This doesn't follow. Your prior position was that the pregnant woman alone had the right to choose abortion at any time because it was her body. If that is your position, it makes no more sense to allow a man or another woman to decide what that woman gets to do with her own body. Women don't have a special sisterhood where one gets decide what to do with another's body. If a 15 year old girl is pregnant, you believe Sarah Palin should be given greater rights to decide what she ought to do over Bernie Sanders? — Hanover

Only in an ideal sense. I recognize the difficulties in real life of implementing something like that. But, in general, I believe that those who are effected/affected by policy should be the ones who have say -- and abortion policy is one of those that clearly effects/affects women more than men.

In particular, non-ideal terms, my answer is that the woman alone should decide.

Suppose some women believe that men ought to weigh in on the issue, does the authority they have as women encompass the power to delegate that power to men? — Hanover

Not in my ideal of all ideals. I'd separate out the particular decision about abortion from the general decision about policy which regulates abortion.

Either you want to make every case subjective where the pregnant woman herself gets to weigh her life circumstances and emotions and decide or you create some objective criteria that you apply across the board. If you're going to look for some objective criteria that allows limitations on abortions, women are no better objective evaluators than men regarding what criteria ought to be used. It's not as if every woman has been pregnant or can be pregnant, and it's not as if no man has any understanding of what human life is.

In practical terms I think that every case is subjective.

In ideal terms, I think that objective policy should be set by women.

And, of course, arguing that only women can meaningfully debate the abortion issue somewhat defeats any argument you've presented here regarding abortion, your being male and all.

I don't believe that only women can meaningfully debate the abortion issue. I'm stating that in an ideal sense I think that policy should be set by women.

Right, that's what I'm getting at. While simultaneously recognizing that there are pragmatic difficulties in encoding that into law.

I agree that it is a heap problem. Perhaps we have some common ground, there.

What I would question on your part is the obviousness of your own beliefs. I can respect the Catholic position because it is consistent. It's a bit a-historical, if we take Aquinas as a measure, but hey, institutions change with political realities, even religious ones. Their position is still consistent, and I understand it, though I disagree with it.

I've also lain out my position, on the other side. I insist that it is consistent, philosophically arrived at, and not absurd. It is rational. That doesn't mean it is singular. But it is rational.

I don't think you, or others, can get away with hand-waving on this particular point while also rejecting people who have put an answer forth. You may reject us, but I think then it is on you to provide a justification.

And we are all dealing with the same heap problem. But, rather than debating whether this or that is in fact a heap of sand, our answer has consequences.

How do you answer? That I know. But why do you answer it? What is your justification?

Take your time. No need to rush anything.

And, yes, I don't have something that we should do together now. I just know what I believe, and why I believe it.

In the ideal of all ideals, I'd prefer the question of abortion's legality to be settled by women only. But, I'm not sure how you'd implement that.

That's how it should be unless and until a better basis for judgement than viability is found. — Sapientia

Birth works as far as I'm concerned. ;)

But, I'm not alone in the world, nor the dictator.

It seems, then, that you are pinning "sufficiently advanced" on "viability"?

(b) The abortion is performed on a viable fetus, and both of the
following are established:
(1) In the good faith medical judgment of the physician, the fetus
was viable.
(2) In the good faith medical judgment of the physician,
continuation of the pregnancy posed no risk to life or health of the
pregnant woman.

So, even if the fetus is viable, if it poses a threat to the mother you're good -- and even if the continuation of the pregnancy does not pose a threat to the mother's life, if the fetus is not viable (as defined above in the definitions --

"Viability" means the point in a pregnancy when, in the good
faith medical judgment of a physician, on the particular facts of the
case before that physician, there is a reasonable likelihood of the
fetus' sustained survival outside the uterus without the application
of extraordinary medical measures.

),


then the abortion is not illegal.


"Good faith", from my familiarity, just means "on your word" -- so if someone sets up an operation to sting a particular doctor, say, and records the doctor stating "I know that this fetus could live, but we're going to do it anyways!" you'd have a strong case against that particular doctor. But otherwise? You have a hard time proving it, at least. I am only familiar with this term from contract negotiations, though, where management basically just has to show up to the meetings to be counted in good faith.. Maybe it's different, here.

Cool. Sounds good.

So, what's your take on California's law then?

EDIT: To remain clear, so it doesn't seem like a bait or anything -- I read it, and yes it does say viability at the end. In good faith, no less. But there's something very different in this particular law -- one, "life of the mother" isn't an issue. And, two, "viability" is done on good faith.

It's not whether common people are dumb or not, but whether or not they have the information. I mean, seriously -- who could expect someone to know the 50 various differences in the law? I wouldn't know that. I'd have to look it up. (And I am about as common as they come -- when I speak of common people, I include myself. It's not me and them, but us. And, yes, at times we are dumb and uninformed)

EDIT: Take California's statue, for instance -- this pretty clearly states that it's a decision between the doctor and the patient. Would you agree?

Being "embodied" - having a unique cellular structure - doesn't define us? No one else has your cellular structure -- (which incorporates your history of experiences), so what else would define you? — Bitter Crank

The incorporation of a particular history, of experiences, a physical and social environment are all important aspects of who we are -- but also being physically separate, so I would say.

What, if not a body, is a fetus? By 24 weeks it looks pretty much like a baby body. — Bitter Crank

A fetus is a fetus. It has the potential to be a body, as you note below, but I wouldn't call it a body in the sense of a body someone owns.

A clump of cells, the same as the first trimester, seems more accurate to me.

So, how far can we extend this ambiguity indefinitely? "Hey kid, you're 24 years old, you've got a degree: get a job or it's off to the abortion clinic with you." — Bitter Crank

I think that's the dilemma anyone faces -- this was the point I was trying to bring up in @Hanover's rebuttal of 3rd trimester abortions. The rebuttal works against any arbitrarily chosen line, because the time before and after doesn't have much difference.

I choose birth because you at least have a separate body at that point. Makes sense that you should be treated as a separate being once you have a separate body.

If a newborn--premature or not--is on the table, or if the person was just fished out of the river, or has a gunshot wound, "viability" just means they have a biological future. If the drowning victim has been in the water too long, life for them is no longer viable. One can try resuscitation all day, but once life has departed, is not viable, it's not coming back. If the lost blood can be replaced quickly, the gun shot victim's life may be quite viable. A premature baby (lets say 28 weeks) is probably viable with very good care. If such care isn't available, then viability does not exist. — Bitter Crank

Yes, I agree.

Ok, fair. My bad, then. And, no, it's not common knowledge.

I never disputed that the line is drawn at various stages of development, nor that the justifications differ. That does not entail that there is no consensus. So, in the context of our disagreement, your point is irrelevant. There is evidently consensus in the most relevant sense in the context of our disagreement, which is about the legal status of abortion at approximately 37 weeks. Your own statistics show that it's illegal in 41 out of 50 states (that's 82%) beyond 28 weeks, let alone 37 weeks! Yet you deny that that in any way reflects a consensus? — Sapientia

Yes, I do.

Suppose you have some topic, and within that topic there are 8 opinions with an even distribution. You might then say that 1 such opinion is certainly outnumbered by all the other opinions. And therefore has a consensus against it.

But the devil is in the details, so I would say.

You were the one that provided the numbers in an attempt to show that there is no consensus. That failed, so now you've changed tack, and are saying that it's the content and "feeling" behind the numbers that is more important. Well, I don't agree in the context of our initial and primary disagreement, which is over whether or not abortion should be legal right up until birth. The policy representing at least 82% of the U.S. is that abortion is illegal subsequent to 28 weeks. You can't simply sweep that under the rug - especially given that you were the one to have presented these statistics in an attempt to support your own position. — Sapientia

The position that there is no consensus, yes. And I'd still stick to that, as per the above argument.

One thing I have not claimed is that "science has spelled out when humans are human", yet you've nonetheless suggested that that is what I've assumed. How about you stick to what I've actually claimed? I did speak of advanced life, and I did so intentionally with the hope of avoiding this superficial issue of "personhood" or "humanness". I'd rather just avoid such terms if it's going to be problematic. It's a living thing, yes? A foetus of the species homo sapien, aged approximately 37 weeks, and relatively advanced? One thing that science can tell us is whether or not a typical 37 week old foetus is viable, and to what degree. — Sapientia

Sorry, this is what Baden was alluding to -- that the science backed him up, and that my position was therefore on par with creationism.

A fetus is living, without a doubt. Metabolism and all. And it is a fetus of the species homo sapien. But what is "relatively advanced"? That's where I'd say disagreement lies.

From a pragmatic standpoint, that doesn't really matter. What matters is how we can best solve the current situation, and we only have access to what we currently know. We can't look into a crystal ball. What would be the point of discussing such a hypothetical future scenario? We're talking about what the law should be, and I don't think that philosophical speculation of the sort that you seem to want to engage in will help matters. — Sapientia

From a pragmatic standpoint it certainly does, because "viability" has already changed drastically within the past century.

The point of the future scenario is to demonstrate how the principle of viability can fall into error. The reason why, so I would say, is that we should try and save humans even if they are not viable. This is the right thing to do.

Take some of the more extreme cases of cancer, for instance, if you want an example that's in the here and now.

It is a practical standard, I think. We might have to settle for that in the absence of a better alternative. But if you think you have a better suggestion, I'm all ears. Your proposal would only make things worse, and considerably so. — Sapientia

Considering how many third-term abortions there are, I rather doubt that. It's not a very common occurance. It's not something entered into lightly, either, at least if the Guttmacher Institute is to be believed.

And if you genuinely feel that way, then why on earth are you advocating that abortion should be legal up until birth? That's a performative contradiction if I ever saw one.

Because I don't believe that third term fetus' should be treated the same as the rest of us who have grown and developed, have a separate body, a history, relationships, and experiences which have formed who we are (so that we even are a who). So to stop an abortion there is, as far as I'm concerned, the same as stopping an abortion in the first trimester -- neither of which should be entered into lightly (it is a moral deliberation), but neither of which should be prevented by the power of law.

So, I checked out that link that you provided. I see that Hanover has gone above and beyond refuting your argument on it's own terms, although, as I go on to show, that isn't necessary to refute your statistics-based argument that there's a lack of consensus (presumably regarding the appropriate legal status of aborting an 8 1/2 month old foetus, as that's what's relevant here, because that's where we disagree). Your linked statistics actually indicate that there is a consensus in the U.S. that it should be against the law to abort a foetus after 28 weeks. This is evidenced by the fact that, in accordance with the link that you provided, it is against the law in every state in the U.S. except 9. That's 41 states with an estimated population of 281 million vs. 9 states and D.C. with an estimated population of 28 million. — Sapientia

I disagree that 8.5 months is the only important point to garner there. My point is to show that the line is drawn at various stages of development. You'll find behind each line-drawing some kind of justification -- heart beating, brain development, "feeling pain", or birth.

Stuff like that.

And, no, there is no consensus. People feel quite differently about the issue, in fact. And how you justify that feeling is what's more important, I'd say. You can't just go about assuming that science has spelled out when humans are human and that happens to coincide with the moment when you feel comfortable while simultaneously claiming to have engaged the topic and have an examined viewpoint.

Where do you draw the line, and what makes that line significant? This is what I'm asking. I've provided my point in time, and my justification. Where is yours?

I did intent to look up the science in order to better explain why an 8 1/2 month old foetus is sufficiently advanced to rightly judge it to be (or that it ought to be) illegal to perform such a late-term abortion under the relevant conditions (cf. The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, Offences against the Person Act 1861, et al. Over here, it's a statutory offence named child destruction). However, although it would be interesting, I doubt whether it's necessary. The viability point alone seems like good enough grounds for justification.

I have addressed viability in this thread. Viability changes with both technology and location. In fact, imagine a time in the future where we could just collect sperm and eggs from people and grow humans in a test-tube. Would that, because these are viable, require us to grant the rights of citizenship and the protection of the state to sperm, eggs, zygotes?

Further, I think viability is a cruel standard. There are times when, even if it is not viable, it is good to try and save someone. It's not like as soon as we dip below the 49% chance of survival that we should give up, or even feel like it is permissible to give up on the life of a fellow human. That would be a moral failure. We should strive to preserve human life, even if the chances are against us. As such, even if a fetus were not viable -- say, a 20% chance of surviving -- yet, were human, we should strive to keep said person alive in spite of the low chances of survival simply because they are human. In all cases. This is what we do with humans in the hospital, unless they have a DNR. If the fetus is a human at some point, then shouldn't we do the same in this case?

I clicked on your link which supposedly provided a basis for your argument that abortions in some states were legally permissible for 8 1/2 month fetuses. I didn't go through checking out every state listed, but I just choose Colorado. http://statelaws.findlaw.com/colorado-law/colorado-abortion-laws.html . It was as expected, which is that abortion is illegal in such instances except to save the life of the mother. That is, it's a bit of a misstatement to say that some states openly allow abortions well into the 3rd trimester without pointing out this detail. — Hanover

*shrugs* I suppose? My point is in showing that 3rd trimester abortions are legal. Up to 8 1/2 weeks. That didn't seem to be understood in this conversation.

Personally, no, I don't care about the qualification -- but others do. And, even with the qualification, that's very different from the absolute that I presumed was being proposed.

In fact, if you look at all the laws in all the states, they all adhere to the trimester framework, offering different levels of protection to the fetus depending upon its level of development. They adhere to that framework because it's the system set out by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. You'll note that in the link I cited above, Planned Parenthood only performs abortion up to the 19th week.

A few stats for you: 91% of all abortions are performed in the first trimester (first 12 weeks), 9% in the second trimester, and .01% in the third trimester. http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/06/17/fast-facts-us-abortion-statistics.html . The point being that no one really believes or practices 8 1/2 month abortions, other than probably in some really extreme circumstances, like a true life and death decision has to be made to save one or the other.

I'm aware of the distribution. You'll note that I'm remaining on the side of the law, and stating that 3rd trimester abortions should be legal. There are cases, extreme ones as you mention, where it's more than justified. That doesn't mean it is not a weighty decision, as I've already said,

And if that is your position, I don't see how you consistently hold that a mother doesn't have the right to kill her child after its birth, as there really isn't anything significantly different between a fetus whose head is crowning at the edge of the cervix and that same baby just a few feet further away, fully outside the birth canal. To call one a citizen entitled to protection and the other the woman's chattel based upon it's physical whereabouts seems arbitrary, considering both are identical down to the cellular level. In fact, the newborn infant is still attached by umbilical cord to its mother for a few moments. — Hanover

I don't think they are identical -- first, I would say that our cellular structure doesn't define who we are. We have both skin grafts, for instance, which are human cells but not human beings. Second, having a separate body is a huge, non-arbitrary difference. In one case you don't even have a body, but in the other you do. Surely you can see how having a body is an important factor in whether or not you count as a citizen?

The brain isn't even fully formed at the time of birth. It is still in development. The cerebral cortex cells don't even differentiate until ~20-22 weeks, and it takes time for them to set into place. And without proper care which occurs outside of the womb, just as there was proper care inside the womb, their will be no growth into a human being.

Lastly, I would say that we already agree that there is no point where the before and after has very large differences. A citizen is a conglomerate of attributes -- there's no magic formula which designates this from that. So I'd hold that your arbitrarity clause holds similarly for times prior to birth -- that if you hold 24 weeks to be acceptable, you should also hold 25 weeks to be acceptable, etc. insofar that the point is an arbitrary point and there is no significant difference between two very close points in time.

Birth is the moment when the body is separated, though. That is more significant than any point you'll find within the uterus, even if the second before and after the umbilical separation is not very different.

"Think of the children!"

And there was much gnashing of teeth...


The similarity between yours and the Catholic position is more in the above than the exact placement of the line. As far as I'm concerned your placement of the line is the same as defending zygotes -- but Catholics will say that zygotes are persons, and so they will say most of what you say in regards to those who disagree with them.

Couldn't it be the case that we just happen to disagree on the proper placement of the line, rather than a lack of compassion, or a belief that the innocent are not of consequence?

EDIT: I'll also note here that I've already put forward criteria to the question I've asked yourself, @Hanover, and @Sapientia -- only to find no answer from you or Sapientia, and an acknowledgment from Hanover that decisions must be made, and we make our decisions in different places. (Or, at least, no protest there)

So I'd say you're off the mark in lumping me in with creationists or pedophiles. I have provided reasons. I'm still waiting for yours.

:D

I'm more than happy to agree to disagree or wait until a more formal debate, but I am not below trading barbs for barbs either -- keep in mind that if I am correct then your position is no different from the Catholic position, and that my compassion would be well placed whereas yours would be the result of an unexamined squeemishness that then resulted in controlling women for no good reason.

The compassion-sword can cut both ways. ["They are clearly mad for disagreeing with me! A psychopath, clearly"] -- but what I imagine is more appropriate to acknowledge is mere disagreement, rather than something wrong with either your or my character or psychology

Ah, I see. Well, regardless of whether or not you set out to persuade me, or whether philosophy itself is good for persuasion, the fact is, you made a controversial claim on a philosophy forum, and naturally this sort of thing attracts attention. — Sapientia

Certainly. There is a difference, though, between defending a position and persuading others to it. No?

But if philosophy isn't good for persuasion, then how did it come to pass that you were persuaded by philosophical literature on this subject?

Because I was reflecting on my own beliefs and questioning them. This is what I think philosophy is good for.

And not only were you persuaded, you were persuaded to adopt a position which is arguably absurd, and is evidently viewed as such by many, so it must have been quite a feat.

You'd have to supploy the evidence to make hte claim that many view what I believe as absurd -- and, I think, you'll find that there is not such widespread agreement as you seem to believe on what counts as a whom.

What really matters is the 8 1/2 month old itself, and it's attributes, and what that entails, given our knowledge and values. — Sapientia

Could you unpack that, then? I don't know what you mean, if this is different from anything I've said so far.

I'm not swayed by survivability as a criteria for law. It strikes me as being very similar to potential-personhood arguments, which I similalrly don't think work. Survivability is also variable with both technology and circumstance, so much so that it makes more sense to put said choices in the hands of those who are in the circumstances rather than from afar with the power of law. And, third, survivability doesn't necessarily negate personhood -- sometimes, even if chances are stacked against a person, it would not be good to simply give up. If the fetus is a person, with all the rights and respect which that entails, then we should treat said fetus in the same manner as we do other people -- which often includes trying to help survive what is, statistically at least, unsurvivable.

It would still be a moral failure were the fetus a person, if we just gave up on a person because, eh, chances aren't all that great anyways -- might as well let the person die because chances aren't in our favor.

Eh? What did I say to provoke this red herring about persuasion and implications that I haven't made? I think that it's absurd because it is absurd. — Sapientia

This is what I was reacting to --

I doubt that any amount of philosophical blather about person-hood would convince me that it's acceptable to alter the law to make it legal to abort 8 1/2 month old foetuses. — Sapientia

(I was reacting, in particular, to "would convince")

For the record this is already legal in some states in the U.S. -- http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/18/us/politics/abortion-restrictions.html?_r=0

I don't think you're doing a very good a job of it. — Sapientia

I'll note that in my Sapientia-grade-book ;).

I would say that a position with rational justification is not absurd. I think that was presupposed in my reply. So in providing rational justification for my belief I would be defending it from the charge that it is absurd. What is it you mean by "It is absurd"?

I don't think that the terminology matters anywhere near as much as what's actually at stake here. This is literally a matter of life and death; and at 8 1/2 months old, that life is sufficiently advanced to rule out abortion as a legal option. — Sapientia

I disagree with your conclusion, though I agree with you in what's at stake. That's another reason why I don't mind talking in terms of personhood -- because if those who advocate against abortion are correct then there's currently legally justified murder of innocent people. That would be horrific, and worthwhile to stand against.

What makes a 8 1/2 month old fetus "sufficiently advanced"? What is sufficiently advanced life?

I think that the consensus arises from this basis;

I don't think there is a consensus. If you'll take a peak at the link I posted earlier you'll see a chart of 50 states who place the line along different times.

As for my take, I don't think states should be making such decisions. I agree with those who say that abortion is a weighty moral decision, but I don't think it should be prevented prior to birth by the power of the law. I think that it is something which a woman should be able to choose in accordance with their own moral compass and life circumstances (it is a moral choice only if it is a choice, after all).

I did not set out to persuade you. I was called into question, and am defending my position from the claim that it is absurd. I don't think philosophy is good for persuasion -- it's a self-reflective exercise more than a tool for persuading others. If your mind is made up then I expect you to continue believing as you do. But just because you, and others here, believe as you do that does not then imply that those who believe otherwise are either absurd or simply speaking opinions because they are the correct opinions to expect in certain political circles.

As for whether or not my position is popular -- I rather doubt it. Personhood, as i mentioned to Baden, is the concept put forward by those who want to restrict abortion. Usually those who want to allow abortion focus on autonomy more than personhood.

What counts as a "fully developed nervous system" (and, for that matter, "feel pain", and cognitive abilities -- what, precisely, are you referring to)? What, in your estimation, is the scientific justification of humanity? We can say "human", or "person" -- I'm just utilizing the language of those who generally advocate against abortion. It's an attempt to meet people on their terms.

Abortion is one of my favorite philosophical topics because it trips across so many basic questions that people take for granted, and it has easily recognizable implications. Anytime people disagree on abortion they tend to believe the other party is contemptible. I am quite familiar with this sort of ire -- but I can assure you that my position is not the result of, as you seem to imply, a desire to express correct left-thinking, but has been reasoned to by way of the philosophical literature. In fact I had been much less pro-choice prior to reading philosophy on the topic and I began to question my own presuppositions and find them to be baseless. I am quite pro-choice not because of my left political orientation, but because of the work of philosophers.

I don't know what the essentialist argument that you are referring to is, but when you say there's no specific moment when a fetus turns into a person I can say I agree with you. So it seems to me that we just draw the line at different times.

I would say, absent religious notions, that we'd have to look at clear examples of persons to draw conclusions about what it takes to be a person. Where there is no question of personhood is in the case of able-bodied adults. That doesn't mean that personhood can't encompass other sorts, but these are the cases where there is no dispute.

I think being separate, having a history, having both a social and physical environment which you develop and interact within are all important parts of being a person. A fetus has none of these things. What's more I could even see the argument that newborns are not persons in the metaphysical/moral sense, but we have a workable convention which prevents any mistakes -- birth. Sometime after birth, so I would say, is when you acquire enough attributes of the norm to be counted. But prior to birth? No, I really don't think so.

Why? I think you're assuming a bit much to perform your reductio. One pretty important aspect of personhood is being a separate entity developing within an environment. One way of parsing that would be birth. I've already noted that birth is simply by convention -- and as you say, decisions must be made, etc. etc. What's the difference, then, between birth, and before birth that is so important when you say decisions must be made on the safer side of things?

I think that you and I simply differ on where said decision should be made, then. Birth works well enough for me because it's far before the gray zone you're referring to. I'd say personhood, in the metaphysical/moral sense, occurs well after birth.

Oh, certainly not. I don't want Trump to win at all. I wasn't speaking in terms of my desire, but attempting a description of American's behavior. I'm for Bernie Sanders, personally.

If you believe in ensoulment, perhaps. But I am not one of them. Morally speaking the question hinges on personhood, I would say, and how you approach that topic. Legally speaking, however, people like very precise times for when you should and shouldn't, and birth works by convention.

As for your 8 1/2 month old fetus -- I would put to you that the 8 1/2 month old fetus is not a person, and therefore, is not to be treated in the same manner as the mother who is already clearly a person. That doesn't mean that abortion should be taken on lightly in those circumstances -- morally speaking I am more conservative. But legally speaking I am not. I don't think the question is amenable to the necessary precision we expect of law nor should it be answered by the force of the state.

Perhaps after he wins and we get to see him in action. Otherwise. . . I think people will say "If only he had won".

I'm thinking primarily of Bush II here. It was only after 2 terms that Republicans began to change their opinion of the man. Though, to their credit, Democrats appear to revise their opinions to fit the newest president, while the Republican base decided to stick to their principles and denounce his presidency.

This is a bit easier for me -- less argument, more sharing. :) I tend to have a divided mind on how I'd answer just because some of my beliefs aren't widely accepted and therefore are difficult to implement on a society-wide scale until a time when more folk (if such a time does arrive) see things as I do. In that spirit consider this a set of non-ideal answers, in the world we live in today to the extent that possible to do (because if we were to take that principle to its extreme then I believe I'd just say everything is fine exactly as it is -- you need some kind of ideal to have a belief about the way things should be)

Generalized label: Labor leftist.

Form of government: Democracy.

Form of economy: Socialist.

Those three were harder to answer in non-ideal terms. I think I tend to label myself in ideal terms and think of forms in ideal terms, while the particular questions are more apt to "here and now" type of thinking.

Abortion: Legal up until birth.

Gay marriage: Legal. Pluralistic marriage should be legal too.

Death penalty: I waffle between illegal in all cases and illegal in most cases. In the end I side with illegal in all cases, though, because I doubt the competency of the state to execute people.

Euthanasia: I had to look it up again, but I remember a story about Euthanasia in the Netherlands that I read and seemed to do it right. They seem to have a good handle on such policy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthanasia_in_the_Netherlands

Campaign finance: Parties should be publicly funded, and private donations should be limited. To become a party I'd have some kind of petition procedure in place where X amount of signatures is required.

Surveillance: The police state is whack. I'm flippant towards even calling this an issue because it gives it too much credence. DHS should be dismantled. Hell, the FBI and the CIA already had too much power to regulate citizens -- but these days it seems that everyone just accepts surveillance like it's part of reality itself when it really wasn't that long ago when there was not the widespread surveillance apparatus we live with today.

Health care: Be like Canada.

Immigration: Legal and streamlined. It took a friend of mine 25 years to go through the process of legal immigration from Mexico. That's obscene. Ideally I don't even believe in borders. They should be erased as much as possible. (hey you free market types -- if all markets are to be free, then labor markets need to be able to compete with corporate ones)

Education: I very much dislike how education is handled in the U.S. -- the funding mechanism makes school budgets look like spaghetti, they are organized in a top-heavy manner, administrative staffers have more say than professionals, the public, and even elected officials, and we have a completely backwards philosophy on what education should be for. I believe reform is possible, but it might only be possible in an abstract way. It would take a second educational movement similar to what made education free in the first place.

That being said, I still favor having publicly funded education. No society can be free if everyone does not have the opportunity to grow into their personal best.

Environmental policy: Green party.

Gun policy: Citizens should be able to own weapons.

Drug policy: Recreational drugs should be legalized. Medicinal drugs should be produced on a greater scale to drive down prices.

Foreign policy: I tend towards non-intervention and non-violence. I don't believe in just wars. I believe there are times when organized violence may be necessary, but that it is a perversion of justice to call them anything other than necessary evils.

I share your interest in meta-philosophy. But I find it hard to respond to this because it seems like you are brainstorming and chewing more than looking for a response. You have a lot of questions in there, and it was interesting to read, but I'm just letting you know my difficulty in saying something.

I'm not quite sure about that part either, now that you mention it.

For one, I don't know if it's possible for philosophy to replace religion even in principle. Would people cease being religious if they lived more philosophically? A brief gander at those who study and write and do philosophy seems to indicate that the answer is "no". Perhaps one could say that particular strands of religion wouldn't exist, but not religion tout court.

Also, I'm not sure that people don't listen to philosophy today anymore than they had at another point. Philosophers make themselves heard whether people like it or not. They don't garner popular audiences, more often than not.

But, these are just reasons to be uncertain. I'd actually like to know more about the reasons why they assert as much.

That seems too general to me. And it wouldn't make sense of the difference between philosophical periods, either. The Canon, even, was certainly always part of civilization. But this difference, so I would say, is the result of a particular way in which civilization is organized, rather than civilization as such.

Plus the specialization of capitalism differs from, say, having the cooper, the tanner, the blacksmith, etc. Of course we are all interdependent upon one another in any economy, and specialization (in this weaker sense) generally means prosperity for said society. But the specialization of capitalism is meant to either make work such that it can be done by anyone (the pin sharpener, for instance, in a sewing supply factory), or we compete to individuate ourselves so that we have value. In addition, we look at occupations as something which must be productive of some good or service -- there has to be an end product. So I would say that there's more at work than specialization, even in the stronger sense. The fact that we must produce would also encourage people to deal with smaller problems. They are easier to tackle, and thereby, make a product with (publish or perish, as the saying goes) -- plus you lower your competition if you have fewer people who know your niche.

For those interested -- a good follow-up paper:

http://www.hist-analytic.com/Gricestrawson.pdf

EDIT: My mistake. I was just excited to have found this article and so wanted to share it, but this is really not a good follow-up to "On What There Is", but is obviously better suited to "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"

Yes, in some sense that's true, but I would also say that the phenomena of modern philosophy differs from what Plato was doing.

Insofar that I understand Plato it seems to me that he created an institution which was meant to make men good. Where Socrates was the gadfly who exposed the powerful to their own idiocy, Plato was the patriarch who tried to raise the next generation of the powerful to be wise. So there is still this element of pursuing wisdom and the good life.

Further, there were competitors at the time which didn't agree with this form of institutionalization, and philosophy managed to be practiced in spite of the decline of the schools and transformation of the academy into something wedded to the church (and beyond).

Well, based off of the Quine paper at least, it seems to me that talk of conceptual schemes involves a sort of epistemic primacy of the subject, where blotches of color are more certain than, say, a letter or envelope. This results in physicalism being more mythical than phenomenalism, and platonism being more mythical than physicalism as I read him saying, because the phenomenalist is supposedly committed to less than the others.

The latter point is what I mean, yes. I don't know if I'd say it can be translated, but it can be described in purely physicalist terms -- and vice-versa, as well. And the combination of a conceptual scheme with idealism seems different, to me, than idealism, just as the combination of a conceptual scheme with physicalism seems different than strict physicalism.

Could you explain how I'm reifying it?

My thinking is that it's a word. I'm defining it. This is AP heresy because of Frege's proof that it's unanalyzable. That proof starts with the assumption that truth is a property of statements or propositions.

"True" does appear in language as a property of statements. But I think it's easy enough to translate these usages to "truth" as an object of knowledge. The truth is what we want to know.

Most often, it's that we want to know what is, as opposed to what could be. In short: actuality.

Mathematical truth is something I handle with tongs. I'm not a mathematician, and I've concluded that Banno is right. Math is a game. Truth in math works pretty much the way truth works in a game. — Mongrel

The reason I thought you were reifying truth is because actuality is thing-like . . . or at least contains things in it. So my thinking was that if truth is actuality, then the lamp on my desk and the desk and my phone, and so forth, are all parts of truth, because they are also parts of actuality. Though stating it like this makes me think that the whole is different from the parts, so perhaps not. But even so, then it would seem that truth is part of reality, where I would say that reality or actuality are metaphysical questions, and truth is a concept. There's no truth "out there", so to speak, or behind the veil of appearances.

But I think when you say "truth is what we want to know" that this isn't necessarily the case, either. Like I said, it was just the first thought that popped into my head.

The first thing that pops to mind, at least, is that in saying "Truth is actuality" you're just reifying truth -- treating the concept of truth as if it were a thing. Now, maybe it is an object, as you say -- but you'd have to qualify that somehow, I think. Clearly truth is not like my desk, or my cup, or a myriad other objects. If truth is an object then it would seem that it is closer to numbers, as long as they are objects too.

Then there would be the question -- is it true that truth is actuality? How would you deal with that?

I don't know if these are problems. Just thoughts of mine.

I didn't claim you didn't have a consistency problem. I opened by saying "You can consistently hold an institutional theory"

What it would mean is that the ToR was not science until it was recognized by the institution, though. Similarly so with institutional theories of art -- the question being, if Vincent van Gogh had just left a painting away which had yet to be discovered, was the painting not art until the artworld, the institutions of art, actually recognized them and hung them in museums?

Before being recognized by scientific institutions the theory of relativity would not be science. Afterwords, it would be. At least, in accord with the institutional theory as I understand it. You may have a different notion in mind.

I would say that institutions differ from social actions. Institutions are the ossified remains of social organization and social activity. They are the boundaries within which we organize social activity. They are not social activity themselves. Institutions serve to preserve values, maintain norms, and hold authority and status. Aside from power they are also held up by how those regard them.

A social activity, on the other hand, can disapear from institutions, can occur without an institution, and is absolutely necessary for any institution to be constructed.

But in any case, the claim that "what scientists do" is science doesn't survive scrutiny, and hardly means anything. It would mean that oracles and astrologers are scientists - if they call themselves that. — Landru Guide Us

It's not "who calls themselves a scientist" which bears the mark of science. It's what scientists do. I don't disagree that it hardly means anything -- the meaning comes from actually bothering to investigate what scientists do. So we'd have to then turn to the history, and perhaps even a phenomenology, of science.

Your theory of institutionalization has some peculiar drawbacks. It can be self-consistent, but this would mean that the theory of relativity only became science after it was taken up by Bohr and promoted by him, for instance. It would also mean that a sizeable portion of what currently counts in the history of science would not actually be science. This is incredibly off the wall, and is an odd way to look at what is a human practice. One which is shared cross-culturally and throughout time. It would be like saying philosophy didn't exist until it became professionalized and set into an industrial setting.

I'll repeat what my criteria of science is again: science is what scientists do. I say this because your characterization of my position -- "guys in garages" -- is quite off the mark. Just because the current institutions of science haven't always existed that doesn't mean scientists didn't publish, didn't archive, and didn't utilize standards.

The key in my post is "in the same way" -- I agree with you that a strict physicalism couldn't be wed to a strict idealism. But I don't think adding a conceptual scheme to any ontology leaves said ontology unchanged, either.

What I meant was that the notion of a conceptual scheme seems to be compatible with idealism, anti-realism and realism; that is it seems to be compatible across the range of different ontologies. On the other hand, I don't see how physicalism could be wedded to, for example, an idealist ontology, wherein mind is considered to be prime substance, as this would be a contradiction.

I haven't read the Davidson paper you refer to, but I have heard a little about it in relation to translatability — John

I think physicalism could be wedded to idealism in the same way that conceptual scheme could be wedded to the other's, at least. Kant's project is somewhat like this -- where materiality is a category applied to space and time.

Similarly, conceptual scheme + (any of these) would yield an ontology that privileges phenomenalism as the least mythic of stances.