Fixed. I added them.

I didn't realize there was a thread for this. I'm just reposting what I posted in the December poll as a resource.

Peter Singer -- The Solution to World Poverty
http://www.unc.edu/courses/2009spring/plcy/240/001/The_Solution_to_World_Poverty1.pdf

John Hospers -- What Libertarianism Is
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/teach/pp/B%20%20%20NO%20PUB/B2%20%20%20Right-Libertarianism/Hospers%20-%20What%20Libertarianism%20Is.pdf

Kai Nielson -- A Moral Case for Socialism
http://businessethics.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2012/01/Nielsen.pdf

James Sterba -- Liberty Requires Equality
https://philosophynow.org/issues/110/Liberty_Requires_Equality

Garrett Hardin -- Lifeboat Ethics
http://web.ntpu.edu.tw/~language/course/research/lifeboat.pdf

Judith Jarvis Thomson -- A Defense of Abortion
http://myweb.facstaff.wwu.edu/nmarkos/Zola/Thomson.Abortion.pdf

Don Marquis -- Why Abortion is Immoral
http://faculty.polytechnic.org/gfeldmeth/45.marquis.pdf

Peter Singer -- All Animals are Equal
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/singer.pdf

Paul Taylor -- The Ethics of Respect for Nature
http://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil3140/Taylor.pdf

True, not all leftists would be like this. However, I disagree that these are fundamental values and intrinsic rights. Who are they to claim so? As far as I'm concerned, the only rights a man has by birth are the same rights a tiger has - which are not many. It is society which grants man any other rights that he has, and man owes it to his community for having them. Thus it is man's duty to support his community which has provided for him while he couldn't provide for himself - and it is also his duty to remember that if it wasn't for his community he'd be in no better or worse state than a tiger is. — Agustino

Oh my. I agree with the beginning, but I must admit a severe disagreement with your conclusion. Yes, rights are only granted by society, but -- this only means we can get more, not that we have to respect society. And, really, why shouldn't we ask for more? If we don't, then we have an over-class of folks who take advantage of those who are below them -- and I don't blame them, of course, because that's only human nature -- but we don't have equality until people in the underclass actually come together and fight.

I hope not, given that he's a very consistent progressive -- but, I will note, would not get along in radical circles even in the U.S., which are rather conservative themselves when you consider the world picture. [sorry, mate: don't mean to hate. but. . . it's rather true. especially considering your views on weapons, where most radical leftists are fine with weapon ownership, whether it violates laws or no] @Landru Guide Us [edited so landru sees us all and stuff]

In light of Christmas, I share my still-favorite x-mas song, as unhappy as it might be. Ahhh what can I say -- I try to be happy, but if you ask me, these are the things that make me happy.

I am sorry to hear it, and I hope the best for his loves and family in a trying time. He will be missed. [though I personally never really interacted much with him, I did know him just by being in this circle of folk]

There's a part of me that agrees, and a part of me that wonders.

The part of me that wonders is asking: How do you feel about the works of Camus, or Sartre?

I just want to hear from you, more than anything. I don't have a critique or anything, nor do I know if I will have one after you respond. I would just like to know what you think at this point, if you don't mind responding.

Heh. I think your poll might be a bit too reflective of your answers, Bitter ;).

As it is I can't answer the second question. But it's probably better to type out a response anyways.

I do believe I have real political efficacy. I don't think that changes with the state one is in. I think that it can be harder or easier to be politically effective in certain circumstances, but I don't think one is ever actually politically ineffective.

Now, feeling politically ineffective is one thing, and quite a common phenomena. Understandably so, even. But I wouldn't argue that this feeling, even based on experience as it is, is the truth.

Political agency can be exercised in any situation. I don't think it is quite personal, but it can always be exercised even if you are an army of one. In order to be effective, though, you have to come together with others in some fashion -- which is why I'd hesitate to call political agency "personal".

However, I would say I am also construing "political" in a broad sense. Naturally if you follow all the rules lain out then our agency will be more or less effective depending on those rules. But politics doesn't actually have any rules attached. And in order for the under-class to gain a foothold it is more often the case that the under-class must break the rules [there is a reason, given the system they live in, they are the under-class, after all].

What counts as "the rules" varies considerably. In some countries you can't protest. But in some countries you can -- and as long as you do so in the "polite" manner [in accord with the rules], you won't have much effect. You'll be allowed your free speech so that you can express yourself, and then you'll go back home.

But political movement sees these rights not in moral terms, but as tools. We utilize the rights to position ourselves to act politically, not as the political actions themselves. So you might organize a street demonstration in order to amass enough people together that you can shut down a business, or set up a picket large enough that scabs can't get through. The political act is had at the vagaries where rights are no longer protected, not when they are protected. The protected action is just a means to reach that line of scrimmage where you are an inconvenience to your negotiating partner or enemy.

It is in this sense, I'd say, that one always has political agency.

@darthbarracuda -- It might be helpful to realize that there are more ways of conceiving of pleasure than along a spectrum or number line or something akin to a subjective experience that can fade or grow more powerful.

By all means this is how people today tend to think of pleasure -- as a subjective experience that can be maximized or minimized -- but there's more to pleasure than this. For instance, Epicurean pleasure is had in the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires. It's not along a spectrum, and I would argue that it's not specifically a subjective experience as the British Empiricists imagine it, but that pleasure, in this formulation, has an objective quality to it [hence, why the master could teach others the ways of pleasure, rather than everyone going about individually needing to see "what they happen to like"]

Another sort of pleasure is the pleasure in fulfilling some task -- playing the piano masterfully is a usual example here. There is a pleasure derived by doing, but it is not quantifiable -- we are just fulfilling a desire [something we lack], or reproducing desire [and so it becomes more pleasurable over time]. It's something experienced in the act, and it is experienced because we find fulfillment in doing things well [or, to take an Aristotelian stab, because we are fulfilling our human nature in excellence]



I actually think a good deal of confusion arises because we lack the cultural resources to discuss the complexity of pleasure. In common it's thought of subjective, and along an axis. But there's so much more to pleasure and desire. But I suppose I'm getting off track with that comment. It's just something that's been flitting around in my brain-box for awhile.

The various Islamic caliphates of the past were not anything near the utopias they imagine them to be. Islamists would also be surprised and appalled at certain facts about these regimes. Take Akbar the Great of the Mughal Empire, for example. He had Hindu wives and maintained cordial relations with the West. — Thorongil

Akbar the Great comes much later in the history of Islam, though. ISIL, to my understanding, is referring back to the 600-700's. Hence, an anachronism, but not mythic.

They may have false beliefs and hopes based off of falsity, and they are clearly not historically literate because anyone who takes a historical viewpoint would, well, avoid anachronisms.

But that's still different from the wholesale mythic Fascisms which have no basis in reality. They weren't even false.

The two amount to the same thing, since we can be fairly certain that an apocalypse won't happen as described in Islamic eschatology. — Thorongil

In terms of effects, perhaps -- well, not even then, because the fascists were better at fighting wars and playing politics -- but as far as ideology goes I would say that the falsity of this belief differs from the point I'm making. Namely, that their beliefs about the state marks the two political movements as significantly different.


It may just be a matter of opinion, as you point out in your previous post that you're justifying the use of the portmanteau as good enough, but I suppose I see the conflation is unhelpful and inaccurate. While neither is a desirable society to live in I don't see the motives behind fascism as the same as the motives behind militant Islam, nor do I see the ideological aspects as the same.

Ah, but the Islamist's view of history is equally mythological, and especially IS's view of history. — Thorongil

Care to explain more? I don't see how this is the case, though I could certainly be wrong.

To this I must say a thousand times no. The state is the summum bonum and indeed the raison d'etre for the Islamist, militant or not. This is what IS is toiling to create right now. Not until they have created a state governing the whole world according to Shariah Law will Islamists be satisfied. — Thorongil

I'd say here is where we disagree the most, then. Governing the world isn't the goal. The apocalypse is.

This is to split hairs, it seems to me. They both reject democracy, ergo they have this in common. — Thorongil

Feudal France also rejected democracy. The parallel is in passing, though -- the reasoning why they reject democracy makes a difference, and is not merely splitting hairs.

Fascism too has a goal beyond merely glorying in violence, but I think the point is that much of the violence is gratuitous; it's often done with genuine pleasure and deliberateness, whether it's necessary to achieve said goal or not. — Thorongil

I would say that this is just human nature more than ideology. Violence against one's enemies is pleasurable, especially in the context of war. War is genuinely pleasurable in its own way, even for a society that tends to reject war-like values, for the soldiers in the war.

That isn't to say that this is a virtuous aspect of humanity -- I'd say it's the opposite -- but it's also the case. War gives people meaning and pleasure.

It seems pretty similar to me. The Nazis, for example, were trying to return to a Pagan Germanic world which existed before the advent of Christianity. — Thorongil

Except their version of history has no basis. It was pure mythology. I'd say there's a difference between anachronism and myth.

I see you making my own point for me here. Yes, the state and religion are one in the case of European fascism and Islamofascism. To speak of the state or its religion in fascism is to speak of the same thing, and it is indeed sought for its own sake. — Thorongil

But this is not the case with militant Islam. The state is a tool. No fascist worth there salt would look at the state as a mere tool to something greater.



I had this cool video pop up in my twitter feed: http://www.vox.com/2015/12/16/10240188/isis-history-background-qaeda a six minute history on ISIS.

Militant Islam doesn't reject democracy as the problem, though -- Militant Islam as practiced by IS is based in an older world idea which predates the wide acceptance of democracy. Fascism, on the other hand, does.

Militant Islam does not emphasize violence for its own sake. It practices jihad, but that has a purpose greater than the violence itself.

I agree that Militant Islam is anti-individualist. With the latter as well.


Militant Islam is medieval Sunni society attempting to be reborn in the world today. That is a kind of throwback, but not to a mythologized past as much as to a past that had existed prior to centuries of Islamic interpretation and growth (in number, spiritually, and in time). So it is a kind of anachronism, but it's not the same sort of historical myth that Fascism builds.

The biggest difference, I think, are the views on the state. Militant Islam wants to establish a Caliphate, but this is theological significance. The state, or empire, is a tool, rather than "an organic entity" which can and must be purified for its own sake. Fascism establishes the state as its religion, where imperial theologies establish states for the sake of God.

But using said criteria, I don't think you could classify militant Islam in the same category.

I'd recommend reading the article I posted a bit ago. I don't think the two are even roughly congruent. They seem to be quite at odds with one another, in fact.


The problem with totalitarian/authoritarian, at least as I see it, is that all states are totalitarian/authoritarian. They impose certain values and ways of life upon anyone within a geography. They just have different values.

Then a few years ago I emerged into a very sunny period that I am still in -- going on 4 or 5 years now. With any luck, it will last as far as the grave. This time of good feelings isn't due to any virtue or achievement on my part. I am still kind of surprised that I feel this way. — Bitter Crank

That's actually a pretty common phenomena -- there's a sort of U-shaped curve, if happiness could be plotted, when you plot happiness on the y-axis and age on the x-axis; the right end of the u goes higher than the left end, too. At least so saith the happiness studies I've read so far.

The explanation I've seen posited for this curve is two-fold: life stressors, like career and family, begin around 30, and those go away at around 50-60, and then also you start learning how to accept things as they are, rather than being disappointed by what you thought you wanted. So the little things, such as finding a dollar on the street or bumping into a friend, are more appreciated and not looked down upon, and the grand things aren't really desired -- so you end up being happier.

I suppose, in spite of my curmudgeonly attitude and somewhat generic dissatisfaction, I remain an optimist of sorts. I think the world has plenty to offer humanity, but it is humanity who hurts itself through irrational desire -- a sort of Epicurean move, if you will.

That doesn't necessarily remove existential angst, but there's still a difference between desire and existential angst, I'd wager, and different philosophies apply to both in order that one may be happy.

The question is whether making universals out to be metaphors dispenses with the issue, and what sort of implications that has for scientific theories. Is GR with it's curved spacetime metaphorical? They seemed to think so — Marchesk

Heh. Perhaps I am contradicting what I was saying before, but I wouldn't say that metaphors dispense with universals per se -- especially since what seems to be at issue is whether science implies universals. I would say that the question of scientific realism differs from the question of universals, unless one is a scientific realist.

But one could be a realist or an anti-realist of various stripes without this being at issue at all. Yes?

Can we then say that science requires the utilization of universal concepts to build its theories? — Marchesk

I don't know if we can because I don't know what a universal concept is. I would agree that scientific theories aim at what is general rather than particular. But aiming at generalities doesn't necessitate universals -- such as a really existing red to which all red particulars correspond, or a universal number "1" to which all particular uses of "1" corresponds [or whatever relation we might posit], even if said universals are merely conceptual. I don't believe that one must be committed one way or the other with said beliefs in order for science to still "hold together" coherently and rationally.

It seems to me that if we are scientific realists then, yes, science strongly suggests universals exist. But if not, then not -- but I don't think that the answer to such a question could be decided via science -- science, itself, does not suggest one or the other. Rather, we believe one or the other, and it is in light of said beliefs about scientific realism/anti-realism which strongly suggests universals existing or not existing (or, perhaps, existing, but not due to science)

Though perhaps I don't quite grasp what is meant by "universal", here -- a bit of a curious word, yes? My understanding of "universal", with respect to the distinction between universal-particular, is that universals really exist and particulars are derivative or somehow participate or are related to this universal. But one might also say "universal" to mean "always applies", but then it seems to me that we're not talking about the problem of universals as much as we're talking about the "All" operator.

Would science have to be wrong about electrons? It would seem to me that if electrons count as a universal, and universals do not exist, then electrons do not exist -- and so saying that the propositions of science are wrong about electrons isn't correct. Rather, this particular proposition isn't about an entity, but it could still be correct.


EDIT:
My inclination would be to say that science does not require universals to exist. But, perhaps, if we believe that science is a good basis for ontology, then science strongly suggests that universals do exist. But if we do not believe that science is a good basis for ontology then there isn't as much at conflict between a denial of universals and the requirements of science to be, well, science.

I came across this article today: http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2015/12/10/9886152/donald-trump-fascism

But then, on proof -- which is, I think, where you're really aiming at, I just wanted to note a danger in the generalization -- I think it might depend on what we accept as proof.

I don't know if you could prove that the universe has no intrinsic meaning in some apodeictic or mathematical sense. You can make arguments, but I don't know about proofs -- at least not without some sort of understood (if not necessarily accepted or believed) frame for working through proofs, similar to how mathematics does it by way of axioms and rules of inference.

I don't think there is a single existential metaphysics. There are some broad themes which group existentialists together, but I wouldn't say they agree on metaphysical propositions.

Heidegger, for instance, took the approach that all metaphysical philosophy prior to him had made the same "move", and that move concealed the meaning of the question of being -- that metaphysicians had all focused on the present-at-hand rather than the ready-to-hand.

Sartre focuses on consciousness, and specifically the unity of consciousness and the problems of dualisms past.

Camus, by my reading at least, doesn't seem to think that the absurd needs demonstration -- he notes early on in the myth of sisyphus how his writing may no longer make sense in some other future that differs from his time, but that his time took on the character of the absurd, and then he just tries to work out what the logical consequences of the absurd would entail (suicide, or no?)


I'm certain there are other ways to read these authors. I'm just presenting them to demonstrate the point that existentialism is not uni-vocal in this way. And since it is not uni-vocal in this way, I don't think it would be possible to pin down existentialism as a whole. I think, rather, that you'd have to take up particular theses that happen to fall into what is a broad category. Indeed, of the three, Sartre was the only one who self-identified as an existentialist! :D

We used to run Socrates Cafe-style meetings w our philosophy club in university. Very cool book too. We would also do reading groups and public debates. That, in addition to communal living, and pseudo-anarchist politics, comprised my "serious" philosophic journey. I'd like to continue in that mold, but I often feel uncertain on the how.

Yeah, I really don't mean to spark an anti-academic/academic type of dichotomy. I have good friends who are in the academy, and their work certainly shows. My interest is more along the lines of furthering non-academic philosophy than tearing down academic philosophy because I care about philosophy generally, one, and I'm fairly certain I'd find the academic life miserable just because of my political orientations, two. I clearly benefit, as one interested in philosophy, by the work academics put in. I read them all the time and their thoughts help to expand my mind. I'm interested in making non-academic philosophy work on a level that is more than popular, but is actually rigorous. I suppose that's what I mean by I fear "duping" myself -- I can see the dangers of not having an institution dedicated to high quality philosophy, and how it might be fairly easy to convince ourselves without some kind of rigor.

Maybe we need to look into building philosopher communes or something. Meh. Not sure where to go from here. — Pneumenon

Now that would be a dream come true for me.

Just to note.

In some way my friendship groups -- who I remain in contact with -- from university were like this. We lived together, we read books together, we put on philosophy talks together in public and tried to promote philosophy as a group. While we maintain contact we've hit the diaspora at this point -- to the point of living in different states. It would be nice to have that closeness over philosophy again.

Not sure if "commune" would be the preferred model. I'd prefer "collective" -- since I think anarchist spaces are healthier and more prone to longer lives. [since they do recognize individual needs in addition to collective needs]

. . . but the bar for those outside of the academy and its rules are set higher. . . — Phil

That's what interests me most. What, precisely, is that bar? Higher or no, what are the standards in the first place?

They treat people in our neighborhood differently than they treat people in other neighborhoods. There are worse places than my house, but the popo are hella corrupt in this city. I've witnessed them lie to defend each other in court -- I know they were lying because I had video evidence to the contrary. And they're an egotistical and trigger happy lot who don't go to the range as often as me. I'm also generally pretty good at de-escalating situations, where they. . . aren't.

Plus I've an anarchist streak through me, and so while I'm willing to work with the state, there's some personal disposition that just hates police in particular.

There's a difference between a society with a police force and a militarized society where everybody is primed to engage in gun violence. One difference is that the latter consistently suffers from gun massacres and their public space is eroded. Which of course is the goal of the gun fetishists. Their attack is really on the notion of democracy and a public realm. — Landru Guide Us

There are more possibilities than two, however. Most gun owners are not "militarized" -- and even those who are are no more militarized than our present day police force ;). Owning one's violence does not mean that you are militarized, either. It means that your choices to use violence are closer to home and harder to forget. I certainly don't call the police to my house.

What you present here is a false dichotomy, and not merely in some hypothetical sense. Gun ownership and usage is not an attack on public space or democracy. Many people own weapons without the fetishism you're targeting.

In any case, the proposition that a armed society (forced militarization of every citizen) is a polite society is utter and complete rubbish. It's just the opposite of course. And the opposite is the purpose.

I've agreed to your first sentence, though I don't agree with the latter.

Totally.

But what do you think about the idea in a more general sense?

The indisputable fact is, if you scratch a gun advocate, you'll find a person who really wants to kill somebody. — Landru Guide Us

That's a bit too far of an exaggeration, Landru. I'd just highlight here the point I made awhile back that you can't somehow escape violence in our society -- even if you prefer to delegate violence out. I'll note that in spite of the difficulties surrounding weapon ownership I still prefer to own weapons, and keep it that way.

Hrmm.. how does one re-up?

I checked my profile real quick to make a dig at myself, and I saw that aside "Subscription" the word "Cancelled" appeared. Understandable enough for not having done my monthly, but I had honestly forgotten -- and I don't see the same membership link that I did when I first subscribed?

I suppose this is just asking for help if it's actually quite obvious and I'm just being particularly dense. Otherwise, it might help to make the re-up option density-compatible ;).

Why choose that perspective though?

I'd say we are most certainly not machines, nor is our mind a super-advanced computer. This isn't a difference of degree, I think, but of kind. So there is no point where a program becomes a preference, because preferences are not built up of programs.

Just got home. Happy turkey day.

My sister made her pie crust with pig-lard she rendered herself. This resulted in the richest pecan pie I've ever tasted.

It was a good day.

Truth be told -- in most combat situations training doesn't do much in terms of missing, it just makes you less worse as opposed to actually good. Being shot at sucks, period -- even if you're a crack shot. Additionally there are tactics which aren't necessarily meant to connect to a target, so you have to take that into consideration -- but on the whole most discharges do not hit their target.

An annual breakdown of NYPD “Gunfight” hit-ratio data is differentiated in the table
below.

NYPD GUNFIGHT STATISTICS
Year| Hit percentage
1990 19%
1991 15%
1992 17%
1993 15%
1994 12%
1995 18%
1996 14%
1997 10%
1998 25%
1999 13%
2000 9%
MEAN SCORES 15%

That's a snippet from the report up there. It shows hit percentage in a firefight, meaning the officer believed his enemy also had a firearm (they don't necessarily have to have a weapon, belief is enough to drop the hit-percentage), with the year for the NYPD. Everything I've looked at tells a similar story. ((One of the many reasons why arming teachers in schools is one of the worst ideas to ever be broached))

http://www.deepsouthdish.com/2013/11/southern-candied-yams-sweet-potatoes.html

Here's a close approximate recipe to the yams we make every year.

Close in the sense that ours is simpler -- more butter, and only add brown sugar. ;)

Partially just by the scenario -- if I compare a world where the basic constituent of said world is a force dedicated to a pessimistic existence then, unless by some fluke or chance in the groundless world, that world will be more pessimistic.

I think the latter is true because metaphysics is simultaneously necessary [for developing any knowledge whatsoever] and impossible [to resolve]. I think that we know, so I don't discount metaphysics, but there's a fault to all metaphysical thinking when one thinks that it is knowledge when it is not. That's a theoretical way of tackling the belief, anyways. From a more personal level I would say that a great deal of phenomena aren't explicable, either -- that there is the Absurd, and we can encounter it, and that I have encountered it.

I think that this is preferable, though I might argue the other way were the pessimistic world true [why fight what you can't change? We are, after all, talking about reality], because having both good and bad is prima facie better than just having bad. Even if we make our own goodness or badness, that doesn't negate having a mixture of both.

What work of hers in particular did you find to be on the level of bullshit artistry?

It seems to me that the former is more pessimistic, but that the latter is preferable. Of course, I think the latter is true and the former false.