Ah! That clicked for me. Thanks.

Grasshoppers suffer from OCD because they are really ants, whereas ants suffer from an excess of control -anorexia, for example - because they are really grasshoppers. — unenlightened

I was following you up to this point. Grasshoppers really being ants makes sense to me in this way: that the grasshopper feels more in control by focusing on the immediate, thinking that the future cannot be controlled. But the ant being a grasshopper eludes me. Care to say a little more on that?

If OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behaviour is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions, then by consistency of reasoning all behaviour (not just X's) is determined by physiology. — MetaphysicsNow

I have two points here. The first is that I think your conditional is false.

If my heart beats at a certain rate because of physiological conditions then it does not follow that all behavior is determined by physiology. The same goes for abnormal physiology -- so in such and such a case of physiological abnormality I may not have control over this or that behavior, but I may still have control over others.

In fact the normal human is still limited by their physiology in this sense, while also having control over some things too.

There are some things in our control and some things which are not. If we lack control due to some physiological characteristic that wouldn't mean that everything is determined by physiology.


The second point I want to make has to do with the first statement in your conditional: "OCD is beyond X's control because X's ritualistic behavior is determined by physiologically abnormal conditions"

Suppose that it is not the case that OCD is beyond X's control because of physiology. Suppose he is incorrect in his explanation, that there is some other cause or reason for him not being in control. Regardless it would make sense to believe him that he is not in control when he so says, especially in the context of him asking for help as we've presumed he is doing by seeking out treatment of some sort.

He may be wrong about the cause, but he's in a much better position to be able to tell us what he is and is not in control of. And, what's more, it would seem that if we agree with the diagnosis of OCD that we would concur that this particular thing is out of his immediate control.

Why would you disbelieve him when he says it's not in his control?

What exactly is dishonest in the scenario you posited? In what way is the patient lying to himself?

So again there is no sense in trying to contradict the patient's claim which is confirmed by his action. — unenlightened

That is true! I didn't mean to give the impression that we should contradict the patient. I was more just trying to focus on how the particularities of each case are important in assessing the truth -- so even if this guy is right, the next may be wrong, and there is no reason to believe the cases are related in spite of using the same name for similar behaviors.

X's habit is to allay his fears with ritual, and it has the effect of strengthening the fear in the long term as it allays it in the short. Perhaps he does not fully understand this, and then reason can clarify, but as he has (I presume) put himself in the position of patient, it seems that his reason has already set him on the road of looking for some other support for the resolution of the conflict he is in. He needs the therapist to hold his hand and lend him some strength, not tell him he is being unreasonable. Because, as he says, he already knows that and it doesn't help. — unenlightened

Good points.

I should also say that just because the patient may be wrong, that does not then mean that the analyst is in a better position than the patient to make that judgment.

I don't think there is a general answer. He could be right, and he could also be wrong.

Mental illness is a sub-category of illness. And insofar that reason can help in curing ills that is how far reason can help curing mental illness.

So at one point someone died of diabetes. And then some time later we figured out some of the mechanisms for diabetes and developed medicines which allow a person to cope. Diabetes is actually pretty similar to mental illness in that there is no cure in the sense that a broken leg has a cure -- there are medicines, there is something you need to know, and then there's the part of attempting to build better habits to help manage the disease.

I don't know much about this akrasia condition, but if he relapses, it is either out of his own free will or it is not. If the former, then he was not sincere in the first place and is not to be trusted. If the latter, then his act is not immoral, but harmful nonetheless, and at which point the "punishment" would not be out of retribution but to "save him from himself" so to speak, like an intervention. — Samuel Lacrampe

Akrasia is just a fancy term for failure in spite of our intent. We may correctly judge what is good for us, and yet act against said judgment. Addiction is a good example of this because it is easy to see how one is harming themself, but yet the bad behavior continues. You can even get caught in a kind of cycle of guilt because you are actually sorry, but you still continue to behave badly. Usually this is attributed to a weakness of will.

I think that the case where mercy fails to meet justice and is yet morally good does not add up. — Samuel Lacrampe

Do you think someone else might disagree with you on this?

Recall that justice is defined as equality in treatment among all men. As such, we can define injustice as mistreatment for some men. If justice is not met, even out of mercy, then it follows that somebody gets mistreated.


E.g. You are a judge. Person A is unjust to person B. You could give a just punishment to A but decide not to, out of mercy, which comes from love for A. The logical consequence is that justice is not restored for B. This unjust decision from love for A entails a lack of love for B.

I don't think that's true. Do I not love myself because I forgo pressing for my friend to pay me back?

I think I prefer to call what Berne calls games scripts because it de-emphasizes the games as something as a part of one's personality and puts it in a frame of a role; like something you can pick up, play, reinterpret and re-express but which still has a set of lines which come in a certain order. This is how I feel that games like this are -- they can become a part of one's identity insofar that we identify with a script. But this is exactly like a role in a play, at least as I act; I become the character, it is my identity, and I play it out into the external world of the stage being viewed by an audience, an audience which any good actor knows how to feel, to work, and to modify the highly orchestrated dance that is a play ever so slightly to make that particular audience enjoy it more.

I pretty much feel that demands on maleness and femaleness are like this -- roles that anyone can plug into and re-interpret, within the bounds of the script and to reaction (not necessarily pleasure!) of an audience.

But then there is also an aspect of identity where someone feels like a [gender] which doesn't fit into this. But such feelings don't seem to fit the game archetype to me.

A just punishment is one that serves two goals. (1) restore justice, and (2) prevent injustice from occurring again. If the friend truly intends to pay you back when he can, then goal (1) is met. If in addition he is sincerely penitent, then goal (2) is met without further punishment; and in which case any additional punishment like kicking him out would be overboard and result in injustice the other way.

The problem in real life is that intentions of others are never fully known, and so the disagreement in punishment can come from disagreement in the perception of the defendant's intentions. — Samuel Lacrampe

I think that addiction doesn't work so cleanly as all that, or akrasia in general for that matter. Suppose both conditions are met the first time. What if he does it again? And so on? Or perhaps this is the first time he has done it to you, but he's done this elsewhere before.

We are prone to repeat mistakes. We can be sincerely penitent and yet fail.

We would need to define the term 'mercy' to obtain a full understanding of it. If it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but enough to restore justice", then mercy is always in line with justice by definition. But if it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but also sometimes not fully restore justice", then mercy is not always just; and at which point, I would say that this kind of mercy is immoral. — Samuel Lacrampe

Mercy is to forgo punishment. You have a right to punish (a concept associated with justice), but you do not exercise said right. It may be morally correct to enact justice in some scenarios, and morally correct to enact mercy in others. Mercy is a value which flows from love -- the kind of general love for humankind. While you may have the right to punish, to enact just consequences, you forgo them out of compassion.

Moliere is (par for the course :wink: ) right, I think. — jkg20

You make me feel embarrassed for myself. lol

Provided that one views any purported causal correlations between mind/brain as causal correlations between observed (and possibly, obervable) events, and not causal correlations between soft chunks of matter and intangible vapours of mind, the ontological issue between realism and idealism is untouched by the neurological research of scientists like Ghilcrist (of course, bearing in mind the Kastrup thread, I have to insist here that "observe" is being used in its usual and strictly phenomenal sense, and not in any sense the word might have as it functions in the spiel of realist QM theorists). This is presumably to take the "instrumentalist" view of neurology that ProcrastinationTomorrow recommends. The idealsim/realism issue would be about whether one can be instrumentalist about neurology without also being a realist about the brain - that is where the jury is really out.
I haven't read the Ghilcrist article that sparked this discussion, so cannot comment on his analysis. However, if he is suggesting that we can analyse societal development in terms of the domination of the right-hemisphere by the left-hemisphere of the brain, then the question would arise as to why the left-hemisphere became dominant, and in responding to that question, perhaps the ontological issues become more signficant. To anyone who has read the interview, or any of the works of Ghilcrist, what response does he have to that question? — jkg20

Here he gets close to answering your question in responding to his own question that prefaces it, " If I am right that we are living in the West in a culture dominated by the take on the world of the left hemisphere, how did this come about?"

I think its success can be attributed to several things. First, it makes
you powerful, and power is very seductive. Second, it offers very simple
explanations, that are in their own terms convincing, because what
doesn’t fit the plan is simply declared to be meaningless. For example,
to declare talk of ‘consciousness’ a delusion or a linguistic error has
the virtue of simplicity. It may not, however, satisfy the more sceptical
among us, those who are not in thrall to our left hemisphere’s way of
thinking. If what does not fit the model is just discarded we will never
learn, never sophisticate our model of reality, and our understanding
will come to a standstill where it is. Third, the left hemisphere is
also, as I suggest in the book, the Berlusconi of the brain – a political
heavyweight that controls the media. It does the speaking, constructs
the arguments in its own favour. And finally, since the Industrial
Revolution, we have constructed a world around us externally that
is the image of the world the left hemisphere has made internally.
Appeals to the natural world, to the history of a culture, to art, to
the body, and to spirituality, routes that used to lead out of the hall
of mirrors, have been cut off, undercut and ironised out of existence,
and when we look out of the window – we see more of the world
we had created in our minds extended in concrete all around us.

But I don't think these explanations come close to the ontological underpinnings. I think he runs roughshod, just a bit, over such questions -- but mostly because it seems, at least, that they just aren't pertinent to what he's getting at.


I picked up his book some time ago, but it just sits on the shelf. I read this interview wondering if it might be time to read it just because of things I'm thinking about. Now I don't think so, but it was interesting anyways. :D

Something doesn't add. Being merciful sounds morally good only if he is penitent. And if he is sincerely penitent, then he would intend to pay you back when he can. If he can but refuses to pay, then there is no real penitence, and so mercy does not sound morally good here. Or else, declining to receive the money back sounds like irrational mercy, and thus also not morally good.

It seems the morally good mercy would be, after showing sincere penitence and intending to pay back when possible, you choose to keep sheltering him and retain the trust without further retribution. And this would not be unjust. — Samuel Lacrampe

It would not be unjust, but surely you understand that demanding reparation would itself be just. It is the fair thing to do, since you have been wronged. While there is a path that reconciles the two values -- the one you outline -- there is also a path which demonstrates their differences too. That's what I'm trying to get at here.

The path of mercy would not demand, it would understand that you have a friend in need who is sorry and intends to pay you back whenever he can. Mercy is much more in line with the Christian response, since mercy flows from love (which I would say is the central organizing value of Christian values, if we had to choose one).

However, if justice be the central organizing value -- which flows from a sense of equality, fairness, and respect -- it would not violate justice to demand your friend leave and pay you back (obviously only when he can, but the debt would be enforced). If he were a friend he'd understand, after all, that he has to make amends.

Since the moral judgements of sexual acts appear to go beyond the criteria of justice, I can only deduce it comes from religions, like Christianity, where the bible says that marriage is the union between a single man and woman (thus disapproving of homosexuality and polygamy), and commands against adultery (thus disapproving of premarital and extramarital sex).

If Christianity is true, then the moral commands posited in the bible would be true. But since not everyone has heard of or believes in Christianity or other religions positing these commands, not everyone will agree to follow these, even if they were true. So I think that, in practice, there may always be moral disagreements about sexual acts. — Samuel Lacrampe

I agree.

But let's resolve the above first before proceeding further. I think these are similar, but the above is probably closer to the matter because it's a case of core values as opposed to acts.

This is indeed a disagreement. I would reverse this order — Thorongil

I see it like this: If it's good to help people, then it's good to help people whether or not the universe is material or immaterial, whether it was created by God or has existed in infinite time, whether or not I am a brain the vat or an embodied mind participating in the world.

These kinds of questions don't bear on the decisions I have to make or the values I hold. The factual situation does matter in considering what to do, but facts have to be reconciled with any fundamental ontology and can be rationally believed while believing in any sort of fundamental ontology.

And I suspect that ontological commitments, at least, are often held in the face of beliefs about their ethical implications anyways. So by starting with ethics I begin with what matters for many people (not saying you or universally, just commonly)

Ah, I didn't realize your objection was primarily one of fundamental ontology from the perspective of idealism.

I guess from the materialist's perspective there are some reasons to infer that the brain and the mind have something to do with one another, though. Things which seem like any idealist should also have to reconcile, and probably could in one way or another, but the basis of inference seems to be that if we change the brain either by moving chunks of it around or removing parts of it, or if we introduce new chemicals to a living brain, or as the brain develops there is a corresponding change in both phenomenology and behavior.

Phenomenology and behavior are thought to be at least parts of or resultant due to the mind.

So to say that the brain has something to do with the mind, and to then infer that there is this physical component involved, isn't to commit very hard on any particular ontology.

Either way, though, I don't think that the research he's expounding on or the point of view from said research is deeply effected by fundamental ontological commitments. Regardless of our views there it seems that one would have to account for the facts, and he just seems to be attempting to do exactly that -- and is dealing mostly with brain/mind correlations and causal inferences from those correlations without coming down hard on some fundamental ontology.

Your second sentence above doesn't negate the first. You do have a goal in pursuing philosophy: the truth. That makes philosophy instrumental. Whether you obtain the truth as a result of doing philosophy is irrelevant as to whether philosophy is instrumental. You could fail to obtain truth and philosophy would still be instrumental, as per your own definition. — Thorongil

Well, I guess I don't actually do philosophy for the truth. So I'm being sloppy in hopping between hypothetical set-up and my own actual motivation. Sorry :D

I would say that this class of actions can have results, but the results are not the motive. They are deontologically motivated, in the specific sense that the goal is not what's being considered in the choice to act. The action itself is the reason for the action -- it forms a sort of logical circle, where there simply is no more reason for it other than itself.

Philosophy is like this for me. So is art. (EDIT: So is gardening, reading, talking with friends, biking, walking -- just to give a few other examples) There is no more why at that point, and even if one were to come up with a factual theory of motivation to account for the why (say, evolution predisposes persons to procreate for survival, or human nature predisposes us to seek pleasure and minimize pain to give two very common theories) it would completely miss the point.

That is effectively the question of the thread! — Thorongil

Cool. Glad I'm tracking. :D

One might say that, prima facie, if being is intrinsically good, then it is good to procreate. Thinking about it here, what is lurking behind my objection to this reasoning seems to be Hume's guillotine: that one cannot derive an ought from an is. So my objection is that one cannot go from the claim "being is intrinsically good" to "therefore, one ought to procreate."

If Hume's guillotine fails and it is licit to derive an ought from an is, then I will have to admit that procreation is a supererogatory good (morally good, but not required, as in a duty), assuming that being is good. I don't assume that, though.

This part of my post is a bit rambly. Sorry for that.

I'm not sure I'd go so far as to say being is good -- it's just too general. Human life, though, I think I'd take as a good (though not an exclusive good -- i.e. the life of animals can also be good, I'm just focusing on human life cuz procreation). So perhaps that's just a hard point of difference that informs our thinking -- perhaps because of how we think of the word "good", too, I'd wager since I think of the terms as highly embedded in human practice with a sort of irrelevant/apathetic attitude towards meta-ethical commitments or implications in their usage; i.e. whether we choose naturalism or theology as a frame for understanding the world, it seems to me that the debate on goods is always-already relative to the world we co-create with others and the world and so the grand frame has little bearing on the choices we make and whether or not they are good. The ethics come before the metaphysics.

Also, I don't think I'd defend the notion that procreation is a kind of universal good that anyone ought to do, like the sentence "one ought to procreate" seems to imply. It is contingently good, depending upon the circumstances -- and I don't know if I could even say that the circumstances are fixed, either (is it only good to procreate in 20th century liberal capitalism? That seems way off)

Something more in line with a supererogatory good, but one which has complex circumstantial conditions.

If we're thinking of Hume's Guillotine, then we could make an appeal to the passions. No ought can be derived from an is without some kind of value statement of the form "if x is then a ought y" where x is a true statement about some agent's passion, a is the name of an agent, and y is some action. We would just need the connector between is/ought which, as far as I understand Hume at least, is just a passion.


But, then, I don't think I'm committing the fallacy at all -- it seems to me that giving the gift of life does presuppose that life is worth living. I can grant that. But it's not like I'm starting from a fact and moving to a value. It seems to me that this is values, all the way down. The point of contention between ourselves, I think, is more or less how we parse goodness vs what is amoral.

A non-sequituur if I ever heard one. If you take an instrumentalist view of neurology, then the brain simply has no nature that could even possibly be implicated in those relationships. You already have to buy into some mind=brain ontology in order to find that line of thought convincing, and there are good reasons not to buy into that ontology which I imagine Ghilcrist doesn't even bother discussing in the 350,000 word book that they are discussing. — ProcastinationTomorrow

Probably not.

What reasons, along that line of thinking, do you find convincing?


Also, while that series of statements is a non sequitur I don't know if he came to the notion that the brain has something to do with mind/behavior/social-phenomena through said statement. It seems like he's got a series of experiments he's performed where he's disabled parts of the brain and then had people try to do various tasks -- so his inference is likely based upon controlled experiments where he has seen behavior change due to meddling with the brain.

That being said I don't disagree that he runs roughshod over mind/brain distinctions, as well as mind/behavior/social-phenomena in the interview. The thing is, in spite of all that, you can just cut the inferential underpinning off and the talk is still interesting.

In a causal-scientific sense I suspect social entities which survive are the sorts of entities which incorporate some mode of self-replication. So bureaucracy favors and creates bureaucracy (and assimilates non-bureaucracy) and survives more-so than other social entities because of this. No reference to brains or minds or even individual actors is used in this line of thinking.

All the same, this sort of distinction between the two hemispheres, as he calls it, or just two modalities of conscious experience, as he also calls it, or two possible social-environmental structures, as he seems to imply, is what's interesting. Especially the notion that they are co-dependent upon one another for the very act of thinking, as well as a structure of experience, to take place -- edit, as well as contradictory to one another while appearing to be seamless on the surface.

No? I'm not sure I'm following this. — Thorongil

Instrumental action is something motivated by some end-goal. So I go to work in order that I may earn money. I exercise in order that I may feel healthy. I treat my lover well in order that I may be treated well in return. The action itself is just some means to get to an end.

But not all motivation is like this. Some motivation does not rely upon a goal, but is an end unto itself. So I go to work because I have a passion for justice. I exercise because I enjoy the activity of exercising, the struggle against the self. I treat my lover well because I love her.

Most actions can be motivated in either way -- extrinsically or intrinsically. The action being performed is usually not a good indicator as to what is motivating said action, at least in only considering a single act.

So I do philosophy because I have a passion for truth. Self-interested, in that I am not doing philosophy for you or others, nor am I maliciously doing philosophy to derive a kind of sick pleasure out of harming others (though some may wonder if that's *really* true ;) ) -- hence it would fall in the middle category of your schema.

But it wouldn't be for some end-goal that I do philosophy. Whether I attain truth or not is irrelevant to my motivation of doing philosophy. I continue to do it all the same because I am intrinsically motivated to do it. Even if I were to fail for the entirety of my life at achieving the end of philosophy, supposing that be truth, it wouldn't budge my motivation for doing philosophy in the least.

I said this earlier: "my natalist interlocutor needs to establish that creating life is good, not that life is good. I could grant for the sake of argument that life is intrinsically good (or that happiness is intrinsically good), but that wouldn't in itself prove that creating it is good." — Thorongil

If truth is good, does creating truth fall in-betwixt good and bad?

Seems a weird turn of phrase, though, to say "creating truth". It seems to me that truth is not an action. So, as an intrinsic good, it would not be subject to creating.

So, a tabulation of what I'm tracking so far:


Actions are the bearers of the terms "good", "amoral", or "bad". What seems to be the case is that actions which fall in the good category are actions which are motivated in a particular direction: for-the-other. Categorically bad actions are against-the-other. Amoral actions are for-the-self.

Truth and life are admitted as intrinsic goods. But neither even count as activities, much less have a self/other directionality attached to them.

Also, the basic argument is that good actions are for-the-other, before birth there is no other, therefore the act of having children before there are children can not be good. That all follows definitionally from what I see.

The question is, is there some kind of rejoinder to this argument? In terms of validity I'd say you're airtight -- there could not be a rejoinder. But you did note that you aren't certain, so you're open to examples to see if maybe something is amiss in the truth-value of the argument, if not in the validity.

You agree that I'm following you, at least? Not missing something in my interpretation?

There is a third category of action, yes, which refers to malicious actions. Thus:

Compassion = moral.
Self interest = amoral.
Malice = immoral.

But then they are by definition self-interested, and in that sense I disagree with you — Thorongil

Alright, but then you do agree with the point that the instrumentality of action is not something intrinsic to self-interested action, right?

However, the object of such pursuits may have intrinsic worth (e.g. philosophy is done for the sake of finding truth, which is intrinsically valuable), so in that sense I agree with you. — Thorongil

So what say you about life? Intrinsic worth or naw?

There's a lot of brain-talk, scientific experimental hard-talk, directed at that way of thinking itself. A frantic left brain appeal to the left brain to shut the fuck up a minute. At least one of the 'reactions' seemed to take this as a contradiction, which I think is a mistake. One has to talk to the clever dicks in Cleverdish, because they refuse to speak Barbarian. But when not banging on about brains, my overall impression was, "I've been saying and thinking all this since '68 - what took you so long?" — unenlightened

Yeah, one of my take-aways was how little the actual science mattered to me as much as the discussion it inspired. Like, you could find out later that there was actually some other causal fact which made the whole two-hemisphere's thing merely appear to be factual and the interview, at least, wouldn't lose all of its value.

Not yet. For me it's one of those things that would be nice, but the circumstances have to be just right.

Are you an Objectivist? To say that selfishness can be morally good is the move Ayn Rand made. To me, that obliterates meaningful distinctions between different motives. If all actions are selfish then no actions are compassionate. The latter becomes a meaningless category. Or, if you admit of the category but not of the word to describe it ("compassion"), then we're missing a word to describe a certain class of motivated actions. And in that case, I would say that compassion is already a fine word for that.

My understanding of a selfish action is that it is inherently instrumental, being performed for the benefit of oneself. Your definition of selfish action is far too literal, being "that which is performed by a self or ego." Seeing as all human actions are performed by human selves, it follows that all human actions are selfish. But again, this fails to disambiguate the real difference between actions performed for the benefit of oneself and those performed for the benefit of others. — Thorongil

I am not an objectivist. I was more just following the line of reasoning that came from thinking about egotism in relation to my theory of compassion being a particular mental mode which results in the total negation of ego.

So here you're saying who it is for is what differentiates selfish from selfless action -- for the self or for the other.

Would you say there are motivations which do not fall into these two categories? Or actions which can be motivated by both selfish and selfless motives?

I would say that if selfish actions are inherently instrumental, then there are a class of motivations which are not for others and which are not instrumental. Call them "intrinsic". Doing art, philosophy, love seem to fall into this category -- it's neither for me in some instrumental sense of promoting my self-interest, nor is it for someone else's self-interest or material benefit.

The motive behind such actions is better described as "I do them because I like them", and there ends the chain of reasons.

As I have said, procreation cannot (at least on naturalism) ever be performed for the benefit of another, since there is no child on whose behalf one is acting. The objection raised earlier that one could act for the benefit of one's wife who wants to procreate doesn't work, since her reasons cannot but be selfish.

Cool. Wasn't sure how you'd parse that. So it has to be, at bottom, selfless.

We could, though. I'm open to changing concepts. It'll just take some time to hammer it all down.

How do you understand compassion/ego ?

You're gonna have to unpack that one for me.

I think that I'm committed to the notion that selfish acts, as defined by the frame of compassion/ego, can be good.

But I suspect that in the process of going through examples I'd probably want to say that the division doesn't always hold in particular cases.

In the frame I think of compassion as a sort of dissolution of the self with the specific orientation towards a particular kind of global mind. But that global mind, or any sort of global mind (mindframe?), will always be playing in the background of any actual act -- acts are always done by actors, which needs some self which is choosing. A rock doesn't choose to fall, after all, and a compassionate God doesn't choose to bestow blessings upon the sick.

Humans are somewhere in-between those two extremes, and the very conditions of choice requires a self -- which, as I understand compassion at least, necessitates an ego.

Now our egos can have a sort of global frame to them more in tune with a compassionate mind. But there would be no act which is motivated out of compassion alone.

That being said I wouldn't say that all acts, because they are partially selfish by the very conditions which allow them to be act (on a gradient, lets say), are neither good nor bad.

Hence, when selfishness is defined in this way, I'd have to say that selfishness is not a defeater to goodness.

And it seems to me that you (or the hypothetical you) is wearing rose-tinted glasses here. One ought to remember that for every pleasant picnic at the park, there's such a degree of suffering that exists in the world that one's best and only choice is to ignore the vast majority of it. No one with a well-cultivated conscience could go on living if the weight of the world's suffering was in their mind as much as it probably should be. This angling toward life rather than suffering, I'd argue, means that people are naturally disposed to procreation as being instep with their own will to live. — Buxtebuddha

Life is full of suffering.

I don't think suffering is enough of a reason to say life is not worth living, though. It is a fact of life. Learning to deal with suffering is part of a journey to a worthwhile life. I don't think being weighed down by the weight of the world is what a well-cultivated conscience does.

Also, love is not certain in life. A couple may intend well in having a child or children, but in my opinion the only way that you'd be able to get away with mere good intentions is to equate existence with love. As I believe Thorongil mentioned before, you're kind of forced to preach a Thomistic approach, where existence (being) and essence (love) aren't disparate - meaning that the essence of procreation is love, thus procreation is morally permissible! I do not, however, equate being with love, which explains why I'm not a Christian and why I don't find it justifiable to procreate.

Nothing is certain in life.

Why must something be certain in order for it to be good?

Intent isn't everything, I agree. One must make prudent plans, too. But just the fact that these plans may falter isn't enough to say that having children is not-good (trying to stay away from saying it's morally bad, either -- merely the negation of its positivity, not the affirmation of its negativity)

Additionally, and going back to the bit I quoted of you, I would agree that raising a child/children is a gift, a good gift, but the having of them I don't find on the same moral footing. To say that having a child is a gift means that the child must agree with your judgement of them, otherwise you've failed in giving your sense of life and goodness to your child. However, were I and my spouse to not have a child, but only raise one, our judgement of our child as being a gift is not dependent upon the child's acceptance of our view because we were not ingredient in their willed creation. In other words, if you have a child and label them a gift, and that child completely disagrees and decides later to kill themselves, would you still say with an earnest heart that their life, which ended in misery and suicide, was a gift? If after such a tragedy no sorrow finds you and you proclaim to the heavens what a great gift your child's life was to have ended that way, I would struggle to find a more selfish and twisted perspective.

I don't see a difference between biological children and non-biological children. Having them is raising them in what I was trying to get at -- I'm not focusing on the biological facts of the origins of children and the event of birth.

Also, even supposing tragic end to life, I don't see how that possibility makes having children somehow not-good. The intent was to give a gift. Intent is not enough, I grant, hence why you'd have to be prudent and plan. It may not end as you hope, but so what?

The possibility of tragedy and failure isn't enough to make something not-good.

Lastly, the picture that comes to mind for me when thinking about procreation is children falling into an ocean. Some will learn to swim, some will drown. Some will swim and find dry land, some will swim a ways but give up. You can give the child a rope, a life vest, a granola bar - things that can represent good parenting - but none of it, in my opinion, is enough to justify the throwing of children into an ocean in the first place. Suffering will find you whether you learned how to swim, found land, founded an empire. I think it is Schopenhauer who argued rather peculiarly that suffering, not happiness, is what marks the world for compassion. In this way, or at least how I view it, one rather paradoxically lives for suffering in order to love, as opposed to loving so as not to suffer. To me, that puts everyone in the same "boat" or ocean. The fact that some find love and compassion doesn't actually matter if suffering is the mean.

I don't see suffering as this total negation of life's value. Teaching a child how to suffer -- as there are better and worse ways -- is a part of helping someone learn how to swim in your analogy.

A bit of a disconnect here, though, in your analogy -- there are no children before the swim. They simply do not exist. They are either born into the water or not. You can prepare a cove for the born, but it won't guarantee undertow won't take them away at some point. Tragedy may strike.

But, then, it also may not. This is just what it is to live a human life.

I think your evaluation of the gift would depend on whether or not you view human life, as it is, as worth living. Suffering does not persuade me that life is not worth living. At least, the mere presence of the possibility of suffering being greater than not-suffering.

I think it would depend on the quality of the gift. Do you prepare to give a good life or do you not do so? That would be a good way of differentiating between more egotistical and less egotistical motivations (I say more or less because I already said I don't think it's humanly possible to be purely non-egotistical, in the sense that a frame between compassion/ego would dictate)

Awesome. That gives me a clear picture.

What about giving? A gift can be egotistical -- a display of ownership or power -- but I'd say there is also compassionate giving. Like in the old O. Henry fable The Gift of the Magi.

It seems to me that having and raising children is a kind of gift, if done in the right way. What you are doing is providing a whole new life the means to live happily. Obviously you'd have to be set up to provide, so it's not like this sort of reason would hold for everyone. But you could view having children as giving a sort of priceless gift, one with intrinsic value -- a life worth living.

I'm also sort of hesitant to say that someone could be motivated purely on non-egotistical motives. One is going to have pride for their children, be attached to them, feel joy and frustration in relation to their immediate well-being in the process. But I'd probably be pretty hesitant to think that, on the model of compassion being possibly the only non-egotistical motive, that any human is so motivated.

It seems to me that we are bi-conditionally motivated, on the frame of compassion/ego.

I disagree. I think compassion is an non-egoistic motive. But one can't be compassionate to non-existent people, so compassion can't be a motive to have children. — Thorongil

Cool, that's the sort of thing I was looking for.

Is compassion the only non-egoistic motive?

What if your partner wants children?

Even supposing your partner wanted children out of a sort of egoism, if you were doing it for your partner, that seems to me like it would count as a non-selfish reason.

But then I guess I sort of wonder what would count as egotism, for you, and more interestingly what wouldn't.

Because in one way or another egotism, conceptually, has this ability to engulf all reasons. In some sense we can see all motivations or consequences as centrally related to an ego. So I kind of just want to avoid that sort mistake, not really get into the specifics of selfishness/non-selfishness (since you're actually asking about procreation). I just don't want to think of something and have it seem like, well actually, that's egotistical.

/deleted for pedantry

Got it. This is what I have been calling "primary values": What all consider to be good or bad. But I don't think this it leads to competitions. Primary values such as honesty, respect, safety and health can be received as well as given without competition. — Samuel Lacrampe

Cool.

We should come up with another example, — Samuel Lacrampe

Cool.

Say you have a friend who is an alcoholic. They have lost their house, life, and work to said disease. They turn to you for help to keep them off the street while they try to get their life together, and you agree to do so. While you are at work said friend takes some money laying around your house, buys booze, and gets drunk without telling you.

Let's suppose after sobering up he's penitent.

The path of justice would have him pay you back. The path of mercy wouldn't. (or, at least, a path)

This is why I prefer the term "primary value" over "need". Need sounds more like what is necessary for survival. As such, values like honesty, respect, and equality do not fit the category of need; and yet are considered good, and their opposites bad, by all. I have not met you, but I would still bet you do not want to be lied to, disrespected, or discriminated against.

As for homosexuality, it is true that this does not fall under the criteria of justice or the golden rule, and I am not sure where I stand on this. I briefly talk here about sexual acts and show that it does not harm the claim that morality is objective, but this may not be what you are looking for. — Samuel Lacrampe

Yep, you got me there. Sex seems to be a morally grey area. Some call premarital or extramarital sex immoral, others don't; and the act is not necessarily unjust. Notice however that if the act is unjust, e.g. nonconsensual, then virtually everybody would judge it to be immoral. My point is that, while justice may not be the only criteria for morality, it is nevertheless a necessary criteria. Morality may therefore be more than justice, but not less. — Samuel Lacrampe

Just linking your response earlier about sexual mores for reference.

I'd say that, from my perspective at least, the difference in sexual mores still gets at what I was trying to say. Even "need" as you define it here -- to include more than brute survival -- people still want more than they need. And some of those wants are moral wants. They appear, on the surface, to be preferences but with more emotional "umph" behind them than mere preference.

They are considered moral. But, by your notion of need (which is not bare necessity survival type need, but needs of a broader set which are still considered generally universal), they are not needs -- so, while a bit cumbersome, for the purposes of our discussion I'd call them moral wants.

So it seems you would have to contend that moral goodness is the satisfaction of everyone's needs in this broader sense. But that brings me to my question from before --

We can posit this. But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow. In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste, with a little more emotional "umph", just like sanctions against certain sexual acts appear to be?

I feel like this is really a broad question, because 1) it sort of depends on the particulars, and 2) interpretations can vary. This is especially the case with Hegel.

I think the clearest point of agreement between Hegel and Marx is in Hegel's Master-Slave dialectic.

But the basic run-down that you'd get from some kind of intro book is that Hegel's logic proceeds in accord with the following structure: Thesis-Antithesis-synthesis.

The thesis in some sense "contains" the anti-thesis. But because of a one-sided approach that is not immediately apparent. The thesis is a "moment". There is somehow a move to the anti-thesis, which negates the thesis. However, this too is only a moment, and because of the same one-sided approach ignore the fact that the anti-thesis also "contains" the thesis. They negate one another yet rely upon one another for definition. Only when this is realized does a double-negation happen -- which is termed "sublation" -- whereupon you arrive at the synthesis between two opposing ideas.

Now, if you're full-blown Hegel, this sublation to a synthesis is also its own thesis, and the dialectic continues.

But that's the sort of quick and dirty run-down you'd find in attempting to convey some point of general agreement on Hegelian dialectics.

I had to read the wiki entry on Laing; I didn't see anything there that lead me to think he did a disservice to people. But I just may not know what he did. I think I get a gist of what you're after, but...

This is actually another point on meta-philosophy that "could have gone different". Philosophy today is largely organized along a Peripatetic model -- healthy minds involved in dialectical inquiry seeking after truth in order to grow into great leaders. Back in the day those healthy minds were largely the sons of nobles, and the purpose of said studies was to train them to be tomorrow's leaders. We no longer have nobility, but the whole general training to be tomorrow's leaders thing isn't too far off the mark -- especially at Ivy League institutions, it's virtually the same model.

But not all minds are healthy. Most of the time we are irrationally attached to this or that. We can get in our own way. To the point that we actually are already at a loss of autonomy and freedom. In such a case it may be the only option to treat someone differently than we do others -- like a doctor.

Now, determining when that is the case is not easy. But I don't see having someone in the role of a doctor of the mind as intrinsically wrong. I do understand how said relationship can go wrong; what you describe seems to be an extremely unhealthy relationship. (I'm looking at you, Lacan!)

But there are times when someone needs to be more than a tutor dialectically and reasonably helping a healthy mind to grow, but not quite a full-fledged doctor either -- but it would have to be, I think, motivated by concern for a friend with the end goal of helping them become autonomous.

Such a relationship is not one of equals. There is a power differential established by this medical model. I'd contend that there is a way of doing this that is not creepy and weird. More like a mentorship, or a midwife of the soul, than the pleasure of power over others.

By guru pitfall do you mean where a single person is able to dicate to others when they are right or when they are wrong?

Or what?

Because I can see a place for such action, in a stepping-stone manner. Just not in an ultimate manner.

I don't know if I'd include either as doing philosophy... though I guess that's the stickler of the question.

There is something about popularizes of thinking like Harris and Peterson that just seems off. When I read or listen to them they seem to commit some very obvious mistakes in thinking, and they almost don't seem accidental. They seem like the sort of mistakes which are hard to pinpoint, especially if what they say appeals to someone.

I am tempted to call them sophists, rather than philosophers.

But the question to me is how do you distinguish sophists from philosophy, sans-institutional boundaries?

Or, as related to the OP -- to what extent does desire enter philosophy while still looking like philosophy?

There is something wrong with philosophy as practiced today, I'd say. And the criticisms are well worn on this board, without need of repeating. But how do you come from those criticisms and make something that is both unlike philosophy as practiced today, but still something that resembles philosophy, as opposed to some other practice? (like politics, social activism, psychology, sophistry, and so forth)

If someone like Jordan Peterson, regardless of what you think of him, can sprout out of obscurity into a major cultural figure over a very short period, it suggests to me that people are interested if they can understand what is being said and if what is being said could make a difference in their lives. — Cavacava

But is it philosophy?

I guess that's where my hesitance comes in. It depends on how we understand philosophy. And as it is understood now, even if I don't like the outcome, I am tempted to say nothing. Though I think that notion of philosophy should be challenged -- who could do it but philosophers?

This is odd, because I would say when it comes to necessity, all men want the same thing: food, shelter, clothing, and health. What else would you mean by necessity? — Samuel Lacrampe

OK, this is different from what I understood you saying.

By "necessity" I just meant true or felt for all. So while "Do as you want" may lead to contradiction in desire as people compete over fulfilling desires which negate one another, the same would be said of the golden rule "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" -- so if you acted by said maxim you would still fall into conflict with the desires of others.

But you seem to mean something different than I thought.

So by necessity you just mean a need -- what all humans want: food, shelter, clothing, health.

I would not use the word 'pleasure' because this sounds like it includes tastes (like in movies and music), which are subjective. But aside from tastes, we all 'want' the same things like honesty, respect, safety and health. I think justice is indeed synonymous to fairness. Would you have an example where justice and moral goodness are in conflict? — Samuel Lacrampe

I think the most straightforward example is mercy. Consider the story of Jesus. In a lot of ways it is a story about mercy over justice. What would be fair would be for Jesus to walk free and for those who sinned to be punished for their sins. But mercy abrogates the demands of justice, and in some sense is thereby non-just (at least -- not sure if injustice quite fits either, but it's not just at least).

Just in case it's an issue -- I'm just using the story as a common reference point and allegory to demonstrate a difference between moral goodness and justice by way of the value of mercy, and not trying to weigh in on any factual content to said allegory. We can come up with other examples of mercy -- but mercy is the virtue I'm citing to give a clear delineation between moral goodness and justice.

As per above, aside from tastes, I claim that all men want the same things: we all want food, shelter, health, honesty, respect, and pleasure, and all avoid starvation, homelessness, diseases, dishonesty, disrespect, and pain. This is because we all have the same human nature. Men are men and not plants. This is why the golden rule is adequate for moral acts from man to man. — Samuel Lacrampe

See, I think this is where things get a bit too abstract. We may all have some needs. But we also want more than we need. We often even make choices against our needs for what we want.

And I'd contend that something we may want but do not strictly need are some kinds of moral attachments. So I may believe that homosexuality is a sin. Do I need this belief? Well, no. But I want it, at least in a bare sense of believing it to be so (I recognize that sometimes want indicates choice, but I'm not using that particular meaning at the moment). There are many such rules and maxims which people attach themselves to that they also call moral.

Now what you say here, by my reading at least, is that such attachments are somewhat extraneous to what you're getting at. You're getting at necessity as in need. We all have needs, and the golden rule should satisfy those needs since everyone wants them anyway.

I don't know if I'd agree with your list but I don't have a problem with the notion that we, or at least very many of us, have the same needs.

But then why does invocations of morality so very often not focus on such basic things as food, shelter, clothing, and so forth? Are these things morally good? Or is what is morally good the satisfaction of everyone's needs?

We can posit this. But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow.

In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste?

We need to differentiate between innate desire and sense of duty. While we all have the innate desire of the things listed above for ourselves, we do not necessarily have that same desire for others. This is where the sense of duty comes in; to remind us to not only take care of ourselves but others too, as all have the same nature or ontological value. — Samuel Lacrampe

hrm? I feel like this kind of came out of left field. Not that it's unrelated, only that I wasn't talking about duty -- only that agreeable moral maxims tend to say very little about what to actually do.

Though I think that duty is an interesting thing to bring up in answering my original question/response with respect to needing a more robust theory of justice.

I think we're in agreement there. At the end of the day as long as we understand what we're talking about it's all good. I don't mean to argue definitions; I was just stating what I think about desire.

There is this having and wanting to have more in spite of satisfaction -- a desire that grows in its demands as you attempt to satisfy it. In sense, an insatiable desire. The love of power is like this. There is also attachment to things which aren't necessarily harmful, but the attachment itself is harmful. Fine foods can be like this -- because we can just as easily satisfy our needs regardless of fine foods, but can become anxious if we require fine foods.

I'd say that these both qualify as kinds of desire.

One of the reasons I'm fond of Epicurus is because of his tripartite division of desire -- what is natural and necessary, what is natural and unnecessary, and what is unnatural and unnecessary. Food would count in the first category, while eating luxurious foods like steak and caviar would count in the second.

The upshot, from my perspective, is that desire is given some kind of complexity to it -- it's not just this singular entity. It's still understood as that which motivates, but it can motivate in different ways and the way we are motivated is what causes either pleasure or pain, satisfaction or anxiety. Desire is neither good nor evil, unto itself; what matters is how happy we are. Desire is well defined, by this division, because desire can be a root of both happiness and unhappiness -- that double-edged nature of desire is preserved.

A coherent interpretation of QM must require that the mathematical formalism quantify over actual or possible conscious observations. — ProcastinationTomorrow

That's part of the disagreement I think. Though I'm sure there are other ways one could argue for idealism, too.

But also there's the bit about the word "observer" -- even if QM implies idealism is true, it wouldn't be because a mind set up an experimental apparatus to determine the outcome of an experiment because that's just not what "observer" means.

So, sure, I don't think there's a good argument to be had (yet) that states QM implies idealism.

But I also think it's a misunderstanding of what's being said to say that "observer" indicates a mind which determines outcomes by the mere act of observing and not interacting. That's just a wild misreading. The closest interpretation I see here that comes to saying that was the one I linked previously by Neumann which speculated that the wave-function collapses in consciousness. But to get to that point you still need to understand "observer" in the specific way being used in the theory.

Any argument which argues for idealism from QM should at least understand QM. That's the main point I'm trying to get at -- there's already enough unnecessary magical thinking surrounding QM as it is, we don't need to add more.

Secondarily, I don't see a good argument to conclude idealism from QM.

Even if that were true - and I'm not suggesting for one moment that it is - one would not have established that idealism is true unless you had already established that QM is true. How, though, are you going to establish that QM is true unless you already have your coherent interpretation of it? Mathematical formalisms only get to be true or false under interpretations. — ProcastinationTomorrow

I think there are parts of QM that are not disputed. While they include the formalism, they are not strictly formal mathematical entities -- we understand they are about electrons and photons and things like that which brings more to the matter than just the math.

Then there are interpretations of said undisputed. What is not disputed is still factual, so they can be true.

In that way I think we can determine QM is true without necessitating an interpretation, and then argue over whether this or that interpretation is true.

As is well known, one afternoon whilst walking in the woods in the 1920's, Einstein suddenly stopped and asked his friend Michele Besso, 'does the moon not continue to exist when nobody's looking at it?' And that's basically the same question as the above. So - why was Einstein compelled to ask such a question? (Incidentally, I believe it was asked rhetorically i.e. of course Einstein believed that the moon continues exist when not perceived. But the point is, he was compelled to ask the question.) — Wayfarer

I feel like the answer is supposed to be "Because of quantum mechanics" -- but I'm not sure.

Well, yes, but there are levels of understanding. When I said I wasn't a physics graduate, I'm acknowledging that I don't understand the mathematics behind quantum physics. And as it's a mathematical theory, then obviously that's a deficiency.

But on the other hand, there has been considerable commentary on this issue from the viewpoint of history and philosophy of science. I try to confine my comments to that perspective. — Wayfarer

Sure, there are levels of understanding. I agree with that.

With QM especially, though, the formalism and the math are really important. There's more I could know, but I know the introductory stuff. And when I say I don't see where idealism enters as an implication to the theory it's this formalism that I'm talking about -- the stuff which scientists actually use and debate on how to interpret.

That's why I linked a pdf that at least introduced the formalism in the way of postulates of QM. I don't expect someone to understand them just by reading that paper -- it's just where I'm starting from in understanding this stuff.

Commentary is just secondary to this, from my perspective. It's what the commentary is about. And you can learn that part of QM without a degree -- it's open to you.


EDIT: Like, imagine someone who believed they understood Aristotle because they read Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle. Surely they know something of Aristotle, but wouldn't it make sense to also read Aristotle?