More on Russia re-asserting its sphere of influence in its near abroad:
https://apnews.com/article/russia-azerbaijan-putin-aliyev-tensions-relations-627104d770071082be26c189161b1ac9

More on Israel being doomed due to the Palestinian "genocide, international isolation and, especially, the holy wrath of the Arab world in the name of the Palestinian cause:
Five of the most prominent Arab sheikhs in Hebron—yes, Hebron, the heart of biblical Judea—just declared that they want to join the Abraham Accords, recognize Israel as the Jewish state and break away from the Palestinian Authority.
Not as part of some negotiated peace process. Not as part of a “two-state solution.” But as a rejection of the entire Palestinian nationalist cause.
https://www.jns.org/hebron-arab-leaders-back-joining-abraham-accords/

I was tempted to open a thread on the same subject until I found this one. Let me revive this very old topic which I find extremely interesting.

There are some points that I gathered from the opening post and would like to comment on:

01 - Ideology as “a system of ideas and ideals that form the basis of economic or political theory and policy"

if ideology is a “system” of ideas and ideals, where ideas are about how things are (beliefs) and ideals about how things should be (norms), then those beliefs and norms are somehow interdependent. If ideology is the basis for economic/political theorising and policy, then ideology is a pre-theoretical system of ideas and ideals relevant for economy and politics.
However the pre-theoretical attitude poses an issue about their determinacy and coherence. To what extent each system of ideas and ideals can be translated into a unique list of coherent and determined beliefs and norms? On the other side, isn’t it possible that ideology as a system of ideas and ideals owes its appeal and unity not to a unique list of a determined and coherent beliefs and norms, but on something else and then we arrive at this system of ideas and ideals via abstraction from a set of a determined and coherent beliefs and norms? But doesn’t this abstraction correspond to a theoretical task or to a convenient codification which fails to account for the pre-theoretical aspect of ideology?


02 - "The set of beliefs characteristic of a social group or individual"

If ideology is characteristic of a social group, then ideology is not only a shared system of beliefs, but something that helps us identify social groups.
We can group people by their age, sexual gender, the colour of their skin, their economic status, etc. but we can group by their ideology.
But here is a link to the previous question: how far do individuals share exactly the same unique list of a determined and coherent beliefs and norms? Are people grouped by ideology after surveying their approval of a unique list of a determined and coherent beliefs and norms? Do people typically show their ideological affiliation by offering the unique list of a determined and coherent beliefs and norms which their ideology consists in?


03 - an ideologue is identifiable by their rejections out-of-hand of conflicting evidences or logical critiques. Typically in preference they will attack their detractors' ethical integrity. These ad-hominum reactions can vary across a wide spectrum: From thought-blocking clichés (e.g. of "political correctness" and “bleeding hearts” from the Right) to name-calling (from "sell out" to "counter revolutionary" from the Left) to lethal violence (Fatwa-approved assassinations or the most brutal execution of heretics, by those of a more pious inclination)

Ideology as a system of beliefs and norms resists refutation (via evidence and logic criticism) and it is “thought-blocking” (like powerful emotions), and it accompanied by intellectual or physical ad-hominem attacks. Yet even though claiming that certain beliefs or norms are refutable are not an attack ad-hominem still can challenge the credibility of the attacked. So the thought-blocking factor that accompanies ideologies seems to point to a shift of focus in the ways a set of beliefs and norms is scrutinised: from empirical evidence and logic to the credibility of the interlocutors. So not only a change in the epistemic focus but also a change in method of validation. Beliefs and norms are validated as function of the interlocutors’ credibility, in light of their interest. And the interest is identified via the system of beliefs and norms under scrutiny as convenient rationalizations of self-serving interests.

04 - It seems then that ideology is not merely a framework of ideas supporting ideals and beliefs, but is actually constructed as kind of fortress against reasoned objection, and by extension, against reality itself. While not all ideologies are so malignant, it seems that as intrinsically anti-rational constructions

Being against refutation, thought-blocking, close minded ideology is then considered anti-rational. But what do we mean by anti-rational? If the method of validation is grounded on a set of norms and beliefs, such norms and beliefs can not be refuted, since the refutation must presuppose them (like Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions). But if we do not share such norms and beliefs, and they do not ground our system of validation then of course we can refute such norms and beliefs. How do we know if we share beliefs and norms grounding our method of validation for people’s credibility?


05 - 'Ideology' has become a derogatory term, a brickbat thrown at one's opposition.

The anti-rationality of Ideology turned “ideology” into a derogatory term which is used for ad-hominem attacks against one’s opposition. So even the word “ideological” can be used ideologically! Accusing others of being “ideological” not only doesn’t make somebody immune from receiving the same accusation, but it hints at it since the subjected shifted to credibility of the interlocutor.


06 - Too bad it went sour, because it would otherwise be a useful word, to describe the necessary set of ideas and ideals one needs to organize one's life.

Interestingly, ideology despite being considered “anti-rational”, it can be also seen as accomplishing a positive function, namely offering “necessary set of ideas one needs to organise one’s life”. One may wonder why “necessary”? And how does this necessity relate to anti-rationality? Do people act anti-rationally because this set of ideas is necessary however refutable? Or considering this set of refutable beliefs as necessary is already anti-rational? “Necessary” to organise one’s life in what sense?


I think that there is a key to address my questions which would help understand ideology as something more than just an irrational behavior or derogatory term, without denying such side effects. The point is really to better understand the positive contribution of ideology in somebody’s life beyond misinformation and evil intent.
Indeed, there is a pre-theoretical dimension in everybody’s life that would make a set of beliefs and norms relevant for economic and political investigation and a the same time necessary: that’s social life. The need for trustable sociable networking in which we can fit in is what makes possible to somebody organising their life, as long as we live in society or we think ourselves as social creatures.
The need of trustable networking helps us understand better many of the features attributed to ideology:
- Ideology as a system of ideas and ideals but not in the sense of forming a unique set of beliefs and norms because for a network of people which do not necessarily share same and coherent and deep understanding of beliefs and norms what is important is to “popularize” affiliation markers like slogans, symbols and gestures that testify their “trustable” ideological affiliation (no matter how overlapping the justifications are).
- Ideology as a anti-rational behavior is clear when the issue is not to know things but to maintain the trustable network
- Ideology as an epistemic shift: credibility is important for social networking and interlocutors are provoked into taking position wrt trustability. Here the epistemic method doesn’t only change focus but also method of validation in the sense that evidence is provided through provocation (resistance from refutation and attacks ad hominem), that interlocutors provoke each other to test their trustability, their fidelity to their social network.

Withdrawal from international anti-landmine treaty is the new buzz of the summer :
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/30/why-is-ukraine-withdrawing-from-the-ottawa-treaty-banning-landmines
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2025/05/08/lithuania-s-parliament-votes-to-withdraw-from-landmines-treaty_6741049_143.html
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/estonian-parliament-votes-withdraw-landmines-treaty-2025-06-04/
https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/06/26/parliament-approves-polands-withdrawal-from-international-anti-landmine-treaty/
https://www.euronews.com/2025/06/19/finlands-parliament-votes-to-withdraw-from-landmine-treaty-due-to-russia-threat

Let's all thank Russia which is working so hard for a better world, free from Western imperialism

Why “however”? What do you want it to contrast to? — neomac


The use of the word "however" is to to contrast with the fact that parties seeking their own gain at the expense of some collective gain (family, organization, business, institutional, government, country, empire, or what have you) usually don't advertise that, but will present their plan as in the interest of the group. — boethius

In order to talk about “parties seeking their own gain at the expense of some collective gain” one has to establish how collective gain must be assessed. Adopting a normative standard for it. The problem I’m pointing out is that involved parties do not necessarily share the same understanding of collective gain. So before talking about dishonesty one has to discuss about views of national interest.
The fact that accusing government representatives of being dishonest about their claims or policies over national interest, not only suggests (without proving it) one’s own honest and/or non-exploitative attitude toward national interest (how convenient is that for powerless anonymous people whom nobody would hold accountable?), but that there is a shared view on what the national interest is. Unfortunately there are competing views of ”national interest” within a nation (see pro-Ukraine vs pro-Russian views within Ukraine, or pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel views in Israel). And due to these competing views, whatever supporter of any of them can be accused of being self-serving and exploitative. Any propaganda has its counter-propaganda. Besides humans are generally more prone to detect the abuses they suffer from than the ones they inflict on others, and if offense is in the eye of the beholder, nobody can consider themselves immune from such accusations.
What I find peculiar to “national interest” wrt other concepts is that it is inherently subject to a perpetual ideological struggle with moments of greater convergence or divergence. This is what can be said, independently from what ideology one personally espouses or one side one picks.

So, party A pursues B and party C pursues D; however, party C will usually also claim to be pursuing B. — boethius

You mean, C can’t do both, pursuing B and D?
Your formula applies as well to negotiations. A sells bread, C seeks bread. If C tells A: “hey I’m here to buy some bread from you”, is C being deceitful or exploitative toward A because in reality C wants bread, not give money to A?
What is missing in your formula is what you wished to highlight: the deceitful/exploitative part.
Yet also the notion of “exploitation” can be more slippery than it looks at first. See, there are cooperative games where each player can maximise their payoffs by choosing to cooperate instead of refusing to cooperate. Yet the payoffs are unequally distributed among players. Is this enough to claim that the players who get the least are exploited by the ones who get the most? What if we also add that payoffs are not only unequally distributed but also uncertain or unstable over time? What if we also add that understanding of the payoffs and uncertainties, is not shared?

National interest is and can’t be anything else than what results from people’s self-serving interests on a national level AND given certain power relations between them. — neomac

It obviously can. You can easily have a situation where the "certain powerful people" self-serving interest would be to plunder the national treasury and make off with the winnings. This is obviously not in the interest of any sensible concept of "the nation". — boethius

Here some additional clarifications. If “nation” refers to a series of perceived common traits among certain individuals (e.g. shared language, geographic roots, ancestors, historical events, traditions, phenotypical traits, etc.) that supports a sense of collective identity and common fate wrt other nations, then each individual can form a certain understanding of what could be beneficial to the nation as a function of how representative of the nation one perceives himself (with his self-interest) to be and the kind of cooperation he expects to be likely among national fellows (given certain power relations).
Now multiply this by all the members forming a given nation. What you get is the number of views one nation can offer about their “national interest” , and we can’t simply assume they converge to the point of perfectly overlapping. So more or less competing views of national interest will struggle to become popular and politically represented. Hence my point: “‘National interest’ points at something that is the result of collective dynamics however inspired by individual expectations and wishes”. It’s a collective historical process that determines what counts as the national interest de facto, not what any isolated individual has in mind and calls national interest.
That’s where I find your focus on the honesty of powerful people about "national interest" conceptually misleading. Indeed the dishonest or exploitative intent of powerful people doesn’t necessarily compromise the fact that a policy can still be legitimately perceived in line with national interest. There might be reasons independent from the trustability of certain politicians for others to support these politicians' policies. Besides, lacking “moral” scruples in pursuing taking certain decisions and policies can’t be a-priori considered inherently unapt to achieve national interest. It’s very much human the predicament where people understand what needs to be done but lack the courage or the determination to do it, also for alleged “moral” scruples. Any society as the human beings that form it, have its own inertia due to cross-generational habits, entrenched self-serving interests and prejudices which make non-cosmetic change hardly possible for any national government. While dramatic change will likely trigger controversy and any side will invoke "morality" to rationalize their self-serving views (and "populist" views like yours are not immune from such risk either). Besides, a politician can exploitatively promote a policy which he honestly believes detrimental to national interest and yet be mistaken as much as a honest politician can be mistaken about what is beneficial to national interest.
My considerations should be hardly surprising since politicians do not take decisions in a void of collective expectations, lobby pressure, and collaborators’ advice that are integral part of a nation. Even more so where decisional power is institutionally constrained and distributed over a wider network of influential people. And things get even messier when one reasons strategically under uncertainty where the payoffs of political moves by one player are determined how all other players are moving. Also at inter-national level.
Whatever plausible moral hazard one pins on Netanyahu, Hamas leaders, Iranian leaders, Trump, Putin or Zelensky, all powerful and wealthy people, and all trapped in a conflict of interest between personal gains and their political functions, even more so in times of crisis (what unexpected is there really? How else could it be? is there any instance of power in human history immune from such suspects and fears of abuses?), is not this what I find it decisive to assess the alignment of certain decisions and policies with national interest. On the contrary, it can be misleading in making us believe e.g. that if it’s enough to remove Netanyahu, Trump, Putin, Zelensky, current Hamas leaders or Iranian leaders things will change or align better with national interest. Also discrediting them today as national catastrophes won’t preclude them from being revalued in the future as national heroes. See how Putin elevated Stalin as national hero (e.g. wrt Lenin), compared to previous presidents like Khrushchev, Yeltsin or even Medvedev. And how popular this has become amongst Russians now. Perceived national interest evolves.
It’s an entire nation that is historically engaged in determining what national interest is from within and outside pressure. And that’s why I agree with your following statement: “what exactly is the national interest, even for people trying to be genuinely focused on that, is up for debate”. However, it’s not just misinformation or evil intentions which make us debate and speculate over what’s best for national interest. It’s its inherently historical and ideological nature.

As I said you are framing a situation not in terms of competing interests, but in moral terms. This reflects your allegedly “impartial” (or “virtuous”?) interest. Yet your views are exposed to the same “bias” you are accusing others to be victim of or purposefully embracing: namely, viewing national interest in light of your self-interest. Your “populist” views are putatively aligned with those of the mass of powerless nobodies which are victims of the putative abuses of evil elites. — neomac


At this point in the discussion you are interjecting into, the debate with Tzeentch and @Benkei is descriptive of whose interest is even being served by recent policy.

@Tzeentch presents a description of the decision making process as coherent grand strategy since many decades, whereas @Benkei and I disagree the policy changes and decisions in the middle-east represent some sort of coherent US grand strategy over many decades. — boethius

Nice summary. I’m willing to accord Israel (and Ukraine and Europe) more decisional autonomy from US demands/instructions than Tzeench seems willing to concede. And I would even go further than you did: namely, even if the Israeli attacks against Iran ultimately benefits the US grand strategy, or aligns with a certain understanding of it, that wouldn’t prove that the Israeli attacks were due to the US initiative or consent.
My comment is however about something else, on purpose, no matter how tangential it looks to you. Your “descriptive” yet ideologically loaded analysis is based on certain assumptions of what national interest of the US is and how certain political decisions fulfill such national interest (“I disagree with @Tzeentch, I view the genocide in Gaza as absolutely terrible for US Imperial interests”), to then identify intent and later assess responsibility (“My analysis of the current situation is that Zionists "went for it” and tried to push the United States into a high-intensity war with Iran and the faction that stopped that from happening (for now) is the pentagon (because they know it conflicts with US imperial interest, represent far more costs than gains, have other regions they worry about, such as East-Asia)”). As far as I’m concerned, I find nothing philosophically interesting in adopting certain normative standards (e.g. genocide is bad), assess (not describe) if certain actions comply or not with held normative standards (e.g. supporting a genocidal state is bad), and then attribute intentions (e.g. the US can’t possibly have supported a genocidal state, if it wasn’t somehow forced into doing it), and later blame accordingly (e.g. sure the Great Satan is the evilest, but we can’t blame it for the initiative of Israeli’s attacks against Iran) be it in the moral or political domain. You as the others are engaging in a political debate and wish to be representative of certain political views, possibly contribute to amplify them and make them more influential (I don’t care how honestly). Good luck with that.
That’s the gist of politics and propaganda not philosophy, though. My engagement in political debates in this philosophy forum is finalised to do philosophy no to fix the world. The philosophical task, as I understand and enjoy it, is engaging in conceptual investigations. Hence my focus on the notion of “national interest” to challenge views like yours.

Here is where I do disagree with you:

In terms of how government decisions are made lot's of individuals representing explicitly and implicitly lots of mixes of interests go into these decisions.

However, all of them are going to say what they propose is in the national interest. — boethius

Why “however”? What do you want it to contrast to? What is there unexpected about the situation you are describing? Your expectations are based on reality or on your moral standards? National interest is and can’t be anything else than what results from people’s self-serving interests on a national level AND given certain power relations between them. Here what looks very ambiguous to me is the expression “self-serving”. In your views, I suspect, “self-serving” looks very much like a proxy for “selfish”, which in turn looks very much like a proxy for “I’m not as much selfish and I can honestly judge who are more selfish ad who aren’t, and I defend the interest of the powerless against the abuses of the selfish powerful”.
In my views, self-serving interests can simply be seen as a proxy for “competing” interests for both powerful and powerless players. There is no need to frame things with an allegedly “impartial” psychological analysis which is a surreptitious proxy for a self-promoting moral judgement and blame shifting. That’s why I’m reluctant to describe things in your self-serving psychological terms.

So, everyone is always talking grand strategy and sometimes that's in earnest (as earnest as they can, such as the authors of the Brookings paper discussed above) and sometimes it is obviously a lie — boethius

.

As I said you are framing a situation not in terms of competing interests, but in moral terms. This reflects your allegedly “impartial” (or “virtuous”?) interest. Yet your views are exposed to the same “bias” you are accusing others to be victim of or purposefully embracing: namely, viewing national interest in light of your self-interest. Your “populist” views are putatively aligned with those of the mass of powerless nobodies which are victims of the putative abuses of evil elites.

A "healthy" Empire, the plausibly objective interest of the Empire as such manages to assert itself over special interests that wish to plunder the Empire or otherwise consume its capital base (including diplomatic capital) for their own ends. An unhealthy Empire everyone comes to divide up the spoils and get away with their pickings. — boethius

What does “healthy” mean? Who is going to assess what is “healthy”? The slaves of an empire or the lords of the empire? What if they do not converge on what's "healthy"?
What you call “healthy” may simply be the fact that people within a community cooperate more effectively wrt people of another community, where “more effectively” means that the community’s perpetuation and prosperity benefits from such cooperation. But that doesn’t exclude stubborn and toxic competing interests within a community and amongst communities that can erode cooperation to the point of triggering a vicious cycle of suspicion and accusations.

"National interest" points at something that is the result of collective dynamics however inspired by individual expectations and wishes

However, even then, what they come to define as "US interest" is going to be shaped by more powerful players that may have self serving definitions. — boethius

I'm very skeptical about this approach. If you want to understand how things are, then why do we not start by taking powerful players (with their self-interest) as condition of the game and not in light of what the powerless people wish them to be (which again can be considered self-interested, namely based on the self-interest of the powerless players, no less hypocritical)? if we are talking about "interest" as in "national interest" of course a conceptual framework MUST take into account the interest of the involved subjects including powerful players. We are tempted to say: yes, but of all people part of "nation". Agreed, yet the nation includes also power relations between individuals. As national interest at interstate level must take into account power relations among states, so the notion of national interest MUST take into account power relations also within a nation. "Interest" is a very indeterminate notion per se if we do not assess costs and benefits, risks and opportunities that are de facto shaped by power relations. That's why strategic thought can impose itself and lead people and states to convergence independently from self-interest (see how people and states can converge on what is the perceived "common enemy").
Setting objectives that go beyond one's means is a problem for both powerless and powerful people. Powerful doesn't mean all mighty as much as powerless doesn't mean impactless (most certainly not, at a mass level). We disagree less on what is desirable (everybody happy rich healthy free fully-developed for all human beings and possibly animals and nature in the past present and future, on a universal and infallible just society) than on what is achievable.

In these decision making processes everyone uses strategic language. For example, if you represent the arms industry and all you want is to sell more arms and have more wars and tensions to sell more arms for short term shareholder value, you're not going to just say that; rather, you're going to translate your interest to sell more arms into grand strategy language.

It's called rationalizing. — boethius

Also psychologizing is a form of rationalization. Arguably the most hypocritical form of rationalization.

I know, dismissing interlocutors is cheap, offering pertinent arguments isn't as easy. Unfortunately you can't emojy your way out. You really have to argue pertinently to earn respect, or at least pity.

You’re too stupid to engage with, sorry. — Mikie

I questioned your imbecile comment with pertinent arguments.
And that's why you deserve no pity.

Russia has succeeded in its goals — Mikie

You mean:
- "Denazification" of Ukraine
- Demilitarization of Ukraine
- neutral status of Ukraine
- no NATO access for Ukraine
???
None of these have been achieved so far.

Occupying/annexing land that is not internationally recognized so far is what Russia has managed to achieve. And it's highly questionable the idea that the strategic goal of Russia was just about occupying and annexing Ukrainian land, as if Russia didn't have enough land already.
Breaking the international order the way Russia did is really serving Russia's national interests? We have reasons to doubt it (see my previous comment)

which was never to conquer all of Ukraine — Mikie

It didn't need to conquer the all of Ukraine to control and justify their control of the WHOLE of Ukraine.

Looking forward to reading more of your imbecile comments.

The aggression of Ukraine is looking more and more like a strategic blunder by Russia, doesn't it?
- NATO was enlarged and revived [1].
- Loss of influence over the Middle East (see Syria and Iran) and the Mediterranean sea (see the fate of the Black Sea Fleet [2]).
- Weakened control over Central Asia (thanks to Turkey and China [3]).
- The war in Ukraine to gain control over the WHOLE of Ukraine isn't over yet (after 3 years) and unlikely to succeed given that the US is looking forward to stepping in once the war is over.
- Growing dependence on China [4]
- Also economic recession is looming [5]

[1] "Nato leaders confirm defence spending will rise to 5% of GDP and say support for members is ‘ironclad’": https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/jun/25/nato-donald-trump-mark-rutte-europe-latest-live-news
[2] "Ukraine has ‘significantly degraded’ Russian Black Sea fleet" https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/ukraine-has-significantly-degraded-russian-black-sea-fleet/
[3] "China’s influence is growing in Central Asia. What does that mean for Russia?" https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3315092/chinas-influence-growing-central-asia-what-does-mean-russia
"Turkey’s Pivotal Moment With Azerbaijan"
https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/04/30/turkey-influence-azerbaijan-armenia-treaty/
[4] "Xi in Moscow: China's role in Russia's economic survival" https://www.dw.com/en/xi-jinping-china-russia-trump-tariffs-trade-economy-oil/a-72460014
[5] "Russia’s economy minister says the country is on ‘the brink of recession’" https://apnews.com/article/russia-economy-recession-ukraine-conflict-9d105fd1ac8c28908839b01f7d300ebd

Putin insisting that the WHOLE of Ukraine is Russian:

Trump's wet dreams about Russia?
1. Russia wrecking Ukraine until exhaustion of both, allowing then the US to exploit Ukraine’s resources under Russia’s nose (Ukraine split in two spheres of influence like Berlin during the Cold War ) and conveniently encourage a longstanding antagonism between Russia and Europe. While maintaining an influence over Europe and Russia isolated, the US could still keep it in friendly terms with Russia, playing both sides to maximize the US strategic advantage and global leverage.
2. Israel wrecking Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian regime to benefit not only Israel and Arab countries (eager to normalize relations with Israel), which fear the Iranian influence in the region, but also to further weaken Russia’s and China’s political and economic partnership with Iran. If Trump could impose a deal to a capitulating Iranian regime (ostensibly focused on nuclear issues, but likely also targeting oil and gas exports), the US would not only cement its status as the world’s leading oil and gas producer, but also gain the power to influence Middle Eastern energy production and markets. This would sideline Russia and China, undermining their influence and economic interests in the region, and further consolidating/preserving American dominance on the global stage.

Suppose I ask someone why they believe P. They answer, "Because I hold to S and S implies P," where S is a "way of life."

What is your objection? Apparently it is that S is an "experience," and, "experiences are not claims over how things are."

So while I would say to them, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt," you would say to them, "S is an experience, not an assertion, and therefore it cannot imply P." They would probably just tell you that they hold to S because they believe it is true, or else that they hold to it because it is good and what is good is true. S is not merely an experience; it involves a volitional and normative choice.

The reason I find this conversation so bizarre is because you are basically denying empirical facts — Leontiskos

First, as I clarified in my first post, I’m talking about logic implications. but I do not exclude that there are more equivocal ways of using the word “implication” in common usage.
Second, logic implications are functions in the domain of truth values and we use it to construe complex descriptions which can be true or false from simpler descriptions of how things are. Reasons to believe could be any source of information (including empirical facts, of course) that gets in the actual and fallible (I’d also add “conscious”) process of forming a belief. A sharp knife dirty with blood found hidden in X’s house can be claimed by a detective to be a reason to believe that X is the murderer of his/her neighbour. But a sharp knife dirty with blood itself is not a claim over how things are.
Third, logic implications are used in explanations (also in causal explanations) to express a truth-functional dependency between certain described conditions. Both descriptions and explanations are fallible. They can also fail for conceptual reasons: as I clarified in my first post, "If P is truth-apt then S must also be truth-apt" doesn’t make any sense if we are talking about logic implications for the conceptual reasons I already pointed out. The truth-aptness of S can not be implied from the truth-aptness of P since logic implications can apply only to truth value bearers like descriptions. It’s the semantics of “logic implication” that requires the truth-aptness of all its arguments prior to even applying the logic implication. We do not discover the truth-aptness of one argument from the hypothetical truth-aptness of the other argument AFTER applying a logic implication. One can't meaningfully apply "logic implication" to arguments which aren't already truth-apt.

People do justify propositions on the basis of ways of life, including religions. It seems like you are committed to denying this fact. In Western countries with a right to religious freedom it is commonplace in law for someone to justify a belief or an action on the basis of a religious "way of life." — Leontiskos

As I said, reasons to believe “could be any source of information (including empirical facts, of course) that gets in the actual and fallible (I’d also add ‘conscious’) process of forming a belief” . The categorical mistake you are committing is to believe that a truth-apt description of a certain reason to believe something makes the reason itself truth-apt. I can believe certain things for conceptual reasons, factual reasons, causal reasons, logic or arithmetic reasons, emotional reasons, moral reasons, etc. that doesn’t make those reasons themselves truth-apt, at least not in the same sense descriptions are.

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand? — neomac


If you want to distinguish so strongly between believed logical implications, and other logical implications, then why don't you point me towards a logical implication that is not believed? Because you seem to think that if "the implication is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication." What this means is that in order for there to be a real implication it must not be believed to hold. You will have to point me towards that real implication, the kind that is not believed to hold. Where can I find that? — Leontiskos

Our first-person understanding of our own beliefs is that they can be fallible no matter if the content of our belief refers to a fact or a logic implication. So it’s from within our own beliefs that distinction between what is believed and how things are must be maintained. Otherwise just believing that something is true would make it true.
You keep understanding what I’m writing in light of your categorical mistake, not on its own terms. Logic implications are kind of cognitive rules which we can use to process information and can still fail to do so.

You stated an implication, but that doesn't make it true. So what does make it true? — Leontiskos

All the circumstantial conditions (empirical or not) that we take to be relevant to validate that implication. For example, I’m at home and I hear ringing at the door, so I believe that if behind the door there is somebody, then this is my friend which I previously invited at home that day and that time. Then I open the door and see that indeed my friend is there. In this case, I can hold my implication to be true. On the other side, if it’s my neighbor asking me to borrow something from me, then I can hold the implication I believed in false.

Note that your focus on "objective implication" is beside the point. Here is my argument:

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos


We could write this as a conditional, "If S → P and P is truth-apt, then S is also truth-apt." That is "objectively true," if you like. We could adapt it for belief, "If someone believes that S → P and that P is truth-apt, then, logically speaking, they ought to believe that S is also truth-apt." Of course this is redundant, given that whenever we present an argument we are attempting to influence the beliefs of others.

Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that, but I want to specifically highlight the independently-derived truth-aptness of P given my interlocutors and the positions they are holding. — Leontiskos

Again, do you read what your write? I already made my objection in my first post against your argument (“Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is”). Then you say “Originally you were arguing that if S → P then both S and P must be truth-apt. Sure, I agree with that”. But if you agree with my objection that highlighting attempt doesn’t make any sense. What you can do instead is to check if your interlocutor formulates their reasons to believe via logic implications and go from there to review your interlocutors’ claims.
But even in this case we should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications. Indeed, one can use logic implications to convey the idea of a dependency between claims (and that is what you seem to be trying to do with your highlighting). But that doesn’t mean that our reasons to believe are all “claims” over how things are. Experiences are not claims over how things are. Concepts are not claims over how things are. Logic and arithmetic functions are not claims over how things are. Yet experiences, concepts, arithmetic and logic functions are very much part of the reasons why we believe certain things. For example, I believe true that if x is a celibate, then x is not married. What makes it true? The semantics of “celibate”, but “celibate” is a concept not a claim over how things are.
Even the relation between a rule and its execution is a form of dependency that one can render as a logic implication, but it would be totally misleading, actually a categorical mistake, to claim that the relation between rules and their execution is a logic implication. I can claim: If “3+5” expresses an arithmetic sum, then its result is “8”, that doesn’t mean that the relation between the arithmetic sum rule and my actual calculation there is a logic implication, and this time not only because I can fail the arithmetic rule in an attempt to follow it, but also because an arithmetic sum is an arithmetic rule not a claim over how things are, and my mental calculation is a cognitive process not a claim over how things are.

Here is another example of confusing way of talking: the concept of ‘’logic implication” implies truth values. But that can’t possibly mean that there is a logic implication between the concept of logic implication and truth values. What it means is that truth values are integral part of the semantics of “logic implication”.

If I question P and someone says that P is justified on account of S (or that P is true because of S), then we have a putative logical implication between S and P. This shouldn't be as hard as you are making it. — Leontiskos

Do you read what you write? “putative” means that the implication that is believed to hold, in fact it may not hold. So no implication. What’s so hard to understand?
A justification can be understood as a rule based cognitive process by which we derive certain beliefs from some source of information. Logic implication is one of such rules. One thing is the rule another how we process it. You have to compare a logic implication with an arithmetic sum. Arithmetic sums apply to numeric values as much as logic implications apply to truth values. Still we can fail to process them correctly. That “2 + 3” “putatively” equals “23” to me, means that I failed to apply the arithmetic sum between 2 and 3. Namely, 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum 2+3. Is that hard to understand?

You seem to think that the person is not asserting a logical implication between S and P, but I really don't follow your reasoning. — Leontiskos

I have no problems with people asserting logic implications, I’m simply claiming that you can not conflate logic implications with inferences based on logic implications, nor conflate justifications and reasons to believe with logic implications. Logic implications are like rules, that we can successfully apply or fail to apply. Logic implication and arithmetic sum can not be meaningfully claimed to be fallible. What is fallible is our processing of logic implications and arithmetic sums.

If some onlooker said, "They don't believe P because of S; rather, they believe P because of T," then we would have to talk about beliefs, causality, and all of the other tangents you want to bring in. But there is no need, because we are talking about people who are claiming justification for their own beliefs, and that's what logic always is. — Leontiskos

No I’m pointing at a basic categorical mistake you are committing. It’s like you are confusing a rule with the execution of it. It has nothing to do with first-person vs third person reports. A first-person claim that I believe there is an apple on the table because I see an apple on the table, or that my belief that there is an apple on the table implies that I see an apple on the table (or that there is an apple on the table), doesn’t mean that a logic implication holds about what is believed and the source of this information. Stating a logic implication doesn’t make it true. So a “putative” case of logic implication which does not hold is no logic implication. The fact that 23 does not result from the arithmetic sum between 2 and 3 is not matter of first and third person report.

Reasons given for truth or true belief are logical implications. "There is an apple on the table because I see it" - <See → exists>. The implication need not be infallible or necessary, so it matters not that it "could be false." — Leontiskos

We should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications, because reasons to believe have to do with the actual formation of our beliefs, their genesis.
We should not confuse reasons to believe with logic implications, as much as we should not confuse an arithmetic sum with calculating an arithmetic sum or a deduction from certain premises through logic operations like logic implications with logic implications.
The process by which we derive certain beliefs from a certain informational source can be understood in causal terms or as rule-based cognitive activity.

The implication need not be infallible or necessary — Leontiskos

I have no idea what "fallible logic implication" means. Either the logic implication holds or it doesn't. Our beliefs can be said to be "fallible" not logic implications. Logic implication is a function which applies or not. If it does not apply, then there is no logic implication. On the other side, we can succeed in processing a logic implication or we can fail it.

If you believe that your vision of the apple implies its existence, then you believe the logical implication. — Leontiskos

Focus, you have moved from describing a genetic relation between belief and their reasons as a logic implication (which I’m questioning) to a belief on a logic implication. Sure, if I believe in a logic implication, then I believe in a logic implication. So what? That’s not the point.

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. — neomac

Yes, it does, in precisely the way that is required for the relation I have pointed out. If someone holds proposition P because of S, then S is truth-apt. It doesn't matter if, for instance, S is one conjunct within a conjunctive antecedent (i.e. if S is only jointly sufficient along with other conjuncts). — Leontiskos

Focus, I’m talking about logic implications because you seemed to talk about logic implications in that quote while using the symbol "→". That was clearly stated as a premise in my first comment. If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, not even between their descriptions (if S = “I believe that an apple is on the table” and P = “I experience an apple on the table”, then “S → P” can be false, because S can be true while P false). The relation between belief and experience could be understood in causal terms or rule-based terms.
So either you are confused about what logic implications are, then my comment wasn't out of place. Or you are not confused, then you could have simply said: "no I'm not talking about logic implications" instead of coming back with a pointless rebuttal wrt my comment.

Why insert yourself into a conversation if you do not understand the context? — Leontiskos

Oh, you mean that if I understood the context of the conversation, I would have said something different about logic implications? Why do you answer me if you do not understand my comments to your quotes?
Claims of yours like the one I quoted may contribute to make the context of your conversation hardly intelligible. In fact, even after reading the post you pointed out I didn’t get what you were referring to in your quote.

Good, but what is the premise of your point here? It is that, "No one would ever say that S implies P and yet S is not truth-apt." But we have folks doing that all the time on TPF, including within this thread. — Leontiskos

My comment to your quote is clearly premised with “If the symbol '→' unequivocally expresses a logic implication”. So my or your opinion about what people say or said in this forum or outside is irrelevant. And even if it mattered, I would tell them the same I said to you about logic implications.

We regularly see folks who respond in this way: "Why do you hold P?" "Because of S, but S is not truth-apt." — Leontiskos

"Holding P because of S" does not necessarily refer to a logic implication between P and S. And if S is not truth-apt then it doesn’t make any sense to claim that there is a logic implication between S and P.

One of the examples I pointed to was an entire thread arguing for that idea. — Leontiskos

I’m not sure what you are referring to. Can you quote the claims which triggered that comment of yours I quoted in my first post?

Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. — Leontiskos

If the symbol "→" unequivocally expresses a logic implication, then it expresses a truth function (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth_function), where the truth of the implication must be assessed wrt the truth of S and P in a certain way (i.e. according to the truth table for the logic implication https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_conditional#Truth_table). For that reason it doesn't make any sense to say "It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is" because if one talks unequivocally about "logic implication" then the kind of thing S must be is already constrained by definition: S and P must be something capable of being true or false. So S can not be whatever kind of thing, since there are things that are not true or false like a stone. That's also why it doesn't make any sense to infer the truth-aptness of S from P based on a supposed logic implication between S and P. S and P must be truth-apt for an implication between them to make sense, we do not need to suppose P to be truth-apt nor to infer S truth-aptness from P truth-aptness through the implication.
Your claim sounds as silly as claiming "suppose the arithmetic sum x + y = z, and that x and y are numbers. The result of that sum is that z is a number, no matter what kind of thing z is"

But I did wonder about feelings like the feeling of falling, or the feeling of an insect crawling up your arm, or feeling sick (nausea) or dizzy. "Feeling" seems to cover a multitude of sins, some of which count as emotions. — Ludwig V

I can agree on that. To my understanding too “feeling” has a wider meaning than “emotion”. And while emotions are feelings, not all feelings are emotions. That’s why I’m reluctant to accept the equation between feelings and emotions you attributed to me.

Feeling confident is certainly something we say, and you seem to recognize that it is not the same kind of feeling as feeling angry or happy when you call them epistemic. I don't have any intuitive understanding of that category, so I feel somewhat at sea. — Ludwig V

“epistemic” refers to the fact that the “confidence” we feel is about holding something to be the case. In the religious context, people believe in things like Gods, angels, demons, souls, Afterlife, miracles.
In more ordinary contexts, our epistemic confidence is solicited or challenged by other peoples’ behaviour wrt our expectations about their behavior. But, as I said, in my first post epistemic confidence may concern also our own sensory or intellectual capabilities: e.g. we can grow skeptical about our sensory capacity once we understand that they can also mislead us (see, optical illusions or the distortions of our perceptual apparatus with substance abuse). And this is one of the main reasons why talking about religious faith as an epistemic emotion is just a starting point.

Oh, and by the way, when I draw a conclusion from a conclusive argument, is that also a feeling? — Ludwig V

I’m inclined to say that drawing conclusions from certain premises is a rule based intellectual activity. We can feel more or less confident in performing such an activity. So one thing is what we do (drawing conclusions from premises) another how confident we feel about it. We can draw a conclusion from certain premises, and doubt we have been performing this intellectual task successfully.

Oh, I see. Emotions = feelings. — Ludwig V

A part from the fact that what I wrote doesn't presuppose such equation, “emotions" and "feelings" can be legitimately used as synonyms in common usage [1] that is why I didn’t feel the need to delve into their semantic differences. But I can also appreciate more subtle conceptual or psychological analysis. If you feel like providing yours, I can try to be more specific.

[1]
"emotion
noun [ countable-uncountable ]
/ɪˈmoʊʃən/
Add to word list
a feeling or sentiment
émotion [ feminine ]"

source: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-french/emotion



Definition of emotion noun from the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary
emotion noun

/ɪˈməʊʃn/

/ɪˈməʊʃn/
[countable, uncountable]

​a strong feeling such as love, fear or anger; the part of a person’s character that consists of feelings
to show/express your emotions
They expressed mixed emotions at the news.
Counselling can teach people to handle negative emotions such as fear and anger.
Fear is a normal human emotion.
This documentary manages to capture the raw emotions of life at the tough end.
Emotions are running high (= people are feeling very excited, angry, etc.).
She showed no emotion at the verdict.
The decision was based on emotion rather than rational thought.
Mary was overcome with emotion.

source: https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/emotion?q=emotion

That's a new one to me. — Ludwig V

Besides dictionaries, you can have a look at these entries of the “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”:
The Early Feeling Tradition: Emotions as Feelings
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings

But to describe these relationships in that bloodless way does not distinguish these personal relationships from business partnerships etc. This is where the idea of faith as involved emotion does have appeal. Friends and family are the people that you love and are committed to; that goes beyond approving of their behaviour - it precisely means that you won't walk away whenever you disapprove of their behaviour. There is a lot of variation here, so I think that all we can say is that commitment when times are rough is at least on the table, and walking away will need justification. — Ludwig V

I’m not sure you understood my proposal. I talked about “faith” in terms of “epistemic emotion” not about the reasons/genesis of such epistemic emotions or the metrics to assess the emotional component of such epistemic emotions or the rhetorical forms in which we can express such epistemic emotions. I can feel more confident about the disposition of business partners to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those I decided not to partner with, as much as I can feel more confident about the disposition of friends or relatives to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those who are not my friends or relatives. In both cases, it’s about how we feel about people’s dispositions to act in certain ways. It doesn’t matter whether what I feel about these people is based on affection or on material interest.
The emotion I’m talking about when talking about faith is epistemic not affective. It’s not the emotions we feel for friends and relatives like love or admiration. I can still be affectively attached to someone and support him/her even if I do not fully trust or have faith in or feel confident in his/her dispositions to act in certain ways in certain circumstances.
Finally, I doubt that ordinary phrases like “faithful friends” typically expresses some commitment on our side when we talk about our friends, as a religious expression of faith would. “Faithuful” in “faithful friends” is a qualification of our friends’ behavior (e.g. to stress the fact that s/he has never disappointed use, even in daring situations) independently from how we react to it.
Most certainly, it offers us a reason to reciprocate their faithfulness, which in turn can be motivated by their informal commitment toward us as we are inclined to assume when talking about “friendship”.

I think your view is being skewed by the religious use of faith - which does seem to be about beliefs. I agree that one can be faithful to one's beliefs (or principles). But if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves - different behaviour in each case, as required by the relationship in each case. "Faithful picture" or "account" are different, but obviously not about any beliefs. — Ludwig V

In my post, I already agreed upon the fact that the meaning of “faith” must be determined in the various contexts of their usage. Still, if the task is to identify some commonalities between some (not necessarily all) various usages, then one has to make some effort to abstract from a fine-grained analysis of each specific usage.
Besides, I also warned that my idea that “faith” is some sort of epistemic emotion was just a starting point in need of further elaboration, like the one you suggest: In religious contexts, faith is also related to some normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts) by which we assess how virtuous and/or meaningful one life is. And also in ordinary usage, "faith" conveys some sort of informal engagement by which we assess people reliance, especially under test . So yes the behavioural dimension is also worth mentioning.
Still, what I would disagree with you on is the following claim: if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves. Indeed, your putative counter-examples seem to be very much compatible with what I wrote. Beliefs do not need to be about what exists, their identity or properties, beliefs can also be about how people behave. For instance, when we talk about a faithful friend, parent, dog we are referring to the fact that these friend, parent, dog will act in ways we would expect (and approve of) from friends, parents, dogs based on passed behaviour. It is precisely because friends, parents, and dogs behaved in ways we approved of in the past, that we can believe they will do it again, and rely on it in our life (maybe even under daring circumstances).
"Faithful picture" or "account" refers to idea that certain representations won't betray expectations based on them, they can be trusted, I’m tempted to add "as men can be" (because those expressions can sound as a personification or a metonym).
By the way, I’m inclined to say that faith in an ordinary (non-religious) sense looks more synonymous of “trust” than faith in a religious sense (rhetorical nuances aside, i.e. “to have faith in” sounds more solemn or stronger than “to trust”), as if the religious understanding of faith is richer than that of trust.

But I think the religious use of faith is more complicated than it seems. In the Christian faith, the creed and signing up to it are very important. In other faiths, beliefs are less important. What matters most is behaviour - behaving according to the moral code, taking part in the liturgy and so on. Religion is only part about belief and only about belief as part of a whole way of life. — Ludwig V

Again I agree on that the religious notion of "faith" has a complex semantic and that involves behaviour. I also readily referred to it in my post with the expression “normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts)”. But the idea that “beliefs are less important” in faith (at least, in other religions compared to Christianity) sounds rather a misleading objection to me. “Rituals” and “pious acts” concern people’s behaviour, what people say or do in certain circumstances. And behaviour, what people say or do, can be performed without having appropriate inspiring beliefs or, even, theologically elaborated or critically scrutinized beliefs, or even a satisfactory grasp of what it is believed (religious people can believe in mysterious things like the holy trinity, Jesus' dual nature, miracles, etc.). So yes, in some of these senses belief in religious faith can be said to be "less important" than behavior. The point however is that also in the religious contexts behaviour, especially in the long run or under daring circumstances, is typically taken as an indicator of the strength/authenticity of one’s religious beliefs. Indeed, if people would perform rituals and pious acts without believing at all in the creed that inspired them, maybe due to peer pressure or out of irreligious interests, I doubt we would take them as a the paradigmatic example of religious faith. Prophets, saints and martyrs… they are.
On the other side, the difference between Christianity and other religions you are pointing at may even lead us to not consider those other religions as religions if the element of faith in some supernatural/sacred world is remarkably lacking (e.g. Buddhism is considered by some more as a philosophy than a religion).

1) is faith an emotion or a thought? What if it is neither — Gregory

I think concepts (including “faith”) need to be contextualised wrt their actual and scoped usage for better understanding and communication. Then one can abstract from some specific aspects to better identify similarities among different usages.
For example “faith” in ordinary contexts has different meaning from “faith” in religious sense. And its meaning may lean toward one direction or the other depending on what is contextually contrasted to: in the Western tradition, the meaning of the religious notion of “faith” has been contrasted to philosophical rationality and science.
If I wanted to abstract from more specific usages, I would say, as a starting point, that trust is an “epistemic emotion”: “emotion” because it has to do with “how I feel about something” and “epistemic” because faith is about “beliefs” (e.g. God exists, Jesus has both a devine and human nature, God is a trinity, etc.). This starting point seems to fit well with ordinary and religious usage. But I say it’s a starting point, for two main reasons:
- Epistemic feelings can concern also our senses and mental calculations. “Faith” seems more related to what somebody else communicated (a friend, a politician, a prophet, the holy book, etc.) or proved through deeds.
- In religious contexts, faith is also related to some normative practical engagement (which may include rituals and pious acts) by which we assess how virtuous and/or meaningful one life is. And also in ordinary usage, "faith" conveys some sort of informal engagement by which we assess people reliance, especially under test.

The orange US president yesterday night:
"Trump calls Putin 'absolutely crazy' after largest Russian drone attack on Ukraine".
(source: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g2wz74jdzo)

Oh so now is Trump helping Putin prolong the war in order to win?!
But the Great Satan has been propping Ukraine and the corrupt clown Zelensky all along to fight against Russia?
Not to mention that peaceful Russia has already won the war for the past 3 years and want now peace to become the laughing third with Europe while the US and China are fighting to death, while Trump is just fine with making all concessions requested by Russia (namely the Ukrainian capitulation).
In any case, the BLOB is behind both the Ukrainians and the Russians: for continuing the war, for ending the war, for making deals with Russia, for provoking Russia, for the invasion of Ukraine, for the European rearming, for expanding NATO, for leaving NATO. As predicted infallibly by our experts on morality, propaganda, military, economics, politics in this thread since day one.

More on peaceful Russia provoked by warmongering Finnish Nazis as humpa lumpas of the US Blob, forcing Russia to prepare against imminent NATO aggression:
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/19/world/europe/russia-finland-border.html

Here is an argument:
If Russia won, Russia would impose their conditions unilaterally on the losers.
The latter claim doesn't look true yet, so neither the former.
If Russia wanted peace, Russia would agree on what the US (with a pro-Russian president) has proposed. The latter claim doesn't look true yet, so neither the former.

Robert Francis Prevost (now Pope Leo XIV) once said in 2022:
It is a very serious problem that is affecting the entire world. There are many analyses of the conflict, of the war that is currently taking place in Ukraine, but from my point of view it is a true imperialist invasion, where Russia wants to conquer a territory for reasons of power, and well, Russia's own advantage due to the issue of strategic location as well as the great value of what Ukraine is culturally, as well as historically and also in production for Russia. Crimes against humanity are being committed, it has already been proven, there are crimes that are being committed in Ukraine. We must ask God a lot for peace, but I believe that we must be clearer too, even some politicians in our country do not want to recognize the horrors of this war and the evil that Russia is carrying out in all its actions there in Ukraine.
source: https://www.outono.net/elentir/2025/05/11/the-words-of-robert-prevost-the-new-pope-leo-xiv-on-the-invasion-of-ukraine/

More on peaceful Russia signaling good will to EU to be the laughing third while China and the US are beating each other to death: https://united24media.com/latest-news/zelenskyy-russia-amassing-up-to-150000-troops-in-belarus-for-training-5893
Sorry, Great Satan but not sorry.

(Meanwhile in Poland: https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/04/30/poland-promises-appropriate-response-to-russian-military-exercises-in-belarus/)

the problem with AfD is also due to their ties with unfriendly and hostile powers like Trump's US and Putin's Russia.

↪Mikie
My burning dislike for politicians is non-partisan, don't you worry. But what I loathe even more is to see people of reasonable intelligence falling for their game. — Tzeentch

As if you could call yourself out of the game. If people just watch, others will play at their place. On the other side, if you want to play, you must swallow all the shit that comes with it. Even when you do not deserve it.

But what I loathe even more is to see people of reasonable intelligence falling for their game. — Tzeentch

In other words, your non-partisan views, are politically irrelevant. You are loathing your own irrelevance.

:up:

More on the European nazis and American lapdogs provoking peaceful Russia:
https://en.belsat.eu/86255589/russian-intelligence-service-suggests-us-and-russia-fight-eurofascism-together

More on Russia signalling goodwill for peace and cooperation with Europe:
https://kyivindependent.com/shoigu-threatens-europe-with-nuclear-weapons-if-russia-is-faced-with-unfriendly-actions/
https://tass.com/politics/1948611

Where are the pro-Russians? Where are the experts of propaganda, morality, military, economics, geopolitics criticizing the European lapdogs and the Great Satan? Those who have predicted everything since day one?
Russia is getting everything from the US and Ukraine has lost since day one, Putin has achieved all his goals the same ones he had since the beginning of the war, Zelensky is a catastrophic corrupt clownish American-lapdog looser whom all Ukrainians hate. Why is Putin not stopping this fucking war?

More threats from Trump against Zelensky, the corrupt clown American lapdog Nazi and Jewish warmonger catastrophic looser (have you seen his cloths?!): https://nypost.com/2025/04/23/us-news/trump-gives-zelensky-dire-warning-on-russia-ukraine-war-accept-peace-or-risk-losing-the-whole-country/

What is the propaganda Trump is spinning about the conflict in Ukraine? The silence of the US propaganda critics is destabilizing me. Peace in one day? Nope. In 90 days? Nope. And now "let's take a pass within days" if no progress in peace negotiations (let's make it 100 days?). And Zelensky was just a clownish corrupt American lapdog, how can Ukraine be in the way of blocking two superpower leaders' efforts to bring peace in a devastated land, with no men left fighting or wanting to fight, with no military support, corruption everywhere, and humiliated for all their catastrophic choices and losses they have suffered? While Russia has already won since day one: they just wanted the Donbas and Crimea from day one, and they got that. Why is this conflict not over yet?

Trump in Afghanistan again?
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/the-mysterious-case-of-the-bagram-airbase-1503420373.html