I would maintain there is a distinction between beliefs and experiences. We are mistaken when we believe false statements. So if we believe a false statement which is about our own experiences then we would be mistaken about our own experiences.

That doesn't answer the question, but I think the answer to your question would be found in the relationship between belief and experience. And, as you note, there are types of experiences which seem more liable to be mistake-prone, and types of experiences which aren't. So perhaps it's not even the relationship between belief and experiences, but belief and types of experiences.

Fair enough.

I'm very fond of Epicurus. He's one of the philosophers I return to reading more and more literature about on a periodic basis to get a firmer grasp on the various interpretations offered and to gain deeper insight into his philosophy.

There is no problem opposing people with the words they choose to identify with.

I would also say it's not out of line to make historical comparisons. For instance, white supremacy is a much more widely shared value than the number of people who would call themselves white supremacists -- the frame is usually more along the lines of "we just want to be with our own people, with our own culture, and take pride in our European heritage" -- but when those words also lead to hate crimes, there's more going on than what's on the face.

There are always going to be points of comparison just as there is never going to be identical historical moments. So there will never be a perfect comparison and there will always be the possibility of comparison, both. It's more a matter of making out what's similar to hopefully have a better understanding of what is going on now. There's some judgment involved in determining whether such-and-such a comparison is a "significant" comparison, and that significance happens somewhere in the middle between those two extremes.

Since Gore Vidal said it, probably. People regularly compared GWBush to Hitler. There was nothing particularly fascist about him — Mongrel

Some Democrats did, yes. Not all, though, and those who didn't -- while they opposed Bush 2 -- thought it was silly to make said comparison, for the reason you note here.

He continued an American trend of bringing power to the executive, and helped kick off the surveillance state, but I wouldn't say he was a fascist, either.

The question is: what difference does it make? — Mongrel

To me, at least, it is worth to look to have some kind of expectation to either contradict or confirm. Rather than, say, believing that we just have some villages which have a need for people and so we are shipping such-and-such people there, I might view such an action with a deeper suspicion.

Also, it helps to understand what is likely to actually influence a person in political power. This is why categories like "Democrat" and "Republican" are used, no? Because there are some general tendencies which don't always apply, and may not even be in the majority of the cases, but which we can expect to find often enough to note and check for. This is true even for people who aren't deeply involved in politics.

And it helps to know when something is being tried which hasn't worked before in similar circumstances, or vice versa, or simply to know the way certain trends could go. This will help a person to make better political choices in line with their values. So, in this case, we might say that it is good for Trump to promise jobs to people. But we could note that those jobs only go to some people, and not everyone, and so it may not help us after all. Or, we could note that "jobs", as a catch-all category, isn't something the President has much power over, which is why most presidents say things along these lines in the first place, because it sounds good and they don't have to deliver much on it.

The difference here, I think, would depend a great deal on what level of involvement we are willing to partake in, and what our beliefs about the way things should be. I mean, clearly, a fascist would be happy that a proto-fascist is gaining power and legitimating what they believe in, no?

It's hard for me to think of a scenario where the US crashes into a fascist ditch. But whatever it is, it's not something to be glib about. It's horrendous. — Mongrel

Eh, I figure it has happened before, so insofar that people's motivations and circumstances are similar then there's a possibility of it happening again. No country is immune to morphing into something it didn't begin as, at least.

I agree that it's nothing to be glib about.

Have all Democrats called every Republican candidate a fascist since Bush?

Some have. I would say that most did not, though. And guess which one's might be reticent to use the epithet? Probably those Democrats which didn't call Bush or Romney a fascist. These sorts of statements are not so easily ruled true or false simply because they can apply to people who do different things from one another. I'm willing to accept that this is your perception of Democrats -- it's not like I live where you do, or interact with the same people. But it is also the case that Democrats resist the 'fascist' epithet simply because it sounds ridiculous.

And, it's still worth noting that the parallels I've lain out here are still independent of what Democrats have called who in the past. The standard I'm using is not what Democrats say, but Mussolini's essay and Robert Paxton.

I just want to highlight that these things aren't separate, in that the narrative that Trump is a fascist is inseparable from the Democrats, because it is they who drafted that narrative, and so the narrative makes little sense except with respect to Democrat propaganda. Whether you believe that propaganda is another story. The point is that chances are you literally have these thoughts in your head because a Democrat said them and you heard them, even if you don't subjectively experience it that way. — The Great Whatever

Eh, to get all hipster about it, I've been saying this since before that line began running on the liberal rags. I've argued these same points with liberals, especially when they thought Trump's loss was a foregone conclusion, and also prior to Trump as a phenomena (the base has been growing and building before they had a Trump, and liberals were especially reticent then to discuss the parallels to fascism particularly because they thought it made them look silly and out of touch due to the overuse of 'fascist' as an insult). Trump is just a manifestation of a base which has been growing, plus, as I noted before, a poor candidate and campaign from his opposition.

Maybe. I would just add that I disagree with the Democrats in thinking white people are Satan, etc. and think that throwing a tantrum when they stand up for themselves is probably not a good idea, until you've destroyed their demographics, which they will have done in a couple generations. At which point white people may form just another minority voting block and be subsumed into broader liberal identity politics. — The Great Whatever

Insofar that a Democrat believes white people are Satan then, sure. But I don't think that most Democrats believe this. I think this goes in hand with the perception of persecution and humiliation I was talking about, though.

In what way is it fair to have this description of Trump, but not of Obama? Did Obama not have a cult of personality surrounding him at his election? Was he not a charismatic up-and-comer billed as an outsider (against Hillary Clinton, no less!)? Did he not base his campaign using the word of an emotion, 'hope?' — The Great Whatever

Obama also had policies which he campaigned on along with his sloganeering. Obama certainly had a cult of personality surrounding him. That I don't deny. But he also had a political history, one which is clearly in line with classical liberalism.

Trump has no such history, nor any policies, and he contradicts himself. His emotional appeals have no rational backing, and they even use scapegoat imagery.

What are they? — The Great Whatever

That's what the rest of the post was laying out. This was kind of the "thesis statement" -- the paragraphs following were the examples in which they are similar.

So are we against populist leaders on grounds that they're proto-fascist? Is populism fascist? Is appealing to the working class fascist? — The Great Whatever

All fascists are populists, but not all populists are fascists. In fact that's the general argument I've read from the academy against Trump being a proto-fascist is that they would describe him as a right wing populist, but not a fascist. But I'd say that no historical circumstance is like any other, and we can always isolate any moment in history by requiring our comparisons to approach identity to one another. I'd say that there is something generalizable about fascism which can carry on in other localities, differ, but maintain the core.

And appealing to the working class is not necessarily fascist. Obviously so, given how fascists hate Marxists and vice-versa. I bring up the working-class appeal because it's something that is really particular to the evolution of fascism that marks it as fairly distinct from just a general right wing populism. Fascism is anti-capitalist and claims to move beyond class antagonisms by fusing the classes together into the state. The right-wing populism which Trump has brandished makes it's appeal to traditional left-wing base. It's one of the reasons fascism is actually hard to classify on the left-right dichotomy -- as it has evolved it begins with left-wing sounding ideas but then develops into something else. Trump is even a business elite and yet appeals to working class voters -- so it's something that's really distinctly fascist.

I'm trying to wrap my head around this. My general impression is that the tables have turned somewhat due to a real resentment that white Democrats have for the working class, except insofar as the working class in non-white (in which case their lack of whiteness 'balances out' their unfortunate lack of education).

I think the working class just feels abandoned, mostly because they are abandoned -- whether that be because they should just work harder and fuck you I got mine or because, hey, who else are you going to vote for?

I'd like to reiterate, though, that Trump stands out as a proto-fascist on his own. The Democrats are fucked in so many ways, and I have no problem saying so. I've never had a problem saying so. But my thoughts on Trump are not fueled by my thoughts on the Democrats -- by saying Trump is a proto-fascist I am not, in turn, saying the Democrats are good.

I'm just going to go ahead and say I don't believe this at all, and believing it shows a profound lack of memory or knowledge of how political slogans are used. Just take a look through political slogans used by past U.S. presidential candidates, or politicians at other levels. We know, for example, that Bill Clinton used the very phrase 'make America great agin' when he campaigned in the early 90's; whether or not this statement is 'reactionary' or ;racist' or whatever has nothing to do with reality, but when it;s convenient to label your opponent as racist or reactionary. There's no memory or consistency in any of this, just propaganda. — The Great Whatever

It's not just the phrase, though, it's everything that's attending -- it's a summation of R-wing radio talking points and their blogo-social-sphere.

When Trump says "Make America Great Again", he is appealing to white culture. That's why white nationalists were in support of Trump. It's not just convenient, it's who is being mobilized as his base, and the reasons why it is a mobilizing phrase. And the who is white people, at least by the demographic data. It is reactionary because it taps into the founding father's myth which is told and retold in the propaganda machine that even predated Trump. But he managed to fuse these two impulses into one slogan -- America is a white nation, and we can make it the way it was.

I'm not repeating propaganda or writing propaganda here. And I'm familiar with political slogans, how they are used, and have used and written political slogans so it's not just ignorance or a lack of memory on my part. I may be in error, or we may just end up disagreeing too, but that's different from propaganda or ignorance.

Also, it's worth noting that we are all ignorant, to some degree, on these things. Not one person in the world, even the staffers at various departments with access to pertinent and restricted information, knows how all the pieces fit together. The political machine is huge. There may be gross ignorance, which is the only thing I'm pleading against, but surely there is no point in saying that I know enough. I, as are we all, am largely ignorant on the many details that comprise the political machine. But I am not grossly ignorant in the sense that I am totally unfamiliar with the topic or naive on how the basics work.

Racial tensions are deep; presidential campaigns reflect them rather than creating them. I don't believe the story that left alone we'd all be buddy buddy and it's just mean old fearmongers saying mean old things that make people hate each other. The Democratic party has a lot at stake that revolves around, in its own way, hating white people. Different racial blocks want different things, and you simply cannot please all of them coherently. I think it's utterly naive not to recognize this, and utterly naive to think white people, when pushed to a point, will not start to protect their own interests, which historically they have refrained from doing (never forming a coherent voting 'block'). This may happen in the future as effectively the Republicans become the white, and the Democrats the anti-white, parties. — The Great Whatever

I don't believe that story, either, but I do believe that there's something common to people deeper than their race. Black interests and white interests are a product of history, but there isn't a racial desire as much as there are human desires -- we are separated by race by circumstance and history, and so it is possible to come together on common ground as people.

Not that it is easy. Only that it is possible.


Regardless, it's the case that hate crimes surged post-Trump election. This evidences that the base which was mobilized by Trump was in fact racially motivated, hence why it is fair to compare Trump to fascists -- who also mobilized people through racial identity and hatred.

1) Do you agree that there has been a sudden increase in supposed tensions with Russia, — The Great Whatever

Yeah, that seems about right.

2) Do you believe that these tensions are largely manufactured by politicians and the media, and do not reflect the values of the public,

I am uncertain, to be honest. I don't find it out of the realm of possibility, but I'd have to see more evidence to believe that it was manufactured. More often than not the news cycle is less controlled than that. The focus on Russia could just be the result of recent events between the two countries. Ukraine, for instance.


I don't think it reflects the values of the public, but I'm rather uncertain what the values of the public are with respect to foreign policy. Insofar that war affects our families then people care, or insofar that patriotism or nationalism is a part of a person's identity then they also seem to care about foreign policy. But in general it seems that foreign policy is out of sight out of mind.

It is, from my perspective, utterly bizarre because it does read like a portal opened up to the cold war and decided to write our newspapers for us, though. I admit it strikes me as odd, but I wouldn't draw conclusions yet.

3) Do you agree that the Democrats are doing more to exacerbate this situation than the Republicans?

No, I don't. I don't think I'd agree with the converse either, though.

Obama, perhaps, and so by extension we might say Democrats. But that could just be Obama having access to information which neither Democrats or Republicans have access to, and acting on said information on the basis of national interest rather than party. It's really hard to say from my vantage.

My impression is almost that there is a contingent in the party that, for some reason, badly wants to start a war. I don't get that impression from Trump; I get the impression of blustery machismo, not of a disturbing attempt at rigging up a war. Maybe blustery machismo can start wars, but the Dems are far scarier to me right now. — The Great Whatever

I think both parties want war. It's good for business, it doesn't affect them on a personal level anyways (unless they choose it to), and it helps to project American power across the world. Also, if you're gonna build a toy, why not use it?

I don't see Trump as better in this light.

Of course it's worth noting we're sort of just sharing impressions here, too.

This one is interesting in particular because the narrative during the election was that the dems, not the repubs, were hotter on war (w/Russia). Do you think we are or will be on the verge of war with Trump's election? — The Great Whatever

Yes. It will be focused in the Middle East, I believe, but the Republican party has been beating the war drums for quite some time -- even during the Obama administration they were picking a fight with Iran.

Would said war have been avoided if Clinton had been elected?

I think we would have basically been continuing the Obama administration's foreign policy. Which is to say, no, war would not just go away with Clinton. Clinton has explicitly endorsed "humanitarian" military intervention.

But I don't think Iran would have been a potential enemy with her. Or China. There's something absolutely horrible about Obama's foreign policy -- in some way he's sanitized what is actually a gruesome affair that still kills innocent people across the world. He was just as much into projecting American power as, well, most American presidents have been since the end of WW2. (in truth, I think Obama's foreign policy, especially with respect to the war on terror, is the worst part of his presidential legacy. He expanded presidential powers like no other president -- Bush was an innocent, naive schoolboy by comparison)

But he didn't express a belief that Islam is somehow the enemy we need to defeat to ensure freedom will be granted to our posterity. That seems to be the story I get from the Republican party. Will they go through with it? I don't know. But I'd rather the people in power weren't saying these things to begin with.

Do politicians generally in your experience have rational political philosophies? — The Great Whatever

They at least ascribe themselves to rational traditions, yes. Of course being rational is a whole different thing, but Liberalism -- classical liberalism, I mean, which Democrats are just as much in said tradition as Republicans -- is generally considered a "rationalist" type political philosophy. Research Committees, studies, arguments, and so forth are part of the political currency because of this rationalist backbone. The fascist, on the other hand, feels in his heart what must be done and that the Leader is the human manifestation of the state guiding us all to greatness.

What are the similarities? I agree there is resentment, but then, this seems like an easy rhetorical move, to be a garbage political party, and then when people rightly resent you, to cry fascism. It can't fail. — The Great Whatever

Right. I should note that I'm not defending Democrats here. I didn't vote for Clinton or Trump. Trump is a proto-fascist on his own account, not in relation to the Democratic party. So what I say of Trump here is not to also say, at the same time, that Democrats are automatically better. That being said I do think Clinton would have been better than Trump, just to be honest about that. But I don't think Clinton and Trump define one another is all that I mean (though to judge by the arguments which often pass muster as worth repeating I can understand wanting to frame Trump in those terms)

And I agree that it can be -- and has been -- an easy rhetorical move. A shame, really, because here we are seeing actual worthwhile parallels to consider and it gets drowned out in this history of using "fascist" as a kind of catch-all brush.

But, at least among the policies proposed, and in the environment we are in, the similarities are striking.


"Make America Great Again" was the perfect proto-fascist slogan in that it harks back to a mythological past which people feel has been lost. And, in particular, it was a racially coded message for white people -- because America is not great due to its PC culture, it's flamboyant acceptance of everything, it's relativism when America was strong, verile, frank, and knew right from wrong when the founders founded. In some sense America has been betrayed by the crypto-socialists (like Obama) and atheist/pagans. (On the former I'm assuming you've heard that bandied about among R-wing radio. On the latter, while there is a current of Christian fear of darkness corrupting us, I'm in particular thinking of the framing of the Podesta emails during this past election cycle)

This is very similar to the shame which fascists tapped into in the Weimar Republic. It was a common sentiment to believe that Germany itself had been humiliated and betrayed in World War 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stab-in-the-back_myth Further, the fascists harkened back to mythological aryan past -- our myth is just the founding fathers, which do achieve mythological proportions among the r-wing. They aren't historical figures understood in their own time as much as they are saints whose intentions we should live by.


The fascists of the past had many scapegoats. Trump's campaign was fueled by this, too -- we know you are suffering, we know that America has degenerated, but we are going to make it great again, and we are going to get rid of those who are stealing our jobs. The desire to build a wall to keep Mexicans out, and become harsher on deportation is very much along the same lines as the fascists desire to contain, deport, and otherwise make Germany clean again from degenerates. And Mexicans are not the only target of Trump's base -- the bathroom requirement story still gets fuel among r-wing blogo-social-sphere. "Black Lives Matter" is a controversial statement which can't just be accepted, but must be countered by, at first, "All Lives Matter", followed by "Blue Lives Matter". And even anti-semitism has become more pronounced since Trump's election, so perhaps there's more of the classical fascist base than I had initially thought. (I tend to think of Trump as a proto-fascist, but an American one -- there are ways in which he differs from fascists past because he's not Italian, for instance, but he really has a resemblance, in bombastic style and masculine projection, to Mussolini)

Which is to say that just as fascists prior had scapegoats for the ills of society, so too does Trump -- and they aren't the sort of usual political figures. It's not like he's just saying this or that politician or political program is bunk (though he is saying that too) -- it's that he also targets groups of people.


There's also the social conditions which are similar to the Weimar Republic, too -- just prior to the fascists winning power there was a fairly progressive administration in charge, and people were suffering economically and there was seemingly no end in sight. What the fascists did was tap into this economic despair, just as Trump did (and he did it better than Hillary), and really did offer some genuine basic benefits to the right kinds of people. They offered pensions, minimum wage, workplace safety, etc. They appealed to the laboring class. Trump also appeals to the laboring class, in his own particular way. I don't buy the White Working Class myth peddled by the liberal rags, mostly because the data doesn't support it. If anything the reason Trump won is because the Democratic candidate wasn't inspiring enough to her base to turn it out enough. But I also know many working class families who voted for Trump on the basis that he was not a political insider, and Hillary Clinton was. So he was seen more "underdog", and therefore appeals to the identity of working class families by that token. Further, Trump did at least appeal to jobs -- he didn't offer a plan, but he had a scapegoat and said that we are going to get people to work. So he has this sort of bread-and-butter appeal to working class and middle-class persons, which combined with right wing populism is exactly what brought the fascists to power in the past. Whereas the Democrats who have been in power for the past 8 years haven't delivered the goods (not as measured by econometric data, but in terms of feeling secure and having a job that gets you stuff), so why believe a Democratic insider when she says she's going to help the middle class? Especially when she quibbled a popular and concrete policy for working class people, the minimum wage?

This is just to say there are strong similarities to the sentiments of the two electorates and in their appeal and path to power.



So we have a mythological past which has been lost, a desire to make the state pure again, scapegoats who have made the state impure, humilitation due to this impurity, and similar social conditions to the Weimar republic in that working and middle class people feel economically insecure. And this sort of story is being launched through right-wing populism which does not have a high regard for argument or even consistency. Further there has been an outright increase in racial tensions concurrent with the Trump campaign.

There is a kind of reverance for violence among his base at least. And then there's the bizarro phenomena where the Christian right is deeply wed to the Republican party, introducing elements of spirituality into their statecraft. But, eh, that strikes me as distinctly American. There's a kind of analogy there, but the other stuff I'd say is stronger.


It's a bit too early to say whether or not the Trump administration is going to crack down on political freedoms, but it would actually be in line with many administrations past, and then taken up a notch by Bush, and further exacerbated by Obama. So given the other parallels, well -- all I mean to say is that it's not just a rhetorical move. There's a fair comparison to be made. They are not identical, but it's not just hot air.

Is fascism being used here as a term of political philosophy, or is it being used as a pejorative? If the former, what political positions are implied by the term, and if the latter, what is the pejorative – that the candidate is authoritarian, or that you don't like him? — The Great Whatever

The former.

Fascism is a political system which seeks to build a great nation. It is born out of humiliation, a desire for purity, a perceived ostracism from society, and a desire to return to a great past. It speaks to popular discontent and mobilizes said discontent against those who are impure (and also purportedly the cause of what many are discontent about). It's also an irrational political philosophy -- where other political philosophies we are familiar with tend to emphasize rationality, fascism is something which is more a spiritual political philosophy where man finds his purpose in the state, and is run more on emotions than on rational argument. Hence it often contradicts itself.

Umberto Eco's list is great. And I always go back to Mussolini's ghost-written essay The Doctrine of Fascism, as well as Robert Paxton's The Five Stages of Fascism

Policies which result from said philosophy include war, the stripping of Democratic institutions, the fusion of capital and labor within the state, and enacting laws which encourage racial purity.

I had hopes that these feelings and emotions which were evoked for the election of Trump were more cynical than anything, but the cabinet picks of his administration don't indicate that. I don't know how far these sentiments will go once the Trump administration actually begins interfacing with the state (and with a sizeable opposition, with democratic institutions still in power), but the sentiments which brought Trump to power are quite similar to what brought, say, Mussolini to power or Hitler to power so the comparison isn't just a rhetorical move in a game of painting the enemy in the worst light.

The analogies between Trump and fascism are not merely rhetorical. There are a large number of parallels between fascist parties past and Trump's path to power. And his cabinet picks seem to indicate that his campaign was not just rhetorical.

It depends on how things go from here -- there is still opposition, there are still institutions of democracy in place, and so forth -- but proto- or neo- fascist is a fair description of everything Trump's put out thus far.

Ah ok. my bad.

THEN -- I have grown to really enjoy the Republic. But I admit that the Phenomenology of Mind was a very close second. The only reason I pick the Republic over the latter is the appeal which Plato holds to other people -- which I value in a text regardless of how I may personally feel about it.

I initially disliked the Republic, but have grown to appreciate it with re-readings over time. I don't agree with it, of course, but I can find a basis of sympathy with it.

Martha Nussbaum is also one of my fave female philosophers, personally. Her work on late antiquity hit home for me.

I have to admit that I find the question a bit too presumptuous to answer. "classical" already selects among many works, and it would seem to me that classical would already include "important" -- and how does one select between important texts?

I mean, I am appreciative of the conversation starters that you are posting -- but the question is just so big.

They ask who is the village idiot, who is the easiest to pick on? Descartes! Great! Let's do it! They reply to him only in jest, only as a means of having an easy target against which to frame their own philosophy. — Agustino

I s'pose that seems a misreading to me. Descartes was certainly not a village idiot, and rejection of Descartes is characteristic of much of modern philosophy -- hence why I said he is so important to it.

Did major philosophers of the modern period respond to Descartes because he was easy to respond to due to his village idiot status? That's just a wrong opinion. No, of course they didn't. Even if he has so many bad ideas, as you note, philosophers don't respond to bad ideas because they are bad ideas to make a joke.

It is noteworthy that Kant -- who I think is one of the best responses to Descartes, for whatever that's worth -- is also frequently disagreed with by much of the philosophical cannon.

I picked Arendt. Certainly my favorite, though Judith Butler was a close second.

I tend to think philosophers who challenge my beliefs the most are my favorites, and she did a superb job on that front.

I think the best way to surreptitiously introduce philosophy to those who may believe they are not philosophical (for whatever reason) ((and when they clearly are, given the sort of questions and discussions they like having -- they may just not like the associations of philosophy, or think they're bad at it, or think it's for "they" and not "us")) is to not discuss this or that philosopher, but to discuss the ideas people might be interested in.

I posted this book in the last forum, but it's worth the repost: https://www.amazon.com/Socrates-Cafe-Fresh-Taste-Philosophy/dp/039332298X

I joined a group found on this model (in a small town, even -- so you don't need a city), and even led it for a couple of years after joining. It's worth a read for anyone whose interested in philosophy "in the streets", so to speak.

Of the bunch I voted Descartes because he's arguably the beginning of modern philosophy, and I would say the reason for that is because of his contribution to philosophy. In many ways we are still dealing with the problems he set out. Everyone disagrees with Descartes, of course (well, most everyone) -- but it is this very requirement of disagreement which makes him the most important.

Not many take the time to disagree with Boethius, for instance. He's well known and respected in the cannon, but the modern period doesn't take the time to disagree with him in the same way as they do Descartes because he's not as important to the modern period of philosophy.

While I agree that the causes for mental health problems are more often than not found in the environment, I would still say these two are distinct one from the other. Sometimes after fixing the environment the damage is still or already done. The environment was the cause, but the cause had an a/effect on something real to that person, and while fixing one's environment is a good step towards alleviating a condition (just as quitting a job which requires lifting is a good step towards alleviating back pain), mental sickness is still a reality that needs to be contended with after removing the cause of damage.

Also, sometimes it is easier to learn how to cope than it is to fix wider social conditions which are surely the cause -- but given one's general feeling of impotence (depression is apt here) coping is easier to learn than changing the environment.

I have to say that though I spoke in favor of likes in the aforementioned post, I've actually grown used to not having them and like things as they are now.

What gives art (literature, poetry, religious texts, visual art, music, etc.) its power over the human soul? Clearly, art never helped man to survive, except in a very abstract kind of way. It's more likely that we live in order to create art, rather than create art in order to live. So why do we create art, and why do we enjoy art? — Agustino

I'd note that I think all of your questions, including the title question, are asking different things. What gives art power over the human soul isn't the same thing as the purpose of art isn't the same as why we create art or why we enjoy art.

I'd also probably separate religious texts from art, saying that religion -- while it can be and is interpreted by artistic ways of understanding -- is a separate domain from art. We can make religious art, but religious texts are just religious -- they may have artistic qualities to them (like the Psalms, for instance), but in reading the Psalms from an artistic perspective we are not reading them from a religious perspective, and vice-versa. We can do both at once, of course, but they're different too.

I'd say art has no purpose. It does not derive its value from some higher goal. It is intrinsically valuable.

As to why it is intrinsically valuable -- why it has power over the human soul -- I would say I'm not sure. What could possibly serve as an explanation for, say, science or religion? Why does science have power over the human soul, why does religion have power over the human soul? While we can propose answers, it would seem to me that any answer would presume to know too much about both the human soul and its subject. It may be an informed and reflected upon opinion derived from much work, so it's worth listening to answers that people have arrived at, but I wouldn't say I have an answer and I wouldn't say any answer is knowledge.

As for why we create or enjoy art -- that seems to be pretty individual, from my point of view. But perhaps I don't understand the question. In answering "why" I'm thinking about what motives people have, and if that be the case then that is highly individual -- some people gain pleasure from creating/enjoying art, some people want something extrinsic to the art, some people feel a duty to create/enjoy art, etc. It would just depend on the person.

No, there is nothing objectively wrong with having depression; but, one feels much more burdened socially having depression than say having a broken wrist or leg — Question

That's true. People don't view it in the same way. And I agree with you -- especially in the workplace. I'm more open about my depression with friends or in social spaces than I am at work or with people I don't know very well for that very reason. Socially speaking there's a kind of taboo surrounding mental health, and I agree -- again -- with you when you say that depression, and admitting that you have depression (even to yourself) runs counter to classical forms of masculinity.

I suppose that's why I say that depression is identical to having chronic pain -- in an effort to make it viewed in that manner. Depression isn't just being down or feeling pain. It's very particular, and one can feel both happiness or sadness concurrently with depression. (at least with the kind that I have. I am drawn to understand that not everyone's is like mine, though I am far from alone in my experiences too)

It seems to me you're saying what is wrong, in some moral sense, with being depressed. As if having depression is a failure of oneself, and the reason people seak treatment is not out of need but is because they perceive themselves as being wrong and perceive others as perceiving them as wrong.

If that be the case then, certainly, there's nothing morally wrong with depression. The reason one seeks treatment is the same as the reason one seeks treatment for chronic pain -- to feel better. Not because they are wrong for having depression.

Do I have you right?

I don't think there's a distinction to be had between the two. Hardware itself is programmed, and you can do the tasks of hardware within software (in fact, you need "software" to make "hardware" sync up). The distinction is more to be useful in certain contexts than some fundamental difference in a computing machine.

But either way a computer is a bunch of logical switches running on binary.

Why does anyone still continue to study this nonsense? — lambda

Because lamda was unable to prove any of lamda's claims about philosophy.

One problem though is that he used the phrase "logical deduction." It's kind of difficult to make a case that he wasn't referring to logic in the sense of deductive inference when he uses the phrase "logical deduction." — Terrapin Station

Good point. I was just giving it a go, I suppose.

I think we can easily go overboard with the principle of charity.

:D

I think I agree with un when he says it doesn't apply with exam questions. At least, not as much.

I'll note I'm quite the fan of the principle, though. Perhaps even to my own detriment.

As an aside, I never liked the formal/informal distinction with respect to logic. I don't think that the idea of an informal logic, in the sense of a logic that doesn't have to do with form (or relationships of propositions etc.), makes any sense. Symbolic/non-symbolic, or logical language/natural language or variable/non-variable, or something like that would be a better distinction in my opinion.

Have you had the chance to read Finocchiaro? I think he does justice to informal logic. Maybe just a preference of ways of expressing the same thing, but it seems to me that his approach warrants the "informal" approach (in that he studies logic, but it is not the study of logicians but is rather the study of people using reasoning in historical contexts -- in particular he focuses on Gramsci and Galileo a lot)

Anyway, not as an aside, the upshot of this is that there's not really an informal, significantly different sort of logic (in any broad sense) to refer to.

Perhaps a bit off the point from the initial question, but it looks like we've tripped across another topic to discuss in another thread. :) Not sure i even disagree here, but it does seem to go pretty far astray from the OP.

I don't know. I was just trying to give the best interp of question that I could. I'm not even sure if I'm right, it was just the only thing that made sense to me.

Post what you think of it. I'd like to hear first hand accounts.

It all looks pretty cool.

Best interpretation I can think of is that the human condition is the entity, and it is being described as logical -- but not logical in the sense of formal logic or deductive inference, but rather logical in the wider sense that it is something which can be understood by way of reasoning.

A bit of a joke in that I don't see my brain. I arrive at believing in a brain by inference, which relies upon . .

Again, I'm not saying that this process is necessarily explicit, but it's the process that's going on with respect to concept application. We formuate concepts because that's necessary for us to be able to deal with the plethora of information we encounter--we have to formulate conceptual abstractions so that we can quickly assess our perceptual data and take actions that allow us to survive--our brains evolved that way because it's the only way we can survive, and when we perceive something, our brains quickly register it as fitting or not fitting particular conceptual abstractions we've formulated via what are essentially necessary and sufficient criteria. That's how you know what you count (not some general "what counts," as there is no such thing) as a chair. And it's the only way it makes sense that we can observe something and go "chair." — Terrapin Station

Your brain does all this?

Where?

:D

There's a lot of entities you're introducing in this paragraph. A very large story on how we "essentially" comes to necessary and sufficient criteria (are concepts or are concepts not necessary and sufficient criteria? I'm saying they are not, but are just rough notions -- but here you're introducing "essentially". What does that mean?)

I don't think it's the only story that makes sense of the fact that we can observe something and go "chair". First, I would say we do not observe something and then go chair. We don't have perceptual data. We have chairs. "perceptual data" is an abstraction built on abstractions arrived at after much contemplation, which itself relies upon language.

If our brain and evolution does things for us, then just as the brain and evolution make us sit in the chair, then also the brain and evolution make us refer with signs ("chair" to chair) which already mean something.

It is not the brain and evolution which creates meaning, but the brain and evolution which uses meaning -- just as it uses chairs.

But you have absolutely no theory of that besides "you just know."

No theory, of course. Only an argument about the necessity of having to "just know" in order to be able to formulate necessary and sufficient conditions.

Your story about concepts and sense data and brains and evolution driving perception of chairs all relies upon this -- our -- ability to "just know" the meanings of words without necessary and sufficient conditions. (EDIT: It's worth noting here, too, that we are really focusing a lot on nouns, but that language meaning is much more diverse than necessary and sufficient conditions for categories. I'm not saying you deny this, but it's worth noting because right now we are focusing very much on this one example, when meaning isn't just this one example)

People have discussions about categories, no doubt, and whether something does or does not fit a category.

But when someone sees a chair as a chair, they did not do so by necessary or sufficient conditions. The conditions are post-hoc explanations of word usage. Explanations which can even modify how we use a word in the future or elucidate something about the object, no doubt. But when someone asks for a chair, and the shopkeeper brings them a chair, the shopkeeper did not buy chairs on the basis of some sort of rational conditions. He just knew what counts as a chair, as the buyer knew what they were asking for.

If the shopkeeper brought the above image to the buyer, then a discussion about the proper use of chair, or the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood, might take place. Prior to that, though? We have to be able to pick out chairs in order for us to even begin laying out the necessary and sufficient conditions of chair-hood -- hence, have some kind of notion of chairs prior to assigning conditions.

I suppose because it's not the "explicit" part that gives me pause, but whether it happens at all -- I don't think people implicitly hold necessary and sufficient conditions for being able to pick out entities for words.

My question is, do you see this fundamental difference? In one case, truth is dependent on a agreement between individual human beings, we agree that the object is called "the apple", therefore it is true that this object is the apple. In the other case, there are things which we are calling apples, and truth is dependent on an agreement between the properties of these things, and our definition of "apple". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that makes a good deal more sense to me now. In one case we're offering a standard by which to judge whether something fits a category, and in the other we are referring to some entity.

When I read this:

The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. — Terrapin Station

That is what I hear.

Alright, cool. Then I did (and probably do) not understand your objection.

This makes no sense, though. If usage is what makes meanings true, and a definition gives the meaning, then a definition isn't true independent of meaning. That's a simple contradiction. — Terrapin Station

Usage is not what makes meanings true. Usage is how one determines what a meaning is. Meanings themselves, I suspect, are not true or false. It would be like saying a chair is true or false to say that meanings are true or false.

A definition describes the meaning. Is that the same as gives? I don't think so.

In my view, meanings are meantal associations that we make, where they're inherently mental and can't be made into or translated into something else. The words we express via speaking, writing, etc. (so, for example, definitions) are correlated with meanings, but they're not the same as meanings. — Terrapin Station

Gotcha.

Then we're not so different, I think, except insofar that I don't believe that meanings are mental. They are, however, associated with words/phrases/sentences. (do we associate the meanings? We can, but we also don't always do so

The importance of being able to say what makes it true is when someone--that's me--comes along and challenges the claim that definitions can be true (or false). If you're going to claim that they are indeed capable of having truth values, then you'd better be able to support that claim beyond "I just know that it's the case" which is essentially all that you're saying here — Terrapin Station

I certainly didn't have a proof written up. I'm just being honest about that. I'm working through ideas with you. It helps to have someone who disagrees to do exactly that. Sorry if it frustrates. After all:

To me, it just looks like a combinatino of not wanting to analyze this very much (because you like the view you hold) and perhaps being too lazy to analyze it very much — Terrapin Station

It would be an odd way of being lazy, considering the length of the discussion so far. :D

Re "What makes it true that something is a chair?" my answer to that is simple (well, rephrasing it because it's not true (or false) that something is a chair--it needs to be rephrased to something like "What makes me say that that is a chair?" The simple answer to that is that it fits the concept that person holds of a chair. It meets their necessary and sufficient criteria to call the object in question a chair. This has the upshot that it's a chair to them, and it might not be a chair to someone else. And that's indeed the case with ALL name-bestowal. Not everyone calls the same things by the same identification names. Not everyone has the same concepts. — Terrapin Station

The problem I have with that is we just don't operate on necessary and sufficient criteria. People don't gaze about looking at objects and evaluating them on this basis. Philosophers wonder about answers to these questions, but this does not reflect how people identify chairs.

To rephrase your question in terms of meaning, then -- "What makes me say that that is a meaning of a word?"

Again, I would say an answer to the question "What makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart?" is to ask the exact same question. It's not ideas, from my view, as per what I stated above. Notions maybe, in the sense that people have rough ideas, but not necessary and sufficient conditions. At least, from the way I believe we actually use words and think about these things.

There's an ambiguity in the word "makes", too -- I mean, I could say that what makes me say that that is a chair of Walmart is someone asked me whether or not Walmart has chairs, and reply in a jocular fashion, "That is a chair of Walmart". So someone else's question made me say exactly that.

What makes me say that words are correlated with meanings -- signifiers with signifieds -- is that there are signs in the world, and they mean things regardless of what beliefs I might hold about those signs. "tomato" refers to a tomato even if I use "tomato" to insult someone. What makes me say that this is a meaning is that meanings of words are as public as chairs of walmart. To go back to an older example:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad — Moliere

If you were to reply, "Now what does that mean?", and meanings are private, then I would reply:

Heber brewed a of gone huber of a draken fitch-witch wherever why to run gone mad — Moliere

And "Now what does that mean?" would have about as much meaning as the above example does.

So when you state:

So I'd ask you "What makes you say that's a reetswahtter?" and hope that your answer would give me some clues as to what the heck a reetswahtter is in your usage. — Terrapin Station

I only understand you because I know the meanings of your words. Were they private, then the whole thing has about as much meaning as reetswahtter does in English.

Anyway, this is all going way far afield from what I was asking you. We're going off on a bunch of tangents, which I hate doing, and that's why I hate that people type such friggin long posts, especially in response to a simple, direct question. I want to focus on one simple thing at a time. — Terrapin Station

And I was just getting to how this all leads to World Peace. Darn.

But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. — Moliere

Just really quickly -- putting your contradictory quotes into context above

"insofar" means "if" in the above, not "Since".

Saying that a definition is true if it describes the meaning of the term is just putting what you're claiming in different words, and it's not answering the question I'm asking. I'm asking what makes it true that something is a meaning of a word. Usage can't be the answer if you're agreeing that definitions do not necessarily report usage. — Terrapin Station

Usage is the method. If you want to know the meaning, then you look to usage -- or reports, sure. That is what one would look at. But whether a report is true is still different from whether or not a definition is true, since a report is describing events and a descriptive definition is describing word (sentences, phrases, etc.) meaning.

A meaning is different from a description. For you this is a restatement because you're saying definitions are meanings. But I would say that the meaning of some term isn't the same as its description.

"What makes it true that something is. . . "

"What makes it true that something is a chair?"

This question is clearer to me than the previous one. But I don't have an answer for you, which is bound to disappoint. But I also don't have an answer for the latter -- at least not one that I believe is true. You're asking after, from what I'm able to parse, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can pick out, out of all the entities, which entities are meanings.

I'd put it to you that to ask the question "What makes it true that something is a chair?" is to at least have a notion of "chair" and chairs. It is possible for us to know that this is a chair without knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions by which we can definitively state what, of all entities, which entities are chairs.

Likewise, we can know whether something is or is not true without also knowing what it is that makes this true. (I know true statements, but I may not know what truth is)

But I do know what a chair is, in spite of not knowing "what makes it true that something is a chair" (or, perhaps more clearly stated, I'm able to pick chairs out of the entities I am familiar with). I could even offer a definition of "chair", though that's different from what you're asking.



I'm not offering a theory of meaning, as you have. So that may be a source of some miscommunication on our parts. But I also don't need one for my assertion that descriptive definitions are true, insofar that you likewise believe that words have meanings which differ from definitions as my argument didn't rely upon a theory of meaning but rather just on whether or not language is meaningful, or that meaning exists. This, I believe, is mostly the crux of our disagreement. You believe there is no distinction to be had because you believe that meanings are definitions, in particular, stipulated definitions. My strategy has been to demonstrate, by way of example, words which have meaning in spite of stipulation to show that there are meanings aside from stipulation. I understand that the perils of such a strategy is that any counter-example can be re-interpreted under a new theory, hence why I noted I know you can sustain belief in a stipulative theory of definition and meaning. My recourse from there was to note that beliefs in meaning account for more about how language is, whereas your account doesn't account for the factual and historical element of language -- that it, taken to extremes, would lead to a bunch of people barking but never communicating. Meaning really must be shared, at least, in order for us to communicate (insofar that we believe there is such a thing as 1st person experience, at least -- as I do, and I suspect, given your comments about meaning, that you do to).

There are very good reasons to believe that language has meaning. Aside from communication, which is only one part of what language does, we can read a letter, a play, a poem, a book, an article and they all are rich in meaning. This is something of a brute fact, from my perspective -- just as objects are. There is not an existential or ontological difference between objects and words. It's possible that neither exist, but I don't think you can deny one without also denying the other. (perception, after all, doesn't individuate on its own -- objects are named, and names are a part of language) So in some sense I'd say to deny language meaning is very similar to denying objects -- I understand that it can be done, but I don't have a good reason to do so.

My understanding of our disagreement isn't as much about the existence of meaning, however, as much as whether or not meaning is purely a stipulative, and thereby private/mental/subjective, affair.

So onto that:

I found Wittgenstein's treatment in P.I. fairly convincing in arguing that language is public. That we are able to communicate on a regular basis with one another, just as we are able to sit in the same chairs and share food, indicates we share meaning, and that notion of private language are only expressable because of this shared meaning -- since, if language were strictly private, then it would not express. It wouldn't mean anything, at least not to me. And you would say that I can look to your behavior when saying some private word and infer from behavior what you have in your head. But I would say that said inference is impossible without a language. Inference is built on our ability to use language. "if", "then", "possibly", are all words taught to us -- not discovered or invented by us.

Private languages don't account for this, which brings me to:

The phenomenological consideration that I was born into a world where the meanings of language pre-existed me. Language was always-already there. So it's simply true that I didn't define the words which I use. English is older than me, and has a history. I have a Background, of which language is a part.

So, I have good reason to reject that meanings are private, at least. I suspect they are not mental, but perhaps there is some way of parsing a public mental sphere which could make sense of the matter. However, I likewise suspect that any such parsing will make objects just as mental as words -- idealism of a stripe, even if it be a more reserved transcendental idealism.

No, I am not.

A descriptive definition is true if it accurately describes the meaning of a term.

We know the meaning of a term by its usage -- more specifically, as I stated earlier, the extension of usage.

The first states under what conditions a descriptive definition is true, and the latter states how one might go about evaluating whether a descriptive definition is true.


EDIT: At least if by "report of usage" you mean statements like --

"Robert said, "Please pass the salt""

Or --

"It has been observed that "salt", by and large, is often used to refer to salt"


The latter is closer to what I am on about, but I am claiming that meaning exists too, and that a definition is true as long as it accurately describes the meaning of a term. (or perhaps even "a" meaning -- a definition does not need to be exhaustive in order for it to be true).

The only answer I can think of is to state a basic version of both theories of truth, thereby making it clear how they differ. Or to say that we can account for differences by pointing out or describing differences -- by contrasting different ideas. But that all just seems kind of flippant on my part, and so doesn't seem to answer the question.

What are you asking for?