I think Bourdieu was touching on the bodily quality of social practices. As you walk through the day, notice how you position your body relative to other people, relative to things. These are social practices that can be unpacked to reveal an array of propositions. — frank

The split is between my emerging view, Dreyfus, and whatever Heidegger was actually trying to say. My view carries more weight with me, obviously — frank

No worries.

I'm not sure how to respond to your quote of Bourdieu. But I'm more than happy to hear your emerging view.

What do you believe social practices can instill? And, for that matter, what do you mean by "instill"? Simply to make someone believe?

I admit -- I don't know all of what you're getting at. But I like that music video and want to talk about it.

There was also a good live performance on SNL worth watching if you haven't: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2P2qbr-_Ps

To me: The music video and song is the most angry expression of being trapped in something he doesn't want. America views blacks as happy dancers from Africa willing to put on a performance to get the money they need to escape the poverty enforced upon them, but the song points it out on multiple occasions: "This is America". This happens after the reggae-ish intro claiming that "we just want to party, party just for you, we just want the money, money just for you" -- to set the scene and point to "this" in "this is America".

Of course in the music video he also kills a man just prior to the music change and saying "this is America". But that's because blacks are faceless victims of murder in America, and in spite of that fact -- whether it be police or criminals carrying guns pulling the trigger -- the popular stage for black Americans is as entertainers who are pretty and hip and happy who just want to party.

Also, as if to warn what happens if you fall out of the Black America character, Gambino explicitly says "don't catch you slippin up" -- you're accepted as a party icon, as someone who is out for the money (for you), as someone who would pull the trigger, and also as a victim forgotten not even 2 seconds after the trigger is pulled -- but don't slip out of that.

The dance confirms this variation between happy-fun-entertainer and serious-minded player -- by hopping between clear expressions of gay frivolity that are exaggerated where the eyes are pointed off screen to looking straight at us, the viewer, no smile with advice and a dead cold stare that says 'here is the truth'.

Also, shortly after Gambino is joined by dancers in school clothing that present the "nice negro". They are always involved in a song and dance number as well as in the SNL stage version of the song. They are the front that you need to present, well dressed with good dance moves, that you can't slip out of.

Contrast this with the lyrics where weapons are a necessary part of life, where you have to think like you are going to get what you need, that you are cold, that you are cool, that you are engaged in guerrilla war.

Quick change to a black church choir singing -- the advice from grandma saying you gotta get your money, black man. It sounds happy and looks happy and ends with a Kalashnikov killing every one of the singers.

I honestly thought of the civil rights movement when I saw the choir. It was the old way of doing things, the get your money black man and stand up way. I saw the killing as a breaking away from the old way, as well as throwing back to the worthlessness of black lives in America -- because, immediately after, Gambino says 'this is America'

In the montage that follows we have Gambino and the school-clothes dancers at front, but in the back we have people running around everywhere and chaos -- first there's a guy thrown from the rafters, then you see people sitting in the rafter recording everything with a cell phone, and then a car on fire with a police officer chasing after the people causing chaos in the background.

I am honestly uncertain about the reference to Oaxaca. Just prior to that we get the answer though: "Hunnid bands, hunnid bands, hunnid bands
Contraband, contraband, contraband:

And just after we get a reference to reparations, but ones that are individual:

"America, I just checked my following list and
You go tell somebody
You mothafuckas owe me"

with the quick justification that grandma always told the speaker.

Just prior to all this we have the speaker lighting a blunt, and after the justification we have a common hip hop theme of the speaker hopping on top of a vehicle with plenty of vehicles on display with girls as if he owns them all. But they aren't the usual luxury vehicles. They are old vehicles, as if "get your money" and a blunt are what you have to settle for.

Dancing all the way until the end. Where the truth is presented --

"You just a Black man in this world
You just a barcode, ayy
You just a Black man in this world
Drivin' expensive foreigns, ayy
You just a big dawg, yeah
I kenneled him in the backyard
No probably ain't life to a dog
For a big dog
"

Someone trapped, and running -- and to take the SNL video -- someone still performing for the money.

The fact that the song is catchy and dance-able just adds to the meaning. It's the only medium in which this sort of feeling could be expressed.

edit: So in conclusion I felt the song was both very angry and cynical in its presentation, but because of the ending it seemed like the singer -- as opposed to the person in the music video -- wanted more than this "new" way of doing things. Like there was hope outside of the structures that forced the performer to perform, since at the end he was running. And in some sense, according to the music video, it looked like everyone was running too, even people who are not black. Just that black America has it worse.


Having said that, I don't know that philosophy works in the same way that art does. Art has a place in the world for expression. Philosophy does too. But I don't know if this art replaces philosophy -- they are just different modes of expression.

One thing art has over philosophy is that it's able to express philosophical ideas in a manner that is more tasteful and moving than philosophy tends to be.

But philosophy appeals to reason, at the end of the day. That is both its weakness and strength.

I picked up AB Dickerson's Kant on Representation and Objectivity -- it's an argument that Kant is a particular kind of representationalist that is unique to his philosophy based upon his reading of the B-Deduction. It's been good so far, especially because the deduction is just so hard to understand.

The tv aspect is huge too, and I'm having trouble pinning down its significance — csalisbury

For me I think the television just serves as a strange setting to make the distinction between reality and imagination yet even more difficult to discern. There's also this notion of how the tropes of television seem to constitute the imagination -- sort of like a collective imagination that bridges the gap between persons, erasing their individuality and turning them into Babysitters or Sheriffs or Lovers.

Your whole position seems to me to just be by fiat, in that case. Justice is objective, in your view, because it is not dependent on the subject. But you define justice in a manner which people clearly do disagree with -- there are people who believe the death penalty is just, for instance. There are people who also don't think that justice is the most fundamental value. When confronted with those counter-examples, you say they don't really disagree on values, but rather are making mistakes in reasoning. Why? Because justice is the equal treatment of people, and what they propose violates justice.

It's a bit circular. Of course if what you say is true then what you say is true. But the same could be said for the man who believes in the death penalty -- in which case it is you who wish to spare a man's life who justly deserves death, to use your reasoning, that is falling to an error in fact or reasoning.

Can a whole cosmology really be instilled by social practices? — frank

I feel like this thread must have split off from another conversation, but I like the question so I thought I'd have a go at it.

I'm split a bit on what you mean. In one sense of cosmology it seems obviously true that a cosmology can be instilled by social practices. You would just need a social practice which teaches cosmology to people, like a school or a church or some such. And we obviously already have institutions which do exactly that. Insofar that someone believes what's being taught, you'd have your cosmology instilled entirely by a social practice. That's just a straightfroward example. I don't know if "stand up straight" has the same effect as a school, though maybe in conjunction with many such norms, injunctions, habits, and so forth social practices could basically function the same as schools do.

I feel that I have but I'll try it again.

I'll think upon the action at hand. I'll apply this or that moral calculus as an exercise. Then I'll make a decision based upon what seems best, relative to the things that are important to me. I'll reflect upon what I've done in the past, and make adjustments based upon said reflections.

I don't think this is unique to me. But it's a fair description of how I decide things.

I don't see any difference here than people insisting on being right in other threads here. Unless you'd claim that all threads here eventually devolve into mere persuasion? But then again, the art of rhetoric is the art of persuasion, so perhaps that's a big part of what all discussions are about? — NKBJ

I don't wish to say that everything devolves into persuasion. I don't even wish to say this thread devolved, even. At most I was giving @chatterbears a light ribbing for simultaneously claiming reason and science while obviously being motivated by a deep passion, and being unable to admit to that. It's the sort of thing that you see Sam Harris do too -- thinking that there really could only be one position that anyone could reasonably hold.


It's not just the act of persuasion. I mean, sure, we frame our arguments in that way. But at the point of discussing rhetorical tactics to persuade? That's what really set my mind off with respect to missionary work, because those sorts of apologetics are exactly the kind of thing discussed in groups dedicated to persuading others. The same happens in politics too, for what it's worth. "if they believe X, then respond Y" There's a kind of lack of ability to listen to others that comes with that level of planning out your conversation.

For what it's worth, I have not for a moment thought that anyone would change their minds due to this thread. I've mainly seen it as a useful vehicle for helping me better clarify and articulate my own position.

Sure, I feel the same there.

I think veganism can be defended, it's mostly the manner in which chatterbears did it that I was responding to. I wouldn't even mind if vegans won their political goals. There would be some good from it.

There's sooo many fallacies this whole "you're just a missionary" statement could fall under... suffice to say that it would be pure stubbornness on your part to look at this entire discussion and claim that the entire vegan position (even if you don't agree with it) lacks any merit whatsoever and that anyone trying to defend it is just being a missionary.
That goes against a core principle of philosophy--the principle of charity. — NKBJ

I don't think that the entire vegan position boils down to missionary work. I don't think missionary work is even a bad thing -- especially in light of a good cause. I have soap box issues myself that are near and dear to me.

But discussing what to say to what sounds an awful lot like apologetics to me. I mostly try to avoid my soap box issues here anymore, though I'll mention what I believe, because soapboxing isn't philosophy. If you have that kind of conviction the issue stops looking like something that's really worth debating. You're persuaded. And persuasion seems to be the goal at that point.

Does that count as philosophy, anymore? Maybe so. But it's a philosophy which is concerned with the beliefs of the listener -- a kind of medical philosophy where the practitioner is attempting to move someone from one belief to another for their betterment, be it moral or otherwise.

Every missionary has their bible and their conversion story. But without a passion for a value the reason and logic won't do the work that the missionary does.

:D

Vegan apologetics spoken like a true believer. It reminds me of missionary work -- if the person you wish to convert believes this, then respond with that, if something else then this argument works better.

It seems to me that there is a fourth option available while discussing bootstrap problems: agreement.

We can disagree with any assertion. But do we? I'd say usually not -- usually there is something we can find that we agree upon.

Insofar that there is some agreement between participants in a philosophical dialogue then there is a place to begin from.

That's a great story. And I didn't see the ending until it was too late, too -- sort of like what the son went through.

I thought the story was definitely about race. And, in particular, race in the United States. The author had a very clear picture of the minds of white people which still relates to today. The only time that our characters interact with black people is through whiteness -- and they are both condescending to blacks in their own way. We just get two sides of the same coin; whiteness is the basis of each of their interactions towards blacks, be it of a genteel southerner used to looking down on blacks or an educated white man proud of himself for being beyond race.

I like the title as well. It seems to go along with the mother's dreams for herself and her son -- and rather than live in a world where whites are integrated, she would die on her path to the pinnacle.

The son is equally rotten. He's just so mean to his mom. He thinks it's because of this or that moral platitude, but really I think the author lets on enough that it's because she didn't secure enough for him, and he is bitter about his lot in life and he takes it out on his mother. Not that he really wanted her to die from it; he just wanted to lash out at something, and his mother was an easy target. His meanness went beyond mere annoyance at having to escort her because of integration. I think that the imaginings of the mansion are the clue to his mean spirit.

What I meant by this was, how do you differentiate between right and wrong? What mechanism do you use to morally justify an action as right/correct? — chatterbears

I don't think there is such a thing as a mechanism which justifies action as morally right or wrong. Differentiating between right and wrong takes judgment, choice, and a willingness to look at the effects of your actions. The various calculi proposed can help in thinking through any choice, but they are just tools for reflection.

There is only judgment, action, and living with the choices you make.

Some humans aren't moral agents, such as mentally disabled people — chatterbears

I don't think this is the case at all. If you are human then you are a moral agent, and deserve the respect that this entails. There are circumstances of character or environment which mitigate responsibility, but that does not then mean that the person is not a moral agent.

Consider, for instance, how strange it would be to hold your dog as morally responsible for digging through the trash. That's just silly.

This is just as flawed as appealing to 'preference'. What makes you happy does not say anything about what is right or wrong.

If it make me happy to cheat on my wife, am I then justified in doing so? If it makes me happy to torture animals, am I then justified in doing so? If it makes me happy to exploit animals for my taste pleasure, am I then justified in doing so? No. No. And no. — chatterbears

I'd say this suffers from a impoverished view of happiness. Happiness is not so singular as this sort of view suggests. There are general enough trends in happiness that it can serve as a guide to a good life. Not as something failsafe, or anything. Just general.

But, regardless, I did note other things in my reply to you. Namely that we are moral agents, and if aliens were sufficiently human-like to be moral agents then they'd be included and not treated like beasts. Beasts are not culpable for their actions, but they do suffer -- so it is reasonable to treat them as beings which suffer, and not with the same respect as I give moral agents. So we can kill them, though to make them suffer is too much.

Also, as a side question. What do you base your moral foundation on. The bible? The mind of God? Etc... — chatterbears

I don't believe there are moral foundations at all. We are adrift in a universe devoid of intrinsic meaning or value, and one way that we create a meaningful life in said universe is living an ethical life. But said meaning-seeking activities are a matter of choice more than anything. Rather than having a moral foundation we are beings which believe this or that is right or wrong, and act in accord with this or that to the extent that we are passionate enough about it.

For myself I think living a happy life is good. I also think that living a just life is good. I also have moral intuitions which are similar, but not identical, to Kantian moral philosophy. Those are probably the most foundational values I have, but I'm willing to go against them too depending on the situation. I'm willing to hear out other thoughts, and find a middle road between them when working with others. I have very few hard rules. I think that the world is too complicated to live a life bound by principles -- generally, a good will, a willingness to listen to others, and prioritize the people you love will go far.

But there are no guarantees and there are no answers. There are just choices which prioritize values, and the responsibility that this sort of freedom incurs: the acceptance of the choice and the act.

Plus, I view ethical thought as a constant work in progress. So there aren't any rods to hold to. As the world changes, as I change, so do the morals. It is more appropriate to deliberate the world as it is than it is to fashion whole new commandments from on high that we stand by.

Again, unless you want to produce an inconsistency within your own ethical framework, you would need to grant the same 3 basic rights to animals. — chatterbears

I do not believe that humans have inalienable rights. They have legal rights, and that's it. As God does not exist so too with Inalienable rights -- they do not exist. There is no God who we stand in front of as equals.

Since you claim you are not a speciesist, you seem to be basing your reasoning on preference? Which we can easily refute right now.

Is "preference" a valid justification to use for causing needless harm to another sentient being? It could be the preference of a white man to enslave a black man. It could be my preference to torture a dog and then kill it. It could be your preference to contribute to factory farming. None of these are a "need". So when you say, "when it comes to satisfying needs", eating meat is not a NEED for survival.

Clearly "preference" is not valid, and not consistent. — chatterbears

My preference was for human needs, not for causing needless harm. It is a moral preference, if you will, and I don't think there is anything more than preference to secure moral feeling. Reasoning only goes so far, and is moored in moral preferences of moral agents. Also note that need, for myself, is not just brute necessity, but is defined by what makes human beings happy rather than what is required to survive.

The beasts aren't even moral agents. They are not culpable for their actions, because they are beasts. We are. But, in being culpable, we are also simply reflections of what we desire in a moral sense. So, for yourself, you desire rights to be universal. This would include beings that can feel pain, and not just morally culpable agents. You believe this in your desire to be consistent. Consistency is the main drive behind all of your replies -- maybe you could give up rights, but whatever you or someone else proposes you believe that they must be consistent in their proposals.

I'd say that this notion of consistency is a bit vague. Nothing wrong with that, but I don't think it's just mere logical consistency you're thinking of. I think it only makes sense for your notion of consistency to apply to animals in the light of another commitment -- that those deserving moral consideration are those who can feel pain. I don't think that sentience makes sense, because that's a much harder thing to prove of various animals, and besides it seems that you're mostly concerned with animal suffering anyways. In light of an animals ability to feel pain you believe they should have three rights, because you believe all humans deserve those three rights. In that sense I can see what you mean by consistency -- anything that feels pain is worthy of moral consideration, and animals can feel pain, so you would be inconsistent if you just decided that only humans got these basic rights when the important thing is that all animals feel pain.

That makes perfect sense to me. But I don't believe in rights. Further, I don't think that the ability to feel pain is enough, or even the only thing. What if a human couldn't feel pain, after all? Well, they would still be human, and deserving of the respect afforded them as a moral agent regardless of this trait. I believe in a commitment to other human beings, and maybe more generally to moral agents (so in the case of aliens who are relatively human-like I would say we should treat them like humans, and not like cows).

I think pain is an important thing to consider in how we treat some being. Needless suffering I can understand should be prevented -- I am the sort of moral agent who prefers this kind of world, and think it a good thing to pursue. But I don't think that leads to veganism, simply reform of how we kill animals.

This seems to me you are a speciesist. Is this correct? That because a species is different, we are therefore justified in treating them however we want. — chatterbears

If that's what speciesism is then I don't think I'd qualify as a speciesist.

How different are we from animals, really? Is there a difference that makes a difference?

Not really. We are nothing but animals, ourselves. And we are an animal I happen to prefer over other animals, when it comes to satisfying needs.

That doesn't then imply that I think we can do whatever we want to every other animal. I don't believe in torturing animals. I find some scientific experiments that use animals to be inhumane. I think dog fighting and cock fighting are wrong. I don't think the way we produce meat now is humane.

So I guess I don't qualify, by this particular definition. Still, I think it's fine to eat other animals. We can do so, and other animals do the same as us. I don't think it's necessary, as you note. We could get by on a vegan diet -- the species wouldn't cease to exist were everyone to go vegan.

But so what?

It seems to me that you believe animals have inalienable rights. But why? Why on earth would you believe such a thing? What gives animals rights?

Humans have rights in our current political setup. I don't think they have inalienable rights. Rights are legal entities that gives some political agent a claim to something -- be they positive or negative rights.

If you're not consistent within your own subjective ethics, you have no grounds for telling me what is moral or immoral. And also, you have contradictory/hypocritical beliefs within your own internal moral framework. — chatterbears

Well, I wasn't telling you what is moral or immoral. :D By all means bless your vegan heart.

I'm not sure what you're trying to get at here. It's up to us, and so we should? Or we have the power, whereas they do not, and so we should grant rights to animals? Or they have rights, and don't have the power to secure them, whereas we do, and so we should secure the rights they already have?

People keep misinterpreting what I mean by the moral trifecta. I am not stating that most people adhere to this moral trifecta, because in reality I would say most people do not. You don't need empathy for other animals to lead to Veganism. All you need is empathy for humans, and logically consistency. And I would also argue, you may not even need empathy, but could replace empathy with a foundation for basic universal human rights. So just focus on these two things. — chatterbears

OK.

Do you believe in the most basic universal human rights?

I do not. I think rights are inadequate for addressing the needs of human beings. That doesn't mean I think that they should be violated, mind. It only means that I think the political theory which requires us to frame demands as rights is deficient.

Regardless, though, for the sake of argument I'm fine with just saying I do believe in the 3 articles below.

And I am not even referring to all 30 articles of human rights. For the sake of argument, let's just say these:

- Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security
- Freedom from Slavery
- Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment

If you believe that every human deserves at least those 3 articles of human rights, that ultimately leads to veganism. You don't even need to bring empathy into the discussion. Because after you acknowledge those 4 articles of human rights, it now comes down to ethical consistency.

Why do you deserve those 3 articles of rights, but an animal does not? Whatever that trait/quality may be, if it were true of a human, would you then be willing to violate the rights of that human? Simple consistency test.

Because humans are more important to me than other animals. It's not a particular trait of humans that makes me feel that way, or a set of traits. I belong to the group 'humans', and I look out for their self-interest.

These are, after all, human rights. Rights which human beings decided we deserve and in turn built into human institutions to make those rights a reality, to the best of our ability. With Locke the reason humans all had natural rights was due to being created by God and equal in the eyes of God.

I'm going to hazard a guess here, since you're talking about Sam Harris in your OP, that you probably don't share that view.

What, then, could secure rights for human beings? It seems to me what is left are institutions. And since institutions are built for our own self-interest, we aren't being inconsistent in giving rights to ourselves and not to all animals.

Indeed. I've thought that from the start. We've had to try to tease them out. The opening post doesn't say anything about equality, for example, yet some kind of equality seems to be a big part of it, and a part which is much more controversial. Perhaps that's why it was hidden. — Sapientia

I don't think @chatterbears is intentionally setting up their argument to be deceptive or anything like that. I think chatterbears is very passionate about animal rights, and sometimes when that's the case it becomes hard to understand why other people don't believe as oneself -- and hard to see that there may be implicit assumptions that make the belief justified to themself.

From what you're saying, this sounds like speciesism, correct? — chatterbears

Sure.

I think there's an easily exploitable flaw in your trifecta, which is that you're relying upon empathy. And many of us don't have the emotional reservoir to be empathic towards every living thing -- not even every living thing that experiences pain.

Empathy and compassion are important, but it just doesn't follow that having empathy and compassion and consistency implies veganism. Because we can have all three, feel nothing for certain animals, and continue on our marry way.

There are more commitments than you're letting on that makes your belief work.

Which is why the most important part of the trifecta is logical consistency. If you are a believer in universal human rights, that ultimately leads to Veganism. Because you cannot justify the discrimination of animals without internally contradicting your own position, as I have pointed out multiple times on this thread.

Person A believes it is okay to kill animals because animals are less intelligent.
Person A believes it is NOT okay to kill humans because humans are less intelligent.

These are two contradictory statements. One justifies killing based on intelligence level, while the other does NOT. Because as I have asked before, for this specific example, if you took a human (severely autistic) who had the intelligence level of being no greater than a cow, would we now be justified in killing them? No. Therefore using the justification of "lesser intelligence" to kill something, is invalid and inconsistent. — chatterbears

But I didn't use intelligence. In fact I said intelligence is not a good basis for moral feeling.

The difference between me and you and a cow is that you and I are human. That's it.

well, I double checked before saying that :D. But maybe I missed something. I thought that the timeline as presented vs. events actually reported was one of the meta-fiction conflicts, but maybe I missed something.

It is anecdotal, but nonetheless accurate to a greater degree than you may think. I've watched plenty of debates on this topic, as well as spoken to 100+ people about it. Out of the hundreds of opposing views I have read or watched on this topic, only 1 person has been internally consistent without being vegan. They were holding the view that human rights don't matter, and they also lacked empathy for ANY living being (human and animal included). This is a position, I would argue, almost nobody holds — chatterbears

Anecdotal experience is not evidence.

So are you appealing to the societal/cultural norm? Which, I don't think I would need to state how flawed that position is. The cultural norm says nothing about what is moral or immoral, but more so what people have generally agreed is permissible. in Saudi Arabia, it is the cultural norm to put homosexuals to death, yet I think we would both agree that their cultural norm is immoral. So you cannot point to 'societal or cultural norms' as a justification for your actions. — chatterbears

I am merely telling you why I feel as I do, from a causal perspective.

What is flawed, I think, is your moral trifecta. If you want to argue for veganism then you need to include more than mere empathy -- because empathy is indeed influenced by cultural norms.

Oh yeah! Something else I wanted to mention to hear what others thought...

There's a number of times that the babysitter is either looking at a penis or imagining that she has a penis. It's never flattering -- the penis is small and rubbery and she imagines how funny it must feel to have it come out of the hole in male underwear. In some sense, to my mind, it almost seems like a desire to escape being the object of desire. Because the men are never mistreated in the story. And it points out how funny that a little rubbery bit flopping between the legs ready to piss over everything (as evinced with the Jimmy) makes such a huge difference.

I'd say that the story does say something about the nature of desire, though.

Not that this is the whole take. I think you're right to point out that it's metafiction -- it is fiction that is about fiction, playing with the tools of fiction.

But there is something about desire that is communicated in the story -- how it melds with reality and crosses from mere imagination to collective imagination to mass media. And how desire, as contorted like this, is fragmented. It is a ecstatic high, but it's also pitted against itself and totally confusing.

I think that the reason it kept flipping into my mind while reading Cat Person was because of the subject of both was erotic desire, but in an unpleasant way. Plus you had in Cat Person desire contradicting itself, so it just kept leaping to mind. Though clearly they aren't the same kind of story, either.

I think the story is emotionally intense. It jumps from the erotic to the horrific and intermingles those two emotions throughout.

There is a linear timeline in the passages -- it slowly goes from 740 and builds to 1000. But there simply is not a single storyline. From embarassing booze fueled attempts at sneaking a peak on teanagers having sex to supplant them only to find the three teenagers sitting on the couch watching TV, to dead babies and children to rape, to a horrific scenes of the party game of getting Mrs Tucker back into her garter, to the dishes just being done and everything be just fine at the end... it's just a wild ride that cannot have a single story.

Plus it blends television with "reality" -- sometimes the characters take on the roles of the western, in particular. But even the invalid drama story seems to be part of the character's fantasies who want to save the babysitter from some other man and have her.

I tend to think of Mrs. Tucker and The Babysitter as foils to one another. Mrs. Tucker is even an object of desire to the host in the same way that the Babysitter is an object of desire to Mr Tucker. And both Mr Tucker and the host both dream of oddly kinky games to play with their object of desire, in spite of how horrid it is shown to be for their respective objects.

So, yeah. I think that the story is unresolvable into a linear plot. But the subject matter is one of desire -- hence all the erotic tropes, including the title of the short story. So in a way it's a showcase of desire -- both its possessive attractiveness and the horrors that this leads to. Though maybe not quite as moralistic as all that. I think the author is playing off of notions of storytelling, as well, by making the plot unresolvable, melding the fiction of the story with the fiction in the story (the television and the fantasies of the characters are many times hard to distinguish from what's "real" in the story), yet still making it emotionally compelling enough to want to read it.


It sits in a weird place in my mind, but I found it so compelling that I never really forgot about it. I read the story in a collection of short stories I bought for a class on American short stories I took maybe about dozen years ago, and I still remember it more freshly than most of the stories we read.

You still would. Because you need to explain why you don't feel empathy for a cow, but you do for a human. What is the trait that differentiates the two living beings? — chatterbears

I understand what you're trying to do here. Whatever trait I select is then applied to certain classes of human beings, and then...

But I said most explicitly that there is no trait difference. We are all animals.

The most likely reason is simply because of the culture I was raised in. How much empathy do you feel for Moray eels? Maybe in some universal sense you might, but most people wouldn't think much of them in terms of empathy. I'd wager that's mostly because of exposure and how similar they might feel they are to them.

If you aren't regularly exposed to a particular beastie then empathy doesn't develop.

So it's not so much that there is some singular trait among humans that makes them superior. It's simply that they are human. End of story.

And you know what a cow isn't?

Yes absolutely, but my point still stands. If you believe in universal human rights, that ultimately leads to veganism. The only way to be consistent without being Vegan, is to deny rights to humans. Which, 99% of people would not do, other than psychopaths. — chatterbears

Given your commitment to reason I'd be interested in how you came up with that number. Where's the evidence?

Psychopathy isn't in any way related to a belief in universal human rights. If you lack empathy for other people then you might be a psychopath. If you don't believe in universal human rights then you might just not find the current political regime all that convincing, but still have a general sense of care for people and ability to feel where they are coming from.

I think the OP would include sympathy with empathy. Humans cannot empathize fully with pigs, but we can sympathize with them. And it is because we consider every other animal to be just a smelly brute that millions upon millions of animals are slaughtered every year without any regard for their status as living things.

One of the earliest things I struggled with as a kid with regard to animals was when learning about the Holocaust. The talk of the Jews and others being rounded up and sent on "cattle cars" was always distressing - is distressing - but I started to wonder why it was wrong for humans to be crammed in there but right for cattle? Why was it wrong to treat humans like cattle but also wrong to treat cattle like humans? — Buxtebuddha

The OP does not say it includes sympathy with empathy. I'll wait to hear from him. And he's defining these terms in very specific ways that seems to me to miss much of how people think about moral problems and reasoning.

The Holocaust is an event full of evil. It's not something that's hard to learn about just as a child, but is something which is still hard to learn about. It is unequivocally evil, from my perspective.

As for why it is wrong or right -- I am just using the OP's moral trifecta at this point. I am telling him, point blank, that these are not feelings I have for cows, pigs, or fish. I do have empathy for some animals. I think it is most likely that these empathic feelings are simply due to being brought up in the society I am living in.

For me I don't feel empathy for cows, but I can understand that they go through pain as we currently do things. I don't know the exact specifications which I would say, "Hey, we're doing good now that cows don't go through pain". I'm willing to hear it out. Maybe carting them around in trains is bad. I know that our current practices cause unnecessary pain. I know that the reason for this is that meat is cheaper, but I'm fine with meat becoming more expensive to halt unnecessary pain in spite of not feeling empathy with the animals that are killed.

"If I raised a cow humanely and killed it without pain, would I accept this same treatment for myself?" — chatterbears

No.

I am not okay with humans being raised humanely and killed without pain, because humans are smarter than animals ' - The trait you would be using here is "humans are smarter". So to lead to your logically consistent conclusion, would you allow that treatment for a human that is NOT smarter than the average human? Something similar to a severely autistic person, or a mentally handicapped person. Since those two types of people would have similar intelligence levels of a cow, is now okay to raise them humanely and kill them without pain? If you say no, then your position is inconsistent. — chatterbears

I wouldn't use intelligence as the basis. Intelligence is merely a tool, and to be better with a tool can inspire admiration for craftsmanship, but it is no basis for moral feeling.

I would just say that a cow is not human, and I empathize with humans but not with cows. I empathize with humans and not with pigs. I empathize with humans and not with fish. I don't think there is a single trait that separates us. We are all, after all, animals.

But if empathy is the basis for considering other beings moral agents, and compassion is a subset of empathy, then by your own trifecta, since I do not feel much empathy for these things, I wouldn't be logically inconsistent.

Veganism is the logically consistent conclusion you would reach, no matter what your subjective ethics consist of — chatterbears

That is one whopper of a statement. Were I a Cartesian, of the old school variety, then animals would simply be biological machines. They would not have a soul, but would be meat-machines reproducing themselves and would feel nothing at all.

I don't think that, of course. I said I think it's reasonable to think that animals feel pain. But this statement seems to indicate that you haven't explored much of what is possible in terms of subjective ethical commitments.

Are you actually interested in knowing how others think about their ethical lives?

Empathy refers more generally to our ability to take the perspective of and feel the emotions of another living being. Compassion is when those feelings and thoughts include the desire to help. (Can be substituted for Altruism). Ethical Consistency is being logically consistent within a belief. Primarily regarding the consistency of the justification being used. — chatterbears

I can empathize with a dog or a cat. But admittedly I do not feel much empathy for cows -- they strike me as stupid stinky brutes who are the way they are because we have domesticated them. I wouldn't contend that they don't feel pain. But I don't feel a deep sense of empathy for them. I feel even less empathy for fish. They aren't even vertabrates. I really don't know what it's like to be a fish.

If compassion is defined in terms of empathy, with the additional feeling of goodwill towards the other beings well being, then i similarly wouldn't feel much compassion for a cow since I don't feel much empathy for a cow.

Ethical consistency seems to apply if I were to believe "Do not needlessly harm" -- but if I didn't even believe that, then ethical consistency wouldn't come into play.

It seems to me that you believe cows feel pain, therefore we should not needlessly harm them (and similar reasoning for other animals). I know what pain feels like. I wouldn't disagree that cows feel pain. But I don't empathize with cows. I do not feel like a cow and I am uncertain when it comes to thinking about their perspective -- what it is like to be a cow. I know I would not want to be treated like a cow. I could go so far as to say that I do find current methods of factory farming to be egregious in that they cause needless pain, even to creatures I do not feel much empathy for.

So I would support legislation that would make such methods illegal. That seems to me to be the right way of things. Much pain is being caused where much pain does not need to be caused. I don't feel their pain or even feel much compassion for the creatures, but I do think that simply causing needless pain is something worth avoiding.

But if cows could be raised humanely and killed without pain? I don't have a problem with that. Though I don't know if I hold to your moral trifecta, either.

Yes, it shows us he was a bad guy and that her fears were justified with a metaphorical sledgehammer in the form of a text message. I can think of a million more subtle ways to do a similar thing. But maybe the author felt the readership would need a sledgehammer to get it. And judging by the amount of shares, she may have been right. That to me is sad. Sorry, I mean SAD!!! — Baden

I think that's a fair point. My original thinking was to read the story without the ending, but now that I'm rethinking that the story doesn't make as much sense from Margot's perspective without it I can see that it was over the top and that a more subtle approach would work better.

Just to quickly note that I would agree with that, but the New Yorker is not the literary equivalent of a museum (even if it does have a historically good record). If that short story were to be taught in our top universities as art, I'd have to accept it as institutionally art, but I'd still evaluatively deny it was. — Baden

I guess I think of museums as paradigmatic examples of institutions, but not exclusive ones. So they are sufficient to include something within the artworld, but not necessary.

For me the necessary conditions for inclusion is an artist and an audience. There are some problem cases that this doesn't deal very well with, but I think it get's at something important that's essential to inclusion into the artworld. The institution which brings these together, from my perspective, can even be informal -- it doesn't need a tax designation and a name and so forth. It can be a writers group that meets at the coffee shop to share poetry, for example. There you still have artists and audience applying evaluative standards and coming from a history of doing art.

"To Build a Fire" is great. I'll read "The Babysitter". — Baden

Let me know what you think!
(edit: Maybe even start a new thread so we don't get too far off topic here)

I'm talking evaluatively, and my evaluation is that it's not art at all and therefore it's not good art either. Being published in the New Yorker doesn't make it art in the categorical sense you quote. The New Yorker is a business and despite having a good historical record can make commercial decisions that have little or nothing to do with considerations of artistic merit. As I said to Schope, just writing words on a page that follow the structure of a work of art doesn't make what you create a work of art. And as I suggested to TL, emotional impact alone is not enough because that can be got from texts other than the artistic. It's the interplay of form and content that counts. — Baden

Maybe you've misunderstood me. I agree it is more than a diary entry or is intended to be (in terms of structure but doesn't offer more in general because it largely fails structurally and aesthetically). It does give us the standard character transformation, and the point would be to analyze that because it's relevant. I was arguing earlier that without bringing the form explicitly into the critique, no amount of discussion of its emotional impact would wrap up the question of its artistic value as a short story. (But I feel I've said something along those lines too many times now, so I should just let it be.) — Baden

Ah, OK. I did misunderstand you because I was thinking you meant the second use. You meant the first.

I pretty much adhere to the institutional theory of art. What makes a work of art a work of art is that it is part of an artworld -- which includes creators, audiences, histories of art, various and changing standards for evaluating said art as good or bad, and (in our case) institutions which showcase art. So the difference between a can of Campbell's soup in the grocery story and one in a museum is that the can of Cambell's soup in the museum is part of the artworld, whereas the one in the grocery story is not.

So I'd count the short story here as categorically a work of art, though separate the discussion on how good it is from that categorical distinction. It's been published in a venue for short stories. There is an author. There is a readership. And there is a history of the short story as well as norms being applied to evaluate how good or not good said short story is.

And you are in the majority. I'm happy to remain in the minority in thinking that it's not of any artistic merit but is possibly useful as a conversation starter. Leaving that aside, as we're unlikely to agree and neither of us has a monopoly on artistic wisdom, what are a couple of short stories that do live up to being great works of literary fiction in your view? — Baden

I really love Robert Coover's The Babysitter. I kept thinking of it while thinking about Cat Person because of how it deals with the ambiguity of desire.

I'm also very fond of the naturalists -- so Steven Crane's The Open Boat and Jack London's To Build a Fire are some of my favorites. I just like the themes of naturalism, and they were both really good writers.

A quick thought on the ending that I just had, though... I'm starting to second guess myself.

The ending actually shows us why Margot may have been looking for reasons to follow along the scripted path. He may have been doing all the right things, but it shows that there was a reason for her fear. Without the ending we do get a more balanced view of the two characters, and more ambiguity, but you don't understand why Margot is in conflict with herself. The ending shows that she was actually both an object of affection and possession, which she was not explicitly but may have been implicitly aware of.

I do want to debate Hume's mistreatment of induction and his attack on Newton. — Ron Cram

I mean, we can try and hash together his argument for you, but in the end if that is what you really want then you'll have to read him yourself. He does a far better job of making his argument than any of us could. You'll find it in Book 1 of A Treatise of Human Nautre

@Baden

George Dickie makes a useful distinction between two uses of the word "art".

There is "art" in the categorical sense, as in "All paintings in the museum count as art"

And there is "art" in the evaluative sense, as in "That sculpture is a real work of art"

The former designates the set of all works of art, where the latter designates that something counts as good art.

In the categorical sense I'd say that Cat Person certainly counts as art. I think what you mean by art is in the latter sense, though let me know if you disagree.


I'd say Cat Person is more than a diary entry because it has a character which follows a progression from distinct uncertainty to certainty -- she undergoes a change of character, though not one that is exactly specified but more negative. It's not that she knows what she wants at the end, it's that she knows one particular she does not want.

In some sense the ending is what provides that journey for the character, so I can understand why it's there even though I actually prefer ambiguity (but not everyone does -- in fact narrative ambiguity drives some people absolutely nuts). The entire time she is always uncertain until the moment that Robert declares himself the villain by calling her a whore. She wasn't even able to break it off with him without the aid of her friend, in spite of knowing how she felt.

What was in her way the entire way was herself -- she had various feelings of disease, but she didn't listen to them. She instead listened to convenient concoctions that allowed her to continue in the role set out for her by the rules of Dating. She did so because of imagined possibilities which, at every turn, Robert gave evidence to contradict. The only times Robert seemed to do something nice would be when the rules of dating and mating seemed to mandate to him that it was time for him to be the nice guy he wanted to portray himself as.

It's this nice guy portrayal that the title "Cat Person" is meant to elicit. He was a cuddly cat person who would perform gallant acts of kindness, but when it came to actually asking what his object of affection wanted he wouldn't ever ask.

What Cat Person does over and above Aziz Ansari is portray the stream of conscious of Margot in her various decisions and conflicts. The plot isn't the point as much as her thinking through her desires in what is a rather mundane (and hence actually relatable) situation.

It's actually kind of interesting in that while it is a stream of conscious narrative, it's also in third person partial. Usually stream of conscious narratives are in first person. I'm not sure why that choice was made -- perhaps we are meant to take on the role of someone who is thinking through their experiences after the fact, looking at them from a standpoint that differs from living through the moment.



Just trying to give some more of my thoughts on why I thought it was pretty good. I don't know if it qualifies as the pinnacle of art, exactly, but I don't think it's fair to compare it to a diary entry or a news story either -- and not just in a categorical sense, but in an evaluative sense -- as in "That's a real work of art"

Though I must admit that I'm not entirely fixed on what makes a short story good, either. But a lot of the elements of basic good storytelling are there, when you look at it from the perspective not of two persons in conflict but rather one person in conflict with herself. There is conflict from the beginning (Flirting out of habit because that's just what you do in this role, not out of a desire to flirt with Robert), and a resolution at the end. There is a character arc. And there's the interesting choice of using third person partial in spite of it being a stream of conscious narrative.

So, sure, maybe it doesn't live up to some great work of literary fiction, but I'd still say that it's good, I think, in spite of being uncertain about all the qualities that make a short story good.

Ethical judgements do not fall into this category, since one's feelings are the ultimate arbiter of truth here. — sime

I'd put it differently. Truth is invariant of feelings. Action and choice aren't, but the truth is.

Actions coupled with motivation are the bearers of the terms "good" or "evil". So "Helping people in need is good" describes the property which attaches to the action which is the subject of the sentence. Sometimes motivation is an important aspect in evaluating the truth of some sentence which describes. So helping people in need is good, but "Taking donations for the needy out of a desire to help the needy is good" differs from "Taking donations for the needy out of a desire to keep a non-profit afloat is good". Some may argue that the motivation is irrelevant, but we sometimes do care about the motive, and some people only care about motive in certain cases, so I think it's important to add that in there. Plus it fits well enough with the notion that actions are the bearers of the terms "good" or "evil".

These sentences, to all appearances, look no different from statements like "The grass is green" -- they follow a subject-predict form and attribute some property to some subject. Further, people argue as if certain norms are true or false, so it seems sensible to admit that such kinds of statements are truth-apt. On their face, at least, they appear to have that sort of semantic meaning and function.

It's just that, when we look how such values are used in practice we see that people choose differently using the same values within the same circumstances. So it is reasonable to infer that there is no fact to the matter. Hence, all such sentences are false.

If the third person is sincere, then his error is not a moral but rational one. We appeal to the principle of a just punishment: A punishment is just if (1) it restores justice when possible, and (2) prevents further injustice. Also, if numerous punishments accomplish these ends, then we ought to choose the one that is the least harmful.

Killing a criminal does not restore justice to the victims. It does prevent further injustice from the criminal, but then jail time accomplishes this too and is less harmful. — Samuel Lacrampe

Justice can be interpreted in this manner, but it doesn't need to be. What I refer to here is retributive justice -- an old form of justice, by all means, but one which people do believe in.

What is more rational about a punishment that simply prevents further injustice? What in reason makes this so?

I'd say nothing. Upon accepting one form of justice or another then reason can tell us what we must do. When attached to some interpretation of justice then I'd say that it even appears that this attachment is a kind of fact of reason, to borrow a phrase.

But there wouldn't be a way to differentiate your commitment here from our third man's commitment on the basis of which is more rational.

Our third interlocutor would simply say that a man who murders a million deserves a million deaths. That being impossible to do he deserves the most that we can give him -- one death.

And if there were no sinners, then we would all be saints. Can't disagree with that logic, but it says nothing about how to deal with current warriors and sinners. I am not sure how extreme pacifism or 'mercy' as we have defined it, can stop current wars or injustice. As such, I claim rational error again, because the means does not meet the end. — Samuel Lacrampe

But sometimes it isn't so much about the means and ends. Sometimes commitments are motivated by good will alone -- it isn't the results of actions, but what they intend to accomplish which compels persons to adopt a particular moral position.

There's nothing more rational about consequentialist reasoning. Consequentialist and deontological reasoning are both two forms of thinking through moral problems. You'd have to have some third way of reasoning that was somehow able to lay claim to being more rational to decided between the two before you could claim that the pacifist here is simply making an error that reflects their irrationality.

They certainly have reasons.

Unequal treatment among men for a given situation. And this is evaluated objectively. — Samuel Lacrampe

So far "objective", though, has just been fleshed out as a test in the imagination -- what someone is able to conceive of as being possible or impossible, in the same manner that a triangle cannot have anything but three sides.

If math is the metric for necessity, then I'd say that it's fairly obvious that people can imagine different things -- things which are no more or less rational than one another. In fact, once thought through, they are sort of a founding principle of rationality in making moral decisions.

Indeed there are. I will exclude rational errors here. We all know what is morally good and bad, but free will entails we have the choice to be morally good or bad. Why decline the moral good if we know it to be good? To prioritize other kinds of good such as physical good (e.g. unfaithful sex) or emotional good (e.g. merciless revenge). Now why should we prioritize the moral good over the other kinds of good? By definition of the moral good which is "what we ought to do". In other words, to say "we can do something else than we what ought to do" is a contradiction. — Samuel Lacrampe

It goes deeper than mere temptation. All that happens after having determined what is good or evil.

But there are those who disagree on those terms. Rationality isn't the basis for deciding between good or evil -- people can be consistent and supply reasons for why they think this or that is just.

Really, it's in the competition between moral goods that you see this -- so in the above, we have kinds of justice or interpretations of justice. Before, acts of mercy from God to man or between men. Or in the case of the pacifists a conflict on how to reason about moral goods, whether it be measured by the outcomes of our acts or the motives and purity of our acts.

Each story is about a person who is good, and people who are good disagreeing with one another on what that means in particular circumstances.

Yeah, it makes sense. People are flawed, people have baggage, but The Date is meant to showcase yourself as a desirable object -- yet, in order for us to have a real connection, we can't just hide our bad and show our good.

I think friendship is the best basis for building love, for that reason. It's slower than The Date really allows for, but it's a real connection built on trust. Not everyone seems to feel that way, but maybe they're just looking for something else than what I like. What love through friendship does is create something built on trust that maybe isn't super sexy and exciting, but is worthwhile and on the whole better than purely erotic and spontaneous pleasures (which is all The Date seems to be about, to me).

There's excitement and ecstasy, but not connection and relationship. And certainly not love.


Also, with respect to shame/guilt: I definitely see where you're coming from on that. You're wanting a path out, in a sense, for people who fuck up -- because we all fuck up after all.

On the other side I think there's a sort of exasperation which stops feeling care for people who fuck up. So shame is the end of a process in which someone is just tired of cleaning up the fuck ups.

I don't really know which is right, or if there even is a right way to respond. It almost seems to depend upon the circumstances of an individual -- where they are at and all that. I don't think either reaction is really better, per se. They honestly both feel like understandable sorts of reactions to the world.