I suppose because it's not the "explicit" part that gives me pause, but whether it happens at all -- I don't think people implicitly hold necessary and sufficient conditions for being able to pick out entities for words.

I don't know why you'd think that, though, because it happens all the time. For example, someone might see this:



And say, "That's not a chair!"

When you ask them why they say that, they might respond with, "It ain't got no seat!" or "It ain't got no legs!" or both. In other words, it doesn't meet a necessary condition (or two) for them to call it/consider it a chair. (If you object that it does in fact have a seat, they'd say it doesn't, because it doesn't meet their necessary criteria for what counts as a "seat.")

But someone else might say, "That is a chair!"

When you ask them why they say that, they might respond with, "You can sit on it and it even has a backrest; plus it was intended as a chair." Or in other words, it meets that person's sufficient conditions to be a chair. (By the way, that was in fact intended as a chair--it's an example of an "art chair.")

People do this all the time when they're assigning or refraining from assigning a term to an object.

Look at how often this sort of thing happens with, say, film and music discussions regarding whether a particular film or piece of music belongs to a particular genre or not.

People have discussions about categories, no doubt, and whether something does or does not fit a category.

But when someone sees a chair as a chair, they did not do so by necessary or sufficient conditions. The conditions are post-hoc explanations of word usage. Explanations which can even modify how we use a word in the future or elucidate something about the object, no doubt. But when someone asks for a chair, and the shopkeeper brings them a chair, the shopkeeper did not buy chairs on the basis of some sort of rational conditions. He just knew what counts as a chair, as the buyer knew what they were asking for.

If the shopkeeper brought the above image to the buyer, then a discussion about the proper use of chair, or the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood, might take place. Prior to that, though? We have to be able to pick out chairs in order for us to even begin laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood -- hence, have some kind of notion of chairs prior to assigning conditions.

He just knew what counts as a chair, — Moliere

Unfortunately, you have absolutely no explanation for that aside from "he just knows."

Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair."

But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."

With particular types of brain damage, by the way, people can no longer look at certain things and register whether they match a concept--they can no longer recognize certain things. That's because that brain damage affects some concept-formulation and storage structures in their brain.

Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair." — Terrapin Station

Your brain does all this?

Where?

:D

There's a lot of entities you're introducing in this paragraph. A very large story on how we "essentially" comes to necessary and sufficient criteria (are concepts or are concepts not necessary and sufficient criteria? I'm saying they are not, but are just rough notions -- but here you're introducing "essentially". What does that mean?)

I don't think it's the only story that makes sense of the fact that we can observe something and go "chair". First, I would say we do not observe something and then go chair. We don't have perceptual data. We have chairs. "perceptual data" is an abstraction built on abstractions arrived at after much contemplation, which itself relies upon language.

If our brain and evolution does things for us, then just as the brain and evolution make us sit in the chair, then also the brain and evolution make us refer with signs ("chair" to chair) which already mean something.

It is not the brain and evolution which creates meaning, but the brain and evolution which uses meaning -- just as it uses chairs.

But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."

No theory, of course. Only an argument about the necessity of having to "just know" in order to be able to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions.

Your story about concepts and sense data and brains and evolution driving perception of chairs all relies upon this -- our -- ability to "just know" the meanings of words without necessary and sufficient conditions. (EDIT: It's worth noting here, too, that we are really focusing a lot on nouns, but that language meaning is much more diverse than necessary and sufficient conditions for categories. I'm not saying you deny this, but it's worth noting because right now we are focusing very much on this one example, when meaning isn't just this one example)

Your brain does all this?

Where? — Moliere

You're asking me where one's brain is? Or where in the brain? If where in the brain, one study suggested that it starts in the hippocampus, though other evidence suggests that at least once concepts are formulated, they can occur throughout the brain. It's not highly localized.

If our brain and evolution does things for us, — Moliere

You're not something separate from your brain/body. It's not doing something for you. It is you.

(Although oops, I'm meaning to stick with one thing at a time.)

A bit of a joke in that I don't see my brain. I arrive at believing in a brain by inference, which relies upon . .

Unfortunately, you have absolutely no explanation for that aside from "he just knows." — Terrapin Station

What I've been discussing with Moliere, is that there is no need for him to know that the item is a chair, nor is there a need for him to know what a chair is, in general. When someone is talking about a particular object, and calling it a chair, all that matters is that the people hearing know which object is referred to as the chair. So knowing what a chair is, or that the object referred to with "chair" is really a chair, or not, is completely unnecessary for us to be capable of making true statements about the chair. All that is necessary is that we agree on which item is referred to as the chair. It is highly likely that the context of the word "chair" within the speech and actions of the speaker is what determines the object that "chair" refers to, not some sort of conditions as to what constitutes a chair, within the hearer's mind.

I think it is very important to understand this, before we move on toward analyzing any sort of standards by which we say that the object is or is not a chair. At the basic fundamental level, all that is necessary is the agreement, that this object will be identified as the chair. Then we have a basic truth, that particular object is "the chair", and this is a fundamental truth. It doesn't require any standards or criteria. But if we want to establish a class of items to be called chairs, then we need some criteria for classification, and this is where definition comes into play. Now we have a completely different type of truth, we are not agreeing that this object goes by the name "chair", we are agreeing on the criteria by which any object may be correctly called a chair.

In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity. — Moliere

Suppose we have a category now, the category of chair, and we want to judge an object as to whether its a chair. We have two distinct judgements to make. First we have to judge the standards. Are these the proper standards for defining "chair"? And, we have to judge the object to see if it fulfills those conditions.

So back to the first case now, when we are just referring to some entity with some name. There is no double judgement. One person says "chair", and the other person judges what the particular item is that is being referred to, as the chair, without referring to any set of standards. The item referred to is the chair, and that is the truth. In the other case, we want to determine whether the item referred to is really a chair. Then we need to make this double judgement, which will lead us toward the truth of whether the item really is a chair or not

The first problem with the entailment angle on truthmaking is that any object which exists will end up being a truthmaker for a necessary truth. My dog is a truthmaker for the proposition that 2+2=4. And there are other problems.

So we'll attempt to remedy this by adding relevance to entailment. Is it possible to become systematic about the concept of relevance?

Since 2+2 = 4 is true either a priori or analytically, does it then require a truthmaker?

Good question.