I agree that religion is tied with fascism, though I wouldn't say that fascism is the offspring of right wing Catholic political thought. The partially ghost-written essay The Doctrine of Fascism says as much, from a philosophical perspective.

many of the practical expressions of Fascism such as party organization, system of education, and discipline can only be understood when considered in relation to its general attitude toward life. A spiritual attitude (3). — The Doctrine of Fascism

But I don't think I could say that religion is more than nationalism. It's more like they lay on an equal plane to one another, in fascist thinking. The state is the religion and the leader is the physical manifestation of the state. Though perhaps there's a difference between the state being the religion and nationalism -- since one must have an identity outside of the state in order to identify as a nationalist, where the committed fascist seems to lose their sense of self in the state.

While this isn't a debate of fascism in favor or against, I've long appreciated Robert Paxton's take on fascism: http://academico.direito-rio.fgv.br/ccmw/images/0/00/Paxton.pdf

But if there are other ways to organize the pooling of resources and cooperative effort then "the state" is not some foregone conclusion. It's not like there's a historical hierarchy where first we had the tribe, then the city, then the empire, then the church, then the kingdom, and then the state. Culture doesn't function in this manner. Culture works more along the lines of history than along the lines of a natural science. The old positivists -- the ones from the 1800's, I mean, who were sociologists -- had such notions, but they just don't work. All you end up doing is looking at cultures along a developmental axis which, surprise, puts your own culture at the top of the hierarchy. But this is arbitrary -- because, surely, using the same principles, another culture can do the same, and it is our culture which is then still trying to develop towards their culture. But what we see are many cultures co-existing, many forms of organization, and neither leading to the other.

I agree with this. I don't mean my interests in the sense that Moliere wants cake and so the state shall supply Moliere with cake. I mean collective interests -- my people's interests, of which I am a part and therefore will benefit personally, but not Moliere's desire for cake.

You disagree - but you agree? — unenlightened

:D

That's probably the best way of putting it. Though the following makes a difference to my mind so maybe I don't disagree after all. I may just be being pedantic. I do see the state as being other from the people that compose it, at least -- I'm not sure if it's fundamentally other, but it seems quite different from people to me. But that wouldn't make any difference here:

I say that to the extent that people care about each others' interests, they will have a good state, and to the extent that they care only about their own, they will have a bad state. To measure the goodness of the state according to one's own interests is inherently despotic. — unenlightened

because you're stating what makes a state good, not what makes a state a state.

I would say that the state is inherently despotic. There's not quite such a thing as a good state -- there are better states and worse states, but no good states simpliciter. And if you do not measure the betterness of the state with respect to your interests then you won't get much out of it. I think this has to do with the nature of states, though, and not necessarily the nature of people.

((EDIT: Just to be clear -- I am very much in line with the thinking of Rousseau. Though I do not share his views on human nature -- I don't think people are inherently good in nature, or that goodness springs from sympathy -- I also believe that our societies structure who we are, and that the state is a part of society which structures us to be despotic. ))

So, after all this, do we agree on anything, here?

Is ISIS good, bad, or negligible?
— Bitter Crank

ISIS is bad. But I'll make the same point here as I made with Iraq back in the day when these things were discussed -- so is North Korea. Yet we don't go to war with them just because we believe they are bad. That is a marvelously bad way of making decisions.

If ISIS is bad, what may, might, can, should, be done?

I don't rightly know. But I do know, based off of 9/11, that reactive military action hasn't exactly been very effective in defeating what's bad.

I meant that these conflicts relate back to British imperialism, which drew the state boundaries in the first place.

All the same I'd like to know --

what am I missing? I can certainly see how my own experience with the invasion of Iraq could be clouding my understanding. What are you proposing, precisely, that differs from the U.S.'s reaction to 9/11?

Yeahrp. A lot of this conflict, though it would be oversimplifying to say that there's a direct causal connection, can be traced back to colonialism and the imposition of the state in these regions.

I agree with that. But I don't see how bombing leads to that. It seems to me that this is more of the same -- and that the people who suffer most due to this are the innocent in both parts of the world who would be better off without yet another war.

You don't think what you've called for is the same as the 9/11 response? It strikes me as similar.

FWIW, this popped up in my twitter feed today and I thought it appropriate: http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2343-isis-attacks-targeting-innocent-people-by-hamid-dabashi -- isn't there some truth to what he says there? (it links back to this story: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/11/je-suis-muslim-151114163033918.html which I'm still in the middle of reading)

Should we really be the world police in the first place? Isn't that what we're actually pushing in saying we should defeat ISIL/QSIS/ISIS? Or what am I missing, then? I can certainly see how my own experience with the invasion of Iraq could be clouding my understanding. What are you proposing, precisely, that differs from the U.S.'s reaction to 9/11?

Oh, I remember. Afghanistan, arguably, also had nothing to do with 9/11 considering how the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are organized. But how would an assault on QSIS differ from those invasions in their outcomes? Weren't these invasions, as far as the people of the U.S. and their allies are concerned, really motivated by revenge more than anything?

I think of the state as an entity which is more than the sum of its parts. There are other ways to organize large-scale society than through a state. The modern state is a relatively new phenomena, some odd 400 years or so. http://faculty.ucc.edu/egh-damerow/gov207hist_mod_state.htm

I don't mean to advocate for "the way things were", but only to point out that the state is a peculiar entity, a way of organizing that one does not need, but can abolish (without, thereby, abolishing the people that make up the state -- at least in theory) (just wanted to tag you @unenlightened bc. I think my response differs because I think of states differently)

And, so I would say, the abolition of the state is not a bad priority to hold. While I think there are better and worse states (because in politics you can't reason very well without a notion of better and worse), I don't believe that the state is the best possible manner of organizing people. I would prefer to abolish borders. I would prefer to abolish capitalism, which the state props up.

Which is pretty much how I'd answer your question -- the state is a menace to me and mine, because the US is concerned primarily with those who own the means of production. We can make things better(for us, of course), but the fundamental laws of the land -- private property and representative politics -- are opposed to working class interests.

I suppose I would say that it's not possible to have a friendly state, and that any attitudes of friendliness are out of place in assessing ones state. It's a collection of interests -- and it's goodness or badness is relative to what extent it represents your interests. It's not a universal-morality-machine, by any means, where we all look out for one another. That's just not the nature of state-centric politics. And as soon as it is then we really do become nationalists, which is just creepy in my opinion.

ISIS is winning in this area because it has a supreme confidence and idealism that is currently lacking amongst the liberal defenders of cultural diversity, freedom of speech, democracy, equality for women and gay people. That lack of confidence, if not outright scepticism and equivocation, is very apparent in this thread. — jamalrob

Hrmm, I wouldn't say that this is the case. I have no problem standing by my commitments. But the whole affair is so reminiscent of 9/11 -- it's not like Saddam Hussein was a leader for a free world, or anything. But, all the same, the amount of murder that has arisen out of toppling his regime far outweighs the number of deaths on 9/11.

What I see is a really similar response as 9/11 -- feeling hurt and needing to lash out against an enemy and "show them" what happens when you mess with us. But, by this time, supposing we use that old standard of justice "an eye for an eye", I wouldn't be surprised if the number of innocents killed in Paris are roughly equal. However, a full on war would far outweigh that equality of killing. And, given the success of both Afghanistan and Iraq, it may not actually end or even result in the ending of QSIS. One article from the Atlantic is not enough to determine if that is a sound policy, I think.

I have read all the links posted here, and I have tried to be fair in reading them. Once again I feel that calls to either go on the offensive or no are not quite warranted. The most I could commit to would be to militarily support people who are already on the ground fighting that battle against QSIS. There are too many agendas in play to be able to safely say much more, even in light of these various articles. Even htough I wouldn't move there I am clearly sympathetic towards the plight of the Kurds [from our perspective, the PKK and the YPG are fine], and would think that utilizing them -- by giving them military support -- might be the best bet. But that may not actually collapse QSIS, who may find themselves contended with some land -- in the end.

Especially from where I sit... I just don't feel comfortable committing much in the way of military endorsements. There's too much noise, and I am not personally familiar with the situation, enough so that I don't think it right to commit. If I've learned anything in my involvement with politics it's that being personally involved really sheds light on the situation, and since I am not -- and I don't have access to people I know I can trust with respect to the situation -- I remain skeptical, overall.

I voted 1, but I agree with 3 as well. I suppose I wanted to say "Option 3, if no, then option 1" -- in general I like "likes" in formats like this because it keeps good housekeeping. It's a way of expressing approval w.o. cluttering the discussion with a bunch of "qtf"-style posts.

I suppose I look at it as a fledgling democracy where all the things you listed are true, to some degree, about it. I don't know if I'd say that each of those destroys democratic practice. Stupidity or "being hoodwinked", for instance, aren't part of the vocabulary of democratic practice. It may be true, but that's not something which makes a social system democratic is what I mean by that. Stupid people, hoodwinked people all have equal say in democratic social systems. I'm not so sure that party structures, even, subvert democratic practice. You have to be able to organize interests, especially in representative forms of democracy.

Corruption, wealth assymetry, and low turnout, so I would say, reflect the degradation of democratic values. The system, due to these influences, becomes less democratic. That's because each of these subverts the process where the majority beliefs of people are not represented, and the rights of people as both citizens and individuals are violated. So I supposed I'd lay the blame there for why the U.S. isn't democratic.

But, at the same time -- and even including the countries you have listed -- it seems to me that these are all fledgling democracies. It's not like any social system is born perfected. Considering where I lay the blame -- representative politics and property rights -- it's clear that these democracies would have to be reformulated at a pretty basic level. Since, in the US at least, those aren't looked at as bugs, but features of the political system. Still, I wouldn't discard democracy just because some greedy adventurers from way back when got it wrong.

Well, those were all the events I was thinking of. And I think you make fair points. Though I tend to think of the revolutionary war as a war of conquest, in addition to the French and Indian war. He may not have been a founder at the time, but it's not an unfair characterization to say that it was a war of conquest. The purchase of the Louisiana territory, while I grant that the massacre came later, was still itself conquest.

But, fair points. There's still a difference to be had in my characterization and Action Jackson. And I am certainly way off topic at this point too ;).

Not to be too trite, because I find the topic interesting unto itself -- but it seems that we are in agreement, then. Yes? I wouldn't disagree with what you have said here.

Yay. And though hollowed be their holy names, the founders were responsible for a fair amount of conquest.

Though I suppose you might say they are cleaner, because at least then we actually acquired land for the murder we perpetrated. There was something of a reasonable cause. These are more ideological, and therefore unwinnable, than all that.

That, I think, is the interesting question. As the laws are now it's no surprise that irresponsible persons obtained firearms.

I think licensing requirements to be a firearm distributor is where policy makers interested in tackling the issue -- rather than pandering to their base -- should target.

My argument is more or less that the function of victory is not a single variable function where the input of said function is the technological ability to to kill.

I have two lovely books, if that be our preference, titled "150 questions for a Guerrilla", where a General Alberto Bayo -- who helped train Che, though I'm ignorant on the specifics of that -- lays out some basics of Guerrilla warfare for a rank-and-filer, and "FM 31-21" -- an old field manual written by the Army on how to conduct and support (and therefore reverse engineered to combat) guerrilla warfare. Not that this guarantees any sort of victory. But it shows that I'm at least not alone in the opinion that military victory is not solely a function of technological capacity to kill.

Is this what we are disagreeing over? Or are we just disagreeing over the particular example I used?

Hrmm, I dunno. I really couldn't say what it would take to secure such-and-such amount of land or a country at this point. I plead ignorance on that. But I would say that because war is largely political, especially when you are dealing with a guerrilla force, that I'm still convinced that a less advanced force can defeat a more advanced force. It just depends on whether or not you have the populace on your side [and by "on your side" I don't intend any particular method, whether it be fear or inspiration, only that the people of a land are where the fight is at]

I think war is more political than that.

We had committed considerable resources and held quite a bit of land, in the military sense. Vietnam was another example of a failed occupation/police action. Or do you think that if we had "stayed the course" that we'd be winning now? Were we winning prior to the scale back of troops?

I wouldn't say so. I would say that the Taliban won that fight, and continues to win. The reasons why are numerous and complicated, but it's a fair example of an organized force defeating a more advanced organized force all the same.

Not that that's a tragedy, by my lights. I don't think the US should be in the business of policing the world to spread goodness, etc. etc. It's better to look at it as a loss and cut our losses than to think there's some kind of achievable goal in "fighting terrorism" and continue to dump resources into that goal.

From the basic assumptions of existence (such as cogito, which even that is disputed), to grand metaphysical and ethical theories, to the existence of god, string theory, or whether or not the sun will rise in the east tomorrow; all of these cannot be proven without any doubt.

It is conceivable that we could actually find out something about the way the universe operates that makes the Earth suddenly turn on its axis, making the Sun rise in the west. Whether or not it will actually happen is unknown, but it is conceivable.

Similarly, it is conceivable for a utilitarian to read an argument tomorrow that will disprove utilitarianism.

Because of this, should we hold any positions at all? Sure, we can defend these positions, but it certainly takes a bit of the passion out of the debate if it is irrational to actually believe it is true. — darthbarracuda

I would draw these distinctions: knowledge and rationality, truth and rationality, certainty and rationality. I center on rationality because of your ending sentence and the title of the thread.

Rationality deals with a process for belief-acquisition. If you acquire a belief rationality, then you are the sort of person who follows a good process in acquiring said belief. Whatever that process happens to be is up for debate, but this is how I would tackle rationality in the abstract.

Knowledge is produced in communities of knowledge-producers. Communities of knowledge-producers create their own standards of rationality and enforce said standards. So, knowledge is a little less abstract than rationality as such -- in my accounting set out here -- because it is here that we can begin to reference particular actors and communities to begin sifting through what counts as knowledge. But you'll note that I do define knowledge as a cultural product, and not a particular belief some individual agent might hold onto [[which runs up against JTB]]

Truth is a value of some beliefs. One might taylor their rationality such that true beliefs are an objective for said rationality, but truth isn't that easy to acquire where you can just say "I want to believe true things", so rationality must include much more than this simple criteria.

Hence, we have certitude. I tend to think there's not much to any criteria for epistemic certitude -- I can make sense of attitudinal or psychological certitude pretty easily, but I'm less clear on the epistemic -- but, in the abstract, it's easy enough to think of certainty as a scale from some theoretical absolute point to another theoretical absolute point, neither of which are actually possible to obtain epistemically [though we may be familiar with them at the psychological level] (also, why I tend to be shy of epistemic certainty -- it's just so abstract that it doesn't actually seem to work as much of a practical guide, and I prefer to think of rationality/knowledge etc. in terms of praxis due to my emphasis on process). Certainty is just a measure of how much we ought to hold onto a belief in the face of contradictory evidence. So you are very certain that demons don't just appear, and upon seeing one, in spite of this strong evidence, you come up with other theories to explain said experience on the basis that you are very certain that demons do not exist -- at least until you see more than just this one demon when you happened to be under the influence. But suppose you are a forgetful person, and you think your keys are in your pocket. Upon looking you find that your pockets are empty. Knowing that you are a forgetful person you don't cling to the belief that your keys are in your pockets because you weren't terribly certain about that to begin with.


Given all that -- it is, indeed, rational to believe. And the fact that we may be wrong is just part of the rational acquisition of beliefs. EDIT: Though I might prefer to say that it is not irrational to believe -- since I would say that to believe is not necessarily rational. We are still irrational creatures, as humans, so it's not like believing necessitates rationality.

Haha. "Kant" is 13 clicks away. :D Squirrels appear to have something truly profound to say.

"computer" is a mere 9 clicks away.

I'd say that's too simplistic. The reasons why are complicated. Regardless, though, these and other similar occupations should be sufficient to show that an organized military need not be as advanced as their enemies in order to stand a fighting chance -- that the "tanks and planes" of the U.S. military do not necessitate victory against any other organized force.

Now, do I think Americans would win? At present, I do not. I don't think they have a reason to fight their own military. They're very pro-military and pro-USA. You wouldn't have popular resistance in most cases, today. But that's still different from the argument @Benkei is stating.

I don't think that this argument holds up too well against the facts. Though the U.S. might have a very advanced military, it is losing the battle in the middle east to armies largely composed of old assault rifles, and so forth. They don't want to admit that, of course, but it's not hard to see that these wars are being lost in purely military terms.

I tried to aim for a middle-of-the-road. I generally am not interested in gun control, but I certainly don't think that gun-culture, or the particular phrase, are worth defending.

EDIT: There's also a general problem with the phrasing "Gun Control" -- as if it were something you can increase or decrease -- which is a necessary result of politicizing any issue, but is problematic in finding any sort of real solution to the problem. This is especially so because laws around guns aren't like taxes or something. There's nothing to increase or decrease, in that sense. Rather, the need for good gun control laws needs to be tailored to the situation.

As it is, the frame is largely around an increase or decrease of gun control, followed by an attack on the culture of guns. But that's not really looking at the laws and finding sensible policies which would result in a better society. In the USA, at least, while one may desire a weapons ban or some such, generally speaking you'll probably just alienate yourself and bolster the NRA by proposing measures like that. An unfortunate result, considering how much far-right politics and the NRA are in bed with one another.

To judge by how many assholes live around here in spite of open carry. . . ;)

No, I don't think so. I also don't particularly like the implication of said phrase. A polite society that I'd want to live in has nothing to do with violence, but with compassion and respect.

Though I still like firearms. I've been shooting since I was 8, so I just don't have any sort of averse feelings attached to weapons. Weapons are killing machines. I suppose I just don't see the world in a way where I think we are actually beyond killing. It's in that frame that I think of weapons. I much prefer having the reality of our violent lives closer to home -- so that the question of violence is not a bar conversation and an identity to project, but a serious action that we take ownership over, or disavow. As it is state-sponsored violence is a reality that few countries can say they don't participate in. Especially in the United States, for what that's worth. If it is killing and massacres that we are concerned with, I'd start with talking about the military.

Plus, I am a leftist. And I'm not particularly keen on letting just the right-wing crazies own firearms. I'd much prefer reasonable folk who are averse to violence than those who fetishize violence as a means to manhood own weapons.

What would "sponsoring" entail? Money? Time? Both?

Is material progress required for socialism? — jamalrob

I don't think so, though I found myself agreeing with most of the points in Farber's essay. One of the counter-points Farber didn't seem to respond to, though alluded to, was the ecological concern of economic growth. At least redirecting the economy into green industries like socialist transportation, I don't think, would actually address ecological impact.

I think of socialism as economic freedom as defined by the working class. Laissez-faire capitalism looks like freedom because it is freedom to a particular class. Socialism is the freedom of the working class -- which, by necessity, must be collective just because of our position in society. It is the way in which economic life is organized that defines socialism.

All that being said, it's not like most people are opposed to material progress. If our democratic system is set up in such a way that collective preferences are actualized in the economic realm then I'm sure that the majority of people would prefer material progress within the confines of ecological restraint. But I don't think it's the defining feature.

Is it required for human beings generally?

I don't think so.

Can environmental problems best be overcome with more, or less, economic growth?

I suppose that all depends on whose defining the terms. I would say, in the present way of organizing the economy, environmental problems are better addressed through less economic growth. Economic growth in a capitalist economy doesn't -- and cannot -- account for environmental values. You can retranslate ecological values into capitalist logic, but all such efforts so far just seem to mitigate environmental damage rather than actually do something about it. The bottom line just isn't the environment.

And are these issues connected with wider cultural, moral and philosophical notions of progress?

I could see that.

I suppose my whole thing with progress is that people treat it like some kind of force in history.

I certainly don't believe in that, and neither -- so it seems -- does Farber.

And when Farber points out that those involved in practice must believe in progress, I would disagree there too. All that one has to do to be involved in political practice is to want something. It doesn't have to be progressive, necessarily. One can have a goal without, thereby, believing in progress of society or something akin to that. I would prefer to live in a free society, and so I pursue socialism. It's freedom that entails social commitments, but preference which drives action.

Though I tend to think that preferences can't all be lumped together. It's not like all preferences are like ones preference for ice cream flavors. There are a wide variety of aesthetic preferences, I think -- and principles, feelings, attitudes, and so forth -- and there are ones which are more serious and ones which are less serious.

That's what I took him to be saying in the preface. And I could see there being no relation between the analytic/synthetic method and knowledge. It was just something that caught my eye is all.

Was China's 12th 5-year plan publicized so much as the 13th 5-year plan seems to be?

I continue to see all sorts of news sources talking about the new five year plan. I have no recollection of this happening before, though I don't know if that's just me or if it's actually being reported more now.

At this point it would just be speculation on my part. I'm not exactly sure. Though it seems to make sense from his examples and with his philosophy in general -- it seems that with the "analytic" method we would basically be presupposing the conclusions of the critique of pure reason and deducing their implications so that one understood the general plan. Whereas with the synthetic method we would be presenting something for someone else to judge -- ie the deduction -- and consider in light of reason.

That's just a guess though.

What interested me most was the relationship between method and knowledge. I checked the german real quick to make sure that the word wasn't "wissenschaft" or anything -- it was actually Methode. Usually I think of the analytic/synethic distinction as something which applies to knowledge, but here Kant mentions a method. Though that could also just be my memory, as well. It's been a minute since I've picked up the CPR, so maybe he made more of that than I had perceived or remember.

Already it's been a pleasure to revisit Kant. Thanks for the opportunity @Sapientia , and the suggestion to do this reading-group style @jamalrob

Preface

The preface states who the work is meant for -- not for apprentices of metaphysics who are just learning the ropes, not for historians of philosophy who must wait for the philosophers and scientists proper to create the new science he has in mind, not for those who look at the works of metaphysics in dismay, contempt, or of an attitude firmly decided on such questions by way of ancient authority -- but for those future teachers and founders of a science who already believe metaphysics is a worthwhile pursuit unto itself, and who might become lost in reading the proper treatment of the subject due to the self-admittedly literary weakness that academic requirements make of any work in that vein -- and who want a guide to begin understanding his arguments so that they may fruitfully pursue metaphysics, and hopefully ground it as a proper scientific discipline, or barring that, show in what other manner Hume's critique of knowledge may be successfully addressed.

As such we find the thesis of the Prolegomena in paragraph 7:

... there can be no such science unless the requirements expressed here, on which its possibility rests, are met, and, as this has never yet been done, that there is as yet no metaphysics at all — Kant

I separated out the previous quote for emphasis, though this immediately follows:

Since, however, the demand for it can never be exhausted, because the interest of human reason in general is much too intimately interwoven with it, the reader will admit that a complete reform or rather a rebirth of metaphysics, according to a plan completely unknown before now, is inevitably approaching, however much it may be resisted in the meantime

I quote this to emphasize in what way Kant's work is meant as a propaedeutic to metaphysics.And so, in some ways, what we are dealing with in the Prolegomena is -- as far as explicit intent is concerned, at least -- something of a propaedeutic to the propaedeutic proper.

To emphasize this reading I would point a few pages later, after he gives some history of the problem he's dealing with (including his own struggles with it):

But I fear that the elaboration of the Humean problem in its greatest possible amplification (namely, the Critique of Pure Reason) may well fare just as the problem itself fared when it was first posed

. . .

with regard to a certain obscurity -- arising in part from the expansiveness of the plan, which makes it difficult to survey the main points upon which the investigation depends -- in this respect the complaint is just; and I will redress it through the present Prolegomena.
The previous work, which presents the faculty of pure reason in its entire extent and boundaries, thereby always remains the foundation to which the Prolegomena refer only as preparatory exercises; for this Critique must stand forth as science, systematic and complete to its smallest parts, before one can think of permitting metaphysics to come forward, or even of forming only a distant hope for metaphysics

Something that piqued my interest later is when Kant distinguishes between methods to draw the distinction between the Prolegomena and the Critique -- namely, the Prolegomena follows the analytic method, and the Critique follows the synthetic method. Kant insists that the synthetic method is necessary to present all the articulations, whereas the analytic method is good enough -- after accepting the deduction (which, back then, was more akin to legal justification than dedeuctive logical inference) -- for giving the plan in broad strokes.

Lastly, I want to highlight one quote at the end to show what Kant is asking of his readers. In part it articulates what we mean today by "inference to the best explanation", I think -- which Kant is sometimes credited with articulating -- but historically speaking it's what makes Kant's philosophy truly critical, as opposed to either dogmatic or skeptical:

whosoever undertakes to judge or indeed to construct a metaphysics, must thoroughly satisfy the challenge made here, whether it happens that they accept my solution, or fundamentally reject it and replace it with another

(emphasis mine)

So our job isn't to just find why we disagree with Kant -- because, indeed, it's easy to see that everyone except Kant disagrees with Kant ;) -- but to judge whether we do, in fact, agree, and if we do not, to not fall into skepticism and present our own solution.

I want to revisit this work in light of your thread.

As a general thrust, however: I have only just begun to disagree with Kant, and I'm still uncertain on which ways I am confident to do so. Saying that, however, I think it is invaluable to read him as if you agree with him and attempt to understand him from his own perspective. Part of my project to disagree with Kant was the hope that I might disagree with him in a way that he might hypothetically agree with -- meaning that I might understand where he's coming from, and would be able to say why I disagree in his own idiom [even if my own personal philosophical interests might differ]

It would almost seem, then, that it's appropriate to say the Epicurean's practiced both the medical and academic meta-philosophies -- though I think it might be fair, with the notion that professional philosophers are not particularly blessed, to say they were still practicing philosophy on the medical model. In the same way that we have research institutions dedicated to medicine, and practitioners who apply said research, the Epicurean community would have both [and those who are practiced upon, as well].

Heh. I don't know how it is in Delaware, but I know that where I'm at this is just part of the game. The police do public relations stunts like that in order to have a good report with the communities they police. I say stunts because there's still a culture of silence among police officers whenever a police officer violates the law and a culture of us vs. the world. They treat the public as an enemy that needs to be contained rather than as fellow community members. They are trained to fire center mass -- which is what they taught us in the US military as well. Many of them are ex-military, and are used to military operations and seem to utilize that experience in policing the streets. And police tend to treat civilians as civilians in the sense that police view themselves as not-civilian.

It may be a damned-if-you-do-or-don't assessment, but one way of containing people is intimidation, and another way of containing people is good PR. Usually a mixture of the two works great in maintaining control.

Personally I would move away from having beat cops and large standing paramilitary forces. How you do that is difficult because the police are an entrenched lobby at municipal, county, state, and federal levels -- and they tend to have a good relationship with the judiciary, given how much they work hand-in-hand.


For me, though, I suppose I'll never really look at police in a positive light. At least as they are currently organized. So I may just be at the extreme end of things. But I don't think that my extremity is irrational, at least, though I know that folk could rationally disagree with me.

Yes, but you're employing "criterion of truth" in an entirely different sense from me. Here's what I've been meaning by it all through-out: http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ . Epicurus for example, (since I know you are an Epicurean), held that sense experience is the criterion of truth. I thought you meant the same thing by criterion of truth, so that's why I got confused. — Agustino

Cool.

Though, with Epicurus, I think that one fair and consistent reading is that he is using another criteria to accept his criterion of truth -- pleasure.

The stoics thought logic was valuable unto itself
— Moliere
False, just check out Epictetus who emphasises the difference between philosophical discourse and philosophical practice.

It is as if, in the area of the exercise of assent, we were surrounded by representations, some of them "objective" and others not, and we did not want to distinguish between them, but preferred to read treatises with titles like On Comprehension ! How does this come about? The reason is that we have never carried out our reading or our writing in such a way that, when it comes to action, we could use the representations we receive in a way consonant with nature; instead, we are content when we have learned what is said to us, and can explain it to others; when we can analyse syllogisms and examine hypothetical arguments
— Epictetus

Epictetus shows that the only justification for reading theoretical treatises [...] is so that, in concrete situations, we can act in conformity with mankind's rational nature
— Pierre Hadot

Well, I would think that, given this, that you'd be even more in line with the thrust of my argument there. I was trying to concede that with the stoics you could possibly argue that there's a bridge of reason between them and enlightenment, because they valued logic as a practice unto itself [which is true of them as a class, at least my readings have lead me to believe this, because they believed that reason, nature, and God were interlinked in some way, so exploring logic was in some way related to their ethical project, whereas for the Epicureans it was not]. But, given this, I think you would agree that there are not any ethical theorists in the ancient world who rely upon pure reason to justify their ethics.

I second that "feel", though with different activities.

I often prefer to write by hand because the way I think is different when I write by hand. I prefer to edit on the computer, but the original work I prefer to do by hand (if it is a labor of love, at least).

My thoughts are often more crisp and clear when I go for walks, or even more intensive exercise as well.