Best interpretation I can think of is that the human condition is the entity, and it is being described as logical -- but not logical in the sense of formal logic or deductive inference, but rather logical in the wider sense that it is something which can be understood by way of reasoning.

A bit of a joke in that I don't see my brain. I arrive at believing in a brain by inference, which relies upon . .

Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair." — Terrapin Station

Your brain does all this?

Where?

:D

There's a lot of entities you're introducing in this paragraph. A very large story on how we "essentially" comes to necessary and sufficient criteria (are concepts or are concepts not necessary and sufficient criteria? I'm saying they are not, but are just rough notions -- but here you're introducing "essentially". What does that mean?)

I don't think it's the only story that makes sense of the fact that we can observe something and go "chair". First, I would say we do not observe something and then go chair. We don't have perceptual data. We have chairs. "perceptual data" is an abstraction built on abstractions arrived at after much contemplation, which itself relies upon language.

If our brain and evolution does things for us, then just as the brain and evolution make us sit in the chair, then also the brain and evolution make us refer with signs ("chair" to chair) which already mean something.

It is not the brain and evolution which creates meaning, but the brain and evolution which uses meaning -- just as it uses chairs.

But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."

No theory, of course. Only an argument about the necessity of having to "just know" in order to be able to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions.

Your story about concepts and sense data and brains and evolution driving perception of chairs all relies upon this -- our -- ability to "just know" the meanings of words without necessary and sufficient conditions. (EDIT: It's worth noting here, too, that we are really focusing a lot on nouns, but that language meaning is much more diverse than necessary and sufficient conditions for categories. I'm not saying you deny this, but it's worth noting because right now we are focusing very much on this one example, when meaning isn't just this one example)

People have discussions about categories, no doubt, and whether something does or does not fit a category.

But when someone sees a chair as a chair, they did not do so by necessary or sufficient conditions. The conditions are post-hoc explanations of word usage. Explanations which can even modify how we use a word in the future or elucidate something about the object, no doubt. But when someone asks for a chair, and the shopkeeper brings them a chair, the shopkeeper did not buy chairs on the basis of some sort of rational conditions. He just knew what counts as a chair, as the buyer knew what they were asking for.

If the shopkeeper brought the above image to the buyer, then a discussion about the proper use of chair, or the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood, might take place. Prior to that, though? We have to be able to pick out chairs in order for us to even begin laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood -- hence, have some kind of notion of chairs prior to assigning conditions.

I suppose because it's not the "explicit" part that gives me pause, but whether it happens at all -- I don't think people implicitly hold necessary and sufficient conditions for being able to pick out entities for words.

My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that makes a good deal more sense to me now. In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity.

When I read this:

The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. — Terrapin Station

That is what I hear.

Alright, cool. Then I did (and probably do) not understand your objection.

This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction. — Terrapin Station

Usage is not what makes meanings true. Usage is how one determines what a meaning is. Meanings themselves, I suspect, are not true or false. It would be like saying a chair is true or false to say that meanings are true or false.

A definition describes the meaning. Is that the same as gives? I don't think so.

In my view, meanings are meantal associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings. — Terrapin Station

Gotcha.

Then we're not so different, I think, except insofar that I don't believe that meanings are mental. They are, however, associated with words/phrases/sentences. (do we associate the meanings? We can, but we also don't always do so

The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here — Terrapin Station

I certainly didn't have a proof written up. I'm just being honest about that. I'm working through ideas with you. It helps to have someone who disagrees to do exactly that. Sorry if it frustrates. After all:

To me, it just looks like a combinatino of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much — Terrapin Station

It would be an odd way of being lazy, considering the length of the discussion so far. :D

Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?" The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts. — Terrapin Station

The problem I have with that is we just don't operate on necessary and sufficient criteria. People don't gaze about looking at objects and evaluating them on this basis. Philosophers wonder about answers to these questions, but this does not reflect how people identify chairs.

To rephrase your question in terms of meaning, then -- "What makes me say that that is a meaning of a word?"

Again, I would say an answer to the question "What makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart?" is to ask the exact same question. It's not ideas, from my view, as per what I stated above. Notions maybe, in the sense that people have rough ideas, but not necessary and sufficient conditions. At least, from the way I believe we actually use words and think about these things.

There's an ambiguity in the word "makes", too -- I mean, I could say that what makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart is someone asked me whether or not Walmart has chairs, and reply in a jocular fashion, "That is a chair of Walmart". So someone else's question made me say exactly that.

What makes me say that words are correlated with meanings -- signifiers with signifieds -- is that there are signs in the world, and they mean things regardless of what beliefs I might hold about those signs. "tomato" refers to a tomato even if I use "tomato" to insult someone. What makes me say that this is a meaning is that meanings of words are as public as chairs of walmart. To go back to an older example:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad — Moliere

If you were to reply, "Now what does that mean?", and meanings are private, then I would reply:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad — Moliere

And "Now what does that mean?" would have about as much meaning as the above example does.

So when you state:

So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage. — Terrapin Station

I only understand you because I know the meanings of your words. Were they private, then the whole thing has about as much meaning as reetswahtter does in English.

Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time. — Terrapin Station

And I was just getting to how this all leads to World Peace. Darn.

But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. — Moliere

Just really quickly -- putting your contradictory quotes into context above

"insofar" means "if" in the above, not "Since".

Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage. — Terrapin Station

Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning.

A meaning is different from a description. For you this is a restatement because you're saying definitions are meanings. But I would say that the meaning of some term isn't the same as its description.

"What makes it true that something is. . . "

"What makes it true that something is a chair?"

This question is clearer to me than the previous one. But I don't have an answer for you, which is bound to disappoint. But I also don't have an answer for the latter -- at least not one that I believe is true. You're asking after, from what I'm able to parse, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can pick out, out of all the entities, which entities are meanings.

I'd put it to you that to ask the question "What makes it true that something is a chair?" is to at least have a notion of "chair" and chairs. It is possible for us to know that this is a chair without knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can definitively state what, of all entities, which entities are chairs.

Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true. (I know true statements, but I may not know what truth is)

But I do know what a chair is, in spite of not knowing "what makes it true that something is a chair" (or, perhaps more clearly stated, I'm able to pick chairs out of the entities I am familiar with). I could even offer a definition of "chair", though that's different from what you're asking.



I'm not offering a theory of meaning, as you have. So that may be a source of some miscommunication on our parts. But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. My strategy has been to demonstrate, by way of example, words which have meaning in spite of stipulation to show that there are meanings aside from stipulation. I understand that the perils of such a strategy is that any counter-example can be re-interpreted under a new theory, hence why I noted I know you can sustain belief in a stipulative theory of definition and meaning. My recourse from there was to note that beliefs in meaning account for more about how language is, whereas your account doesn't account for the factual and historical element of language -- that it, taken to extremes, would lead to a bunch of people barking but never communicating. Meaning really must be shared, at least, in order for us to communicate (insofar that we believe there is such a thing as 1st person experience, at least -- as I do, and I suspect, given your comments about meaning, that you do to).

There are very good reasons to believe that language has meaning. Aside from communication, which is only one part of what language does, we can read a letter, a play, a poem, a book, an article and they all are rich in meaning. This is something of a brute fact, from my perspective -- just as objects are. There is not an existential or ontological difference between objects and words. It's possible that neither exist, but I don't think you can deny one without also denying the other. (perception, after all, doesn't individuate on its own -- objects are named, and names are a part of language) So in some sense I'd say to deny language meaning is very similar to denying objects -- I understand that it can be done, but I don't have a good reason to do so.

My understanding of our disagreement isn't as much about the existence of meaning, however, as much as whether or not meaning is purely a stipulative, and thereby private/mental/subjective, affair.

So onto that:

I found Wittgenstein's treatment in P.I. fairly convincing in arguing that language is public. That we are able to communicate on a regular basis with one another, just as we are able to sit in the same chairs and share food, indicates we share meaning, and that notion of private language are only expressable because of this shared meaning -- since, if language were strictly private, then it would not express. It wouldn't mean anything, at least not to me. And you would say that I can look to your behavior when saying some private word and infer from behavior what you have in your head. But I would say that said inference is impossible without a language. Inference is built on our ability to use language. "if", "then", "possibly", are all words taught to us -- not discovered or invented by us.

Private languages don't account for this, which brings me to:

The phenomenological consideration that I was born into a world where the meanings of language pre-existed me. Language was always-already there. So it's simply true that I didn't define the words which I use. English is older than me, and has a history. I have a Background, of which language is a part.

So, I have good reason to reject that meanings are private, at least. I suspect they are not mental, but perhaps there is some way of parsing a public mental sphere which could make sense of the matter. However, I likewise suspect that any such parsing will make objects just as mental as words -- idealism of a stripe, even if it be a more reserved transcendental idealism.

No, I am not.

A descriptive definition is true if it accurately describes the meaning of a term.

We know the meaning of a term by its usage -- more specifically, as I stated earlier, the extension of usage.

The first states under what conditions a descriptive definition is true, and the latter states how one might go about evaluating whether a descriptive definition is true.


EDIT: At least if by "report of usage" you mean statements like --

"Robert said, "Please pass the salt""

Or --

"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt"


The latter is closer to what I am on about, but I am claiming that meaning exists too, and that a definition is true as long as it accurately describes the meaning of a term. (or perhaps even "a" meaning -- a definition does not need to be exhaustive in order for it to be true).

The only answer I can think of is to state a basic version of both theories of truth, thereby making it clear how they differ. Or to say that we can account for differences by pointing out or describing differences -- by contrasting different ideas. But that all just seems kind of flippant on my part, and so doesn't seem to answer the question.

What are you asking for?

I'm afraid I'm not following what you're asking after here. What is "per what"? Like, by what authority? Or, by what feature of the world? or. . what?


A description of, say, the watch is true if it describes the watch. Likewise, a description of "watch" is true if it describes "watch". In the case of a descriptive definition we're asking after the meaning of "watch". So, a descriptive definition is true if it describes the meaning of "watch".

So what makes a descriptive definition true, as with any assertion, is the facts. The facts in this case is the meaning. The meaning is determined by usage.

Suppose that instead of "the meaning" of something, we are talking about "the colour" of something. If I demonstrated to you, that we could determine the colour of something by seeing it, and we could determine the colour of something by hearing it, wouldn't you agree with me that we were using "the colour" in two distinct ways? — Metaphysician Undercover

I suppose it depends, actually. If you could reliably hear green, then I'd just say you're using a different method that I'm not actually familiar with, but that there's no difference in the green property. If you're using "green", on the other hand, to describe something which is not green then you'd be using "green" differently.

Common usage is such that "the colour" refers to the visual impression and also to the aural impression. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'd say that common usage refers to the color green, and not an impression of the color green.

Wouldn't you agree that we should separate these two distinct things, such that when we talk about "colour" we can distinguish whether we are talking about the visual impression of the thing, or an aural impression.

I'd say it just depends on if that's important or not. Consider a submarine. A submarine can detect, at a distance, objects by way of echo-location. But there's no need to constantly specify that the submarine is using echolocation when we, as humans, would typically use sight in determining spatial distrubtion of objects. We could just say "There is an object so many meters away from us", regardless. We might even say "I see an object so many meters away from us", even if what I see is a radar.

This is what I am doing with "meaning". We have two distinct ways of determining "the meaning", one, by relating the word directly to an object, as we commonly do in day to day communication, and a second, by relating the word to other words (defining the word) as we do in more sophisticated situations. Do you not agree that we should identify and separate these two, so that when we talk about "the meaning", we can avoid ambiguity, and have a better understanding of what we are talking about.

I think the use/mention distinction handles this well enough, personally, and that there's no need to divide meaning up because we can use a word or we can mention a word.

I say that definitions can be true or false. Obviously a stipulative definition is neither true or false. A descriptive definition, on the other hand, is true or false. It is true in the case where the description describes the meaning of a term, and false when it fails to do so.

I think our disagreement follows more from my assertion that there are more definitions than stipulative definitions. I don't deny stipulation, only that there's more to definition than stipulation.

In the rest of your post, you're saying that the truthmaker for "The definition of 'tomato'," in a context-independent way (re that specific context) is how people use the word "tomato."

The problem with this is that that IS the specific context I was referring to. So that's not a context-dependent "true definition" (re that specific context). — Terrapin Station

Context-independence is your term. Insofar that you're using that qualifier I am too, but it was not I who introduced this notion. Hence why I asked what would count for the qualifier in any case at all, since the way I would put things would be to say there is no such case with regards to anything.

You're agreeing that definition doesn't refer to anything like consensus or conventional usage unless we qualify that that's what we're referring to. — Terrapin Station

"Meaning", but yeah. Definitions describe meanings, by my reasoning. I understand that you don't agree with the distinction, but I'm just making it explicit that this is what I'm saying.

You're claiming that "The definition of 'tomato' is x," unqualified, can be true or false. (And you've also made claims that this is true regardless of usage, although it's fine if we don't bother with that part here. That you claimed the definition, unqualified, can be true or false is enough.) — Terrapin Station

I'm claiming that a definition can be true or false. I'm not sure where I said "unqualified".

When pressed on how the definition, unqualified, and independent of the specific context of usage, which isn't implied by the word "definition," can be true or false, you explain that it's true or false by virtue of how the term has been used. Well, this contradicts both (A) and (B). — Terrapin Station

To me this just seems like a strange set-up. Perhaps it derives from your notions on truth, actually -- since many people seem to believe that truth is somehow a property which pertains outside of context. But that's just a guess on my part, I don't know.

What I can say without reservation is that definitions can be true or false, and they are true or false by virtue of usage. That isn't to say that usage is the same as meaning, but that usage is how we determine meaning. But since I've been relying on usage as my methodology, it would certainly be shooting myself in the foot to then say that meanings exist in an unqualified and independent of specific context way. But, this is an idea I think you introduced which I'm willing to engage, but it's not what I've been saying I believe.

I just don't think you need an unqualified and independent of context way for meanings to be in order for them to serve as facts. Since all facts are neither unqualified nor independent of context it strikes me that this is just an odd criteria, too, since even with non-controversial facts (such as "the capital of the United States in the year of our Lord 2016 is Washington DC") neither quality applies.

Well you've totally lost me. If meaning is what a word means, and I can know what "apple" means, and knowing is a capacity, then how can you say "meanings aren't related to our capacities"? Isn't it clear to you that if we can know the meaning of something, and knowing is a capacity then necessarily meaning is related to our capacities. Is knowing not a capacity of human beings? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fair. I should be more specific. What I mean is that what a meaning is is not related to our capacities. Yes, we can see some kind of relation between our abilities and our words (and the relationship may just be one of knowing or believing), but I just meant to indicate that our capacities do not create meanings.

One person knows the word "apple" as meaning that particular object on the table, and another person knows the word "apple" as meaning "a round red fruit", and both are correct. Do you not recognize a fundamental difference between relating the word to a particular object, and relating the word to a bunch of other words? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't. Objects and words, insofar that either exists, are existential equals.

No sarcasm on my part. The point is too rarified for me to be able to lodge sarcasm very effectively -- it's kind of one of those things where it's so simple that you already sound dumb for even talking about it, so sarcasm isn't going to exactly work.

In this case, where I say "tomato" means X, we're talking about truth and meaning in a somewhat general way, and I'm trying to make use of an example to give something more concrete to talk about. So, to give an "in the flesh" example:

https://www.planetnatural.com/tomato-gardening-guru/

There is a language which we share, English, and within that language there is a sign "tomato" which means X. The author of that page knows English just as I know English, and they know the sign "tomato" just as I know the sign "tomato". The fact of the matter, in the flesh, is that the author is using the sign "tomato". (interesting to note that the usage of the sign, in this case, doesn't occur within a sentence, but still has meaning) There is a shared Background, and shared meanings, which we were both born into which allows us to discuss how to garden.

The idea is more that if you want to claim that there is a context-independent (per this specific context) truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x," then you should specify what the truthmaker is. — Terrapin Station

I'd hazard that the truthmaker is no different in this context than any other context for which truthmaker is applicable -- it's just the facts.

Facts are never context independent. But I don't think context-independence is necessary for truth.

You're not forgetting that I'm talking about a specific context here, right? Namely, how particular persons are defining/using the term(s) in question. I specified this a number of times. — Terrapin Station

No. I figured what you were saying, though, was that because " there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x."" that it follows that meaning is mental/private/subjective. (Hence why you were saying that we do not figure out what words mean, but rather assign meaning)

And in conjunction with this, you've agreed that "definition," unqualified, does not refer to a non-institutional consensus or conventional usage. — Terrapin Station

Yup.

But I don't think that implies that meaning is mental/private/subjective.

You don't figure out what words mean. You observe usage and assign meaning. — Terrapin Station

I think we're chasing our tail on this one. :D

Re the reason I'm saying that it's not true or false that tomato is defined as x context-independently, that is outside of how someone(s) happens to be defining/using x, and getting back to the thread topic, is that context-independently, there is no truthmaker for "tomato is defined as x." The reason that I'm not reading "defined as" as necessarily referring to the context of consensus or conventional usage I've already explained in detail, and you've already agreed with this; you've already agreed that "defined as" needs to be contextually qualified, that it can't necessarily be read as implying (non-institutional) consensus or conventional usage.

I'd say that anything that is true is not true context-independently. "context-independently" is an imaginary scenario by which we may be able to judge certain things as more or less subjective, but since it is imaginary it's the sort of standard which we can draw wherever our heart desires. It's more a way of creating a point of contrast for comparison than it is a reality.

"All Bachelors are Unmarried" is true only in the context of English. "War is War" is not a necessary truth, but is true in our world. "(A + B) + C = A + (B + C)" is true in basic arithmetic


For what is there a truthmaker, in your view? What is context-independent?

Logic is upfront when we're talking about truth. A truth realist will deny that the mechanics of meaning are ultimately significant with truth because a proposition can be true though it's never been expressed and no one knows it. This must be so. Otherwise there would be no detectives. — Mongrel

See. . . that definitely strikes me as a semi-platonic entity then (it may not be strictly platonic, so that's why I say semi- in that it relates to some features of platonic philosophy). If a proposition can be true even though it's never expressed and no one knows it, then the proposition has a reality all of its own -- and propositions are even thought to be the vehicle through which we can translate to different languages, so whatever language we might be speaking would be inconsequential to the existence of propositions. Language wouldn't even need to exist for propositions to exist, in that case, as I see it.

That's just something that I'm incapable of believing in.

Truth I could at least see as semi-plausible as a platonic entity. Not saying I believe in it, but it's at least believable and something I could consider seriously.

But some kind of language-invariant meaning that's also true above and beyond usage just seems like a convenient just-so story to me.

Language, I can see, exists all on its own. It has an independent reality, of a sorts. It's pseudo-real, and exists in the same way as anything else we might posit exists. But then I would also say that "it is raining" means something different from "Es regnet".


Surely there's some other way of thinking about truth, and believing in detectives, than believing in the existence of propositions which are never expressed and never known.

No, that's not exactly what I'm going after either. Or, at least, if it is true, I don't believe that language is a series of barks chained to our reproductive worth to the species.

(EDIT: though, by the same token, I don't think language makes us special in comparison to other animals either.)

Mostly because words have meaning (or sentences, at least, do).


Maybe it's just the sound of proposing "propositions" that makes me think of them as magical fairies -- that's the connotation that I hear when hearing someone propose propositions.

So do you agree that we need to respect two distinct senses of "meaning"? One is associated with the capacity to relate words to objects, and the other is associated with the capacity to relate words to other words, form a definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

If that's the conclusion I should draw from what I said, I don't see it as of yet. Meanings aren't related to our capacities, so just because we have different capacities -- are able to do different things with words -- that does not then mean that words have two different senses of meaning. We can use "apple" and we can mention "apple", but that's just us using the same word in a different way.

In fact I'd be rather suspicion of a theory of meaning that treats words like tags that we can put on objects, to be honest. We do things with words, and one of the things we do with words is refer -- but that's no different than if I were to point at something.


"meaning" has many meanings, and if that's all you mean by sense then I don't see it as controversial. Maybe I don't get what you mean by sense.

One doesn't even know what proposition is being expressed unless the context of utterance is known.

John said "2 is a prime number."
Bill said, pointing to the number 2 written on the blackboard "That is a prime number."

Different sentences, different utterances, same proposition. — Mongrel

OK. Then yeah, I certainly misunderstood them.

Sounds and marks won't work as primary truth-bearers in spite of their ready visibility. If you and I are in agreement, it's not sounds or marks we're agreeing to. — Mongrel

That's fair. I agree.

I get the objection to propositions based on ontological considerations, but as photographer would often say: reality is what we can't do without. Before you ditch propositions, recognize what you're saying you can do without.

There's the ontological consideration, but also it seems an odd way to talk about meaning too. Propositions focus on such a very specific use of language, and it seems to me that if one were to base a belief about meaning on them that they'd just be over-generalizing and getting it wrong. Some meaningful sentences are true, but then if we just understood meaning then that would give a means to truth (at least, truth understood in this way -- the kind of truth which telling the truth relies upon)

As I mentioned, it's communication itself that's undermined by that rejection. — Mongrel

Cool. I'd have to read the dude you referenced, I think.

My immediate thought is that we could just take meaning for granted. It seems more plausible, to me at least, to believe that our expressions are meaningful rather than to rely upon a belief in propositions to say what it is that makes them meaningful. We don't have to know what it is that makes a sentence meaningful to know that it is meaningful, after all.

They know what apple means.

But maybe they don't know how to define a word, yet. They haven't reached the ability to begin thinking about their words in the same way that they think about their apples. So they know what "apple" means, but they may not know what "The word "apple"" means.

But these aren't two types of definition, one is a definition, the other a direct relating the word to an object. The latter is knowing what "apple" means by being able to point to an apple, it is not in any way defining "apple". — Metaphysician Undercover

If someone uses the word "apple", then they are not defining it. They are demonstrating competence of the language, but they are putting the language to use.

If someone is teaching another the meaning of "apple", then they may choose, rather than speak the meaning, to demonstrate the meaning by showing the pupil an apple.


So being able to point to an apple, and pointing to an apple, is using "apple". Demonstrating to someone how to use "apple" is a way of defining apple. Telling someone what an apple is is another way of defining "apple". So if we are asking a clerk for an apple then we are using the word "apple", and if we are telling someone about "apple" then we are mentioning the word "apple".

Two different propositions were expressed. An utterance is sounds or marks, generally... not really a good candidate for truth-bearer. — Mongrel

What were the two different propositions? To my understanding, propositions are generally taken as the content of certain expressions. No? Does the location in which we speak change the semantic content of an expression?

I may just misunderstand propositions. Because I would say that "It is 5:00 PM" is expresses the same proposition regardless of the speaker -- so your assertion that there are two different one's runs counter to my understanding. (which, as I've noted, isn't in any way professional. I'm certainly open to reading more. I'm just interested in the topic, so I'm talking)

Propositions don't operate on "possible contexts." A sentence is uttered to express a proposition. Listeners either understand what proposition was expressed or they don't. No malarky about computer generated poetry here. — Mongrel

Propositions don't, but language does. An understanding of meaning without somehow incorporating context doesn't strike me as terribly helpful because meaning changes so much with context.

Why not computer generated poetry? Isn't computer generated poetry just as much a part of language as declarative sentences?

That's the crazy part about language. It has meaning regardless of intent. If a computer generates a sentence, then we know what it means even though there wasn't even a speaker.

What's wrong with sounds or marks, vs. propositions? To me it seems that I know the former exist because I see them. But the latter strike me as convenient inventions that don't even account for language meaning, but only the meaning of very particular types of sentences which some philosophers have an interest in. Granted, these are the sorts of sentences we're usually interested in when talking about truth-apt sentences, and therefore truth, but still -- it seems to me that meaning is wider than truth, and truth is just one goal a sentence can accomplish.

While Saussure certainly believes meanings are in the head, I don't think that is necessary to take on board if we talk about language in terms of signs. A sign is composed of both a signifier and a signified. The marks can be the signifier. And truth is the property which a signifier has to some fact. The signified is the meaning which "comes along with", but given that semantic meanings of words are resilient to change -- whereas the marks in a given context aren't (whether "mark" be understood as phonic or visual), and in fact vary considerably with context -- it makes sense to assign truth to the mark rather than the meaning to account for the variety in contextual use.

It may be counter-intuitive to say that the marks we see bear truth -- but that doesn't mean it shouldn't be the case, no? I can see that because a mark can have different meanings that maybe it's a bit of a bait-and-switch move... but it seems to me that just because a mark can look different and mean the same, or vice-versa, that there's still good reason for attributing truth to the mark because it's the very thing which is in context.

I don't think so. Meaning isn't the same thing as definition, so there's no need to say there are different kinds of meanings just because we define a word in different ways.

I couldn't disagree with these two paragraphs more strongly than I do. In my opinion, it's rather clear that you have this stuff factually wrong. — Terrapin Station

Cool.

The factual side of language certainly isn't that words have definitions (which you'd call "meanings") that can be different than usage. That goes against the factual evidence. Words are defined however people choose to define them. They can do something highly idiosyncratic there, or they can follow suit with how the vast majority of people are defining the term, or they can do anything in between. None of that is right or wrong, by the way. And typically, those definitions, that usage (of the vast majority that is) shifts over time. — Terrapin Station

Hold on there. A definition is not a meaning. A definition describes the meaning. When someone uses a word, they are not defining it. They're using it.

Haha--no, that isn't true. It's only true that that's the conventional definition — Terrapin Station

I understand that you disagree. But the best reason I seem to get for you is that your idea about meaning accounts for being able to use words idiosyncratically.

But if we can figure out what words mean by their usage, then I don't see an issue with new uses of words, and it seems that we have a way of understanding shared meanings, rather than having them be private.

How about both? I'd call the former a descriptive definition, and the latter an ostensive definition. So they are two different definitions of the meaning, but we can both fairly say we know the meaning of the word, I think.

I'm having trouble following this... sorry. — Mongrel

No worries at all. Please question away -- I'm far from an expert on this subject. I probably know just enough to hurt myself, really ;).

Consider agreement. Two people are willing to assert the same truth-bearer. It can't be that they're willing to make the same utterance. I can't make your utterance and vice versa.

True. But then suppose while I was in California I were to say, "It is 5:00 PM". And my cousin, who lives on the East coast, were to also say "It is 5:00 PM" at the same time in a telephone conversation. Only one of these utterances is true, even though they express the same semantic content. (well, OK, they could both be false as well -- but they can't both be true :D)

One of the reasons I like the focus on utterances is that it seems, at least, to be a nice and neat way to accept all the messiness of context without getting lost in the mud of possible contexts.

This paragraph isn't at all clear to me, unless for some reason--though Lord knows what reason--you'd be reading "consensus" as necessarily referring to some sort of formal agreement a la your comment about a committee. — Terrapin Station

More just that language isn't something which is institutional, as "consensus" seems to imply to me -- though there are other ways to institute, of course, than by consensus. I do not hold that meanings are made by consensus. There are even uses of similar phonemes which are unrelated to one another, and there are more or less popular uses of certain words, as well as archaic usage too.

There are institutions dedicated to language, but language came prior to said institutions.

Institutions are where we get conventions from. So, therefore, language is not purely conventional. I would say that there is a fact to the matter.

That sentence doesn't make sense to me, either (including grammatically). — Terrapin Station

"Tomato" means. "means" is a verb, indicating that the word is an active participant in language, regardless of intent. In the same way one might say "The rock is", I was stating ""Tomato" means" to indicate there is a fact to the matter.

Other than that, definitions only obtain via stipulation (per usage at least). — Terrapin Station

:D -- I am trying to draw a distinction between what you are smashing together. Definitions obtain via usage, not stipulation. So, it is either by use or by stipulation, at least if we happen to be just that smart and are debating the only two theories that are possible. ;)

To highlight the difference:

But then it's just a matter of whether other people will agree with that stipulation or not. If lots of folks agree and follow suit, then it becomes a conventional usage, and dictionary authors note it when they're doing their work. — Terrapin Station

Agreement is a kind of institutional action -- a way of creating institutions. But it is not agreement which gives meanings to words. We are able to stipulate, of course, because anything can serve as a sign. But this does not then mean that agreement creates meaning -- even if we agree to use "The crow flies from coast to coast" to mean "I'm a member of the Communist Party", and even if the entire communist party began using it in this manner, that would not change the meaning of "the crow flies from coast to coast".

There is a certain history to words which agreement is unable to overcome. People don't follow suit and decide to create language. Rather, we are born into a world with language, and it already means something, regardless of my intent.

I'd say that this is what your theory is unable to explain -- it explains how it is we can take a sign to mean something, but it doesn't explain the factual side of language.

(c) Definitions are stipulations, not truth claims — Terrapin Station

I think this is our only point of contention, really.

Anyway, so you mostly learn the conventions of the language in English class. You could separate prescriptions from that, but really, prescriptions are the conventions of a particular population (such as English professors and other people considered language experts)

On my view, one can not learn, or share, etc., meaning. Meanings are mental-only, and can't be made non-mental. You learn definitions and observe (behavioral) usage. Meanings are something that happen inside an individual's head, from a first-person perspective. (This is a response to your final question as well.) — Terrapin Station

Cool.

Then I'd submit to you that I know "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.

If I know that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc., then it is true that "tomato" means a round, soft, red fruit that is eaten raw or cooked and that is often used in salads, sandwiches, sauces, etc.

If an utterance is true, then there is a fact to the matter.

If there is a fact to the matter with respect to language, then not all language is stipulated.

An utterance is a matter of language. And so I'd conclude that there is something missing in the belief that "all English definitions are stipulated"

This is just a bit more formal way of presenting what I already stated above.

"Definition" does not refer to consensus usage. The latter I've already assented to.

I imagine what's throwing us off is this:

Now, if everyone began to use "tomato" as "used for emphasis", then the meaning of the word has changed. — Moliere

But there is a difference between saying that we can tell what "tomato" means by what everyone uses "tomato" as, and that a descriptive definition refers to consensus usage. A descriptive definition describes the meaning of a term. We can tell what the meaning of that term is by the extension of usage of said term. There's not exactly a Committee for Consensus on the Sign which holds conventions to ensure consensus is reached, at least with most natural languages.

A stipulative definition is understood because I know what "to stipulate" means. "Tomato" has meaning regardless of what a person might stipulate it as because "stipulate" means. So, no, just because someone can use a sign idiosyncratically that doesn't sink the notion that "tomato" means something regardless of said stipulation.


Also, I think you're focusing on my former part -- admittedly larger -- of the post in this dialogue, whereas I'm focusing on my questions, such as:

How would you deal with, say, the existence of an English class? What is it they are learning? The mathematical average of the contents of a culture's mind? — Moliere

Which seems to me to be the results of your theory -- that what you learn in English class, when you learn word meaning, is the average of mental contents -- which sounds a lot like consensus to me, but maybe not to you.

But if I could just have one question answered, because you seem to be indicating that I have it wrong, this would be the one:

what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective? — Moliere

I'm not sure what this is directed at.

Well, I don't want to boil semantics down to pragmatics, more than anything. So "attached" just means it's not merely the usage of an utterance which is the meaning, but that the meaning of some utterance can be determined by the extension of usage.

This is not my account, but my understanding of your account. Just to be clear.

Yeah, as truth-bearers. And it would differ, at least from my understanding of Propositions, because the meaning is attached to utterances -- the extension of usage. Propositions, from what I understand, are semi-Platonic entities.

It seems to follow from your theory of stipulation -- at least, that's the best interpretation I can come up with, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective. When a class learns the meaning of the word, and the meanings of words are mental/private/subjective, then it would seem that the meanings we learn are some conglomeration of mental meanings.

Obviously the hypothetical person is stipulating another definition. But not many people are using said definition, no?

But you seem to be saying I have it wrong. So, what would you say we learn when we learn the meanings to English words, given that meanings are mental/private/subjective?

The latter.