philosophy and reason are inextricable. And two, that philosophy should address the needs of people. So philosophy is the pursuit of a good life through the path of reason. Or, in a more limited sense, philosophy is the pursuit of a good life when reason is called for.

While there are theoretical concerns in philosophy, as well, I think that from my side of things -- outside of academia -- that such concerns are not the main organizing principle of philosophy. I simply do not have the time necessary to deliberate such things (I also suspect that such debate is interminable and indeterminable, but I'd rather set that aside for now). But, regardless of the time allotted me, I and we all must do things. So in a sense this practical side of philosophy is more important merely by the fact that it is inescapable -- we all do things in the world. And insofar that truth matters to our doing we care about truth, but we can also ignore it to the extent that it does not impact upon our cares. But we cannot ignore waking up and having things to do. (I say "things to do" rather than "make choices" or some such formulation to avoid notions of choice, control, and will which are related but not of interest to me here.)

I phrase the question in terms of of the how of justification and when it's appropriate or working to avoid questions about what. I don't care what it is. I care how it works, how to phrase things more clearly, when reason should be used. Given my meta-philosophical beliefs these questions are similar to asking about the limits of philosophy, though I'd rather not go the meta-route. For me those answers are fixed at the moment. What is in flux, and uncertain, are my thoughts on reason.

Oh, I don't know if it's better that way or whatever. After work I find it hard to concentrate, so it was nice to have it read to me. Plus the translation used in the video I linked had a lyrical quality to it which did make it nice to hear out loud.

Haha. Well, to be fair I don't think I would have liked it at another point in my life. Like a lot of spiritual literature you have to already sort of be in the right frame of mind or at least thirsty for it before it can work its magic. There was one verse that described me well --

When a superior man hears of the Tao,
he immediately begins to embody it.
When an average man hears of the Tao,
he half believes it, half doubts it.
When a foolish man hears of the Tao,
he laughs out loud.

Immediately upon hearing it I was like "Well, I was a foolish man, and now I'd say I'm an average man"

I can kind of see it, but there's a difference too. It's not quite a heap, but there are criteria in play. I think the Sorites paradox would apply only if you were able to fashion objective-subjective as a kind of continuum -- where at one end you had the most objective knowledge and at the other you had the most subjective knowledge, and everything else somehow fell in-between. But what would define the poles in such a way that it would apply to all knowledge?

And then wouldn't we actually be using the dichotomy as opposed to dropping it?

How would you parse Tiff's example, in that case? OR do you mean just to restrict yourself to discussions of objective knowledge only?

I'd have to say that if that be the criteria for subjective and objective truths that you're using the words differently from the scenario with a patient and a doctor. First the domain of discourse has already changed from symptoms to truths. And secondly the mind wasn't really part of the definition of objective or subjective in the case of a patient and a doctor -- rather, it was who was reporting what which determined if a symptom was objective or subjective. The roles determined the meaning of the terms, not whether something depended upon a mind or not.

I think the words are quite squirrelly. So, yes, they can be used, but they have a tendency to shift meaning without notice.

You were talking about criteria for evaluating knowledge though, right?

It seems to me, re-reading your OP, your saying that you can replace all talk of objective or subjective knowledge with talk of criteria for knowledge. Though without the categories objective/subjective.

So you just mean that there are criteria for counting something as knowledge, and we can argue about those rather than argue over whether or not something is objective or subjective..

I think Tiff gave a good response. I'll add a bit more. As Tiff pointed out, if I give you a report of what happening internally, it's clearly subjective, i.e., it originates with the subject. If I give a piece of knowledge that is dependent on me, then it's also subjective. For example, it's true that I like orange juice, and someone can claim that they know that I like orange juice, but this kind of knowledge is dependent on the subject (me). Objective knowledge is not dependent of the how I feel or think, it's independent of how I feel or think. Thus, the fact that the Earth has one moon is an objective fact, i.e., it's not dependent on how anyone feels or thinks. Objective facts can exist apart from minds, subjective facts cannot. This is not that difficult to comprehend. I love the way people want to throw out words that they find difficult, or that they cannot fit into their world view. — Sam26

I think Tiff's response was good, too. What it gave was a very clear context of usage. I would say, however, that the context of usage for objective/subjective is not always so clear as that.

For one, I wasn't sure if the OP was even talking about knowledge per se (I see un brought up this point too). We could be talking about beliefs, facts, knowledge, or even entities. Any given philosopher has some project in mind which might help to understand the terms, but in speaking together, here, I'd say it is hard to pin down the exact meaning of the terms without a little leg-work. With Tiff's example we knew what was under consideration -- symptoms. So a patient gave a subjective symptom, whereas a doctor -- playing the role of an analyst -- gives an objective one. Makes perfect sense.

But using the words objective and subjective does not always play out so smoothly, nor is it clear what domain is under consideration even.

Also, words don't get their meaning from other words, words primarily get their meaning from how they're used. — Sam26

I am more inclined to agree with you, but I didn't want to raise the point. I mostly wanted to understand what the implication was, regardless of whatever theory of meaning we might subscribe to.

So, the issue seems to be, when does one know they are being objective, correct? — Posty McPostface

Well, for myself at least, I just began to think that the use of the terms added more confusion than clarity. But in not using them their importance seemed to drop out with them, and you could get on with thinking about the topic at hand.

Yes, words are circular, they derive their meaning from other words. What do you think this says about the objective/subjective dichotomy? I'm trying to point at a third alternative. — Posty McPostface

I'm open to a third way. I still don't think that the terms are terribly important, merely that they are tolerable as long as we remain clear about what we mean - hardly a passionate defense of an old dichotomy :D.

I am uncertain what the derivation of meaning from other words might say about objective/subjective. I'd have to have it spelled out for me more.

Well, thanks to this thread I listened to the Tao te Ching -- it was my first exposure to it. There was a reasonably decent reading on youtube, and the speaker also gives a preface.

I never really had the inclination before and I don't know why. I really enjoyed it.

I had thought, for awhile, that it was preferable to reject the distinction between what is objective and subjective. Now I'm tentatively of the opinion that as long as we set out what we mean then the terms can be used, while keeping an eye on the fact that they are ambiguous and often change meaning depending on the speaker. But aside from the fact that people use the words I don't know I'd go so far as to say there is some advantage to using them -- they are ambiguous and often seem to result in more misunderstanding than understanding.

Asking "Do they deserve it?" is another way of asking "Is the punishment just?". If we unpack the question, we get "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?". The objectively correct punishment is the one that answers "yes" to both questions (if possible). But I only see a matter of facts here. Why do you say this is a matter of values? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because the question I offered is not asking, "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?", but rather "Does the person who is deserving of punishment deserve this punishment?" -- It's a question of how we interpret justice, and what we mean by justice. In the case of the death penalty it is thought of as just when the person in question has done something so wrong that the worst punishment we have is the only possible way to rectify what they have done. Justice, in this sense, is seen as a kind of balance. One person kills, and so is killed in return.

Another sort of justice would just be restorative justice. Killing a murderer only creates more death, rather than rectify the wrong. Seeing as we can do nothing to bring back the dead the debt owed by the murderer is unpayable, and so they are given some sort of life sentence.

Another sort of justice would be rehabilitative justice. Killing a murderer not only fails to rectify a wrong, it also misses out on what the truly just act would be: turning the murderer into a productive member of society. Justice, in this sense, is more about the health of a community than rectifying wrongs.

Given that we agree that morality is objective, this question becomes virtually irrelevant; because objective truth is found by reason and not opinions — Samuel Lacrampe

I'd say this confuses truth with justification. So while we agree that moral statements are truth-apt, in that they seem to be describing things which are or are not the case invariant of one's point of view, what I am asking is how you determine whether such a statement is true or false. Agreement seems to be the metric on hand, so we'd have to ask how it is we determine that people agree.

I'd say that this is not enough:

Moral systems on the other hand are very similar in different places and times. The Golden Rule is called such because it is universal. It occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition — Samuel Lacrampe

For the reasons against the golden rule I already mentioned, one, and also because "moral systems" could just be read as synonymous with "systems with the golden rule". So any system with the golden rule is a system with the golden rule, meaning that definition-ally they'd all be similar. But this just begs the question.

I'd say that, for instance, the Nazi system you propose contra moral systems is another example of people acting on moral impulses. These were moral impulses of disgust and a fascination with human unity in the state. There is a certain desire for purity in Nazi emotions, as well as a desire to be rid of a previous embarassment and rectify wrongs done to the people. But I would call it an immoral system, in the evaluative sense -- but in the descriptive sense, just like capitalism, communism, or feudalism, I'd say that it counts as a system of prescripts for society, and so is in that sense at least a normative system. It would count when looking at whether or not people agree on goodness.

Power -- Bertrand Russell. It's written as a survey of types with the hopes of making a science of power. I don't think it succeeds, but it fits what you're asking after, and still provides a nice little set of kinds of power.

I suppose a direct response to your titular question is: It's not as tedious as discussing philosophy with definitions. Also, it keeps the discussion from becoming about what a word really means, as if such usage could be settled by appealing to Meriam Webster.

Rather than argue over the meaning of "animal", we can just argue over whether animals have rights -- just to use your example you opened with. And we can clarify exactly what we mean by said terms as we go along, just as we would have to even when setting out our terms from the start.

In a sense it doesn't matter what the definition of a word is as long as it is understood. The only point in providing or asking for meaning is to clarify usage, and once that is understood then the other possible uses a word can be put to are not relevant.

Or, perhaps, if your style of communication is somewhat more mathematical -- as if you were providing a proof, maybe. But said proofs can be just as arbitrary as vague word usage, too, where it appears we have proven something we haven't just because of a queer way of using a word, rather than talking about the issue at hand. So, for example, we could use the word "vertebrates", as you say, and get long just as well as if we used the word "animal" as long as we understand what we're talking about. But in the end it's not the biological characteristics of certain beasties at play there, but the capacity of suffering that some beasties have. And even here "beasties", made up as it is, serves just as well because you understand what I mean by the term.

(1) Subjectivity is not necessarily entailed; inasmuch as people disagree on religions even though it is clearly an objective topic (E.g., if the Christian God exists, then He exists for everyone; and if not, then not). — Samuel Lacrampe

That's a good analogy actually. By your terms I agree that morality is objective. The notion that I'm proposing is that every moral statement is false.

Similarly with religion -- every religion has truth-apt statements. And that makes them objective. And they are false statements, i.e., there is not one true religion.

(2) I dispute the claim that the disagreements are strong; even for the case of the death penalty. People do not argue on the death penalty when it comes to simple cases like children jaywalking; they do only when it comes to complex cases like dealing with terrorists. E.g., if only put in jail, will they escape? Will they do it again once released? Will their buddies continue to terrorize because jail time is not a strong enough incentive to stop? etc. If we know the answer to these questions with certainty, then there would be very few disagreements; and these are matters of facts, not values. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think there's one important question that you're missing there. Do they deserve it? And that is not a question of fact, but of values.

I agree that there is agreement for absurdly simple cases, but I don't know if there is agreement even for most cases. First, how would we determine such a thing? It would seem we'd have to know the opinion not only of everyone who exists now, but even people who have existed -- since moral difference is most clear when viewed historically, and not just by asking your neighbor. And that just isn't possible to know down to every detail. We have to make assumptions of some kind to determine what everyone ever has believed.

Given the changes in laws over time and the differences between even current countries, and persons within countries, I'd say that it is at least reasonable to believe that there is more disagreement than agreement with respect to all persons. I mean, we used to have a feudal society ruled by a single church. And now we have a democratic capitalist society with a plurality of religions. In what ways would all the people of the past agree with our current world? And wouldn't they actually disagree with it on what they consider to be moral grounds?

Would it really be for others? Maybe family and friends. But the same things that motivate people now -- desires for comfort, food, water, and so forth. Material comforts.

If they are correct, then yes, I am the one in error in this case. But the very fact that there can be an error proves the objectivity of the topic. There cannot be any error on subjective topics, for it is by definition only a matter of opinion. — Samuel Lacrampe

Sure. But it's sensible to ask, then, how it is you know what you claim? Why is it that some people believe in the death penalty, and some do not, and both call it justice -- how do you adjudicate between these two possibilities, and justify your belief?

I have granted the possibility of error. But given the diversity of opinion on the topic it seems reasonable to also say that not only is error possible, but we are all actually in error -- because there is no fact to the matter.

There's a nice book by Ian Hacking titled The Social Construction of What?. I think it's great reading for anyone interested in the notion of social construction.

It is not a weakness that Philosophy appeals to reason. It is the weakness of the reasoner that requires Philosophy to remain on her knees and continue to appeal.

The weakness of Philosophy is that it must genuflect before the reason of the reasoner. Art does not appeal. it stands like a God and simply declares. Art, is the liberated soul of Man. — Marcus de Brun

Isn't that what makes it better than philosophy, in some respects?

I think so.I think they're both important aspects of human activity. And actually work better together than the traditional dichotomy between reason and feeling might suggest -- but only if we understand them to be doing different things and to be good at what they do.

I was hoping to get that point across by saying what I feel and think when I watch the video you linked -- trying to do philosophy on art. Now, what I wrote was very far from moving. It wasn't an expression of my liberation, or anything so deep and profound as what many an artwork can express. But it still provided something valuable -- by telling you what was going on in my head, in my thinking, by my reasoning. Rather than just make declarations it gave you, and others, something to pick on from the standpoint of reason.

Asking the easy questions today? :D

There's a funny thing about the question "What does that mean to you?" There's a couple of senses of "mean" that come out, when I read it -- in one way you are asking me the simple linguistic meaning, or the meaning of the concept of freedom in a descriptive sense. In the other sense you are asking me what freedom means to me as in why is it meaningful or important to me. And maybe you are really asking both questions. If you meant anything besides that then you'll have to explicate a bit.

Freedom is a negative condition -- in the sense that you only lose it because you are being coerced. But there is nothing specific to the condition of freedom just by virtue that you could be doing any number of things while being free, and you could even being doing those same things while being unfree. Freedom isn't an action, but a mode of action. And in a simple sense it just means a lack of coercion. But what counts as coercion? That's where you'll have people disagree. I'd say that a fantasy-land of realistic feeling pleasures is coercion -- a coercion I'd take over fear and pain as tools of coercion, by all means, but coercion all the same.

What comes of freedom is up to the actor. That's the whole point. So it can't be specified, really. But there is something worthwhile in owning your own actions, rather than doing them because someone is enticing you to do them. From my perspective, at least, I'll take a world of pain where I am not being coerced over a world of pleasure where I am. Because the pain coming from the world is something you can contend with, you have the ability to act and learn how to deal with it. But in a world where you are the object to be controlled you have no such recourse. You're alienated even from yourself.

Plus, in a more practical manner, it's not like the world the Matrix created was all that great to begin with :D. Pain and suffering are just part of life. There's no eliminating that. But if you are free you can learn to be at peace with it.

I'm not exactly sure. I just know what I'd choose.

First I'd be curious. What in the heck are you talking about? Sure, I want to see what that's all about. And then I'd sort of feel like I was caged, just taking the premise of the film at face value, and I would want to remain free.

Misery in the domain of the real!

Well, I don't know if I'd call it misery. But I'd want real power and money, as opposed to dream power and money. And besides that there are other more important things which would be similar -- whatever we care about I'd want something real rather than a simulation of what is real. What is real matters to me.

That's fair.

I'll own up to the fact that love has been one of my philosophy topics for a bit. :D But there's wisdom to what you're saying here.

Again, have a expressed my love and adoration with saying that I love you more than words can say? — Posty McPostface

Sure. But I don't see what you think this entails.

Surely, we can talk about love; but, it is often shown through deeds and acts. A transactional relationship can entail everything that is the case about love.

Yes, it's shown through deeds or acts.

I'm not drawing the same implications you are. I don't see how you get from your first sentence to your second sentence, in a reasonable fashion.

"Psychology: an interaction of an individual with one or more other persons, especially as influenced by their assumed relational roles of parent, child, or adult" — Baden

I had hoped that the use of examples like a shopkeeper would make it clear exactly what I mean by transactional.

But even a role seems a bit off to me. I'm not so sure about that.

To me though it seems to inhere conditionality, the necessary expectation of something in return, which doesn't fly with regard to love. See Un's post. . — Baden

Yeah, I think you're right there.

Anyhow, talk is cheap in this area

It can be. But I think it's worth exploring love at a conceptual level, too. I'm halv-sies on the role cognition can play in healthy relationships -- it's not all talk, feelings and actions play a bigger role than Reason may wish, but reason can help too.

But I do. They feel different. Just as I have a reason to distinguish between red and blue -- they look different -- so I have a reason to distinguish between transactional and loving relationships -- they feel different.

You have no grounds for doubting here. — Posty McPostface

What? I'm totally confused as to what you're getting at. My best guess right now is you believe I was talking about someone else's relationship which is transactional and so I don't know what they are feeling -- but I wasn't talking about someone else's relationship, I was talking about my feelings with respect to someone I have a purely transactional relationship contrasted to someone I have a loving relationship with.

Yes. Though I'm a little hesitant to call something second nature, just because I'm always leery of essences in general, but maybe that won't be an issue. Unthinking behavior and analysis are definitely different from one another, though. I think I can agree that human life has both in them, and they are different from one another.

I'd say feelings are noticeably absent. Also, the kind of commitments , as well as specific commitments, in a transactional relationship differs from a loving relationship. My commitment to a store clerk is to not steal, or some such, but that's about it. To a lover I'm committed to their well-being.

And then there is the relationship itself -- the mutual feelings and commitments that are shared between people that I do not feel for the store clerk, nor do they feel that for me.

And then there's the kinds of actions. For a store clerk I simply pay for what I'm buying, and leave. If I don't buy something of his there is nothing personal at stake -- he's just not selling what I'm buying at the price I want it at, and that's that. But for a lover I will think of things they enjoy and do things so that they might enjoy them because I am motivated out of care for them, in particular. I'll know their quirks, their dislikes, their likes, dreams, feelings... so many personal details that just are not present in a strictly transactional relationship, which is goal-oriented and ends the moment the goal is completed.

Being in love, falling in love, and acting out of love just don't feel anything like a business arrangement or simply working together towards some end-goal. It's deontological and motivated intrinsically, rather than utilitarian and motivated extrinsically.

This is nonsense. When someone says that they love someone more than what words can convey, then they have conveyed their love, no? — Posty McPostface

Sure. But my bagel is not a "bagel", and when I eat it I'm not eating words.

Love needs more than expressions of love -- it is also actions, commitments, feelings, a relationship, and an experience.

Yet, we treat it as if a beetle in a box, that is unique to us only or to two partners. — Posty McPostface

Hmm. I dunno. It seems to me that love isn't ineffable. Because it's not strictly propositional there is more to love than words, but we can sensibly talk about love.

I don't understand the difference between the two here. — Posty McPostface

Learning is more broad than development. It seems to me like development involves a kind of programme or discipline where someone could potentially teach a skill. But we can learn what pizza tastes like only by eating and tasting pizza -- there is no class that can teach that taste. True, we can develop theories of taste and improve our discernment based upon said theories, but I'm not sure that there is a real discipline here as much as it is a mutual discussion about a shared experience.

Maybe you could develop some sort of discipline, but I am merely uncertain.

We can talk about what people or ourselves think about love; but, in many cases love is a transactional attitude. — Posty McPostface

Like when? And, if so, how is it different from other transactional attitudes? (or is it different at all, in your view?)

Doesn't that imply that love is a unique experience, in a phenomenological nonsensical sense? As if the feeling cannot be learned, and appreciated, and developed over time? — Posty McPostface

I'm not sure what you mean by "phenomenological nonsensical sense" -- care to expound?

I don't know if it's unique. I think we know what we're talking about when we talk about love, at least -- it's not like a beetle in a box that only I have access to. Is that what you mean by unique, or something else?

And I'd say that love can be learned, but I don't know if it can be developed. We learn what love is by being in, falling in, and acting out of love. Then talking about love can help to gain understanding as well, but I think you'd have to have the experience first. I don't think that love is purely propositional and can be understood simply by telling someone 'This is what it is", in the manner that we might say we can understand that the capital of the United States is Washington D.C.

I think I'd fall pretty close to how @Ciceronianus the White talks about love just above in my thoughts, though I think I might make a little more room for its frequency and application.

But is that love?

I'd concur with @TimeLine in saying that a transactional relationship, at least on the face of it, doesn't seem like love. Not even erotic love, which may seem like a transaction of beauty for beauty, seems quite like that to me: I'd say that erotic love is a relationship where you share mutual feelings of appreciation for one another's bodies and mutual pleasures.

At least not "at bottom" -- obviously you can enter into transactions with a lover, such as the splitting of the chores, but you'd do so with a loving relationship already in place for it to count as love. Otherwise it seems like I must love the store clerk, the waitress, a coworker, or anyone who I do interact with on a strictly transactional basis.

I realize you could restrict the definition of love to particular kinds of transactions, but to that I'd just say that love doesn't feel like that -- phenomenologically the experience of love just doesn't feel like an exchange. Hence the difference between friends with benefits and lovers proper.

Love to me is not about how you feel, I see it as a shared goal that you and your partner are constantly striving to work towards — Gord

What's the difference, then, between a lover and a business partner?