Whatever malevolent forces you think are at play in private companies are amplified - not reduced - at the level of the state.

The logic is very simple. If it's bad on a small scale, it's worse at a large scale. Note, there's no starry-eyed idealism at work here. There's just common sense and a keen sense of justice. It's not healthy or right to concentrate power in one individual or some tiny group.

You don't solve the problem of mafias by having one mega mafia. That's like solving the fact you've got a cold by giving yourself cancer.

Incidentally, you know how mafias really survive? State corruption. The most successful mafia in the world is THE MAFIA. And how are they so successful? (They're the most successful organisation in Italy accounting for 7% of GDP) Corrupt government officials. — Clearbury

I don't think that private companies and the state are easily separable. I'm more or less saying that as soon as you abolish the state someone will re-invent the state. That's sort of the whole revolutionary thing.

Further, it seems your programme must reinvent the state because military and police details will be contractable through private firms, themselves needing firms to enforce their contracts. How would they do that unless they send people to prison?

In which case:

I think all forms of government are unjust. Governments claim a monopoly on certain uses of violence and threats. I take that to be definitive. Government policies are backed by the threat of prison. — Clearbury

Your own definition of government would apply.

Private security companies would be a much better job - and do do a much better job - than the state. Try and steal something in a supermarket and see who stops you first - a private security guard or the police. — Clearbury

How would the private security companies operate given your notions of government here?:

I think all forms of government are unjust. Governments claim a monopoly on certain uses of violence and threats. I take that to be definitive. Government policies are backed by the threat of prison. — Clearbury

How would the private security companies' policies be backed? Would they not imprison people?

Privatizing the police and army would be the last step.... — Clearbury

The reliance upon privatization sort of undermines this as an anarchist project -- private property requires rights to be enforced. Once you "privatize" the army the warlords move in and take what is theirs and enforce what they want thereby reinventing the state.

This is what I think of as one of the fundamental philosophical problems for anarchy: the problem of warlords is such that no matter what path to abolishing the state that you take the "bad" kind of anarchy will arise. It's not like gangs and cartels are going to vanish when all the citizens decide to stop supporting the government. And when the army can be bought then we're pretty much back to having warlords fighting over resources because they can pay troops to enforce their will.

The warlord in this scenario may be named "Chrysler", but it's not fundamentally different -- and it basically just recreates the state, but now there aren't many civic institutions to direct the necessity of violence.

But since privatizing the army does not remove coercion this plan will simply reinvent the state in the process of trying to dismantle it, and for the worse.

Hmm. I'm struggling to understand this. Tribal markings arise in the wider system of tribes; cell markings arise in the wider system of multi cellular organisms; makers marks arise in the larger system of the marketplace. — unenlightened

True.

It could just be a professional hazard of the cobbler seeing the world as a big shoe. The system of signs can be seen as an assemblage, too.

An attempt to make a distinction though: A maker's mark and a tribal marking, so it seems to me at least, indicates an actor with intent. This is our company's mark. This is your position in the tribe. Act accordingly! (indicating a "you" to whom the command is addressed -- a sort of responsibility)

Intent is much less obvious at the level of the multicellular organism, though -- the self made of millions of cells interacting in various capacities continues even as the cells that once were a healthy part of the organism become other from the organism from degradation or infection. There isn't an intent so much as a mechanism composing parts connected to parts and the distinctions are each of them a miniature sorites paradox resolved by what's of interest.

When the two organisms became 1 it made me think: here there's no intent, and it's really only the functions and capacities within an environment which is marking the difference between self/other (as the two others become one self due to environmental pressures).

Going back to an earlier thread, marking is the act of making a distinction. — unenlightened

There's something about life that feels different from the relays -- the whole "entering into itself" thing at the end that feels a bit mysterious feels analogous to the question of differentiating species, or even differentiating life from not-life. They are clearly differentiable when they are, and not when they are not (the virus providing a good mid-point between the two -- certainly life, but almost mechanical in its piggybacking on life). But rather than the logical system of marks it's a slapdash and messy process that looks designed at times, but clearly isn't. It's us who find the patterns in life because we like to see the patterns -- we want to know how this whole messy thing began.

But unlike the system of logic there's an entire environment which surrounds and even composes the multicellular organism, and the self -- though we hold it responsible -- is this assemblage of parts feeding into a great multiplicity of functions far beyond intent.

If mating patterns -- that natural chemistry people want -- is the result of compatible immune systems then the self will intend what the functions demand. Or, intent is a post hoc explanation of the assemblage.

EDIT: Though, as always, after I write something and give myself some time to rethink I see little bumps in the thinking I dislike: the tribal markings were supposed to function the same and here I started to think how intent would make them different, and now I'm thinking "intent" need not come in at all in any assemblage. Heh -- the curse of wondering is exactly this back-and-forth...

The functioning seems to me to be more like a makers mark, or a password, or a signature - in other words it is exactly a biological name/label and arbitrary at that if I read wiki aright.

And now I'm thinking "tribal markings" as the social equivalent. — unenlightened

"Tribal markings", insofar that we understand them in a wider cultural context as fulfilling a multitude of functions, I think is pretty close.

The other thing I find interesting is how the immune system may be linked to mating patterns -- which makes perfect sense from an evolutionary perspective.

I think rather than a makers mark, password, or signature I'd prefer to think of these various protein complexes in analogue to the markings -- which also can mark all sorts of functions within a community. Mostly because the former suggests a singular hand, an "I" marking something, when in fact there is a wider system in which self/other makes sense (to annihilate or not-annihilate the cell)

Further, there's a deeper link to other life evident in the biochemistry. It gives another physical basis for making the argument that humans are connected to the world about them, rather than a thinking thing directing their body from above.

At least these are the sorts of thoughts I have going on -- I could be missing your point entirely too.

Anyways, the world is indivisible so biology, psychology, sociology, have to create divisions with labels and talk, otherwise everything is mush. 'I am he as you are he as you are me
And we are all together.' — unenlightened

True. Or infinitely divisible and so incomprehensible, which amounts to the same. Everything is mush and so we create divisions in the mush to bring order to the world.

Give me any scientific theory, and I’ll show you how philosophical questions can reveal the metaphysical presuppositions making its assertions intelligible — Joshs

I believe you and I can always show how philosophical questions can reveal metaphysical presuppositions, and that these presuppositions at least help to make phrases intelligible.

What I suspect is that science -- even of the psychological kind -- cannot show how artistic questions reveal metaphysical presuppositions which make its assertions intelligible. And these days I tend to think of scientists as the poets of math, but that's a metaphor I'm still thinking through.

Could the same hold true for literature?

Is there a difference between literature and philosophy, in your opinion?

Philosophers arise out of a contingent culture which shapes the sense of the questions they ask and how they interpret the answers. For me the distinction between philosophy and psychology has only to do with the how richly and comprehensively those presuppositions are articulated. — Joshs

I'm wondering, and suspect you would though I don't know, if you'd accept a similar articulation along the spectrum of literature. As in: "For me the distinction between philosophy and science has only to do with how richly and comprehensively each rendition articulates their presuppositions"

Where I think I'd disagree -- I'm not sure how to differentiate, but I feel that both philosophy and science articulate their presuppositions in a rich and comprehensive manner. This is part of why they look similar.

For me, and probably for you in various ways (and I'm more interested in the various ways than the differences, only expressing a point here): the difference has to do with method more than a description of presuppositions.

It could be a side-trap, though, considering that I'm a fan of Against Method :D -- Just some thoughts.

Some more thoughts that may not be worth it:

Metaphysically -- if self/other is a complex of physical proteins performing a function then it seems we'd at least overcome the hurdle of nominalism which uses reductionism: Here is a physical explanation of self/other which relies upon an assemblage rather than a cogito -- so the "I think" cannot be a pure, self-seeing clarity unless it is somehow not associated, at all, with the body which makes it up.

The person who believes the self to be a soul will want more, but the physicalist will see that even in the practical realm of immunology self/other is not some singular divide

Oh sorry. I don't know how much of the details are philosophically important per se, it just reminded me of the organism in your video because what the organism is changes over time -- it's not a crisp and neat divide as even the cells that once composed the organism become metabolically defunct and yet continue to tell the killer cells that they are a part of the organism by having the protein on the outside of the cell-wall which tells the killer cells "Do not Eat"

At least, in one version of cancer. I'm not sure how far the metaphors can be pushed here -- "needs further research" :D

Also the idea that the self-other can be reduced to hinging on the functioning of a protein network seems reductionist, but there could be some interesting implications for the mind-body problem depending upon what we learn and how we'd want to interpret what we learn.

But really I just thought it was friggen' cool. :D

Is it not absurd, though?

Yeh. No matter what I say the keys are locked in the car I locked.

I think to accomplish something like that you'd have to stipulate Wittgenstein, almost. Not quite, because you can argue this or that about him, but if you bring in Davidson as a point of comparison it seems that Wittgenstein is harder to interpret -- or at least has more interpretations to decide from -- than Davidson.

o yeah no worries. You said as much in your review.

It definitely sounds up my ally. I just haven't gotten around to reading the pdf yet is all.

Aahhhh!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_leukocyte_antigen

I was privileged enough to learn about that for work, at one point.

I found the idea of a protein complex as the basis for self/other fascinating, and still do.

I didn't know about the organism you linked about though. Very exciting stuff.

Listened to it. It sounds like a complex and meaty book that I'd be interested in.

One critique: I would not reduce the negation of the negation to Nietzsche's Will to Power. But I could just be misunderstanding too.

Hrm! Apparently I didn't dig deep enough. Those labs would both be a lot of fun to work in.

There is deduction in math and logic; everyone else has to make do with induction, abduction, probability. — Srap Tasmaner

That is -- making shit up and then seeing if it works(and finding that it usually does not). Though in school I call it "Guess and check"

The division between philosophy and literature is not so clear. — Fooloso4

Yup. My inclination is to reduce philosophy to literature.

The question of the OP is, in part, can we find the path to these qualities by examining the peculiar nature of philosophical reflection? — J

First, excellent OP. I hesitated to respond until you gave me something more specific to latch onto.

I'd say we can, but that we don't need to.

If philosophy is only reflection then clearly there's something "higher" than philosophy -- action, life, experience, whatever you want to call it.

We can reflect forever (and I ought note that this is a feature, not a bug): but I think that philosophy touches upon what we do.

Or, at least, I see action as a part of philosophy.

Which makes the idea of philosophy as the highest discourse a bit hard to follow. -- though you've made me think of Ian Hacking's Elevator Words in The Social Construction of What?. Take a gander at page 31* of the pdf and page 21* of the printed page numbers and tell me what you think.

*They are the same page with a subsection titled OBJECTS, IDEAS, AND ELEVATOR WORDS -- that's the section I mean. His notion of elevation seemed similar to your idea about higher discourse.

EDIT: Though I'm laughing upon rereading where the examples for nonfancy commonsensical actions is (throwing a ball, rape) -- OK! What about (throwing a ball, theft)? lol. But I suppose that's the continental in me. Also, I don't think I'd draw the division as Hacking does, it's just a text to riff from that came to mind.

:heart: :broken:

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46560/dulce-et-decorum-est

Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge,
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs,
And towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots,
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind;
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of gas-shells dropping softly behind.

Gas! GAS! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of fumbling
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling
And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime.—
Dim through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.

In all my dreams before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

If in some smothering dreams, you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,—
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.

The key is to ensure that any contact is purely transactional- just enough to meet the basic requirements of existence, without letting it spiral into further emotional entanglements. — schopenhauer1

So what do I owe you?

I suppose I don't really care if we call it democracy or whatever -- if our political actions lead us to war I take that as a sign that something is wrong. But imperialism demands war until everyone is eliminated.

I think once we start justifying the horrors of war in the name of the good we've lost sight of the good.

Well, according to Wikipedia, authority on all knowledge :D --
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle

In Athens, he probably experienced the Eleusinian Mysteries as he wrote when describing the sights one viewed at the Mysteries, "to experience is to learn" (παθεĩν μαθεĩν

So seems others' agree with you based on reading his texts.

I was just thinking if you had something definitive like that it would likely be published or publishable. Ancient evidence is always sketchy and requires lots of interpretation from multiple experts. It's really interesting because of that, but it's definitely difficult to ascertain lots of specifics that one might ask.

Heh. Fair.

I'm not sure it's obvious Plato did due to the cave analogy. Would it be that hard for an aristocrat to hear the tales people tell and reforge them to demonstrate a point? He may have even been there, but the analogy -- especially given its literary form -- doesn't give clear evidence about Plato either way.

He could have heard it from someone else enough times to forge a myth that appealed to the people around him without attending.

Do you have any evidence to suggest that Aristotle went through the Eleusinian Mystery ceremonies? — I like sushi

I think this is so far back in history that if you had some clear evidence you could publish a paper on it.

Ooooo... makes good wine!

Oh, either/or. I'm not picky. It's the Epicure in me.

Only if it pays in both carrots and tomatoes and turnips.

Well, it's not the first time, it won't be the second time...

I'm not offering an answer here, just pointing out that the difference between formal and informal languages is more intractable than it might appear. — Banno

Hey, that's my job! :D

yeah it seems hard to emphasize the parenthetical points if we only typed it out in lowercase without punctuation.

Heh I wouldn't be surprised if I made a few mistakes.

I did write it out while following the symbols though :D -- but I take your point that it's not something I'd ever say outside of logic.

∀x ∃y ∀z ((P(x) ∧ ∃u (Q(y) ∨ (R(u) ∧ ∀v (S(v) → T(z, v))))) → ¬(∀w (U(w) ∧ ∃t (V(x, t) → W(t, w))) ∧ ∃p(X(p) ∧ ∀q (Y(q) → Z(p, q)))) ∨ (A(x, y, z) ∧ ∀b ∃c (D(b, c) → (E(x, b, c) ∧ ∃d (F(d) ∧ G(d, x, y))))) — TonesInDeepFreeze

For all x there exists a y for all z such that if P is a property of x and there exists a u such that -- Q is a property of y or u is a property of R and allv's such that if v is S then the orderd pair z,v is T then it is not the case for all w such that w is U and there exists a t such that if t,x is V then t, w is W AND there exists p such that p is X and All q such that if q is Y then the ordered pair p q is Z OR x, y, z is A and for all b there exists a c such that (if the ordered pair c, b is D then x, b,c is E and there exists a d such that d is F and d, x, y is G.



Obviously.

they have lost the song and are left with only noise. — unenlightened

...though part of my interest here is also in how it seems plausible that sound would effect things in a strictly physical analysis, and if you replicate effects you'll observe consequences, and the whole project can superficially be read as obvious woo.

I stopped 1/2-way through the video you linked because the studies they cited all had the same problem, and that's more or less what I saw when I looked into this. (tho tell me if I ought continue)

But the idea is super interesting and could be rigorously tested without much of a theory. Lots of good data could be produced on the question that controlled and tested for so, so many things. It's just seen as too magical.

For me I like the idea of finding ways of making the songs make sense in the noise, to utilize your metaphor.

Keep 'em coming.

I like to be corrected -- it helps me learn. Alot of this is fuzzy in my head so I'm all ears -- formal training was an eternity ago, light, and now I just read logic books on my own in my free time for fun like a nerd.

Learning is one of the nice things about TPF.

Isn't formal language a part of natural language? — Banno

I agree with on truth, or at least that's basically been an intuition that my other argument in the other logic thread relies upon, and I'm suspicious of substitution with respect to natural language -- it has more boundaries to it than we'd formally expect. That's why I conceded the point to @TonesInDeepFreeze about ironic statements, in natural language, don't fit the form of the OP.

@Srap Tasmaner -- My introduction to propositional logic and set theory came from a math class, so I do think there's some overlap between math and logic. What makes me hesitate to reduce logic to math has more to do with thinking about informal logic as still a part of logic, even though it doesn't behave in the same manner as formal logic -- at least by my consideration. I can understand a reductio without a formalization of it, and it always seems to me that that underlying, vague intuition of reasoning is basically what we check our formalisms against, in particular circumstances.

Oh, nitpick away. I don't pretend to have a mastery here -- just an interested person who doesn't mind being corrected.

So "P → Q" can be read as "P is contained within Q", and it makes sense of material implication because P can be empty set, which is a member of every set.

Okay. I was twisting things around with probability because of the example, but they're not related.

I flip these values accidentally in my mind all the time. I could just be confusing myself. When stating it in terms of probability space my thought is that we can look at A and its negation as a probability space -- say a quarter that's fair has a 50 percent chance to land heads, and since there is only one other possibility (we could call it "Not-heads") we can deduce that not-heads' probability "is contained within", i.e. determined by, the probability of Heads.

Sort of thinking about future events in analogue to the bag of different colored marbles -- George is late has 99 white marbles, George is on time has 15 red marbles, and George doesn't show up is 1 black marble.

I find the visualization helpful. We're just doing Venn diagram stuff here. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes that's very helpful, thanks. I was getting lost in the idea of a probability space and how that relates to "contains in", but the visualization makes it quite literal and easy to comprehend.

So going back to

Ask yourself this: would "George will not open tomorrow" be a good inference? And we all know the answer: deductively, no, not at all; inductively, maybe, maybe not. But it's still a good bet, and you'll make more money than you lose if you always bet against George showing up, if you can find anyone to take the other side.

"George shows up" may be a non-empty set, but it is a negligible subset of "George is scheduled to open", so the complement of "George shows up" within "George is scheduled", is nearly coextensive with "George is scheduled". That is, the probability that any given instance of "George is scheduled" falls within "George does not show up" is very high. — Srap Tasmaner

The probability space here is the set of possible outcomes we've thus far observed and, under the assumption that the distribution over that probability space has not changed -- George hasn't converted to the church of punctuality, giving us a reason to believe the probability space has changed -- the good bet is he'll show up late.

EDIT:

Wrapping that back to the OP, now...

A -> ~A
A
Therefore ~A

The (probability) space of A is entirely contained within the (probability) space of not-A.


Well, of course it is. That's almost a restatement of the probability of P v ~P equals 1.


Not sure where I'm going with this, just thinking out loud more than anything.

https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs103/tools/truth-table-tool/