There's no such claim — Isaac

Then this claim of yours is a lie: neomac's false claim that there was some contiguous entity called 'The Russians' which deservedly had the hatred of because I never made such a claim, and you knew that.

You have to ask? — Isaac

Should I ask again? I want you to state what you claim to be plausible or implausible, so I can quote you, and not creatively rephrase claims as you do.

You think a dislike of racism is akin to a dislike of seafood? — Isaac

I think that you do not have the conceptual tools to make such distinction rationally compelling for the discussion at hand.

So? I don't give a shit about plausible. I'm talking about racism — Isaac

So is racism plausible or not?

They are utterly irrelevant — Isaac

Is this a factual claim or a prescription?

It's disgusting. — Isaac

I find seafood disgusting others don't. But I don't insult people for that nor object against that. Even if I managed to prove that they indeed like seafood.

I did quote you. That's what the quote function does. People can read the full posts, they're linked to the quote in question for that reason. I'm not re-pasting the entire discussion. — Isaac

Quote the original claim of mine where I stated "there was some contiguous entity called 'The Russians' which deservedly had the hatred of...", you liar.

Such was the case with Communist, Fascist and Islamist regimes, but "Putinism" doesn't have this pedigree. — SophistiCat

There might be differences, yet I’m not sure if they are enough to support your claim. The expression “Putinism” would be more insightful if it referred to distinctive/identifiable Putin’s ideological beliefs that he promotes and make a difference with his socio-cultural environment’s, but your claim that Putinism consists in “mining old tropes for ready appeal” doesn’t seem to support that, it simply suggests that Putin’s not an original ideologue. And even if, as you suggest, Putin’s motivations were cynical and not genuine by exploiting the nationalist/imperialist tropes, I wouldn’t qualify a regime “ideological” based on the honesty of its leader (and assumed it's clear what "ideological regime" is as opposed to "non-ideological regime").

And let's not forget that his daughter (presumable killed by the Ukrainian intelligence services trying to kill him) — ssu

But we can't exclude that either:
Russian political analyst Dmitry Babich shed doubt on Dugin being the target, saying that Darya was “more popular than her father” at the time of the incident. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/23/will-darya-duginas-killing-influence-the-russia-ukraine-war

neomac's flase claim that there was some contiguous entity called 'The Russians' which deservedly had the hatred — Isaac

Never made such claim. You need to creatively rephrase my claims to make a point, otherwise you would quote me. I'm responsible for what I write not for what you understand.
Besides my or Olivier's position would still be plausible, even if it were false or racist as you claim.
So for what reason are you insulting me or Olivier? Besides you support humanitarianism, insults are a form a psychological violence, which doesn't sound as supportive of human wellbeing.

then when you'll be three, you'll understand it too, don't worry.

hope these guys get what's coming to them too — Isaac

They did. At least in Belarus and Russia.

Belarus:
Government authorities have repeatedly sought to silence Ales Bialiatski. He was imprisoned from 2011 to 2014. Following large-scale demonstrations against the regime in 2020, he was again arrested. He is still detained without trial. Despite tremendous personal hardship, Mr Bialiatski has not yielded an inch in his fight for human rights and democracy in Belarus.

Russia:
Civil society actors in Russia have been subjected to threats, imprisonment, disappearance and murder for many years. As part of the government’s harassment of Memorial, the organisation was stamped early on as a “foreign agent”. In December 2021, the authorities decided that Memorial was to be forcibly liquidated and the documentation centre was to be closed permanently. The closures became effective in the following months, but the people behind Memorial refuse to be shut down. In a comment on the forced dissolution, chairman Yan Rachinsky stated, “Nobody plans to give up.”

Ukraine:
The Center for Civil Liberties was founded in Kyiv in 2007 for the purpose of advancing human rights and democracy in Ukraine. The center has taken a stand to strengthen Ukrainian civil society and pressure the authorities to make Ukraine a full-fledged democracy. To develop Ukraine into a state governed by rule of law, Center for Civil Liberties has actively advocated that Ukraine become affiliated with the International Criminal Court.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Center for Civil Liberties has engaged in efforts to identify and document Russian war crimes against the Ukrainian civilian population. In collaboration with international partners, the center is playing a pioneering role with a view to holding the guilty parties accountable for their crimes... and they didn't even report war crimes from Ukrainians?!

Putin's regime is not an ideological one — SophistiCat

Not sure what you mean by "ideological regime", but I might disagree on that one. Putin's speeches are replete of myth-building claims, philosophical references, and civilization clash rhetoric

e.g. Ivan Ilyin is among the philosophers who directly influenced Putin, Solzhenitsyn (often cited by Putin) and Dugin.

Piotr Dutkiewicz: Mr President, I would like to return to the words you have just said, that Russia should rely on Russian values. By the way, we were talking about this at a Valdai Club meeting the day before yesterday.
I would like to ask you which Russian thinkers, scholars, anthropologists and writers do you regard as your closest soul-mates, helping you to define for yourself the values that will later become those of all Russians?
Vladimir Putin: You know, I would prefer not to say that this is Ivan Ilyin alone. I read Ilyin, I read him to this day. I have his book lying on my shelf, and I pick it up and read it from time to time. I have mentioned Berdiayev, there are other Russian thinkers. All of them are people who were thinking about Russia and its future. I am fascinated by the train of their thought, but, of course, I make allowances for the time when they were working, writing and formulating their ideas. The well-known idea about the passionarity of nations is a very interesting idea. It could be challenged – arguments around it continue to this day. But if there are debates over the ideas they formulated, these are obviously not idle ideas to say the least.
Let me remind you about nations’ passionarity. According to the author of this idea, peoples, nations, ethnic groups are like a living organism: they are born, reach the peak of their development, and then quietly grow old. Many countries, including those on the American continent, say today’s Western Europe is ageing. This is the term they use. It is hard to say whether this is right or not. But, to my mind, the idea that a nation should have an inner driving mechanism for development, a will for development and self-assertion has a leg to stand on.
We are observing that certain countries are on the rise even though they have a lot of unsolved problems. They resemble erupting volcanoes, like the one on the Spanish island, which is disgorging its lava. But there are also extinguished volcanoes, where fires are long dead and one can only hear birds singing.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975



And I want to close with the words of a true patriot Ivan Ilyin: “If I consider Russia my Motherland, that means that I love as a Russian, contemplate and think, sing and speak as a Russian; that I believe in the spiritual strength of the Russian people. Its spirit is my spirit; its destiny is my destiny; its suffering is my grief; and its prosperity is my joy.”
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465

Yep. Very popular. So's football. What's that got to do with morality? — Isaac

You could ask as ironically what the fact that Mahsa Amini was killed by the morality police for wearing hijab improperly has to do with morality. Your irony has however no analytical value: if you stipulate that morality has to do only with humanitarian goals the way you define them and through the means you find more appropriate, that's an ad hoc move. Humanitarianism wasn't even a big deal among founding fathers of the Western/Christian morality: Aquinas and Sant Agustine didn't see any moral issue with slavery. There was a bloody civil war in the US ideologically around the subject of "slavery" and its morality. So I believe that for many Westerners and avg people nationalism/patriotism can not be qualified as moral now, especially after 2 WWs, yet I wouldn't relate morality to humanitarian goals as you believe it to be.
As I said, nationalism/patriotism is growing everywhere and in many authoritarian regimes is perceived as a moral-imperative.

And in what way does changing a border solve any of this? — Isaac

Fixing border issues is a solution to all problems that could realistically and actually be solved by fixing border issues everywhere in the entire known human history.

The deaths you're referring to here - Ukraine, Chechnya, Crimea - are all the result of disputes over fucking borders and of the kind of racism about so-called ethnic groups that you are so vehemently flag-waiving for. — Isaac

Well I'm fine with the universal declaration of human rights. See Article 15:

• Everyone has the right to a nationality.
• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

And I find unrealistic to expect people to give up on whatever they value whenever it doesn't seem compatible with the humanitarian goals the way you intend them.

From an analytical and explanatory point of view, you have really nothing challenging to offer.

Putin's expectations aside, I think the West has at least a couple of incentives to avoid to go nuclear in response to Putin's nuclear escalation anyways: containing nuclear escalation and proving that Russia can be beaten with conventional weapons.

One more reason to go back to the nuclear threat. Putin has nothing else left to threat the West with.

It seems clear, however, as Michael Millerman notes, that Putin's speech is fully embracing this Dugan world vision. — boethius

Dugan Dugin's imperialist world vision:
“Through rebirth as an empire, as an Orthodox empire, Russia will set an example for other empires — the Chinese, Turkish, Persian, Arab, Indian, as well as the Latin American, African… and the European. Instead of the dominance of one single globalist “empire” of the Great Reset, the Russian awakening should be the beginning of an era of many empires, reflecting and embodying the richness of human cultures, traditions, religions, and value systems.”
Great Awakening Vs the Great Reset
Dugin, Alexander

If you think nationalism is a moral cause then I can't stop you, but I don't think you'll find many people using the word that way. — Isaac

Well maybe I wouldn’t call it “nationalism” for its political implication (often associated with a negative undertone), but how about “patriotism”?
Patriotism is the feeling of love, devotion, and sense of attachment to one's country. This attachment can be a combination of many different feelings, language relating to one's own homeland, including ethnic, cultural, political or historical aspects. It encompasses a set of concepts closely related to nationalism, mostly civic nationalism and sometimes cultural nationalism. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriotism)
Besides those in the West who believe that morality is beyond nationalism/patriotism, are more likely now the minority, given the revival of nationalism, not only in the West (e.g. the patriots in America), but especially in the rest of the World at large including Russia, China, India, Brazil.
Not to mention that the moral universalism (e.g. women’s rights) has been associated with colonialism, and contrasted with moral relativism.

I don't see how. My knowledge of history is not exhaustive, but the longest actually genocidal regime I can think of might be something like the Khmer Rouge or maybe Stalin's regime. Neither lasted for "generations". — Isaac

Others do. Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Chechens lament centuries of oppression and/or persecution from Russia.

I'd be broadly supportive of the idea that mis-governance is responsible for more death overall than war — Isaac

If that’s true, go figure how worse mis-governance plus ethnic persecution/oppression must be.

I can't see how this is remotely complicated. Human welfare isn't an undiscovered planet, or some misunderstood facet of quantum physics. We've been around for millions of years, we know what we need. — Isaac

The complication doesn't come from expressing needs, it comes from satisfying them as freely as possible without others perceiving this abusive/exploitative. Millions of years ago we couldn't satisfy even basic needs (food and health) as consciously as we can do now, go figure needs socially-induced that we couldn't possibly have millions of years ago (e.g. electricity or wearing a hijab).

the unsupported generality that there's some moral weight to national identity alone. It is a means to an end, not an end in itself. — Isaac

Not sure if your distinction between ends and means wrt national identity is morally relevant.
For example I see no mention of such distinction here:
Article 15
Everyone has the right to a nationality.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

Moving a border at tremendous cost of human life is not an efficient, or conscionable method of either protecting minorities or securing resources. War has catastrophically failed to do either, in virtually all cases. — Isaac

I find your generalisation objectionable again: if Russians mange to annex and see acknowledged the Donbas regions, it's likely that the Russians living there are not going to suffer from alleged genocide and persecutions for generations to come.
Besides I still fail to understand how you calculate efficiency: what's the formula you are using?

Yes, they all take the much more parsimonious route of simply referring to 'right and wrong'. I thought that would be an unnecessarily cumbersome intermediate step. — Isaac

Parsimonious? Maybe but "humanitarian" is not mentioned even once either here:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/
https://iep.utm.edu/modern-morality-ancient-ethics/

If you prefer, consider my use of broadly humanitarian or virtuous actions as being those that are considered 'right' and their opposites 'wrong'. — Isaac

OK what do you mean by "broadly humanitarian"? do you mean human rights as in universal-declaration-of-human-rights ? Or do you mean human rights as in universal-declaration-of-human-rights and pacifism (or rejection of war)? Or yet something else?

Matters that have moral weight tend to relate to issues of "humanitarian" needs or virtues. Either the behaviour in question can be shown to lead to some material harm to human welfare, or it is non-virtuous in some way. Moving a border (in general) is neither. — Isaac

How do you know that “in general” is neither? One could argue that humanitarian needs are best handled within established administrative units. Indeed, in the specific case of Ukrainian and Russian border, your generalisation doesn’t seem to hold, Russians could argue that moving the border is meant to protect Russian minorities in Ukraine from persecutions. Ukrainians could argue that preserving the border is meant to preserve all the material resources in that Ukrainian region which are relevant for the wellbeing of Ukrainians.

'Moral' is a word in the English language, I don't have a private definition of it. — Isaac

The weird thing is that prominent dictionaries like marriam-webster, oxford and cambridge do not mention the word humanitarian in their definition of moral nor vice versa.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/humanitarian
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/moral_1?q=moral
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/humanitarian_1?q=humanitarian
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/moral
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/humanitarian

Some classes of human activities are 'moral', they concern a loose affiliation of behavioral types we've grouped under that umbrella term for various reasons (although some consider there to be only one reason, but that argument's irrelevant here)

When someone asks "what is the moral weight behind that?" they are asking for reasons why the behaviour in question belongs in that group and not some other. — Isaac

I didn't ask "How does one assign moral weight? " I asked "How do you assign moral weight?".
And the reason why I'm asking is because you claimed:

The point I'm making here is that the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is utterly irrelevant, an administrative matter. It has zero moral weight. — Isaac

How do you decide that the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is irrelevant, merely an administrative matter? On factual terms, there are people who see borders and national identity not as irrelevant nor as merely an administrative point.
So your claim "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine is utterly irrelevant, an administrative matter" is a moral claim, right? something like : "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine ought to be considered irrelevant, and bearing zero moral weight", right?
And since you claim "When someone asks "what is the moral weight behind that?" they are asking for reasons why the behaviour in question belongs in that group and not some other".
Then I'm asking you, what reasons you have to hold such a moral prescription: "the location of the line dividing Russia from Ukraine ought to be considered irrelevant, and bearing zero moral weight".

But my answer fails to give any moral weight to the hierarchical arrangement of those units — Isaac

How do you assign moral weight?

Say, it could be the end of any of these, at least in any way that matters: Russia (country, nation); Russians (people); Russian (identity, culture, language); Russians doing Russian in Russia. Something along those lines. — jorndoe

Sure. Add also the fear of losing the "alleged" status of great power. My point wasn't to deny we can figure out ways to disambiguate it, the point is that vague expressions like this have a rhetorical force both for mass propaganda and at the negotiation table, and can blend well with Putin's own personal fears.

Vagueness is key here. The term "existential threat" is not analytical but evocative and it echoes Putin's mantra that the West wants to destroy Russia. In that expression Putin can project all his own fears (to lose his power, his reputation, his life) that he hopes to share with his base. Anyways I found his speech at the Valdai Discussion Club dubbed in English: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wi24CBaqI5w let's see if there is something else to find out.

↪neomac
The head of state stating any attempt at NATO expansion to Russian borders is seen as a direct threat is crystal clear language. You asked for evidence for Russia's perception of NATO as a threat, and I've provided it. — Tzeentch

You are confused. And probably you didn't follow the reasoning which you tried to address.

One has to distinguish the evidence about threat perception from the evidence that support threat perception. The evidence about threat perception is e.g. statements by the head of state that "any attempt at NATO expansion to Russian borders is seen as a direct threat" the evidence that support the idea NATO expansion to Russian borders is a direct threat is e.g. placing nuclear strategic missiles in Ukraine. I asked the latter (What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? ) you now offered me the former.
The reason I asked for evidence that support threat perception is not because I believe there is none, but because whatever evidence is going to be offered, is still questionable as to its geopolitical implications, especially within a security dilemma where players read aggressive intentions in other player's deterring moves. That's why it's a hopeless endeavor to question threat perception when it's grounded in historical mistrust.

One could question that Crimea was in Ukrainian borders. — Isaac

Sure one can! Borders are matter of international recognition. And indeed: At first Crimean authorities attempted to claim that it was a sovereign Republic albeit with a relationship with Ukraine. On 5 May 1992, the Crimean legislature declared conditional independence, but a referendum to confirm the decision was never held amid opposition from Kyiv. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Crimea_(1992%E2%80%931995) )
So in the end the control was restored without war.

Are we really going to rehash the whole 19th jingoism? I suppose that would go well with our rush to world war three, rampant nationalism did a good job of warmongering back then, its got a good track record.

Using what exactly would one go about 'questioning' the properness of a border?

Ought we test the genetic stock of the population either side? — Isaac

Your pointless blabla doesn't take into consideration that I was talking about perceived threats, and Russia was perceived as a threat by the West and not only. I'm not committed to any specific way in which different actors understood the Russian imperialistic threat, nor ground my reasoning based on the specific case of Chechnia. But if playing dumb makes you happy, keep enjoying, by all means.

Russia was 'imperialistically' retaining territory already within its borders. — Isaac

After the collapse of Soviet Union one could question that Chechnya was within Russian borders.
The First Chechen War took place from 1994 to 1996, when Russian forces attempted to regain control over Chechnya, which had declared independence in November 1991. Despite overwhelming numerical superiority in men, weaponry, and air support, the Russian forces were unable to establish effective permanent control over the mountainous area due to numerous successful full-scale battles and insurgency raids. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chechnya

You mean the war in which; — Isaac

I mean: The Russian government began massive allocation of Russian passports to the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2002 without Georgia's permission; this 'passportization' policy laid the foundation for Russia's future claim to these territories (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement )
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-soft-power-works-russian-passportization-and-compatriot-policies-paved-way-for-crimean-annexation-and-war-in-donbas/

Oh, and do you even reslise how absurd it is to include Chechnya in your list of evidences of imperialist expansion? — Isaac

I talked about geopolitical ambitions (obvious in the Caucasian region) and arguably a case also for "Russian imperialism" since the Chechen war was a war for independence against "Russian imperialism" and perceived as such not only by the West (About 15,000 Caucasians and their supporters demonstrated in Ankara Sunday. Addressing the rally, Nationalist Movement Party leader Alparslan Turkes said, ``We support the independence of our Chechen brothers. We want the world to stop Russian imperialism.'' https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/1227/27071.html). Interestingly here is the view of Ukrainians about it:
The Chechnya crisis was condemned by the entire cross-section of Ukrainian political parties immediately after the launch of the covert war to topple President Dudayev in summer 1994. To centre right national democrats (Rukh, Union of Ukrainian Officers, Ukrainian Cossacks and the Congress of National Democratic Forces), writers and intelligentsia as well as the radical right nationalists (Ukrainian National Assembly and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists) it is a question of 'we told you so' about Russia's long-standing imperialist intentions which will sooner or later turn against Ukraine. 'In this situation the signing by Ukraine of a Treaty on Friendship with Russia will be regarded by the world community as moral support for Moscow's imperial policies', the Democratic Coalition 'Ukraine' believed. 'Russia demonstrated to the world its inability to renounce forceful dictatorship and armed intervention in deciding political problems', Rukh's leader, Viacheslav Chornovil, said. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists applauded the Estonian example of wishing to recognize Chechnya's independence. The Communist Party of Ukraine also condemned 'any forcible resolution of any kind of conflict' , The communist head of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, Borys Oliynyk, described Russia's military intervention in Chechnya as 'aggression' and its tactics as 'genocide'. The socialist chairman of parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, also came out against the use of force in Chechnya. Moroz's Socialist Party believed that, 'The Russian democrats are reaping the fruits of their own anti-national policy on the Soviet Union's collapse’.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02634939508400925?journalCode=ccas20

@Isaac try harder, you have all my humanitarian support!

The pair have already outlined a potential deal to avert a crisis over Washington's planned missile defence system in Europe, involving a string of safeguards to ensure it could not be used against Russia.
Bush has insisted the system is a shield against a potential Iranian missile attack on Europe or the US, but Moscow sees it as an attempt to blunt Russia's nuclear deterrent.

In other words
- No evidence stronger than Russian development of new nuclear weapons in 2004 and Russia suspension of CFE Treaty in 2007
- Putin's speculations about threat perception from the US despite Bush administration assurances

Whatever it is that’s convinced you of it prior to the NATO summit. I’m not interested in surmise and gut feelings. — Mikie

To that I already answered: “That’s why Russia and Putin were under NATO’s radar. By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia”.
Then you asked me for evidences about Georgia prior to the Summit and I gave you the link to wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement (which case BTW presents -similarities to what Putin is doing now in Ukraine)
Overall, Putin showed a much more assertive politics and foreign politics compared to Yeltsin, as nobody could fail to notice [1]

Regardless, I asked about the threat of imperialism prior to the NATO summit because the claim was that NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions. — Mikie

I feel compelled to prove my claims and my objections not whatever you feel the need to be convinced about. And if you lack a deeper understanding of geopolitics (including Mearsheimer’s views) than what you are showing with such objections, that’s all your problem not mine.
For example the claim that “NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions” is conceptually myopic: however it was presented by American administrations in public, the big concern about Russian (not Putin’s!) imperialist bent was present since the collapse of Soviet Union (so prior to Putin’s presidency). This threat perception was felt by everybody in that debate, and especially by Eastern European countries. The attitude toward this threat was not to deny it but to decide how to address it either by expansion of NATO (as a defensive alliance) primarily and/or by using the EU market and institutional integrations.
If your argument was geopolitically compelling, it would be even more easy for you to question the evidence of Yeltsin’s “imperialist bent” compared to Putin’s given that NATO expanded over 3 ex-Warsaw Pact states during the Yeltsin’s presidency, and there were discussions to integrate ex-Soviet Union republics. Russia was at its weakest point after the Soviet Union collapse, what was the threat then?
Besides your arguments can be retorted against you. What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? Also Putin and Putin’s administration sent ambiguous messages about Nato expansion, after all [2]
Your reasoning is conceptually flawed for the following reasons:

• Geopolitical strategising is of course speculative (BTW also for reasons explained even by Mearsheimer’s) so "speculative" is not an objection to my arguments
• It concerns threat perceptions by countries from other countries, not by specific administrations independently from geopolitical context (if not even a geopolitical theory) and historical trends. And neither you nor Mearsheimer are the ones to assess such threats but political decision makers and their advisors.
• The more mistrust there is between countries the greater is the sensitivity toward threats (so response can be over-proportionate), and the need to anticipate them (that’s the case for ex-Soviet Republics)

As Mearsheimer notes — who isn’t an “average dude” but who, unlike you and I, has studied this for decades and is considered a foremost expert on it— this claim is an invention, started especially after 2014. — Mikie

If you have your argument from authority, I have mine: for the third time, read Brzezinski who wasn’t just an academic (from Harvard) but also an actual United States National Security Advisor. Not to mention that I find Mearsheimer's views inconsistent wrt his own assumptions.

[1]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has just said that his country is working on the development of new nuclear weapons, claiming that they'll be so advanced, no other nuclear power will be able to match them. Besides sparking speculation by saying that Russia needs the weapons to deal with future security threats - President Putin was particularly vague about what these threats might be - the news has also raised fears that we could be about to see a renaissance of the old nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. https://www.nci.org/06nci/10/RNW%20Putin%20nuclear%20posturing.htm (18-11-2004)

“Join Nato and we'll target missiles at Kiev, Putin warns Ukraine” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/12/russia.ukraine

“Defying the United States, Russia agreed in July to sell $1 billion in combat aircraft to Venezuela. The deal marks the latest in a series of Russian arms sales to a state that has increasingly clashed with Washington over different ideological approaches to Latin America and the developing world.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/VenRussia

NATO members say they share the goal of bringing the adapted accord into effect as soon as possible, but had maintained collectively that they would not ratify the agreement until Russia fulfilled commitments to withdraw military forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia made those pledges in conjunction with the adapted treaty’s completion, and many NATO governments saw them as prerequisites for concluding the adapted treaty. (See ACT, November 1999. ) Notwithstanding the lingering presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia, NATO recently suggested that some of its members might soon begin their ratification processes on the adapted treaty. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-01/russia-suspends-cfe-treaty-implementation

At Munich security conference in 2007: President Putin continued in a similar vein for some time. "The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres - economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states," he said. It was a formula that, he said, had led to disaster: "Local and regional wars did not get fewer, the number of people who died did not get less but increased. We see no kind of restraint - a hyper-inflated use of force.” The US has gone "from one conflict to another without achieving a fully-fledged solution to any of them", Mr Putin said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (10 February 2007)

the Kremlin has neither forged an EU entente against America nor widened its “partnership for peace” with Washington. Instead, it has demanded concessions for the accession of former Soviet bloc nations into the European Union, sniped at the West for NATO expansion, conducted a mammoth nuclear exercise, announced the successful development of a new ICBM to defeat America’s National Missile Defense, and vigorously sought to carve out “imperial” spheres of influence in Moldova, Georgia, and the CIS.5 All these give solid reasons to think that an “integrationist” interpretation of Putin’s international strategy is one-sided and does not grasp the continuity of Russian strategic thinking. While unveiling Putin’s strong desire for inclusion in the international community and selective engagement with the West, this approach fails to capture the aspects of great power thinking which guided his strategy from the very beginning. In his “manifesto”, Putin mentioned about derzhavnosti as one of Russian traditional values on which has to be based Russia’s revival in the 21st century. Therefore, for Putin, Russia can revive and successfully develop only as a great power recognized and respected in the world. In this regard Putin warned the possible opponents to this idea in international community that it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.
https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/76701018.pdf (January 2006)


[2]
02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html



During his November 2001 visit to the United States, Putin struck a realistic but cooperative tone:

• We differ in the ways and means we perceive that are suitable for reaching the same objective . . . [But] one can rest assured that whatever final solution is found, it will not threaten . . . the interests of both our countries and of the world.

In an interview that month, Putin declared,

• Russia acknowledges the role of NATO in the world of today, Russia is prepared to expand its cooperation with this organization. And if we change the quality of the relationship, if we change the format of the relationship between Russia and NATO, then I think NATO enlargement will cease to be an issue—will no longer be a relevant issue.

Putin even maintained the same attitude when it was a question of Ukraine someday entering the Atlantic Alliance. In May 2002, when asked for his views on the future of Ukraine’s relations with NATO, Putin dispassionately replied,

• I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day, the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners.

A decade later, under President Medvedev, Russia and NATO were cooperating once again. At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, Medvedev declared,

• The period of distance in our relations and claims against each other is over now. We view the future with optimism and will work on developing relations between Russia and NATO in all areas . . . [as they progress toward] a full-fledged partnership.

From the end of the Cold War until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO in Europe was drawing down resources and forces, not building them up. Even while expanding membership, NATO’s military capacity in Europe was much greater in the 1990s than in the 2000s. During this same period, Putin was spending significant resources to modernize and expand Russia’s conventional forces deployed in Europe. The balance of power between NATO and Russia was shifting in favor of Moscow.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/

I'm struggling to think of anything more dumbfoundingly bigoted than thinking the fight for human rights is a 'Western thing'. — Isaac

A 'Western thing' more than in authoritarian regimes like Russian, Chinese, Iranian which are antagonizing the West (indeed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorial_(society)#Persecution). Keep struggling and playing dumb.

Shame not every refugee is equally as 'Ukrainian' — Isaac

You mean that Ukrainians preferring to save their lives over the Africans' are morally on the same level than Russians bombing their "brother" Ukrainians and Africans?

20 Years of Immigrant Abuses — Isaac

That's the West. And also that's the West: Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watch).

The thing to remember is that if a state fails and collapses, most of the people with technical knowledge of nuclear weapons would also be subjects for terrorists to recruit into their organizations. If successful, they won't need state support. — Christoffer

:ok:

The problem isn't really that there will be new nations with nukes, that can be resolved with diplomacy. The biggest problems are broken arrow scenarios in which nukes go missing in the turmoil after Russia collapses. Terrorist organizations could end up with tactical nukes or with knowledge make suitcase bombs out of old bombs. This could become one of the most dangerous terrorist situations in history. — Christoffer

Sure, that too. About this I read a study of 2005 (https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_859_5.pdf) reporting:
There is great concern that terrorists could obtain nuclear or radiological weapons and
detonate them in a large city. The authors analyse the technical requirements for and obstacles to obtaining such weapons. What difficulties would have to be surmounted?
Could these problems be solved by a terrorist organization without direct support from a State possessing nuclear weapons? The authors conclude that nuclear weapons are most likely out of reach for terrorists. However, radiological weapons may well be used by terrorists in the future. The possible consequences of such an attack are discussed.

Russia will probably collapse in the long run and fracture into smaller nations that want to get out of the national bullshit while healing their relations with the west. — Christoffer

In this case the next foreseeable concern for US/NATO would be - as it was for Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the Russian nuclear arsenal (and even nuclear plants) remaining in the hands of ex-Russian sub-states (with all their unresolved border issues) and the Chinese hegemonic ambitions in est/central Asia. Likely even Turkish and Iranian, at least in central Asia.

Then use reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-has-notified-us-about-planned-nuclear-drills-pentagon-2022-10-25/

weird indeed, I just upgraded my firefox version, and still the link doesn't work. :chin:

It looks more shit is coming:

https://news.usni.org/2022/10/18/accelerated-chinese-timeline-to-seize-taiwan-raises-questions-on-pentagon-priorities

https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/1129652322/ukraine-us-midterm-elections

@jorndoe it depends on the browser: the twitter link still doesn't seem to work on my firefox.

Which agreement or disagreement from the past can serve as a template for progress in the situation? That is not a rhetorical question. On the other hand, nothing discussed here has yet to approach it. — Paine

My 2 cents:

• As long as one must address the solution offered by Putin (his non-negotiable demands) to end this war without knowing what the existential threats for the Russians more specifically are, one is left with no other option than to accept or refuse it. If the existential threats for the Russians were stated in more specific terms (like the weapon system available to the Ukrainian army, the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, Russian minorities in Donbas and Crimea, etc.), one could try to propose other solutions which would take into account Russian concerns.
• In international politics, the most super-partes way one could and could have addressed this issue was by means of the UN: like UN supervised referendums (for stronger autonomy if not annexation) in Crimea and Donbas.

Russian National TV:
https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584054018145685504

(Why doesn't the tweet link work?)

If there were both statements and actions that demonstrate it. There were neither before the 2008 summit — Mikie

Again, for the third time, what kind of statements and actions would demonstrate to you an “imperialistic bent”? Statements should be like "Me, Mr. Emperor Putin feel imperialistic bent" and actions should be like


???

Ah, so that's what everyone was secretly thinking, but it was never stated explicitly. And the evidence that would lend them to secretly believe this was what, exactly? — Mikie

Anyway -- you admit it was never stated as a reason. That's a good start, I suppose. — Mikie

Geopolitical strategizing requires anticipating events in medium-long term based on a deep understanding about history, society (people and their leading elites) and geography, not on arbitrarily recent chronology of news and public speeches accessible to any avg dude, like you and me. And it's done behind doors for obvious reasons and without consulting any avg dude, like you and me. They didn’t even consult Mearsheimer, go figure!
The debate over NATO expansion behind doors was complex and nuanced, with a blend of more hawkish and more dovish attitudes toward Russia. But nobody underestimated the “imperialistic bent” of Russia, nor conflated real geopolitical strategizing (affecting the deep state) with current presidents’ preferred posture and official propaganda.

Relatedly, it is important to note that NATO expansion before February 2014 was not aimed at containing Russia. Given the sad state of Russian military power, Moscow was in no position to pursue revanchist policies in eastern Europe. Tellingly, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes that Putin’s seizure of the Crimea was not planned before the crisis broke out in 2014; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In short NATO enlargement was not intended to contain a Russian threat but was instead part of a broader policy to spread the liberal international order into eastern Europe and make the entire continent look like western Europe.

It was only when the Ukraine crisis broke out in February 2014 that the United States and its allies suddenly began describing Putin as a dangerous leader with imperial ambitions and Russia as a serious military threat that had to be contained. What caused this shift? This new rhetoric was designed to serve one essential purpose: to enable the West to blame Putin for the outbreak of trouble in Ukraine. And now that the crisis has turned into a full-scale war, it is imperative to make sure he alone is blamed for this disastrous turn of events. This blame game explains why Putin is now widely portrayed as an imperialist here in the West, even though there is hardly any evidence to support that perspective.


That's exactly right. — Mikie

That’s why you should put aside Mearsheimer for a while, take a deep breath, and start reading Brzeziński.

Feel free to cite any sources at or before the 2008 summit that support your other claim. — Mikie

From:

THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:

Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

[…]

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''

[…]

Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

[…]

Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia . A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.

[…]


Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.

[…]

The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.


Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :

If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]

My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.

[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.


"imperialist bent" is meaningless. I said "an imperialist bent on expanding". So do you mean, "What is an imperialist?" I think you know very well what that means. — Mikie

Sure "expanding", also because "an imperialist bent on contracting" doesn't sound right, does it?
I'm asking you what constitutes evidence for "an imperialist bent on expanding". What would prove that concept?

why was that not stated as a reason for NATO membership in 2008? — Mikie

NATO (very well aware of Russian elites’ anti-NATO dispositions) never planned to take a confrontational attitude toward Russia. Some NATO advisers were prospecting the European Union as way to draw Russia toward a pro-Western attitude.

How do you know there have been no negotiations? Countries contact each other through unofficial, non-public channels all the time. The fact that you claim this implies you have some insight into these. — Tzeentch

No it implies that I couldn't find anything to support otherwise from the available resources.

Second, you blame the Russians for a lack of negotiations (if such a lack there is). Do you not see a clear role for the United States, in the fact that they have made statements and carried out actions that imply they have no desire to negotiate? — Tzeentch

The point I was making is simply that as long as the existential threats are generically formulated, the only thing that remains to address is what Russia demands to restore its sense of security. While if the threat was more specific one could propose solutions (other than the ones proposed by Russia) favorable to Russia.