It was Mary Midgley, and here's @Banno's thread on it: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/11175/philosophical-plumbing-mary-midgley/p1

do you have a better alternative to explaining the bizarre death sentence that "the 11" gave him? What was Socrates trying to accomplish? — ProtagoranSocratist

I take him at his word in the apology. He's a gadfly trying to move the city towards a healthy way of life.

And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if you kill me you will not easily find a successor to me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by God; and the state is a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel out of temper (like a person who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and you think that you might easily strike me dead as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say that I am given to you by God, the proof of my mission is this:—if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in my doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient witness to the truth of what I say—my poverty. — Plato, Apology

I think the world, in general, is pretty bad overall. I'm not so sure about "worse" as much as I've become more knowledgeable about how the world works.

But what has gotten better is my ability to live with depression, and that's made a huge difference in my life satisfaction.

A large portion of the fruitless arguments here on the forum result from lack of metaphysical clarity. — T Clark

How do we achieve or pursue metaphysical clarity?

It's interesting to know also that "Metaphysics" isn't even a precise way to label his book, it's terminology after the fact. — ProtagoranSocratist

Yup. That much is good to note, I think, because it shows how Aristotle isn't the arbiter of metaphysics, but rather the term was developed over time and became to mean something.

In the name of simplicity: I agree with you!

Now what?

So @Wayfarer is not committing the genetic fallacy by referencing Aristotle.

I understand that instinct, but to reject Aristotle on the subject while comparing him to cartoons is to misunderstand the subject.

It's simple until it is not simple :D

I think it's not so easy to define, but I agree with your assertion that metaphysics is about the nature of reality.

"Being qua being" would be the Aristotelian approach, as I understand his metaphysics.

I suppose really I just want to highlight that even giving a suggestion for a starting point -- be it a quick and easy definition or a reference to a historical text -- is the sort of thing which metaphysics can question, which is why it's hard to define.

He is engaging and really funny, though I have to note that his history is almost more of a joke book than a proper history of philosophy. It says true things about the ancients, but it skips over the medievals and bastardizes the German philosophy (in an albeit funny way).

My reason for responding to @Clarendon was because I thought Clarendon might be committing the same fallacy he's accusing @Wayfarer of, but not noticing it because it has been used for less time.

I.e. to ascribe a real meaning to "metaphysics" such that one can say "That's not how to understand 'understand metaphysics" is to simply point to a different body of texts that define it differently, rather than to argue for why that's the better way.

Given my various stances on metaphysics I've said it's a similar bubble-popping method that I'm employing.

That Aristotle's work so named is concerned with similar enough things that starting with Aristotle isn't bad.

It's a serious question. What is the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means?

I am saying that it is not the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means. — Clarendon

What is the way to understand what 'metaphysics' means? Listen to @Clarendon says on it?

I'm still struggling slowly through "Question and Answer". — Jamal

Oh yes much more can be said on each of the sections. I sort of jumped ahead because the text started to flow, but in that way where I'm just seeing one pattern -- i.e. if something didn't quite click I let it go to keep going and move with the thoughts as I was perceiving them.

Just noting it as a mark for where we're at roughly. (I've found myself rereading each of the sections multiple times so far in our reading group and never regretting the reread like it was a waste of time. the text is very dense, in the good way)

(In no way equating marriage to murder, btw. :grin: ) — javra

Well, not today at least. There are times...

That said, again, my interest here is in what Epicurus himself taught.

I'm interested in that too. And in helping people to understand the philosophy generally. I had mistaken your counters to @180 Proof for what they are.

But

I can concede there. Still, improper expressions can all too easily lead to improper interpretations and the misinformation that can then follow. I do like your general rendition of Epicureanism, though. — javra

Hard to argue with that, isn't it? :D Thank you.

Whether the rendition is correct: I know more needs to be said, which is why I began with the tripartite theory of desire, but the down-and-dirty version of what is good and what is bad -- which the philosophy itself sort of doesn't pursue at all -- made sense to me. It's not like it's easy to summarize these ancient philosophies so they're digestible.

As to the quote you presented, please notice that I did not state that "romantic love always leads to unnecessary pains" or something similar whereby it is "a bad/wrong onto itself", but that it is best shunned because in most cases, aka typically, it does — javra

Sure, makes sense. Though I'd put it that this was the man speaking more than the philosophy -- yes, Epicurus the man cautioned against it. But the Epicureans calmly went about doing it anyways as evidenced by the continuity of the texts from Epicurus' time to Cicero and Lucretius. How to explain that?

For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom. — javra

Is the part that made me think so, along with the other two examples you meant to counter @180 Proof's summary with.

It occurs to me that we may just be disagreeing on what constitutes a good enough summary -- I read your examples as something which were counter to Epicureanism in addition to @180 Proof's rendition, but is that wrong? You're disagreeing with Epicurus, in one sense of with the man himself, and you're disagreeing with 180, in the sense that his rendition is incorrect?

But, in point of fact, in “not really” concluding that you are then concluding that peer-reviewed quotes such as this with scholarly references are erroneous.

Epicurus actively recommended against passionate love and believed it best to avoid marriage altogether. He viewed recreational sex as a natural, but not necessary, desire that should be generally avoided.[38]
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicureanism#Ethics — javra

I do not think that scholarly reference is erroneous. That's why I said:

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural. — Moliere

Yes, there's a kind of love Epicurus cautions against. No, that does not mean that marriage is a bad unto itself.

Rather it's a natural, unnecessary desire -- Epicurus didn't want to marry, but that does not then mean that marriage is bad.

I then take it that you find Epicurus wrong in his stance that romantic ("passionate") love, and marriage, are to be generally shunned. — javra

Not really -- I'm giving an exposition of what I think a reasonable Epicurean response to your example. As in Epicurus wouldn't say "Do not marry", but would instead contextualize your action back to why you're doing what you're doing. Romantic love is not to be generally shunned -- it's not a bad unto itself. It depends upon why you're motivated towards it.

If it be a romantic love in the sense of Romanticism -- full of pathos and self-justifying -- then that sort of love I think Epicureanism is opposed to. But Epicureans did marry and have children, even if The Master did not. So there must be a kind of sexual love that was generally deemed as OK. Even if there be a honeymoon phase that fades away -- that's only natural.

You seem inclined to defend and uphold Epicurus's doctrine. — javra

I'm willing to play the apologist in order to increase understanding.

OK Can you then comment on your own stance as regards romantic love being a general wrong as per Epicurus's convictions?

Sure.

The outline of desire to which @180 Proof wrote needs further specification to address why, though.

There are three kinds of desires: the fulfillable and the unfulfillable, and that which falls in-between. Or another way to put the same categories: the natural and necessary, the unsatisfiable, and the natural and unnecessary desires.

Romantic love in this division falls under "natural and unnecessary"; one may live a content life without it, and one may live a content life with it -- the important part is to live a content life. Similarly so with the marathon runner: If someone is taking on the pains to run marathons out of the pleasure of running a marathon then there's nothing wrong with pursuing a natural, unnecessary pleasure (unnecessary here because one need not run marathons to live a content life). What would be in error, though, would be to run marathons out of a fear of death because no matter what you do you'll die, and then the entire time you're here all you did was spend time pursing that fear.

To put that latter part in terms of the lover: imagine the person who never settles down because every real person doesn't satisfy them from the vantage of "The One" -- when, really, there is no "The One", there's a relationship you can build with someone who wants similar things out of their life.

It's not that we must avoid pains -- it's that we shouldn't be the cause of our own mental anguish; the pains aren't so bad as they stand, and the pleasures are not so alluring that we need to punish ourselves for not obtaining them.

OK, I don't though. For one thing, I don't agree with Epicurus that everyone ought to be an ascetic like he was. — javra

I want to mark a distinction here: @180 Proof's description of the good/bad pleasures is accurate to Epicureanism is what I mean -- as in, descriptively, this is what Epicurus says are the good/bad pleasures in a rough-and-ready way.

With your examples what I'm saying is that the Epicurean ethic can handle them. So with:

For starters, just because most cases of romantic love lead to pains that would not have otherwise occurred does not to me entail that therefore romantic love ought to be shunned by one and all as a form of wisdom.

And your example of the marathon runner, and your example of the altruistic firefighter.

It's not that all marathon runners, firefighters, or lovers are bad. It's the ones who run marathons for glory, heroes that save people for praise, and lovers that possess their object of love that the Epicurean philosophy is aiming at.

So it's not that marathons are bad -- it's the character of the person who is running marathons in order to achieve immortality that's causing themself to be miserable.

Maybe this is all differences of opinion. So be it then.

Oh, of course it does in some way, though we can still offer reasons and such for the opinions and attempt to pursue what's good, or at least enjoy reflecting for awhile.

But my post was in direct relation to how Epicureanism was outlined by 180 Proof. And with that description I yet disagree. — javra

I thought his summation good enough, basically -- in a rough and dirty way, sure that's what the bad pleasures are, and the good pleasure is ataraxia and aponia, like the link he linked says.

I'd disagree with that link in marking a distinction between Epicureanism and Hedonism -- but I understand the distinction he's drawing (I'd just call them two types of hedonism)


Also, your post gave me an in to laying out a bit on Epicureanism -- I had been thinking about what to say yours was just the first comment that finally sparked words.

Going by Epicurus's thoughts as just outlined by you, running marathons would then be bad, this because they result in increased unnecessary pain. As does weightlifting, and a good number of other human activities often deemed to be eudemonia-increasing. The altruism to running into a house on fire and thereby risking grave unnecessary pain (to not even get into the risk of mutilation and death) so as to rescue another's life would then be bad and hence unethical? — javra

That's not quite right.

Something that's difficult to understand with ancient ethics is we have a tendency to want to classify an act as good or bad, but these ancient ethics don't address the goodness and badness of acts in the way modern moral philosophy often does. For Epicurus:

No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but some pleasures are only obtainable at the cost of excessive troubles. — Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus' Principle doctrines

to respond to your example of training for a marathon. (so it'd depend upon how much anxiety a person is burdened with in training for the marathon -- if they are tranquil and accepting of the pain then no evil is found in training and running a marathon)

For saving someone in a burning building: were you to do it because of anxiety that you would not be perceived as altruistic (even if just by yourself or before God) then that'd be bad, but if you were to do it because you have a natural kinship towards other human beings and no fear of death then ataraxia is still achieved.

That is, just as there aren't good/bad acts for Epicurus in particular there are no heroic acts one must strive towards. None of us are Odysseus and Homer is a storyteller more than a doctor: surely it's good that someone else was spared pain, and surely it's good to care for our fellow man, because this is what it means to live a good life.

But whether a particular act in a circumstance is good or evil -- as if there were some consequentialist calculus that tells us the right action to take as an individual at a given moment -- just isn't what the ethic is driving at, and is more contextual than asking after whether a particular act just is good or bad because of some rule.

Nice exposition of Heidegger's relevance to this text.

And making sense of why Adorno is tying the question to the answer: i.e. one could assert that Heidegger's opening of the question is the work, whereas Adorno wants to put that line of thought to rest in noting that for philosophy the question asked often is already connected to the answer.

This does not mean, however, as in the
constant parroting of Kierkegaard, that the existence of the questioner
would be that truth, which searches in vain for the answer. Rather in
philosophy the authentic question almost always includes in a certain
manner its answer.

Idealism would like to drown out precisely this, to always
produce, to “deduce” its own form and if possible every content...
[But]...There can be no
judging without the understanding any more than understanding
without the judgement. This invalidates the schema, that the solution
would be the judgement, the problem the mere question, based on
understanding

Although I think he wants to target all phenomenologists including Husserl with this, just to make that explicit (not that you said otherwise), and not just Heidegger -- but Sartre, and Bergson, and anyone who might lay claim to "the things themselves" absent ratio: this being a sort of "flip side" to Hegel who claimed everything is "analytic" --- the idea goes from one to the next as any philosopher could judge -- where now by looking to the non-identical we are trying to set aside our desiderata in favor of the things where we cannot do so without some sort of ratio for the things themselves to be mediated by.

EDIT: I finished Being, Subject, Object and see I was following along with the general pattern of thinking -- he notes the difference between these thinkers there while grouping them.

Adorno is very aware of this objection, which is why in the introduction and in the lectures he emphasizes that negative dialectics rigorous, stringent, and so on. — Jamal

This theme is what I think attracted me to pursue reading Adorno, along with your and everyone else's help.

Stringency, rigor, reason -- these are things I care about and only argue against because I care about them.

And Adorno is taking up dialectics, which I've always struggled with, so it helps in my understanding there too.

I'd say that's only because we're all rats in the mindless race. It's just a part of life in the capitalist world.

I'm pretty sure that's what the university is meant to be, though it fails to live up to the ideal.

Personally I think we have a preponderance of bullshit jobs in the sense we could get rid of them without much changes in terms of economic output: Rather, the structure of jobs is there to create a moral caste system of the deserving and the undeserving based upon how much money one has so we continue to make up new occupations to have a chance at survival when we could just limit the economy to the necessities -- which we've already done before in a practical way during the pandemic -- and let people live as they want while distributing out the hours of necessary labor.

But, then, why am I bigot? Or why am I, if you prefer, speaking bigotry? — Bob Ross

I don't believe you're a bigot. I think you're a person of good character: else I wouldn't have engaged.

I'd rather say that sometimes the words we use are used by others in a manner which we wouldn't approve of -- but since we live in a social world we have to find another way to express ourselves.

Make sense? I have faith in you @Bob Ross, but the words you've used are used by others who want more than a philosophical reflection.

The people in here are trying to claim that I am a bigot or at least speaking bigotry by saying that transgenderism is bad and transitioning is immoral; but yet when it is transgender person that says it now it all of the sudden isn't bigotted. — Bob Ross

I'm not following your ending here -- I'd note that there's nothing wrong with being trans or gay for the various reasons I've stated. And I don't think it's who says what with respect to this issue -- i.e. I don't think there is a morally or factually correct stance which states that trans or gay people should not be what they are.

I suspect the reason such sentiments creeped into spiritual texts is that we are the authors of our own spiritual texts and we're as imperfect as they come: Sometimes a bigot got to pen a spiritual passage.

"Transitioning" only became a thing in the past few decades — Outlander

Supposing that's true: So what?

Can't you see the lunacy in assuming a life-changing and often permanent and irreversible procedure that hasn't had the time for any actual lifelong studies to be done is the "first, best, and only option"? — Outlander

Can't you see that the life-changing decision is truly life-changing one way or the other? That to not-transition is as life-changing as to-transition?

Yes, people have to make decisions for themselves and live with that.

No, others who have feelings elsewise about those decisions don't have much of a say in what they do, and ought not to.

Would you consider that transgender person a bigot then even though they were pro transitioning as a necessary evil? — Bob Ross

A bigot? No. They're clearly in a place of conflict. I'd only want them to feel it's OK to transition while they don't think it is.

Also, come to think of it, that transgender person I mentioned to ProtagoranSocratist agreed with me that transgenderism is caused by gender dysphoria, that it is bad, and they even went so far as to say it is immoral to transition; — Bob Ross

This is exactly the sort of thing I want to combat: it's not immoral to transition. This is a false belief passed down from an ancient world where bigoted beliefs could easily be passed on.

To consider it immoral is to hate onself if they want to transition. That's a bad ethic.

Your explanation of ‘tendencies’ seems to deploy realist semantics to convey your point; and it is tripping me up.

If humans do not share a nature, then we cannot say that there is such-and-such a way a human will tend to behave because there is no such thing in reality as a human—no? — Bob Ross

Sure we can.

Because you were saying it is eudaimonic: that’s an Aristotelian term that refers to happiness as a biproduct of realizing one’s nature; and you description of Epicurean thought seemed to imply the same thing. I think I just need to understand how you are analyzing what a nature is and then I can circle back to this. — Bob Ross

I think that's not quite right :D

I'd rather say that your response here is exactly where we're missing one another.

Epicurus follows along with Aristotle's assumptions, which is why I choose him as a foil to Aristotelian philosophy.

I think Epicurus has a point about human nature that's much more limited than what he thought, though still applicable in all cases where someone wants to live a tranquil life.

I'd say that this is still eudaimonic because once one accepts they want tranquility all the other components of character-development towards one's nature come into play.

In a sense I'd say that there is more than one nature a human can pursue, even if they contradict one another in terms of what all humans can be. (I'm still persuaded by the existentialists)

Are you saying you deny that the heart functions in a way to pump blood? I don’t understand how one could hold that: can you elaborate more? — Bob Ross

I deny that there's a teleology to an organ: once the heart stops pumping this is as natural as any other function our body undergoes. We have the capacity to pump blood with our heart, and due to natural selection we're endowed with that power, but there is no truth to our teleology -- one day all of humanity will be extinct in the same way that the heart stops pumping. There is no purpose which secures these capacities.

But that's the question, isn't it? Can excluding certain debates ever be done in a philosophical manner? — Leontiskos

I'm not sure. That's what I'm attempting at the moment, though.

There's a sense in which, sure, if I follow along with the thoughts of my own heritage, I understand the lines of thought which note differences between various sexual acts, feelings, and so forth.

I think they're all mistaken, though. Were I still religious I'd consider them abominations which desecrate the texts -- human beings being what they are, fallen, of course they'd write scripture which supports bigotry against sexual minorities.

As it is I'm of the opinion that it's the religions which need to come to terms with the world we are in, if they be peaceful. If not then I suppose we get to be on different sides of a divide in spite of both wanting peace.

I think this qualifies as classical.

should try hard to entertain the possibility that some people who hold to traditional sexual ethics really are acting in good faith, and are not bigots. — Leontiskos

This has been my approach all along.

I am also strongly stating that these sorts of questions aren't really up for debate here -- but am hoping to do so in a philosophical manner. Insofar that a sexual ethic thinks that homosexuals or transexuals are immoral that is something not really worthy of debate as much as persuading someone who is reflective that they are in error.

Wonder away: But I'll insist that you're wrong factually and ethically.

Ok, but what is a ‘nature’ then? — Bob Ross

For Epicurus the human nature is more fixed (though fixed by atomic combinations so the possibilities for what a human can be is pretty large). I'd rather say that "Human nature is a tendency" while noting the useage I mean is with respect to the locution "human nature"; it's the sort of thing we mean by what something is, as you note. I just don't believe that there's exactly a set of necessary/sufficient conditions or secured by the essence of its type. Rather we have to come to some sort of understanding between ourselves in a particular conversation with respect to a question to contextualize our interests instead of thinking about human nature qua human nature.

What concepts are we considering with respect to human nature? What environment do we find these humans in already? If we're to speak biologically then we'd be talking in terms of natural selection, but in terms of our history we'd be reflecting on a different body of texts, and a different body of evidence that displays what human beings do.

For the purpose of Epicurus human nature is our tendency to get wrapped up in our desires to the extent that we are the cause of our own suffering.

"Tendency" since there are no necessary/sufficient conditions to include a member in the set "humans". That does not thereby mean that the human is not a natural human: they could participate in other tendencies. And, really, descriptively speaking, because we treat someone as a human basically everything they do is an example of human nature in some circumstance or other: the outliers are just as much evidence for our nature as the ones which follow norms as they are a possible tendency.

But that's because we treat them as such, not because they are such-and-such a thing.

No, I have not given an account of why someone should accept realism: I was noting that you are a nominalist and you are an epicurean that accepts eudaimonia which requires realism. You are holding two incompatible views. — Bob Ross

Why does it require realism?

I'd say it just requires wanting a tranquil life. For Epicurus he went out and actively recruited people due to his realist commitment, but I don't think we have to be realists to utilize an ethic. We could just want what the ethic wants.

Let me reword it in a way that you might be on board with: the anus’ natural functions are such that it secretes and holds in poop. That’s what it does for the body. You may divorce the functionality from teleology, but let’s start there. — Bob Ross

"Natural function" is the same as teleology. It'd be the sort of thing I'd deny as knowledge. Instead I think we can use our body however we see fit within its capacities: Rather than purposes there are things we have the power to do and the will to control these powers. The purpose a body has is the purpose towards which I put it, not the purpose which a theoretical device can define.

Basically the same response in noting how teleology is used in biology: Sure it is! And it's just a way of organizing our thoughts rather than the ontology of speciation. We're the ones who think in terms of form-function and that's how we make sense of the world. There's a sense in which a teleology arises but they also fall in the same sense so it's not like there's an actual proper function -- extinction is as much a part of evolution as birth, and that's when all the functions stop.

Nominalism is the view that essences are not real: you are denying realism about essences, so you are a nominalist. Semantics aside, you are still affirming realism about natures in a way that doesn’t seem coherent; but I’ll wait to elaborate on that until you give me your account of what a nature is. — Bob Ross

I associate more with nominalism than the belief "Essences are not real", so that's why I protested. If they are one and the same then no problem. (for instance I can make sense of "wholes" without "essences", which would count me out as a nominalist in some uses of that word)

How can it though if you are claiming that Epicureanism is Aristotelianism without the social obligations derivable from one’s nature? — Bob Ross

I don't agree with your characterization there -- rather there are different social obligations in different social worlds -- but in terms of hedonism it's because people want to do these things. Sometimes Fathers actually like their kids and so want to sacrifice themselves for them out of a sense of love and care. The pain isn't so bad in light of this pleasure.

Ok, would it be fair to say that Epicureanism is the same fundamental, naturalistic project that Aristotle is doing but it focuses on well-being of the organism independently of an ordering to any higher goods? For example, it seems like Epicureans would say that sacrificing yourself as a father for your son is not good; because it goes against the immanent well-being of the father and there is no recognition of the higher good that relates to the father’s role as the father. — Bob Ross

Re-reading and seeing I did not address this.

I'd rather say that a father understands their role and accepts pain when it comes.

The Epicurean cure is supposed to relieve worry about desires we can do nothing about: as human beings we want pleasure, we avoid pain, we want to live forever, and we'd like luck on our side and hope it grants us what we desire.

Since we're a social species who learns roles and desires to fulfill them hedonism can explain sacrifice.

There is much more to say, of course. I might try. — Jamal

I agree. There's much more that needs to be said for a proper summary.

Do you, on the one hand, believe that things have natures that they can realize to live a happy life (as you describe with Epicurus) or do you deny the reality of natures altogether? This seems internally incoherent to me. — Bob Ross

I deny that men or women have natures, that sex has a nature, and that gender has a nature but I think the concept of a human nature workable. And I wouldn't put "nature" in terms of "essence" either.

I don't believe in universal criteria for inclusion in a set, such as necessary and sufficient conditions, which specifies what a thing is.

But there could still be a use for "nature" in our thinking even if we're not adopting Aristotle's ontology.

I am not arguing that we can know everything about the nature of something at first glance: we’ve impacts the natures of many things over many thousands of years. It’s an empirical investigation: it is not a priori. — Bob Ross

You are arguing you can know the ends of things, though. Their teleology. Yes?

If that can come to be known over time then by what means do we infer the teleology of organs as you have?

This is the thing I'd deny empirical investigation can really do: We utilize teleological notions in biology but they're an organizing apparatus more than the ontology of speciation. Rather all we can do is describe -- at least if we play Hume's Guillotine.

If we do not then

Ok. We aren’t discussing the ethics involved in the medical industry nor what should be the ethic there: we are discussing what gender and sex are. I think you are jumping to my ethical views on sexuality when I have not imported it into the OP’s discussion. — Bob Ross

... it was explicitly your description of the anus' teleology that got me started on this line of thinking.

Likewise, Epicureanism may be an alternative: we would have to explore that; but it definitely doesn’t seem coherent with nominalism (which you accept since you reject essentialism).

This is your Argument 1. There is either Realism or Nominalism. Nominalism is not tenable, ergo Realism.

Epicurus' epistemology is one of direct realism. It's a naive epistemology with respect to the critical turn in philosophy heralded by the Enlightenment thinkers. I don't agree with it in specifics, though I think it's harmless in general -- its' major fault is shared by all other philosophical theories in that it is wrong.

I'm not claiming nominalism. I'm speaking in my own words and not as part of a category of people with such-and-such beliefs well known, unless nominalism really is nothing but the belief that essences do not exist.

I would say that we possess knowledge, though -- it is provisional and not ontological, but still knowledge of what's real. In that vein I think the poetics of Epicurus' ontology get along with what we know about the universe at present. But that's not the sort of knowledge which the Epicureans would have claimed -- they claimed to have the truth that all of reality is atoms and void.

Which I take ontology to be: not real but rather a poetics that allows us to comprehend and bring sense to the real. It does not encompass all of reality and we cannot deduce things about reality from our categories. However we define our terms the reality of things will always slip beyond our categories such that we cannot have deductive knowledge of the real, but rather provisional knowledge.

But that means the sorts of claims we find in Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, the neo-Platonists, and on forward which make claims about reality as it really is cannot be treated like we know them. They're just ways of organizing what we know into sense for ourselves so that the absurd is manageable.

So, anti-realist with respect to ontological commitments, but realist with respect to reality, anti realist with respect to essences, realist with respect to nature, and explicitly agnostic with respect to ontology: Not only is it not known, but due to our position it cannot be known.

So sex, gender, and boning under this umbrella: Speciation roughly follows Darwinian evolution because some molecules formed at one time that started to self-replicate. Natural selection took care of the rest. Sexual reproduction is a method for mixing up genes, however that's done. There's no "natural" sex as much as there are methods for swapping genetic information such that the next generation has a mixture of genes. Male/Female is a rough, metaphysical speculation which we utilize to understand this infinitely complicated process.

Gender is social and inter-social and inter-personal and personal. Sex is our metaphysical belief about others' biology, and gender is the identification one has in all the previously designated senses. It functions as a means for understanding one's role, understanding one's place within a community, understanding what desires are acceptable and what are not acceptable for the kind of gender you have, understanding the sorts of desires that are had by said gender, all in order to then enact it within the social dance. This social dance is real, note -- not essentially so, but as real as you and I talking right now. People perform gender.

The important thing to note here is that does not then mean:

Well, it wouldn’t be real; because reality is objective, and socially constructed ideas are inter-subjective (even if they are expressing something objective). — Bob Ross

Since there's no underlying reality which defines the perfect specimen of a genus the performance is all there is to it: the surface is expansive and deep, but not undergirded by a purpose or soul. Rather it's something that arises naturally through coming to learn how to act with others: socialization.


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So I'm definitely taking the critical turn more seriously than the neo-Thomists are. And without some way to specify how natures are determined rather than offering a common-sense teleology it would seem to me that the neo-Thomists aren't so much overcoming the critical turn as ignoring it and stubbornly continuing in their tried ways.

An attempted (very, obscenely brief) summation of the Introduction:

Philosophy is a discipline unto itself, and ND is an attempt at sketching a method for philosophy in light of its various previous attempts such that it is not slap-dash, not arbitrary, but still up to the classic task of philosophy: truth of the world we find ourselves in -- the truth of the non-conceptual through concepts.

OK with your help I finished the introduction now. Thing, Language, History I read as Adorno's answer, actually -- and the follow up is a "close second" through Benjamin's adherence to a tradition rather than the immediate. The last section sets out what Negative Dialectics aims to do in philosophy: save rhetoric as something more than a mere means to an end or something to be discarded as trickery.

I find the metaphor for how philosophy can be positive -- as the prism that directs the light -- Interesting.
Adorno is using one of the oldest metaphors in philosophy here that, to my mind, would run somewhat counter in some readings to what I think I've read so far. Maybe not -- the concept is not the thing (the prism is not the light) but that which operates upon the thing in order to render it perceptible. The light was there but only became a perceivable object by passing through the prism of concepts forged by philosophy.

Or maybe philosophy is the hand which spins the prism, itself the idea. . .

Something like that. It's an interesting metaphor to think through.