Again with your thinking that Palestine = Hamas. — ssu

Palestine = Hamas may be good as a slogan. But I offered arguments and evidences, not slogans. So do not put slogans into my mouth. That's a straw man argument. Indeed, you can not quote me claiming Palestine = Hamas, nor you can logically infer that Palestine = Hamas, from what I said.

...just like anybody else, me and you included. — neomac

Well, of course an interviewer can just ask the protesters what are they doing and why and leave then those who watch it to make their own conclusions. — ssu

Sure, but one can clearly hear such students express support for martyrdom, provocation, and resistance narrative, while refusing to explicitly acknowledge their implications when such narrative is to be applied to Hamas, no matter what the interviewer wants me to conclude. And the reason why I believe they are more pro-Hamas than pro-Israel doesn’t depend on their holding Hamas flags, or their praising Hamas’ actions, or their response to controversial questions (like the one about decapitated kids), but on their actually chosen arguments and rhetoric.

What political impact do they have?

I don't think so much. In the media, "students" are basically portrayed to be protesting for one thing. Now it's Palestine, another time it was Black live matters. Even Greta has changed his costume to wear a keffiyeh. — ssu

In the current political circumstances, it’s plausible that students protests may have a non-negligible impact (also in the long term). This was more plausible when Biden was the likely candidate [1], with Harris maybe less, but I doubt her declarations would be enough for pro-Palestinian protestors (https://www.npr.org/2024/08/23/g-s1-19232/kamala-harris-israel-gaza-dnc).
Besides, my argument should still be compelling even if we reasoned in hypothetical terms.

[1]
As the Biden administration balances its policy commitments with the need to address concerns from a crucial segment of its electoral base, media analysts suggest that his response to the Gaza War is costing him support among the young voters who played a significant role in his 2020 election victory. However, dissatisfaction with Biden’s policies does not appear to be shifting young voters toward President Trump. Instead, it is leading to increased disengagement, with 14 percent of young voters indicating they would opt out of voting if the presidential election were held today. Given the overwhelming preference for Biden over Trump among young voters, these opt-outs could significantly influence the election, potentially tilting it in Trump’s favor.
https://globalamericans.org/explaining-and-predicting-the-impact-of-student-protests-across-the-americas-finding-a-balance/

Eman Abdelhadi, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, said younger people are growing increasingly frustrated with the status quo on domestic and foreign policy issues.
“I think there’s a real disaffection with the older generation, but more importantly with the system that they’re running,” said Abdelhadi.
She added that the protests mark an “inflexion moment” in US public opinion more broadly.
“In American history in general, usually the big shifts in public opinion have either coincided with or been triggered by large student movements,” Abdelhadi told Al Jazeera.
She said campus activism can be the basis of political change. “There’s a sort of sense that this is the future.”

“The reality is the Democrats have been telling us that young people need to save democracy and that people of colour need to save democracy and that any quibbles with this current administration need to be put aside in order to save democracy,” she told Al Jazeera.
“But where’s the democracy when you have state troopers beating up students and faculty for protesting, and the White House saying nothing about that?”
Wasow also said the protests and crackdown against them could add to the apathy towards Biden.
“The Democrats can’t really afford to give people more reasons to vote against Biden, and this actually becomes one.”

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/4/26/generation-gap-what-student-protests-say-about-us-politics-israel-support

What a government does to foreigners ought to matter. — ssu

Political leaderships may more likely find this argument compelling to the extent what “a government does to foreigners” matters to domestic people. But this in turn also includes domestic people’s perception of foreigners’ hostility and the degree of trust domestic people put in their political leaderships’ policies toward hostile foreigners.

And there are laws of war. — ssu

Some of us still make the difference between a civilian and a combatant. — ssu

The problem is that asymmetric warfare and terrorism challenge the classic distinction in international humanitarian law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. Hamas’ asymmetric warfare blurs the distinction between civilians and combatants. What’s worse is that Hamas is not only nationalist but also Islamist, so I’m not sure Hamas can ever be ideologically committed to IHL at all.
Besides the weight of laws of war depends on the international order that supports them. And in the current predicament the Western-led international order (supposedly championing humanitarian principles) is destabilised by authoritarian forces hostile to such Western-led international order and exploiting the war in Ukraine as much as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict accordingly.

Then don't think that everybody else see's the conflict as black and white — ssu

.

Dude, we were talking about the pro-Palestinian student protests, right?
I already conceded as plausible that “American students who protest for Palestine are far more protesting for the end of the conflict and for an independent Palestine (with the Apartheid system ending) than supporters of the armed branches of the Palestinians in a way that would put them on a terrorist watch list”. I also conceded that the interviewer has his own biases betrayed by questions and reactions meant to elicit a certain response from his target audience. And I have no qualms even about conceding that pro-Palestinian student protests may have more nuanced and diverse views than such interviewers are interested to explore. But that is beside the point I was making.
STILL, protesting students are political activists aiming at achieving a certain political impact on government and public opinion through their actions and speeches. When protesting, they already made up their mind about what to do and how to talk, also in front of biased interviewers. When political activists engage in their protests, it’s no longer time for pondered analysis of reasons and consequences, expectations and realities, because as Marx said “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it” . So I take their political activism for what it is. And good luck with that!
But we are in a philosophy forum, not in a political forum, and I don’t buy into Marx’s motto. In other words, I’m willing to question their views as much as let others question my views without indulging into fancy slogans, emotional arguments, unverifiable conspiracy arguments, self-serving denigratory labelling and all sorts of sophisms to entrench oneself in their own ideological comfort zone.
So here my virtual questions to them: once one buys into the idea that Israel is a colonialist, genocidal, and apartheid state, would Israel lose this defamatory label immediately after acknowledging the two state solution? Or does anyone need to be reminded of it as much as possible for generations to come as anyone is reminded of the Nazis crimes? But then, why should one think that Palestinians’ grievances against Israel as a colonialist, genocidal and apartheid state will be appeased once for all with a two state solution? Why should one think that once the Palestinian state will be in condition to openly and legitimately re-arm and have its own national army, while taking military control over a larger portion of Palestinian territory, there will be no chance that revisionist or revanchist Palestinian movements would politically rise and threaten Israel, a colonialist, genocidal and apartheid state, or just restart terrorist attacks against Israel, a colonialist, genocidal and apartheid state? Maybe still with the support of anti-Israel regional allies? BTW If Israel as a colonialist, genocidal and apartheid state has nuclear weapons, does the new Palestinian state have the right to have its nuclear weapons to defend itself?

First of all, Israel exists, and it's victory in this conflict should be evident from the fact that the arguing is over the 1967 borders — ssu

.

Who’s arguing are you referring to? Even if pro-Israeli students would be supportive of a two state solution, Hamas still questions the right of Israel to exist, and Palestinians seem more supportive of Hamas armed resistance in war time than Hamas administration in peace time [1]. Besides the arguing about the 1967 borders by pro-Palestinian students is more grounded on Palestinians’ rights to self-determination (anti-colonialist arguments) and humanitarian concerns (the atrocities committed by Israel, genocide, apartheid, etc.) without actually addressing Israeli historical security concerns, and the thorny status of Jerusalem for Israelis (especially if religious) both of which neither Palestinians nor Hamas are particularly sympathetic with.

[1]
https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-palestinians-opinion-poll-wartime-views-a0baade915619cd070b5393844bc4514
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gazans-back-two-state-solution-rcna144183
https://www.jpost.com/israel-hamas-war/article-806498

As long as it is with so little impact to Israel, the mowing of the lawn every once in a while will continue. — ssu

However this time it looks more than just mowing the lawn, Netanyahu is more determined than ever to eradicate Hamas organisation and its infrastructure from Gaza.

From a telegram channel of ultra-nationalist Ukrainians:

На фоні новин про передачу іранських балістичних ракет малого радіусу дії в руки московитів, можна констатувати що вісь зла більш монолітна, рішуча та згуртована, аніж мʼякий західний світ. Вісь зла думає про збереження своїх багаторічних правлячих режимів, хворих на голову провладних еліт та про запаси зброї щоб це все вберегти від оточуючого світу. Західний світ думає про наступні вибори та плюралізм думок в своєму ліберальному раю, де ультраліві, ультраправі, послідовники ІДІЛу, фанати Палестини, прихильники Ізраїлю, зелені, ліберали, бізнесмени та бомжі, наркомани і баптисти мирно співіснують на одній вулиці, і поважають одне одного. Вісь зла, врешті-решт, переможе цивілізований світ. Бо сильні ті, хто відвантажує запаси смертоносної зброї своїм союзникам, а не боїться міфічної «ескалації», коли повномасштабна війна триває вже третій рік. Сильні ті, хто диктує свої умови і діє, а не обіцяє з огляду на соціологічні опитування.


Against the background of the news about the transfer of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles into the hands of Muscovites, it can be stated that the axis of evil is more monolithic, decisive and united than the soft Western world. The axis of evil is thinking about preserving its long-term ruling regimes, sick-headed pro-government elites, and stockpiles of weapons to protect it all from the outside world. The Western world is thinking about the next election and pluralism of opinion in its liberal paradise, where far-left, far-right, followers of ISIS, fanatics of Palestine, supporters of Israel, greens, liberals, businessmen and homeless people, drug addicts and Baptists peacefully coexist on the same street, and respect each other. The axis of evil will ultimately defeat the civilized world. Because those who are strong are those who ship stocks of deadly weapons to their allies, and are not afraid of the mythical "escalation", when a full-scale war has been going on for the third year. Strong are those who dictate their terms and act, rather than making promises based on sociological surveys.




Зеленський похвалився, що українські військові не беруть в полон цивільних московитів. Дійсно, що ми звірі якісь? Ми ж не московити, це тільки їм можна бити електричним струмом 16-річних підлітків з окупованих територій та садити на двадцять пʼять років цивільних тітоньок-кухарок. У нас і військовополонені московити в полоні виглядають набагато краще, ніж до полону.
Тим часом, наш обмінний фонд далі залишається надто скудним, а проросійські депутати голосують в Раді разом з монобільшістю, допомагають одне одному втікати з країни, блокують трибуни парламенту щоб, боронь боже, не заборонили рпц фсб. Московити хапають українців та кримських татар в окупованому Криму за вподобайки в ВКонтакті та схований український прапор в шухляді. Чому ми не можемо забрати всіх цивільних московитів з контрольованих територій та обміняти на наших цивільних - поза межами мого розуміння. Доки буде панувати вся ця толерастія до ворога? Війна все більше виглядає гнилим договорняком. І буде виглядати ще більшим, якщо ми на божевільні дії ворога будемо відповідати ниттям в імпотентних міжнародних організаціях. В моєму розумінні моралі: на жесть ти маєш відповісти подвійною жестю. На подвійну жесть - потрійною. Коли по відношенню тебе жестять, а ти терпилиш - ти тільки подовжиш строк свого ганебного існування, а в підсумку програєш.



Zelensky boasted that the Ukrainian military does not capture civilian Muscovites. Are we really some animals? We are not Muscovites, only they can electrocute 16-year-old teenagers from the occupied territories and imprison civilian cook aunties for twenty-five years. Muscovites who are prisoners of war look much better in our country than before they were captured.
Meanwhile, our exchange fund continues to be too meager, and pro-Russian deputies vote in the Rada together with a monomajority, help each other flee the country, block the stands of the parliament so that, God forbid, they do not ban the FSB RPC. Muscovites are grabbing Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in occupied Crimea for VKontakte likes and a hidden Ukrainian flag in a drawer. Why we can't take all civilian Muscovites from the controlled territories and exchange them for our civilians is beyond my understanding. How long will all this tolerance for the enemy prevail? War looks more and more like a rotten deal. And it will look even bigger if we respond to the crazy actions of the enemy by whining in impotent international organizations. In my understanding of morality: you must respond to a gesture with a double gesture. On double tin - triple. When they treat you harshly and you tolerate it, you will only prolong the term of your shameful existence, and in the end you will lose.



В рамках екзистенційного протистояння, коли московити вбивають українців цілими сімʼями (як позавчора в Запоріжжі, а сьогодні у Львові), ми не можемо собі дозволити уникати цілей серед руснявих цивільних. Кожен український офіцер має наносити дитячі будинки, лікарні, будинки пристарілих, ринки, супермаркети в рф - в список планових цілей. Кожен цивільний автомобіль московита в Брянській області має бути під прицілом українського FPV. Треба запамʼятати одне: якщо у московитів закінчаться ракети - їм їх надішле КНДР. Якщо дрони - допоможе Іран. Будуть знищені всі бомбардувальники - купить Китай. Це аксіома, в якій московитам вісь зла не дасть програти військовим шляхом. Ми можемо діяти лише терористичними методами, адже ми набагато слабкіші в ресурсному плані, аніж московити. Паніка, страх, знищені населені пункти, терор - супутники нашої Держави; женевські конвенції, «права людини», «міжнародні домовленості» - слабкість.



In the framework of the existential confrontation, when Muscovites kill Ukrainians in whole families (as the day before yesterday in Zaporizhzhia, and today in Lviv), we cannot afford to avoid targets among Russian civilians. Every Ukrainian officer should put orphanages, hospitals, homes for the elderly, markets, supermarkets in the Russian Federation on the list of planned targets. Every civilian car of a Muscovite in the Bryansk region should be under the sights of the Ukrainian FPV. One thing must be remembered: if the Muscovites run out of missiles, the DPRK will send them to them. If drones - Iran will help. All bombers will be destroyed - China will buy. This is an axiom in which the axis of evil will not allow Muscovites to lose by military means. We can only act with terrorist methods, because we are much weaker in terms of resources than Muscovites. Panic, fear, destroyed settlements, terror are companions of our State; Geneva Conventions, "human rights", "international agreements" - weakness.

В Україні багато хто мастурбує на Ізраїль, включно з першими особами держави. Проте, ми не діємо як Ізраїль. Чи могли б ми знести з лиця землі бєлгород? Могли б. Чи могли б завдавати ударів по московитських ринках та ТЦ в вихідні дні, заживо хоронячи електорат путіна? Звісно, могли б.

In Ukraine, many people masturbate to Israel, including the first heads of state. However, we do not act like Israel. Could we destroy Belgorod from the face of the earth? They could. Could they strike Moscow's markets and shopping centers on weekends, burying Putin's electorate alive? Of course, they could.

Нині модно бути підспівувачем у центральної влади. Не знаю - свідомо це роблять певні люди при погонах чи ні, але виглядає так, наче це заплановано. Погані бояри, хороший цар. Чекаю з нетерпінням, коли весь цей треш, що коїться, якось закінчиться, більшість мобілізованих повернеться додому, пройдуть нові вибори, на яких громадяни зможуть впевнено дати оцінку нинішній владі, частина людей емігрує. Так буде виглядати наша «перемога», якщо Київ не буде окупований московитами, а Українська Держава існуватиме як така.

Nowadays, it is fashionable to be a backup singer for the central government. I don't know if certain people do it consciously or not, but it looks like it's planned. Bad boyars, good king. I am looking forward to when all this trash that is happening will somehow end, most of the mobilized will return home, new elections will be held, at which citizens will be able to confidently evaluate the current government, some people will emigrate. This is what our "victory" will look like if Kyiv is not occupied by Muscovites, and the Ukrainian State exists as such.

З огляду на те, що переважна кількість московитських ракет, що летіли сьогодні від Краматорську до Ужгорода, йшли по обʼєктах енергетики, я ще раз наголошую на фактичній безперспективності ударів лише по військовій інфраструктурі. Військові літаки, в яких летять сотні наших дорого вартісних дронів, перемістяться далі на схід від кордонів, а їх кількість у москивитів перевищує кількість наших літаків у десятки разів. Єдиний вихід перемоги (мирних перемовин з росією на вигідних умовах) - засипати росію трунами. Кількість вбитих цивільних московитів має в рази перевищувати кількість вбитих цивільних українців. Українська артилерія має рівняти з землею не лише ворожі спостережні пости, а й дитячі садки, навіки засипаючи маленьких рамзанів, ахматів, кужугетів та сєрафімів. Дрони мають летіти не тільки по летовищах, а і по густонаселених кварталах прикордонних обласних центрів. Це єдина формула перемоги, яка є на сьогодні. Поки росія не захлинеться кровʼю, а кількість трауру не перевищуватиме сумарну кількість радощів - війна буде тривати.

Given the fact that the majority of Muscovite rockets flying today from Kramatorsk to Uzhhorod hit energy facilities, I once again emphasize the actual futility of strikes only on military infrastructure. Military planes, in which hundreds of our expensive drones fly, will move further east of the borders, and their number among Muscovites exceeds the number of our planes ten times. The only way out of victory (peace negotiations with Russia on favorable terms) is to cover Russia with coffins. The number of killed civilian Muscovites must be many times higher than the number of killed Ukrainian civilians. Ukrainian artillery must raze not only enemy observation posts to the ground, but also kindergartens, forever burying little Ramzans, Akhmats, Kuzhugets, and Seraphim. Drones should fly not only over airports, but also over densely populated quarters of border regional centers. This is the only winning formula available today. As long as Russia does not choke on blood, and the number of mourning does not exceed the total number of joys, the war will continue.

Важливим аспектом проведення операцій на територіях ворога - є знищення майна та садиб московитів: підпали, вбивства ватного електорату, підриви. Найбільше московити зі звільнених територій бояться втратити майно і ніколи не повернутись в свої халупи.

Нехай же український солдат, памʼятаючи Бучу, Волноваху, Маріуполь та Бахмут, зробить так, щоб кожен московит памʼятав суджу та льгов

An important aspect of conducting operations in the enemy's territories is the destruction of property and estates of Muscovites: arson, murders of the cotton electorate, bombings. Muscovites from the liberated territories are most afraid of losing their property and never returning to their shacks.

Let the Ukrainian soldier, remembering Bucha, Volnovakha, Mariupol and Bakhmut, make sure that every Muscovite remembers the court and lies


Подивіться який злий сидит путін в кріслі і слухає доповідь військового пенсіонера герасімова, який в стилі його українських симетричних колег розповідає про стабільну ситуацію та зупинку просування наших військ. Подивіться як мерзенно виправдовуються американці за наш курський наступ. Ниють, що з ними не погодили, кажуть що нічого не розуміють що відбувається, починають згадувати про заборону застосування американської зброї і все таке. Наші в ГШ просто не беруть слухавку від стурбованих «колег» з-за океану. Бо колег, як і раніше, дуже турбує спокій російських обивателів, адже американці нормально сприймають смерть українських дітей в Україні, але дуже болісно сприймають смерть російських громадян в росії. В їх парадигмі вмирати мають лише українці, на крайняк - московити у яких є автомат і камуфляж. Московит в Суджі, на думку американців, має ходити на роботу, пити по вечорах пиво перед телешоу скабєєвой, ходити раз на пару років на вибори - голосувати за путіна чи його партію. Жити це просте російське тихе життя гєни букіна тихої курської губернії.

Єдиний, хто на сьогоднішній день може захистити українців в мирних містах - це український солдат, що йде по чужій землі, вбиваючи наших ворогів. Нашим важко, складно, багато хлопаків після базового курсу відразу попали на дискотеку, але це ще не кінець історії.

Look at how angry Putin is sitting in a chair and listening to the report of military pensioner Gerasimov, who, in the style of his Ukrainian symmetrical colleagues, talks about a stable situation and stopping the advance of our troops. Look at how despicable the Americans make excuses for our Kursk offensive. They whine that they did not agree with them, they say that they do not understand what is happening, they begin to mention the ban on the use of American weapons and all that. Our staff at the GS simply do not pick up the phone from worried "colleagues" from overseas. Because colleagues, as before, are very concerned about the peace of Russian citizens, because Americans perceive the death of Ukrainian children in Ukraine normally, but the death of Russian citizens in Russia is very painful. In their paradigm, only Ukrainians should die, on the extreme - Muscovites who have a machine gun and camouflage. A Muscovite in Suja, according to the Americans, should go to work, drink beer in the evenings before Skabeeva's TV show, go to the elections once every couple of years - vote for Putin or his party. To live is a simple Russian quiet life of the genea bukina of the quiet Kursk province.

Today, the only one who can protect Ukrainians in peaceful cities is a Ukrainian soldier walking on foreign land, killing our enemies. It is difficult for us, it is difficult, many guys after the basic course immediately went to the disco, but this is not the end of the story


Цивільний московит має страждати більше за московитського військового. Війна - це складне політичне рішення політичного керівництва країни-окупанта, обраного на виборах абсолютною більшістю московитського населення (> 80%). Відповідно, дії свого президента, уряду, міністра оборони та армії більшість московитів підтримують. Допоки цивільне населення країни-окупанта буде підтримувати війну, війна або ідеї повного захоплення України, у випадку якщо вона закінчиться чи призупиниться, будуть жити в мерзенних головах унтерменшів. Чим більше ворожого населення буде деморалізовано, налякане та розчаровано міфом власної непереможності - тим менше такі реваншистські ідеї будуть панувати в ворожих головах.

A civilian Muscovite must suffer more than a military Muscovite. War is a complex political decision by the political leadership of the occupying country, elected by the absolute majority of the Muscovite population (> 80%). Accordingly, the majority of Muscovites support the actions of their president, government, defense minister, and army. As long as the civilian population of the occupying country will support the war, the war or the idea of ​​a complete takeover of Ukraine, in case it ends or is suspended, will live in the vile minds of the Untermanches. The more the enemy population will be demoralized, frightened and disappointed by the myth of their own invincibility, the less such revanchist ideas will reign in the enemy's minds.

It has just been 15 years since Putin gave his speech in Munich. I re-watched it. And I thought — what a purely negative path we have taken in foreign policy over these 15 years.
Back then, there was an absolutely safe situation on our western borders. At one time, I worked as deputy head of the presidential administration and supervised military personnel. When future top military commanders came to me for interviews, I often asked them — do they see any real threat to Russia from the West? Is there any sensible and beneficial scenario for the West to attack Russia?
Not one has said “yes” in all these years.
Everyone understands perfectly well that the West is not living badly, it does not need anything. And even more so, it does not need to attack us, to receive a retaliatory strike, burned cities and countries. From the point of view of the country's security, this is empty.
If suddenly Ukraine joins NATO - and NATO commitments towards it have been accepted - then, of course, the strategic balance will shift if strike weapons, medium-range missiles, even shorter-range missiles with a flight time of several minutes to Moscow are deployed on the territory of Ukraine. But this is a topic of a completely different plan. Then it is necessary to discuss the conditions within the framework of arms limitations in Europe, non-deployment of strike weapons in Ukraine. Of course, then the corresponding demands will be put forward to us. And I fully admit that this will be one of the most important topics of negotiations, at which it will be possible to come to a common denominator.
But I repeat once again: there is no sensible scenario for an attack on Russia from Europe.
On the other hand, let's imagine that Ukraine joined NATO. It is possible that there will be hotheads there who will decide to "feel out" Russia, tickle its nerves, and maybe even drag it, as Lavrov and Putin said, into a direct confrontation with NATO. Can this be imagined? Should our territory be covered? It should be covered. Therefore, I consider the concentration of Russian troops in that region not so much as preparation for an attack, but as preparation for the formation of future fortified areas on the border with Ukraine. If in the end it is possible to reach an agreement on a general withdrawal of troops from the contact lines by 200-300 kilometers, then the troops will be redeployed. But in general, of course, when you watch Putin's old speeches, where he talks about what huge investments are coming from the West to Russia, what good relations we have, that Bush is his friend, you recall the words of Vito Corleone from "The Godfather" - "How did we come to this?"
source: https://republic.ru/posts/103121
By Evgeny Savostyanov (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%8F%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2,_%D0%95%D0%B2%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87)

03.02.2022 20:42:00
Forecasts of bloodthirsty political scientists
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Of delighted hawks and hasty cuckoos

Mikhail Khodarenok

About the author: Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok – former head of the group of the 1st direction of the 1st directorate of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, colonel

Tags: realities , russia , ukraine , donbass , conflict

realities, russia, ukraine, donbass, conflict In anticipation of "Russian aggression," Ukrainian soldiers are settling down on the line of confrontation with the defenders of the DPR and LPR. Photo: Reuters

Some representatives of the Russian political class today claim that Russia is capable of inflicting a crushing defeat on Ukraine in a few hours (shorter periods are also mentioned) if a military conflict begins. Let's see how much such statements correspond to reality.

In the Russian expert community, the opinion has recently become quite ingrained that there will be no need to even introduce troops into Ukrainian territory, since the Armed Forces of this country are in a deplorable state.

Some political scientists emphasize that a powerful Russian fire strike will destroy virtually all surveillance and communication systems, artillery and tank formations. Moreover, a number of experts conclude that even one crushing strike by Russia will be enough to end such a war.

As the icing on the cake, some analysts particularly emphasize the fact that no one in Ukraine will defend the “Kiev regime.”

IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY WALK

Let's start with the latter. To claim that no one in Ukraine will defend the regime means, in practice, complete ignorance of the military-political situation and the mood of the broad masses of the people in the neighboring state. Moreover, the degree of hatred (which, as is known, is the most effective fuel for armed struggle) in the neighboring republic towards Moscow is frankly underestimated. No one will meet the Russian army with bread, salt and flowers in Ukraine.

It seems that the events in the south-east of Ukraine in 2014 have taught no one anything. Back then, they also expected that the entire left-bank Ukraine would, in a single impulse and in a matter of seconds, turn into Novorossiya. They were already drawing maps, figuring out the personnel of future city and regional administrations, and developing state flags.

But even the Russian-speaking population of this part of Ukraine (including such cities as Kharkov, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Mariupol) did not support such plans in their vast majority. The Novorossiya project somehow imperceptibly fizzled out and died quietly.

In short, there is no way a liberation campaign in 2022, modeled on and likened to 1939, will work out. In this case, the words of the classic of Soviet literature Arkady Gaidar are truer than ever: "It seems that we will now have not an easy fight, but a hard battle."

"WITH LITTLE BLOOD, WITH A MIGHTY BLOW"

Now about the “powerful fire strike by Russia,” which will allegedly destroy “virtually all surveillance and communication systems, artillery and tank formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.”

This expression alone shows that only political workers could say such a thing. For reference: during hypothetical military actions on the scale of a theater of military operations, strikes are made on priority targets and massive fire strikes are carried out. Note that during operational-strategic planning, the epithets "powerful" (as well as "medium", "weak", etc.) are not used.

In military science it is emphasized that strikes can be strategic (this mostly applies to strategic nuclear forces), operational and tactical. According to the number of participating forces and targets, strikes can be massive, group and single. And other concepts, even in works of a political science nature, are still better not to introduce or use.

Strikes at priority targets and massive fire strikes can be carried out within the framework of a front (fronts on Russia's western borders have not yet been formed) or the main command of the armed forces in the theater of military operations (such a command has not yet been created in the Southwestern strategic direction). Anything less than this is no longer a massive strike.

And what is, for example, a massive fire strike (MFS) of the front? To begin with, let us note that the MFS involves the maximum number of combat-ready forces and means of aviation, missile troops and artillery, electronic warfare means at the disposal of the front (operational-strategic association) commander. The MFS is one massive sortie of aviation, two or three launches of OTR and TR missile systems, several artillery fire raids. It is good if the degree of fire damage to the enemy is 60-70%.

What is the most important thing in this issue, as applied to the conflict with Ukraine? Of course, the MOU will inflict heavy losses on the probable enemy. But to expect to crush the armed forces of an entire state with just one such blow means to show simply unbridled optimism in the planning and conduct of military operations. Such MOUs will have to be inflicted not one or two, but many more in the course of hypothetical strategic actions in the theater of military operations.

It is necessary to add to this that the reserves of advanced and high-precision weapons in the Russian Armed Forces are not unlimited. Hypersonic missiles of the Zircon type are not yet in service. And the number of Kalibrs (sea-based cruise missiles), Kinzhals, Kh-101s (air-based cruise missiles) and Iskander missiles is measured in hundreds at best (tens in the case of Kinzhals). This arsenal is absolutely insufficient to wipe off the face of the Earth a country the size of France and with a population of over 40 million people. And these are precisely the parameters that characterize Ukraine.

ABOUT AIR DOMINANCE

Sometimes in the Russian expert community it is claimed (by fans of the Douhet doctrine) that since hypothetical military actions in Ukraine will take place under conditions of complete dominance of Russian aviation in the air, the war will be extremely short-lived and will end in the shortest possible time.

At the same time, it is somehow forgotten that the armed formations of the Afghan opposition did not have a single aircraft or a single combat helicopter during the conflict of 1979-1989. And the war in that country lasted for 10 years. The Chechen fighters did not have a single aircraft either. And the fight against them lasted for several years and cost the federal forces a lot of blood and victims.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces do have some sort of combat aviation, as well as air defense systems.

By the way, Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile forces (not Georgian ones) significantly pinched the Russian Air Force during the 2008 conflict. After the first day of combat operations, the Russian Air Force leadership was in outright shock from the losses they had suffered. And we shouldn't forget about that.

MOURNED IN ADVANCE

Now about the thesis "The Armed Forces of Ukraine are in a deplorable state." Of course, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have problems with aviation and modern air defense systems. But we must also admit the following. If before 2014 the Armed Forces of Ukraine were a fragment of the Soviet army, then over the past seven years a qualitatively different army has been created in Ukraine, on a completely different ideological basis and in many respects on NATO standards. And very modern weapons and equipment are now coming and continue to come to Ukraine from many countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

As for the weakest point of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – the Air Force. It cannot be ruled out that the collective West can, in a relatively short period of time, supply Kyiv with fighters, so to speak, from the armed forces – in other words, used. However, this second-hand will be quite comparable in its tactical and technical characteristics to most of the aircraft in the Russian air fleet.

Of course, today the Ukrainian Armed Forces are significantly inferior to the Russian Armed Forces in their combat and operational capabilities. No one doubts this - neither in the East nor in the West.

But you can't treat this army lightly either. In this regard, you should always remember the advice of Alexander Suvorov: "Never despise your enemy, don't consider him stupider and weaker than you."

Now, regarding the claim that Western countries will not send a single soldier to die for Ukraine.

It should be noted that this is most likely what will happen. However, this does not at all exclude, in the event of a Russian invasion, massive aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the collective West in the form of a wide variety of weapons and military equipment and large-scale deliveries of all kinds of material resources. In this regard, the West has already demonstrated an unprecedented consolidated position, which, it seems, was not predicted in Moscow.

There is no doubt that the US and the North Atlantic Alliance will begin a kind of reincarnation of Lend-Lease, modeled on the Second World War. An influx of volunteers from the West, of which there could be many, is also possible.

PARTISANS AND UNDERGROUND MEMBERSHIP

And finally, about the duration of the hypothetical campaign. The Russian expert community names several hours, sometimes even several tens of minutes. At the same time, it is somehow forgotten that we have already been through all this. The phrase "to take a city with one parachute regiment in two hours" has already become a classic of the genre.

It is also worth recalling that Stalin's mighty NKVD and the multi-million Soviet army fought the nationalist underground in Western Ukraine for more than 10 years. And now there is an option that all of Ukraine can easily join the partisans. Moreover, these formations can easily begin to operate on Russian territory.

Armed fighting in large Ukrainian cities is generally difficult to predict. It is well known that a large city is the best battlefield for the weaker and less technically advanced side of an armed conflict.

Serious experts emphasize that in a megalopolis it is possible not only to concentrate a group of thousands and even tens of thousands of fighters, but also to hide it from the superior firepower of the enemy. And also to supply it with material resources for a long time and to replenish losses in people and equipment. Neither mountains, nor forests, nor jungles provide such an opportunity today.

Experts are convinced that the urban environment helps the defenders, slows down the movement of the attackers, allows for a record number of fighters to be deployed per unit of area, and compensates for the lag in forces and technology. And in Ukraine there are more than enough large cities, including those with a million inhabitants. So, during a hypothetical war with Ukraine, the Russian army may encounter more than just Stalingrad and Grozny.

CONCLUSIONS

In general, there will be no Ukrainian blitzkrieg. Statements by some experts such as "The Russian army will defeat most of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units in 30-40 minutes", "Russia is capable of defeating Ukraine in 10 minutes in the event of a full-scale war", "Russia will defeat Ukraine in eight minutes" have no serious basis.

And finally, the most important thing. The armed conflict with Ukraine at the present time fundamentally does not meet the national interests of Russia. Therefore, some overexcited Russian experts would be better off forgetting about their self-indulgent fantasies. And in order to prevent further reputational losses, never to remember them again.

source: https://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2022-02-03/3_1175_donbass.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Khodaryonok

On 31 January 2022, during the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis, as Chairman of the Russian Officers' General Assembly, Gen. Ivashov published a statement condemning Putin's "criminal policy of provoking a war" and calling for President Putin's resignation.[6][7][8] Blaming Putin for risking "the final destruction of Russian statehood and the extermination of the indigenous population of the country" Ivashov stated that the real danger for Russia was not NATO or the West but "the unviability of the state model, the complete incapacity and lack of professionalism of the system of power and administration, the passivity and disorganization of society." Under these conditions "no country survives for long".[8] According to Roderick Gregory, "Ivashov believes that NATO is a hostile power, but his experience has taught him that the NATO/U.S. threat is under control and no external threat is imminent from the Western powers."

Also on 7 February 2022 Ivashov publicly called for Putin to resign over threats of a "criminal" invasion of Ukraine.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonid_Ivashov


The Chairman of the All-Russian Officers' Assembly, Colonel General Leonid Grigorievich Ivashov, wrote an Appeal to the President and Citizens of the Russian Federation "The Eve of War":

Appeal of the All-Russian Officers' Assembly

to the President and Citizens of the Russian Federation

Today, humanity lives in anticipation of war. And war is inevitable human casualties, destruction, suffering of large masses of people, destruction of the usual way of life, disruption of the life support systems of states and peoples. A great war is a huge tragedy, someone's grave crime. It so happened that Russia found itself in the center of this looming catastrophe. And, perhaps, this is the first time in its history.

Earlier, Russia (the USSR) waged forced (just) wars, and, as a rule, when there was no other way out, when the vital interests of the state and society were under threat.

And what threatens the existence of Russia itself today, and are there such threats? It can be argued that there really are threats - the country is on the verge of the end of its history. All vital spheres, including demography, are steadily degrading, and the rate of population extinction is breaking world records. And the degradation is systemic, and in any complex system, the destruction of one of the elements can lead to the collapse of the entire system.

And this, in our opinion, is the main threat to the Russian Federation. But this is an internal threat, emanating from the model of the state, the quality of power and the state of society. And the reasons for its formation are internal: the unviability of the state model, the complete incapacity and unprofessionalism of the system of power and governance, the passivity and disorganization of society. No country can live long in such a state.

As for external threats, they are certainly present. But, according to our expert assessment, they are not currently critical, directly threatening the existence of Russian statehood, its vital interests. In general, strategic stability is maintained, nuclear weapons are under reliable control, NATO force groups are not increasing, they do not show threatening activity.

Therefore, the situation being whipped up around Ukraine is, first of all, artificial, selfish in nature for certain internal forces, including the Russian Federation. As a result of the collapse of the USSR, in which Russia (Yeltsin) played a decisive role, Ukraine became an independent state, a member of the UN, and in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter has the right to individual and collective defense.

The leadership of the Russian Federation has still not recognized the results of the referendum on the independence of the DPR and LPR, while at the official level, more than once, including during the Minsk negotiation process, it emphasized the belonging of their territories and population to Ukraine.

It has also been repeatedly said at a high level about the desire to maintain normal relations with Kiev, without singling out special relations with the DPR and LPR.

The issue of the genocide committed by Kiev in the south-eastern regions was not raised either in the UN or in the OSCE. Naturally, in order for Ukraine to remain a friendly neighbor for Russia, it was necessary to demonstrate to it the attractiveness of the Russian model of state and system of power.

But the Russian Federation has not become such, its development model and foreign policy mechanism of international cooperation repel almost all of its neighbors, and not only.

Russia's acquisition of Crimea and Sevastopol and the non-recognition of them as Russian by the international community (and, therefore, the overwhelming majority of countries in the world still consider them to belong to Ukraine) convincingly demonstrates the failure of Russian foreign policy and the unattractiveness of its domestic policy.

Attempts to force people to "love" the Russian Federation and its leadership through ultimatums and threats of force are senseless and extremely dangerous.

The use of military force against Ukraine, firstly, will call into question the existence of Russia itself as a state; secondly, it will forever make Russians and Ukrainians mortal enemies. Thirdly, there will be thousands (tens of thousands) of young, healthy guys killed on both sides, which will certainly affect the future demographic situation in our dying countries. On the battlefield, if this happens, Russian troops will encounter not only Ukrainian servicemen, among whom there will be many Russian guys, but also servicemen and equipment from many NATO countries, and the member states of the alliance will be obliged to declare war on Russia.

The President of the Republic of Turkey R. Erdogan clearly stated on whose side Turkey will fight. And it can be assumed that two field armies and the navy of Turkey will be ordered to "liberate" Crimea and Sevastopol and, possibly, invade the Caucasus.

In addition, Russia will definitely be included in the category of countries threatening peace and international security, will be subject to the heaviest sanctions, will become an outcast of the world community, and will probably be deprived of the status of an independent state.

The president and the government, the Ministry of Defense cannot fail to understand such consequences, they are not that stupid.
source: https://web-archive-org.translate.goog/web/20220214005455/http://ooc.su/news/obrashhenie_obshherossijskogo_oficerskogo_sobranija_k_prezidentu_i_grazhdanam_rossijskoj_federacii/2022-01-31-79?_x_tr_sl=ru&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp

...just like the interviewer with her own political bias. — ssu

...just like anybody else, me and you included. And that's why I think a philosophy forum is an ideal place to honestly identify, explicit and argue about the grounds of such bias wrt the bias of one's opponents without the pretence we are going to fix anything about the world by doing this. gnōthi sauton should be our philosophical motto too.

I am definately sure that those American students who protest for Palestine are far more protesting for the end of the conflict and for an independent Palestine (with the Apartheid system ending) than supporters of the armed branches of the Palestinians in a way that would put them on a terrorist watch list. — ssu

I don't doubt that either. Yet one must be naive, if not disingenuous, to believe that those pro-Palestinian students "protesting for the end of the conflict and for an independent Palestine (with the Apartheid system ending)" may have a political impact immune from risks such as costly unintended consequences (like being instrumental to Hamas) where the most direct costs are on Israeli's and Jewish shoulders. If governments' legitimacy and accountability highly depend on the governments' capacity of preserving security (whatever that means) of those who willingly submit to it, we should not expect governments to pursue security of foreign people at the expense of domestic people's security. Actually we are compelled to expect quite the contrary, especially if security concerns between foreign and domestic people are perceived as incompatible for historical and geopolitical reasons. Then of course you can add on top of that the risk of nasty polarising propaganda and politicians' selfish interest on one or both sides, among others. My point is that one can't convincingly flatten the analysis of this conflict down just to nasty propaganda on one or both sides. I find it shallow, if not hypocritical, and arrogant. Even more so if this is done in a philosophy forum.

This is debatable though: — neomac

Then shouldn't they show the flag, march in step in what they believe? — ssu

There have been pro-Palestinian protestors who did that in the US:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1KRE_hIMFVU
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/protesters-spotted-holding-hamas-flags-151851331.html
https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1417172/hezbollah-and-hamas-flags-waved-during-pro-palestinian-demonstration-in-new-york.html
https://www.newsnationnow.com/world/war-in-israel/white-house-condemns-anti-israel-protesters-supporting-hamas/

But, more generally, I think the most pertinent answer to your question is no.
Concerning the war in Ukraine, there are pro-Russians in Western media (as in the dedicated thread of this forum) who do not go around waving Russian flags and chanting “Slava Rossii”.
They embrace the Russian or Hamas narrative about facts and responsibilities, and the resistance narrative: Russians and Palestinians have been provoked and they are defending themselves. The greatest burden of responsibility remains on the West, the US, Ukraine or Israel which means that the West, the US, Ukraine or Israel are not in position to reproach the perceived aggressors (Russia or Hamas) or to impose just punishment or to refuse concessions to the perceived aggressors.
Pro-Palestinians activists do not need to explicitly justify Hamas’ response to Israel to be considered pro-Hamas, they can even condemn it (many actually do, when solicited), yet they will complain about Israel in relative terms as way worse than Hamas, and as the one who started all of it, no matter the Jewish history and Israeli security concerns.
The emotional argument (genocide in Gaza, Israel as an apartheid state, Gaza as an open air prison, war crimes against Palestinian kids and civilians etc.) is implicitly meant to back up a psychological excuse for Hamas’ most brutal aggression against Israelis, while granting pro-Palestinians a plausible disclaimer about their morally ambiguous position toward Hamas and a cheap accusation against their opponents' alleged misrepresentations of their own views. The same goes with Western pro-Russian supporters as we can see in the thread dedicated to the war in Ukraine.

And your video is a perfect example of the media bias ...this example on the right-wing side. Are the demonstrators really celebrating Hamas, as the interviewer says? Celebrating Hamas? And the decapitated babies rumour? Still going on?

God I hate this stupidity. — ssu

If we want to assess to what extent the pro-Palestinian front is willing to support Hamas’ resistance against the Israeli oppression, we have to focus on them and on their propaganda, not on pro-Israel propaganda. And from that video one can clearly hear such students to be supportive of martyrdom, provocation, and resistance narrative, while refusing to explicitly acknowledge their implications when such narrative is to be applied to Hamas. If they were forced to, I believe they would likely go with “yes, but who started all of it?”, “who did worse to the other?”, etc. to cope with their cognitive dissonance.
What people talking politics do not seem to realise is that they are not Olympian gods refereeing human affairs. They all are part of the same political game, and all they say and do can be instrumental one way or the other to others’ political ends, even the ones they claim to dislike or morally condemn.

those holding Palestinian flags aren't supporters of Hamas. — ssu

This is debatable though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Students_for_Justice_in_Palestine#Criticism_and_controversies
https://www.haaretz.com/haaretz-explains/2023-11-17/ty-article/.premium/what-is-students-for-justice-in-palestine-the-group-igniting-u-s-campus-wars-over-israel/0000018b-d950-dffa-adef-ff50463f0000
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2023/10/10/psc-statement-backlash/
https://www.intelligent.com/1-in-5-college-students-sympathize-with-hamas/
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-campus-war-on-israel/

Hezbollah's flags look more popular:
https://x.com/SprinterFamily/status/1783619759927435275
https://x.com/JakeSherman/status/1826708643456209366
https://www.yahoo.com/news/jewish-student-slams-princeton-permitting-201822811.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAEek4XJ_k0Ey2uSa09f3cxyI6eEtqqUCrWm8b70Nv-YxyDWtQrBcSVpJ7D9CfDu6FssmdfamVAbp9v09Qe9fTfUU2F1djtippl4Um_gMGx34A9kG4gg_MvOhv__SkbufLbEHXBdrr0KDgl1bQ5l4Ujj-hdblzGPStNWgf2wpyAsc

To me the problem is still in the way issues are framed. Indeed, even though one can explicitly be pro-Palestinian in a broader sense without being explicitly pro-Hamas, that doesn't exclude the fact that many pro-Palestinians are willingly walking over grey lines to obfuscate themselves and their interlocutors about their position toward Hamas for the same reasons Tzeench laid out:

The first thing that needs happen is for Israel to stop its belligerent occupation of Gaza and the West Bank. Until that happens, Hamas is simply a resistance movement that is reacting to being occupied by Israel. Armed resistance isn't even forbidden under such conditions according to international law, and Israel, being the occupier, cannot legally claim self-defense. — Tzeentch

https://springmag.ca/york-university-student-unions-statement-of-solidarity-with-palestine
In response to Palestinian resistance, so-called Israel has continued to escalate attacks on Gaza by bombing residential neighborhoods, deploying white phosphorus bombs and cutting off access to food, water, power and medical supplies. These tactics are not new. So-called Israel has continually restricted Palestinians movement to & from Gaza, creating an open-air prison and obstructing access to essential resources within the apartheid fence for decades. These recent events serve as a reminder that from Turtle Island to Palestine, and across all occupied lands, resistance against colonial violence is justified and necessary. This is “decolonization” and “land-back” actualized as we continue to see the Palestinian people stand firm in their resistance against their oppressors.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been intertwined with the conflict Iran (as leader of the Shias) and Saudi Arabia (as leader of the Sunnis) for decades. — neomac

The Sunni Shia conflict started in earnest with Iraq and later with the civil war in Syria. It hasn't intertwined actually so much. For example for a long time Isrealis went as tourists to see (naturally from their side) from the Golan Heights the Civil War in Syria. That you can sit comfortably on a hill and watch the fighting on the other side of the border tells that ISIS wasn't targetting Israel (which btw. has created a lot of conspiracy theories in the Middle East). The Sunni Islamists simply left their wounded on the border where Israeli troops picked them up and moved them to a Israeli hospital. — ssu

I was talking about the strategic conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran as aspirational leaders of respectively Sunnis and Shias, and more widely of the Muslim world, which ends up in several related proxy wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Also the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a role in this conflict, because Hamas (as Iranian proxy) is an expression of the Iranian political influence and material power projection in the Arab world, it compromises the normalisation of relations between Saudis and Israelis, and its Islamist ideology challenges the legitimacy as Arab monarchies like the Saudis. Besides, depending on how other proxy wars (in Iraq, Syria, Yemen) go the political pressure and security threats on both the Saudis and Israel may vary, decrease or increase.

Yes, just like Saddam Hussein then launched Scuds to Israel because ...why not. A populist move to gain support of the "Arab street" which people occasionally try to do.

Yet what has been the response this time? Some angry rhetoric from the Turkish leader and some angry rhetoric from other countries. And well, that's about it...

So these are quite different conflicts, even if the actors intertwine as you say. — ssu

If we want to take the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a thermometer to assess the cultural clash between the West world and the Middle-Eastern Muslim world, we can’t discount different roots (pluri-centennial conflict between Sunnis and Shias) and rival actors (Iranian mullahs, Saudis, Saddam Hussain, Osama Bin Laden, etc.), as I acknowledged. But we can’t discount the fact that the Palestinian condition and Western imperialism have been object of bitter grievance in the Muslim world and have been exploited by different actors and despite their competition within the Muslim world. That’s why I was talking about “many cultural clashes”

Within Islam there's a lot of totally different struggles going on, which then splash even on our shores and then there's the question of migration in general. — ssu

You didn’t prove they are “totally different struggles” or “separate”. One can distinguish to some extent national and religious roots, and major actors in various conflicts plaguing the Middle East but they heavily interact and influence each other materially and ideologically. Maybe there is not one clash of civilisation but many.

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one specific conflict that soon will have gone for a Century. — ssu

Then there's Sunni-Shia struggle we've seen in Iraq and Syria. — ssu

And then there's the now quite institutionalized Iranian revolution that is something like Marxism-Leninism was for the Soviet Union, which has picked Israel in it's crosshairs (and vice versa). — ssu

Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been intertwined with the conflict between Iran (as leader of the Shias) and Saudi Arabia (as leader of the Sunnis) for decades. For such Sunni and Shia regimes, supporting the Palestinian cause is also about securing domestic legitimacy and enhancing regional influence. By advocating for Palestinians, such regimes attempt to gain the moral high ground and appeal to the broader Muslim population, which often sympathizes with the Palestinian struggle. This dynamic fuels the rivalry and on both sides there are attempts to outdo the other in showing support for Palestine

https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/11/between-swords-of-iron-and-the-al-aqsa-deluge-the-regional-politics-of-the-israel-hamas-war/

Separate is the Sunni Islmamism that started with Al Qaeda. — ssu

From Osama bin Laden's "letter to the American people”:

As for the first question: Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple:
(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us.
a) You attacked us in Palestine:
(i) Palestine, which has sunk under military occupation for more than 80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with your help and your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it for more than 50 years; years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing, expulsion, destruction and devastation. The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of its criminals. And of course there is no need to explain and prove the degree of American support for Israel. The creation of Israel is a crime which must be erased. Each and every person whose hands have become polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its*price, and pay for it heavily.
(ii) It brings us both laughter and tears to see that you have not yet tired of repeating your fabricated lies that the Jews have a historical right to Palestine, as it was promised to them in the Torah. Anyone who disputes with them on this alleged fact is accused of anti-semitism. This is one of the most fallacious, widely-circulated fabrications in history. The people of Palestine are pure Arabs and original Semites. It is the Muslims who are the inheritors of Moses (peace be upon him) and the inheritors of the real Torah that has not been changed. Muslims believe in all of the Prophets, including Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, peace and blessings of Allah be upon them all. If the followers of Moses have been promised a right to Palestine in the Torah, then the Muslims are the most worthy nation of this.
When the Muslims conquered Palestine and drove out the Romans, Palestine and Jerusalem returned to Islaam, the religion of all the Prophets peace be upon them. Therefore, the call to a historical right to Palestine cannot be raised against the Islamic Ummah that believes in all the Prophets of Allah (peace and blessings be upon them) - and we make no distinction between them.
(iii) The blood pouring out of Palestine must be equally revenged. You must know that the Palestinians do not cry alone; their women are not widowed alone; their sons are not orphaned alone.

https://web.archive.org/web/20040615081002/http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,845725,00.html

Whoever has basic notions of logic can't get easily impressed by roughly true predictions, no matter how many they are. Here is why:
1. from false premises one can correctly infer true conclusions,
2. from a set of incompatible premises (namely premises that can not be at the same time true but can be at the same time false, or premises that can be neither true nor false at the same time) one can correctly infer exactly the same true conclusions.

Examples:

Every Saturday it rains
Tomorrow is Saturday
Tomorrow it rains

Every other day of the week than Saturday it rains
Tomorrow is not Saturday
Tomorrow it rains

Both arguments are formally sound. And they lead to the very same conclusive prediction. However, such conclusive prediction may happen to be true even if all or some individual premises are false and comparatively incompatible because contrary or contradictory. So it's not enough that predictions are true, nor that reasoning is sound to have valid predictive arguments or theories.

the idea that the West carries principal responsibility in this war and that the West's conduct so far has been nothing short of shameful — Tzeentch

Let’s complete your reasoning: if the West carries principal responsibility, which one carries secondary responsibility? Ukraine or Russia? I guess it’s Ukraine, right? So no matter what responsibility Russia has in this conflict, yet neither the West nor Ukraine are in position to reproach Russia or to demand compensation or impose punishment to Russia, right? They must pay whatever follows from Russian invasion. Including nuclear bombing of course. This is your serious reasoning or a caricature, Tzeench?

western experts, analists and academics - a group that has done a vastly better job at predicting the course and outcome of this war than those who subscribe to the narrative that is put forward by virtually every major western media outlet. — Tzeentch

In what sense "vastly better"? Actually many geopolitical and military experts other than the few names you often cite explained the root causes [1], or “roughly” predicted what the unfortunate course [2] and the outcome [3] could be, no matter how questionable you find Western media propaganda. So the fascination comes more from the way those few names argue and assess blame which pleases pro-Russian populists like you.

[1]
On Ukraine’s independence and its impact on Russia (1991):
* "Ukraine's independence fundamentally changes the post-Cold War landscape. For Russia, losing Ukraine is a major blow to its ambitions of maintaining a significant influence in Eastern Europe. The success or failure of Ukraine as an independent state will determine the future trajectory of Russian policy."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Premature Partnership." Foreign Affairs, March/April 1991.

On Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia (1997):
* "It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. However, if Moscow regains control over Ukraine, with its 52 million people and major resources, as well as its access to the Black Sea, Russia automatically regains the wherewithal to become a powerful imperial state, spanning Europe and Asia."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives." Basic Books, 1997, p. 46.

On Russia’s likely strategy toward Ukraine (1994):
* "For Russia, the loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, reducing its geostrategic status and diminishing its sphere of influence in Central Europe. Thus, Russian efforts to reassert influence over Ukraine should be expected, especially given Ukraine's strategic significance."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Ukraine: Crucial to Europe's Security." Foreign Affairs, September/October 1994.

On potential Russian moves against Ukraine (1997):
* "A Ukraine firmly aligned with the West would be a major setback to Russia's aspirations to reassert its influence over the former Soviet space. As such, the Kremlin might use a combination of political pressure, economic leverage, and covert actions to try to bring Ukraine back under its influence."
* Source: Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives." Basic Books, 1997, p. 92


[2]
”I fear that the West may not have the political will to sustain the level of support Ukraine needs to resist Russian aggression over the long term."
* Date: March 2022
* Source: Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, in an interview with CNN.

"There is a real risk that Western countries will grow weary of the conflict and reduce their support for Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable to Russian advances."
* Date: February 2022
* Source: Anne Applebaum, historian and journalist, in an article for The Atlantic.

"I am skeptical about the West's ability to maintain a united front in supporting Ukraine, given the economic and political pressures at home."
* Date: April 2022
* Source: Ian Bremmer, political scientist and president of Eurasia Group, in a tweet.

"The West's capacity to provide sustained military and economic aid to Ukraine is uncertain, and this could have dire consequences for the conflict."
* Date: May 2022
* Source: Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of CrowdStrike, in an interview with The Washington Post.

"I worry that the West may not be willing to bear the costs and risks associated with supporting Ukraine, especially if the conflict escalates further."
* Date: June 2022
* Source: Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article for Foreign Affairs.

"There is a concern that Western countries will prioritize their own interests over Ukraine's needs, leading to insufficient support."
* Date: July 2022
* Source: John Mearsheimer, political scientist at the University of Chicago, in an interview with The New York Times.

"I fear that the West's willingness to provide the necessary aid to Ukraine will wane as the conflict drags on and other crises emerge."
* Date: August 2022
* Source: Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in an article for The New Yorker.

"The West's capacity to sustain support for Ukraine is uncertain, given the economic challenges and political divisions within Europe."
* Date: September 2022
* Source: Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal.

"I am skeptical about the West's ability to provide the military aid Ukraine needs to defend itself against Russian aggression."
* Date: October 2022
* Source: General Philip Breedlove, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in an interview with The Guardian.

"There is a risk that Western countries will grow tired of the conflict and reduce their support for Ukraine, leaving it vulnerable."
* Date: November 2022
* Source: Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, in a speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

"The West's capacity to provide sustained military and economic aid to Ukraine is uncertain, and this could have dire consequences for the conflict."
* Date: January 2022
* Source: Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State, in an interview with Fox News.

[3]

"I fear that Ukraine may not have the military capacity to regain all the territory occupied by Russia, especially in the eastern regions."
* Date: March 2022
* Source: Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former NATO Secretary General, in an interview with CNN.

"There is a real risk that Ukraine will struggle to retake territory from Russia, given the significant military disparities."
* Date: February 2022
* Source: Anne Applebaum, historian and journalist, in an article for The Atlantic.

"I am skeptical about Ukraine's ability to regain control of the Donbas and Crimea, given Russia's entrenched positions and military strength."
* Date: April 2022
* Source: Ian Bremmer, political scientist and president of Eurasia Group, in a tweet.

"Ukraine faces significant challenges in retaking territory from Russia, particularly in areas where Russia has consolidated its control."
* Date: May 2022
* Source: Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder of CrowdStrike, in an interview with The Washington Post.

"I worry that Ukraine may not have the resources or the military capability to push back Russian forces and regain lost territory."
* Date: June 2022
* Source: Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in an article for Foreign Affairs.

"There is a concern that Ukraine's military, despite its bravery and determination, may not be able to overcome Russia's superior firepower and logistical support."
* Date: July 2022
* Source: John Mearsheimer, political scientist at the University of Chicago, in an interview with The New York Times.

"I fear that Ukraine may not have the capacity to regain all the territory occupied by Russia, especially in the eastern regions."
* Date: August 2022
* Source: Samantha Power, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in an article for The New Yorker.

"Ukraine's ability to retake territory from Russia is uncertain, given the significant military disparities and the entrenched positions of Russian forces."
* Date: September 2022
* Source: Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden, in an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal.

"I am skeptical about Ukraine's capacity to regain control of the Donbas and Crimea, given Russia's military strength and the strategic importance of these regions."
* Date: October 2022
* Source: General Philip Breedlove, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in an interview with The Guardian.

"There is a risk that Ukraine will struggle to retake territory from Russia, given the significant military disparities and the entrenched positions of Russian forces."
* Date: November 2022
* Source: Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, in a speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Caricatures aside — Tzeentch

Your "serious" arguments come out as caricatures already and you dare to complain if we serve you your own meal?

If you have changed your mind you may start with the post whose contents you almost fully ignored in favor of a "I'm not going to talk to you anymore!" — Tzeentch

So then Tzeentch can ignore yours, @ssu, in favor of a "I'm not going to talk to you anymore!"

https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/99d85643-946a-4d9c-8ff8-3021dc4106ab

Interesting view, if "things get out of hand in a nuclear way", let's blame the US as the puppet master and the Ukrainians as the puppets, and not even mention Russia as the one actually nuclear bombing the region. More than interesting, serious, a serious view on this conflict as you only are capable of.
BTW why on earth would Russia nuclear bomb the region if this not only will not hit back at the US ("US has nothing to lose") but it will greatly benefit the US ("much to gain in a cataclysmic conflict in Eastern Europe", "It would cripple all its potential rivals on the Eurasian mainland")? What strategic reasoning is forcing Putin to bomb the region so that the US will gain much and Eurasian mainland (including Russia) will be crippled?
BTW Putin has already won the war in Ukraine, right? And Ukrainians puppets can only afford stunts "just like the previous Ukrainian offensive - to show both domestic and foreign audiences that the war is not yet lost", so what are the chances of Putin bombing the region which people are grossly underestimating?

I don't see where you get the idea that I'm reducing security concerns to invasion. Obviously invasion is topical for this discussion, but there are plenty of other security concerns as well. For example, between the US and Russia, the main security concern would be a nuclear war. — boethius

Do you read what you write? I got it from your own statements which I quoted and highlighted for you (here again: “You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.”). You are FOCUSING on a hypothetical scenario where Russia invades the US from Ukraine. Why? Because you want us to compare such scenario with the hypothetical scenario where the US invades Russia from Ukraine once Ukraine is inside NATO. How should we logically infer from such a comparison that Russia has “legitimate” security concerns?! And Russia is “justified” to invade Ukraine?! And therefore we should somehow appease Russia?! None of this logically follows, RIGHT? My charitable guess is that if you feel compelled to get to these conclusions from “you cannot invade the US from Ukraine” this is because you are drawing your conclusions also from hidden and uncritically accepted premises. So I’m challenging you to make them explicit. More on this in the following comments.

As I've explained many times, "legitimacy" is a concept that is useful in the context of a negotiation, to denote where your own side sees (or you're arguing should see) the other side as having a point needing to be addressed in some way. — boethius

And from what concrete context of negotiation results that Russia’s security concerns are “legitimate”? You are not a negotiator between the US, Ukraine and Russia, are you? And I'm aware of no negotiation reports admitting that Russia security concerns about the possibility that Russia is invaded from Ukraine by the US or NATO if Ukraine joins NATO are “legitimate”, are there?
Besides on what grounds one would see the other side “as having a point needing to be addressed in some way”? Based on one’s own strategic interests? On international law grounds? On moral grounds? On what grounds Russia has a point because the US could invade Russia from Ukraine once Ukraine joins NATO more likely than Russia could invade the US after invading Ukraine?
Is in the US strategic interest, legal or moral duty, to have Russia invade Ukraine because the US could invade Russia from Ukraine once Ukraine joins NATO more likely than Russia could invade the US after invading Ukraine?
And by “addressed in some way” do you mean “conceded in some way”, “satisfied in some way”, “fulfilled in some way”? For example, if Russia has a point because the US could invade Russia from Ukraine once Ukraine joins NATO more likely than Russia could invade the US after invading Ukraine, then Russia must be conceded all its non-negotiable demands (Ukraine outside NATO, demilitarised Ukraine, territorial annexations)?
Because if “addressed in some way” simply means “dealt in some way” also rejection, indifference, opposition are ways of dealing with other people’s requests.
Your confused and confusing way of talking is a way to keep your hidden assumptions unchallenged. You keep evading my objections by repeating the same shallow arguments replete with rhetoric tricks over and over.

"A right" and "a concern" are one aspect of the situation, if we on our side of a conflict or dispute recognize that the other side does have a legitimate right or legitimate concern then that simply indicates to ourselves that we'll need to pay attention to this aspect of the situation and likely need to address it in a robust way, compared to what we view as illegitimate which can just be dismissed offhand (such as a criminal demanding a flying horse). — boethius

The main thing you are still unable to see is that you cannot go from "rights" or "concerns", of one kind or another, to justifications. — boethius

Where do I “go from ‘rights’ or ‘concerns’, of one kind or another, to justifications”? Quote me.

I often used the example of detectives trying to get information from a criminal. If the criminal demands a coffee, his right to outside time being respected, and a flying horse, the detectives may conclude between themselves that the coffee and the outside time is a legitimate concern, they should address those if they want the criminal to cooperate, but the flying horse is illegitimate and they'll just have to deny that request.

If the detectives don't want anything from the criminal, they are unlikely to care as much, if at all, about the criminals concerns — boethius

Sure, DO UT DES, I’ll give you something and you give me something back IF IT IS CONVENIENT TO BOTH OF US. But how does this translate to the current conflict? Who has to decide what is convenient between Russia, Ukraine, the US and European countries? Besides, why is it more convenient to the US, European countries or Ukraine to let Russia invade Ukraine than oppose it? In exchange for what?

If you go into a court of law or a negotiation recognizing the counter-party does indeed have a legitimate right or concern, the judge will naturally expect you to address in a sophisticated way and then go onto explain that on the whole that legitimacy on those points are insufficient to make their case and your case is the one that is justified.

For example, in contract disputes it is pretty common that both parties have broken the contract in one and usually several areas, and each side will then argue the other side did it first, did it worse, did it intentionally, caused more damages, didn't reasonable address the issue once emerged, didn't negotiate the contract correctly to begin with, didn't secure the appropriate insurance, didn't amend the understanding correctly on the fly which should have been triple stamped and signed in blood with a notary present, etc. etc. etc.

Legitimacy is simply the opposing demarkation to bullshit. If you receive a longwinded demand from a scummy lawyer, the first thing you'll want to do is separate the legitimate points from the bullshit, either born from incompetence or expressly designed to waste your time (usually its both simultaneously), and then come up with robust arguments that address the legitimate points and witty retorts and dismissals to the bullshit if address them at all. — "boethius

Political leaders of different countries are not like lawyers in a court of law in this respect: lawyers are guided by a legal framework to assess people’s claims and requests. Such legal framework is supervised and enforced by a unique state authority with overwhelming means to impose its rule, and represented by the judge. In a geopolitical context, conflicts between different state authorities can not be solved by appeal to a super-state authority with a comparable overwhelming power. That means states and their political representatives have to find ways to deal with security threats by themselves with all the economic, political and military means available to them. In particular they have to value what security costs/threats certain concessions to rivals will bring about. Are there no security costs/threats to the US in conceding Russia control over Ukraine? Or there are security costs/threats but they are less significative than NOT conceding Russia control over Ukraine?

Fighting under impossible odds can be justified, but the situation must be extreme. — boethius

Who decides what is “extreme”? On what grounds?

To argue an action is justified requires arguing the likely consequences are acceptable and preferable — boethius

.

Who has to decide what is “likely”, “acceptable” and “preferable”? On what grounds?

So, to attack your kidnappers with 100 to 1 odds of prevailing over being shot in the head, requires more than the right of self defence to justify, you must argue that the likely result of being dead is preferable to continuing to be captive. Obviously you prefer that 1% of chance of taking down your captors with improvised kung fu, but your action is only justified if you are also content with the far more likely result of being dead. To make things more morally concrete, not just a "you" thing, the situation is that attacking your captors will likely result in you and the other captives you're with also being shot in the head — boethius

.

The problem is not how to act after you have “calculated” odds (the part which you systematically skip in your examples) wrt non-shared or potentially conflicting objectives. The problem is how to “calculate” the odds, and wrt non-shared or potentially conflicting objectives. When objectives and method to “calculate” odds are shared I’d expect convergence of conclusions. Not otherwise.
To what extent Russia, the US, Ukraine, Europe countries share security concerns and ways to “calculate” odds?

If your decision is based purely on the "feeling" that somehow you'll prevail against what you have no problem recognizing is 100 to 1 odds, and you yourself have no problem recognizing the captors will simply leave once they've done robbing the place, then that's just magical thinking that gets people killed for no justifiable reason. However, if the captors are likely to torture, rape and the murder everyone whatever happens, then those 100 to 1 odds are looking pretty good — boethius

.

“Feelings” in politics and war and propaganda is not just what interferes with odds computation. But also input for odds computation. Indeed feelings shape one’s motivations in responding to threat and in committing oneself to a chain of trust within a community. To many people repeated and wide spread unjust violence for themselves, beloved ones and the community they care for or identify with, inspire will to revenge and fear injustice will happen again or worse, if one doesn’t fight back. The bitter truth is that those who fear death will be more likely exposed to the abuses of those who fear less death. The bitter truth is that being afraid of your enemy and showing your own fear to your enemy likely don’t help much win your enemies or making him go away. And this is not just an anthropological observation but a security concern for states: if Russia can mobilize Russians MORE EASILY AND ABUNDANTLY without fear of consequences than peaceful countries can mobilise their own people to counter Russia, Russia can more easily bully peaceful countries at convenience.

Vis-a-vis Ukraine, one can simply argue that land ownership is more important than anything else and it is better to fight to the death than give-up 1m^2 of land. As I and Isaac made very clear, we obviously don't share that view. — boethius

First, you are objecting to an hypothetical argument which I didn’t make (if somebody else did, quote him). Why don’t you counter the actual arguments I made, instead of the ones you wished I made?
Second, your hypothetical argument is a rhetoric manipulation. Indeed, why is your argument FOCUSING on Ukraine? And why are you FOCUSING on square meters? Let’s apply your argument to Russia: one can simply argue that Russian soldiers are fighting to death because “land ownership is more important than anything else and it is better to fight to the death than give-up 1m^2 of land”. But Russia is already too big, actually the biggest country on earth, why the fuck would Russia even want to own 1m^2 more of land? Dagestanis, Buryaties and Chechens soldiers want for Russia to have 1m^2 more of land? Prigozhin wanted Russia to have 1m^2 more of land? Russian convicts sent to the front wanted Russia to have 1m^2 more of land? The 18 years old Russian Yermolenko wants Russia to have 1m^2 more of land? Putin wants for Russia to have 1m^2 more of land? Russian soldiers are killing and raping people, destroying their lives, sacrificing their own life so that Russia has 1m^2 more of land? Doesn’t that sound preposterous to you?
Indeed, for Russia we should talk about ”legitimate security concerns”, “Patriotic war against Ukrainian Nazis”, “hypothetical Western/American/NATO invasion of Russia from Ukraine”, RIGHT? But then why do you feel so confident in taking your hypothetical argument as representative of Ukrainians’ point of view? Why shouldn't we talk about ”Ukrainian legitimate security concerns”, “Ukrainian Patriotic war against Russian imperialism”, “hypothetical Russian invasion of Ukraine and other Western countries”?
Your shallow arguments replete with rhetoric tricks won’t get you anywhere with me.

However, even on this premise that fighting to the death for land with low odds of victory is justifiable, it does not somehow just magically justify forcing people into fighting, taking away their right to freedom of movement, taking away their right to free elections and a free press and a due process and pretty much every other right they previously had (however poorly implemented in the pervasively corrupt state of Ukraine). — boethius

As I said many times, I’m not here to fix the world. It’s arrogant or dishonest or both. I’m here to do some intellectual gymnastics (like avoid to use rhetoric tricks, explicit your premises and reasoning, provide workable definitions to improve clarity, provide your evidence and source, avoid making contradictory statements, contrast explanatory power of your beliefs vs others etc.), that’s all. And I think a philosophy forum is the best place where to do the kind of intellectual gymnastics I’m doing.

First, you didn’t quote me or anybody else claiming that “fighting to the death for land with low odds of victory is justifiable” so you seem to have a quarrel with your imaginary friend. Why don’t you counter the actual arguments I made, instead the ones you wished I made?
Second, I’m questioning your understanding of “odds” and “victory”. If your point is, given the questionable trend of Western military support (something wasn’t evident at the beginning of the war), and the worrisome trend of growing disparity of means and men between Russia and Ukraine (something wasn’t evident at the beginning of the war), it’s unlikely that Ukraine will manage to fully restore its borders as declared by the Ukrainian political leadership by military means, I find that point compelling. And I think that also Ukrainians find it compelling. I can concede that much. But FOCUSING on this to assess political intentions, failures or responsibilities of Westerners or Ukrainians overlooks geopolitical and historical reasons which I brought up and you keep ignoring.
Third, concerning the problem of “forcing people into fighting” there are compelling reasons for that. One is the civic duty to protect the country one belongs to from foreign oppression. This is legally codified in the Ukrainian constitution art. 65 (“Defence of the Motherland, of the independence and territorial indivisibility of Ukraine, and respect for its state symbols, are the duties of citizens of Ukraine”. “Citizens perform military service in accordance with the law” https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b and law includes also martial law). The other reason is security: Russia too forces reluctant people to fight and if Russia can force a percentage of its people reluctant to fight more than Ukraine can force an equal or greater percentage of people reluctant to fight, this may give a comparative advantage to Russia, even a greater advantage since Russian population is bigger. Actually, for that reason only, Ukraine has greater compelling reason to force people reluctant to fight than Russia has.

As I've said many times, if Ukrainians (the individual soldiers) were really fighting of their own choice without coercion with more-or-less correct understanding of the situation, knowing the low odds of success, then I wouldn't have much of a problem and wouldn't have much of an argument. Obviously we could still argue whether that really is a justified position or not, still argue about the strategic military choices, and so on, but if it really was a case of "Ukrainians want to fight"; the situation would be tragic but there would be little to really argue about. — boethius

Logically speaking, the claim "Ukrainians want to fight" is a generic generalisation as opposed to quantified generalisation. Generic generalisations do not specify quantity of individuals (“all”, “the absolute majority”, “the relative majority”, “71.59%”, “23 thousands”) which the claim applies to, as quantified generic claims do. Nor specify the scope (are we talking about “the Ukrainian political government”, “Ukrainian citizens”, “Ukrainian soldiers”, “Ukrainian soldiers on the front line”, etc.?).
Political debate is replete with generic generalisations. There is nothing inherently wrong with using generic generalisations, they stress what is contextually relevant in a discourse about a certain domain of individuals. But they can be equivocal, and manipulatively used to reinforce prejudices and stereotypes (e.g. immigrants steel our jobs). Therefore when I’m using them, I’m ready to add clarifications.
However, one has to keep in mind that it is LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS to take the generic generalisation "Ukrainians want to fight" as a claim about “Exactly all Ukrainian individual soldiers”.
Besides "Ukrainians want to fight" doesn’t presuppose or implicate anything about “more-or-less correct understanding” or “knowing”.

However, when the power of the state is used to corrupt people's understanding with propaganda (both Ukraine and Western governments), a flood of external and contingent (on doing what the West wants) money is bribing the elites in effective control of the state, take away people's rights, coerce them to the front lines, and the end result is massive amounts of death and suffering and nothing to show for it, then there's plenty to take issue with.

The narrative of "Ukrainians want to fight" that's brought out whenever the terrible consequences (slip through the cracks of state propaganda) is just more state propaganda to dull the senses of Westerners who step back a moment from the cheerleading and get uncomfortable with what the actual consequences of our choices are and ask obvious questions (like whether it was a good idea to rebuke Russia's offers to negotiate a liveable peace in Eastern-Europe for decades). — boethius

Besides the fact that is not clear to me on what grounds you discriminate what is propaganda and what is not (apparently to you, propaganda is just some claim politically motivated you believe to be false and whose politically motivations you oppose), the point is that accusing others of spinning propaganda you go nowhere, because each propaganda has a counter-propaganda. Here: “Russia too is bribing and used to bribe people in the West and in Ukraine too to spin the narrative you just laid out. With the mystification of Russia’s legitimate security concerns people like you are justifying Russia’s war against Ukrainians and defaming/blaming the victims to dull the senses of Westerners who step back a moment from cheerleading Russia and get uncomfortable with what the actual consequences of our choices are and ask obvious questions (like whether it was a good idea to not help more Ukraine to fight Russia)”. It’s not by labelling people’s claims as propaganda that you score points with me or prove you are not spinning your own propaganda.
That is why I’m arguing based on geopolitics and history. Not primarily on what Biden or Zelensky or Putin say. Even less on unverifiable and manifestly defamatory conspiracy theories stated as facts, as you do (and if this attitude is not a marker of nasty propaganda I don’t know what is). Even less on the self-promoting and crypto-moralistic psycho-analysis of your interlocutors. Your deconstructionist-like arguments seem really inspired by garbage philosophical reading and understanding, to me. Your arguments do not impress me AT ALL. No matter how much you repeat them.

As far as my historical argument goes, the conflict of Ukrainians and Russians has a very deep and long history. The notion of “genocide” invented by Raphael Lemkin (a Polish jew) is documented also in Lemkin’s essay, ‘Soviet Genocide in Ukraine’. The Ukrainian Neo-nazis and banderites (you were whining about) are the ideological descendants of those who sided with the Nazis to fight the Russian Soviets. To argue FOR Ukraine keeping the Soviet Nuclear arsenal as a deterrent, Mearsheimer wrote: There is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet collapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast suffering under Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological backdrop, small disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism on either side.
Source: https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf
And there is nothing unique in people’s stubborn national aspirations despite averse conditions: see Palestinians, Jews, Kurds, Afghans.
So the plausibility of the claim “Ukrainians want to fight” (also despite the odds and disparity of forces) is primarily grounded on their perception of historical Russian oppression, not on corrupted elites that try to corrupt people’s understanding the odds of winning against Russia, EVEN IF THEY EXISTED. Besides Ukrainians have still wide access to international media over the internet and direct experience on the ground (from families and friends too), so I’m more confident that UKRAINIANS HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PREDICAMENT THAN YOU COULD POSSIBLY HAVE. And if despite all the available information to them, they still support the war and fight on the front line, I take their commitment to be enough popular and solid. I don’t know how long it will last though. Not surprisingly stats show some non-negligible declining after more than 2 years of conflict with Russia (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/07/23/7466999/ ), and these stats are widely and freely accessible to Ukrainians too.

As has been repeated many times, my primary issue is with Western policy (as I'm a Westerner and I mostly affect and am responsible for Western policy) and my secondary issue is with Ukrainian policy. — boethius

Which is why you are prone to spin propaganda more likely than I am. Your contributions here are politically motivated, not mine.

If there was no coercing Ukrainians to fight, then sure, let them fight. However, considering the few Ukrainians outside of Ukraine that return to fight and the many that attempt and do leave, this narrative is simply not true. — boethius

Obviously "Ukrainians" clearly don't want to fight , else there wouldn't be press gangs forcing them to the front lines — "boethius

But I never said nor believe that there are no coercing Ukrainians to fight, quote me where I did that. I here say and claim to believe that there is a disturbing amount of coercing Ukrainians to fight. AT THE SAME TIME I here say and claim to believe that Ukrainians are willing to fight (maybe now less then before, but still). There is absolute no logic contradiction in what I said and believe.
“Ukrainians want to fight” is a generic generalisation not a universal generalisation, if you think otherwise, that’s a logical fallacy, remember? You let words like “obviously” and “clearly” replace the job that logic and actual evidence should do. At this point, what is “obvious“ and “clear” is that you are just playing rhetoric tricks to brainwash yourself.

And, obviously "Ukrainian sovereignty" is not the concern of the West or we would send our own troops to defend this important thing. — "boethius

That’s a false alternative, i.e. yet another rhetoric trick. "Ukrainian sovereignty" is a concern for Ukrainians in one sense and for the West in another because Ukraine have national interest as much as European countries. And they may converge enough. Besides, to my understanding, political and military readiness to send troops is way more problematic for the West than for Russia. And I expanded on this in many other previous posts, which you ignored, because you are just happy to repeat the Evil Satan narrative where the US decides for all, corrupts all, exploits all in the West. Indeed, Portugal and Poland do not see this conflict in the same way. Nor the US and Hungary. Nor Finland and Turkey (as part of the Western-lead defensive alliance called “NATO”). Nor populist and anti-populist Western parties or leaders. Assuming that Western and Russian politicians need enough popular consent to support sending troops to war, yet how to get such a consent is not the same for Russia or the US or Germany or Italy. Putin enjoys comparative advantages in taking more bold, coherent and fast political/economic/military decisions than the West can. Consider the pacifist culture in the West vs Russia, consider the notion of defensive-war in the West vs Russia, consider the notion of preventive war in the West vs Russia, consider the different degree of tolerance over the costs/risks of the war as felt between Westerners vs Russians, consider the different sensitivity of public opinions toward civilian casualties and war crimes in the West vs Russia. More broadly, as I’ve already argued, there is an institutional security hazard that plagues Western democracies more than anti-Western authoritarian regimes, and that’s the strategic reason for “exporting” democracy and human rights independently from humanitarian reasons.
Russia with its hostile authoritarian regime, its hegemonic motives and anti-Western pretexts is a security threat to the West, especially to Europeans, no matter how able is the West to counter Russia in Ukraine, no matter what the Great Satan says (Russians and Europeans fought many times before the US imperialism was even a thing). Even more so, if hegemonic powers as Russia are offensive security maximizer in accordance to John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism. Even more so, if the American global hegemony is in decline and Europeans are not military/politically ready to deter Russia for good.

Let's remember Seymour Hersh's "How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline" as the most serious piece of investigation over the Nordstream sabotage, according to the most serious poster in the this thread.

↪neomac
I meant civil claims. Or do you think Gasunie, Engie, BASF and E.ON wil not be concerned with losing their investments? The standard of proof is also lower so we could see judgments against, for instance, Ukraine that would not reach the level of proof required for criminal cases but will imply guilt. — Benkei

If the question is “which country was behind it”, I find it very much possible that Ukrainians were behind it, on their own initiative, not on Great Satan’s. But it seems unlikely they really did it all alone given that the attack started from within Germany and the infrastructure was of strategic relevance particularly to Germany, while other Western countries (like the US and Poland) were against Nordstream II.
I think that the economic reason of “losing their investments” is pretty compelling but not that compelling: Western investments were spread across different Western companies, damage to Nordstream II wasn’t beyond repair, private investments might have been somehow compensated (even having the Nordstream II functional but unused is still loss of ROI), and most of all, economic reasons can be overcome by security concerns.
What would be embarrassing for Western officials in the eyes of public opinion is if Western and Ukrainian officials were involved. That’s why we should expect they worked on plausible deniability, and will likely keep it as an inside conflict as long as needed in case there might be reason for disagreement. Actually there is something of a pattern here: indeed, how many Ukrainian operations which Western officials publicly disapproved of did already happen? Maybe Nordstream II was just among the first ones. And let’s not forget that Western officials are not only pressed by Western public opinions but also by the Russian escalatory logic (after all Nord Stream II was 51% Russian as you reported). So Westerners may be enabling or even just assenting to Ukrainians all along with these "controversial" operations while withholding the extent of their support from the public mostly to circumvent the Russian red line logic as long as needed.

↪neomac
It does matter. First off, Nordstream is a company owned by five energy companies, including Gazprom (51%) but the others were European. Classifying it as Russian infrastructure is incorrect. — Benkei

I welcome the clarification but it’s beside the point I was making. Notice that I didn’t write that Nordstream is Russian infrastructure, I just wrote “Russian infrastructures and other relevant targets outside Ukraine”, the point being that if Russia owns 51% of Nordstream, namely an infrastructure that is meant to bypass Ukraine, benefit Russian business, and to hook Germany with Russia’s gas supply, then Nordstream may still be relevant target for Ukraine to hit, even more so if the US protector has protested so much and so clearly about it.

Second, this will result in claims and for most people it will affect their willingness to support Ukraine. If the US was involved (and Poland) then the claims will go there and it will deteriorate trust for future operations. — Benkei

To me that sounds more plausible for Germany than for other European countries. However German officials’ declarations do not seem to support your views: “The results of the investigation into the explosions of the Nord Stream and Nord Stream-2 gas pipelines do not yet change Germany's commitment to providing further support to Ukraine, German government spokesperson Wolfgang Buechner has told a news briefing in Berlin. He noted that the investigation into the acts of sabotage against the gas pipelines was being carried out in accordance with the applicable legal procedure. The investigation will have no effect on whether Germany will continue to support Ukraine in the future and, if so, to what extent. As Buechner recalled, the Prosecutor General's Office is in charge of the investigation with a "criminal component" and it "has nothing to do with the fact that, as the German Chancellor has repeatedly said, Germany will support Ukraine as long as necessary.” (https://tass.com/world/1829177)
Anyways, my conjecture is that the risk of alienating Germany’s support was all too obvious to ignore by those who planned the sabotage and if institutional figures were involved it’s unlikely they went for it without suitable alibis. You may very well remember how many people Zelensky has fired from his own entourage (including domestic and foreign intelligence officials), so I do wonder if among those, there might be conspirators of the Nordstream sabotage. I wouldn’t even discount the possibility that powerful interest groups like the Ukrainian gas industry oligarchs (who can even own private militia) may have played a significant role in this sabotage.
BTW it is also claimed the Ukrainian saboteurs left from Rostock (in Germany) so what if they also got some support from within Germany?

↪neomac
↪jorndoe
Still doesn't answer which country was behind it. Makes Ukraine likely but would it do it without conferring with the US? Or is this still a non-state operation? We're not really any step closer to figuring out who's behind it, only just figured out who did it. — Benkei

Does it really matter? Those who believe that the Great Satan is the main responsible for it all, no matter what the “official” version is, won’t be shaken by recent news. On the other side, if the US (or other countries like the UK and Poland) actually supported Ukrainian sabotage of Nordstream or were complicit in hiding the truth, the operation may have been conceived and executed in such a way to grant Western institutional figures plausible deniability.
What I think it would be honest to acknowledge at this point is that Ukrainians have means and motivation to hit Russian infrastructures and other relevant targets outside Ukraine e.g. inside Russia, in the Black Sea, in Africa, in the Middle East without necessarily having the US consent given the problem of Russian red lines or even Ukrainian/Western moles.

But it was the US which sabotaged the Nordstream, ask Tzeench if you dare to doubt!

Kiev is not a victim. It made its choices, and carries the responsibility for the consequences. It chose poorly and is now paying the price. — Tzeentch

Neither is Russia, you piece of pro-Russian propaganda.

this is a philosophy forum and people here make a sport out of trying to 'win arguments', and that's what you're doing, and it's worth no one's time. You're even wasting your own. — Tzeentch

In a philosophy forum, that's a more fair and humble sport than spinning pro-Russian propaganda with a smug posture of expertise in everything that matters in this discussion. And that's what you're doing.

The US has no legitimate security concerns in Ukraine.
You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.

If Russia went and built up forces hostile to the US in Mexico, obviously the US would respond to that. — boethius

Here your assumptions seem that “legitimate security concerns” for one state is only about being “invaded” by foreign countries, and that the only relevant comparison over security concerns is between the US and Russia. But I deeply disagree with both.
1. As I argued elsewhere, “legitimate” is an ambiguous expression: it can be used to express “accuracy” of one’s judgement about perceived risks in terms of security. In that sense also nazis, terrorists, mobsters have legitimate security concerns, because certainly there historical circumstances that potentially harm nazis, terrorists, mobsters more than other circumstances. In another sense, “legitimate” is about other people’s recognition or acknowledgement about somebody’s rights to commit certain actions within an international legal order. So nazis, terrorists, mobsters violating this legal order can not appeal to “legitimate” security concerns to justify their violations, no right of violating the international legal order can be acknowledged by those who are committed to preserve such international legal order. An unprovoked aggressive war (the one Russia inflicted on Ukraine) is not justifiable by security concerns in light of the legal world order Westerners support, a provoked defensive war (the one by which Ukraine resists Russia) is. “Provoked” is not about hypothetical scenarios but actual offensive acts like actual territorial sovereignty violations (as in Russian actual territorial occupation of Ukraine).
I don’t mind you using the expression “legitimate security concerns” once the distinction of the 2 meanings is clearly stated and acknowledged because we should neither conflate the 2 meanings nor assume that one implies the other. Indeed, one can successfully claim that Russia has legitimate security concerns in the first sense, and yet deny the second after the invasion of Ukraine.
2. “invasions” are not the only object of State’s security concerns, destruction of its infrastructures, commercial routes, means of defence and sustenance, and strategic assets (like commodities and technology) can be considered a security threat. Also all factors that may socially destabilise a country beyond conventional wars: like support of terrorists, criminals, illegal immigration or independence movements within a state are security threats. So there are different forms of “security concern”: in previous posts, you yourself were talking about the possibility of putting offensive nuclear missiles in Ukraine as a security concern for Russia, and Tzeench was talking about the threat posed by NATO to the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, and the Black Sea fleet is used for power projection not just defense. Even if one wanted to circumscribe the usage of “security concern” to mere military capacity/equipments and operations, Russia has means and ways to hit the US militarily (see threats of nuclear escalation or “deploy conventional missiles within striking distance of the United States and its European allies”), so it’s not outlandish if the US wanted to increase deterrence against Russia for that reason only. But, at this point in history, I don’t think this the only reason or even the main one: the main reasons are more likely rooted in the security dilemmas for the US within a wider context of a multiplayer hegemonic competition, with China as the primary challenge. BTW something similar holds for Russia too: i.e. I don’t think Russia’s ambitions are primarily about defending itself from an hypothetical future invasion by the US or NATO from Ukraine, Russia’s ambitions are more maximalist, also declaredly so, they are seeking to establish a new world order in which they see themselves in some leading position, along with the US and China. Control over Ukraine contributes to increase Russia’s hegemonic status and power projection in Europe, in the mediterranean area and in the Middle East.
3. Talking about security threats from future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Ukraine which didn't join NATO yet what about about future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Finland joining NATO (apparently, Russia's border with NATO more than doubles with Finland as a member)? Isn't that a more imminent threat to Russia security? And yet Putin has even withdrawn forces from there instead of bolster them (https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-moved-almost-all-forces-from-finlands-vicinity-to-ukraine-media-report/)
4. The pertinence of comparing only Russia’s vs the US’s “security concerns” is also questionable. As I argued, Russia is a security threat to Europe with or without the US. Russia’s hegemonic ambitions are a non-negligible security threat at the very least for all neighbouring countries and countries in geographic proximity, like East European countries (including Ukraine). And Russian DOUBLE aggression of Ukraine confirms that is the case MORE EVIDENTLY than an hypothetical future scenario wereNATO forces invade Russia. The US is at the centre of a system of strategic alliance with European countries and the idea of an alliance like NATO is to share responsibilities on security matters to benefit all allies (including the US). And the US would clearly have a greater burden if it wants to lead the alliance. So the US can NOT ignore Russia’s power projection in Europe, if the US wants to preserve its hegemony in Europe.

As for Ukraine, when you are a weaker nation beside a much stronger nation, your security is not served by forming military cooperation with another major power thousands of kilometres away that (precisely because you are of no relevance to their actual security) is not going to actually send any armies to come defend you if you get invaded due to becoming hostile to your more powerful neighbor.

For example, Mexico's security is not served by becoming a vassal to Russia to get a supply of arms to then lose a war to the United States. — boethius

The assumption is questionable for several reasons.
1. EU and NATO are an economic/military alliance between Ukraine and European states too, not just between Ukraine and the US. Indeed, as we are seeing now, the EU is pressed into taking greater responsibility than the US in Ukraine. I also argued that even a fully European military alliance e.g. between France, Germany, Poland, the UK and Finland that could include Ukraine could still be perceived as a security concern by Russia AS LONG AS Russia has no part in it, EVEN MORE SO due to the geographic proximity of all involved parties and historical precedents (the US never invaded Russia, Europeans did, Eastern Europeans’ primary security concern is Russian imperialism, and American imperialism is compelled to focus on the Pacific).
2. Weaker countries may very much prefer to strategically ally for their own security with a superpower far away than with the closest superpower if this ensures greater political and economic freedom (beside Europe, also in the Pacific we have evidence of this logic since many Asian countries prefer to ally with the US not with China). Besides you persist in arbitrarily assuming that all countries are or should be like peace-maximizers, but that’s a historically questionable belief and, in principle, arguably not on you to establish.
3. Your argument looks self-defeating, because you want to claim at the same time that the US can invade Russia from Ukraine if it wanted (so it’s a “legitimate” security concern for Russia for that reason), and yet that the US wouldn’t want to invade Russia from Ukraine “precisely because you [Ukraine] are of no relevance to their actual security”.
4. My understanding is that Russia’s strategic reasoning could have been something like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of rushing into a full scale war against Ukraine to avert a possible American invasion of Russia from Ukraine, once Ukraine is in NATO?
Instead, Russia’s strategic reasoning was more like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of not grabbing the OPPORTUNITY to subdue Ukraine and reclaim a superpower status (at this point not only in the eyes of the US but also of China) when the West and its leader are now too weak to oppose, Russia is at its historical peak after the collapse of Soviet Union, and the alibi of a war provoked by the Great Satan is already so popular in the West? What’s the point of not violating a Western-lead World Order supported by a declining West to achieve invaluable strategic benefits when the chances of getting punished for it by the West are at so low ?

A smaller state's security is served through a combination of defensive deterrence and diplomacy, without being a threat. Canada and Mexico coexist with the far more powerful United States because they don't threaten the US. — boethius

That’s a questionable assumption on three grounds.
1. Smaller states can also ALLY with other countries against the common enemy as the Greek city states did against the Persian empire. And one weak state might reasonably prefer to military ally with stronger and powerful countries than weaker countries.
2. Defensive moves (like Ukraine inside NATO, which is a defensive military alliance) can be perceived as hostile, despite NATO/Ukraine’s declared intentions. Russia was repeatedly assured that Ukraine inside NATO wasn’t about threatening Russia’s sovereignty, but it didn’t matter, since Russia didn’t agree anyways. Unfortunately mistrust runs on both direction: since Russia’s assurances over Ukrainian sovereignty have been actually violated by Russia repeatedly, while neither the West nor Ukraine have attacked Russia prior to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. In any case, as long as Russia has no decision power over how Ukraine shapes its security strategy, Ukraine may raise security concerns to Russia, no matter if Ukraine joins NATO, or some other European military alliance, or it takes care for its own military security by itself (remember Mearsheimer’s argument for the Ukrainian nuclear deterrent?).
3. Russia wants Ukraine neutral, demilitarised, AND with a Russian Military Naval Base inside Ukraine, so what deterrence could Ukraine seriously achieve over Russia if these are Russian demands?

As I've explained numerous times, rights are insufficient to determine justification.

Russia has both a right and can actually justify preemptive military action against a smaller state: because it is likely to win.
A smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win. — boethius

But I questioned numerous times this kind of arguments. And I’ll do it again.
1. Russia has been acknowledged no right to invade Ukraine to solve alleged “legitimate” security issues under international law (at least by the West). Russia security concerns were framed by Russia in terms of international law when Russia EXPRESSLY AND REPEATEDLY DEMANDED security guarantees (for you, “ornamental” and “with no meaning” or not expressing a “metaphysically necessity”, remember?) which it didn’t obtain, not when it aggressed Ukraine. And if it is not rights according to international law as acknowledged by parties in an international world order, then what rights are you talking about?
2. Binding the notion of “justification” to that of military victory and defeat, or war and peace is questionable. Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds are evidence that people won’t renounce to defend what they perceive to be their land and people against foreign oppression because of the disparity of military means and costs for fighting foreign oppression. One doesn’t need to empathise with them, but if one’s reasoning is FACT based, one can’t reasonably discount the historical and anthropological fact that the pursuit of self-determination by some people can be a major driving force factor in war that overrides the disparity of military means or losses. Nor can one discount the FACT that these wars can be foundational of people’s national identity, in that sense the material and spiritual price to pay for that, it’s ultimately THEIR OWN choice to make in a very personal sense. So I do not need to dismiss your points nor the idea that Ukrainians might have been in better conditions now if they preferred compromise or surrender as soon as possible, actually I find such points even more compelling for Ukrainians after the rather disappointing support Ukrainians got from the West. Yet your points may not be the most personally compelling reasons to Ukrainians. Ukrainians, similarly to many other people rebelling against foreign oppression, may be no peace-maximisers. Their recurrent historical conflicts with Russia supports my belief (as acknowledged also by Mearsheimer in the article you too cited). So Ukrainians too may pursue self-determination against Russian oppression, as much as a political status which grants them greater political-economic freedom through Westernisation. And in order to achieve that they may be ready to pay related (sunk) costs despite being intolerable to peace-maximisers.
3. Ukraine is not fighting alone but with the support of Western allies, so the outcome of their conflict with Russia depends also on the Western allies contribution during and after the war. Both Europeans and the US may be very much compelled to not let Russia win (each of them for their own strategic reasons) as much as they are compelled to not let their alliance be perceived as weaker than the anti-Western strategic alliance.
My conclusion is that no, “likely winning” for a stronger state against a weaker state is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying aggressive or defensive wars.

That "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" is not a justification for trying to do so if the likely result is being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians. — boethius

I don’t find your claim fully intelligible since “trying to do so” semantically refers to an action, but in that contest it’s used as an anaphoric reference to "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" which is not an action. Anyways, let’s charitably assume that you are kind of putting in other words what you just said: i.e. “a smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win” where “preemptive military action” refers to Ukraine joining NATO. I still find your argument misleading.
1. If one wants to reason according to international law, the right for Ukraine to join NATO depends EXCLUSIVELY on the conditions established by NATO and the approval of NATO members, so “being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians” don’t necessarily prevent Ukraine from satisfying the requirements of joining NATO, not exempt NATO members to recognise such a right to Ukraine, if Ukraine satisfies such requirements. Surely unresolved/persistent territorial conflicts are an hindrance to NATO accession taken into account in the accession requirements, but not territorial, demographic, infrastructural and economic losses, even when they are significative. The same goes with the Ukrainian right of self-defence against ACTUAL aggression (not hypothetical one): foreign violations of the Ukrainian territorial integrity put a legal burden on those states which acknowledged Ukrainian territorial sovereignty , including Russia. Therefore, talking about rights outside the international law or what has been acknowledged in terms of international order by relevant participants, if that’s what you are trying to do, looks rather unjustified to me.
2. If one wants to reason strategically over longer term objectives under evolving geopolitical conditions one can not discount NATIONAL interest as perceived by the concerned nation (Ukrainians and Russians, to begin with) nor discount how all other relevant players are reacting to such conflict. So defining necessary and sufficient conditions as a function of chances of winning or achieving peace as soon as possible (not even as long as possible?) based on current military capacity of the two direct belligerents, and independently from perceived national interest or other actors’ playing strategy, looks historically and strategically myopic to me.
At best, you may wish to persuade Ukrainians (not me) that it is not in their national interest to refuse to become Russian vassals. But I would be surprised if Ukrainians would find your arguments conclusive since their national identity is rooted in a historical opposition to Russian national identity and oppression. It would like to trying to convince them that the Ukrainian national interest is better served by being Russified.

If Ukraine's "rights" actually were sufficient justification, then the West would have all their militaries in Ukraine right now, but they don't because tying rights to justifications is a fallacy. What are the consequences of doing this or that also matter in forming a justification for actions. The West doesn't like the consequences of actually sending our armies to defend "Ukrainian rights" so we don't consider it justified on that account, and so we don't do it. — boethius

If all you are saying when distinguishing arguments from “rights” and justification is that one should not conflate legal reasoning with strategic reasoning over security matters, I can agree. But then the one conflating the two is you, when you talk about Russia’s legitimate security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, or the “right to preemptive military action” if that refers to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or the genesis of this war as Western provocation. Here is why:
1. Russia may have security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, but such fact doesn’t commit Westerners to appease Russia’s security concerns in violation of the international world order they support. Russia has no acknowledged right to have its buffer states. While acknowledging Ukrainian sovereignty commits Westerners and Russia (since Russia too acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty) at least to refrain from pursuing unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, or from supporting or approving unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty by foreign powers (where “unprovoked” refers to ACTUAL aggressions of one country against another, not hypothetical ones).
2. On the other side, Ukraine can justify its patriotic war against Russia, INDEPENDENTLY from legal rights to defend itself as acknowledged by others, as a function of heir perceived national interest and a multiplayer evolving geopolitical environment. So Ukraine doesn’t need to appeal to the acknowledged rights of joining NATO to justify its patriotic war against Russia, and to tolerate related costs beyond what you find acceptable. Appeal to rights to join NATO are the reason but the consequence of Ukrainian aspirations to self-determination from Russia’s oppression.
3. Concerning the genesis of this war, again it is not reasonable to justify Russia’s aggression of Ukraine according to acknowledged rights within the Western-led international order, since Russia wasn’t actually aggressed by Ukraine or the US or NATO, there is no internationally acknowledged right for preventive wars. If there was one, Russia wouldn’t need to aspire to change the Western-led world order. It is not even justified to frame Russia’s strategic choice as a function of some “provocation” by the West since all competing geopolitical players, Russia and the US included, may be security maximisers (as Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism claims) and any increase in deterrence by one country can be considered hostile or done at the expense of other countries’ security. The only counterbalance to maximalist objectives by great powers is the risk of overstretching, not the acknowledgement of rivals’ “legitimate” security concerns. In other words, there is no acknowledged legal or strategic burden on the West to appease Russia’s claims over Ukraine or tolerate Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. It’s preposterous for boxers to call out as a “provocation” a punch in the face by their adversary as if they needed a justification to punch back the adversary, the whole point for boxers is to punch each other in the face, no matter who starts first. Similarly in a world where hegemonic powers act as competing security maximisers it's preposterous to talk about “provocation” as justification of their preventive defensive moves. And that's not all, the US approach to Russia and China wasn't even far from being as hostile as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda wants to depict it. Indeed, globalization was the US strategy to push potentially hostile authoritarian countries far from confrontational logic: letting the West do business with Russia (and China) in exchange for Westernization was the US gamble to curb hegemonic competition. DO UT DES, I'll give you wealth for decades, you'll give up on competing against the US on world hegemony. The US propaganda found also a common enemy: Islamic terrorism and climate change to re-direct security concerns. That's why Russia should not have been compelled to perceive talks about Ukraine inside NATO as an unbearable act of hostility. Returning the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal to Russia was an ACTUAL act of good will from the US more than the hypothetical future scenario of Ukraine joining NATO. Unfortunately, the more Russia and China grew richer the more they got ambitious in terms of power projection (while the US got weaker). US-led globalization EMPOWERED and BOLSTERED Russia (and China) wrt the US more than any talking about NATO expansion in Ukraine could ever do. If Russia could invade Ukraine is not because of the US provocation but thanks to the US globalization.
Your emphasis about “provocation” to explain Russia is rather myopic and comes from your confused and confusing understanding of Russia’s “rights” and “legitimate” security concerns.
To summarise, as far as legal reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is Russia’s violation of the international order as recognized by the West (which also Russia was committed to until it violated it in 2014). As far as strategic reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is in Russia’s attempt to exploit an opportunity window to change power balance in its favor at the expense of the US and its allies, given the perceived weakness of the West.

Looking forward to reading your counterarguments to each of my points (I even numbered them).

What I find bizarre is that you keep switching between different premises.

On the one hand, the geopolitical realities are supposed to be impersonal and irresistible forces. But when you have to explain why events don't conform to these forces, you suddenly invoke very personal and contingent reasons. European diplomats are incapable of even basic solutions. Unspecified actors are influenced by the US in unspecified ways. Europeans are "acting in bad faith" or are "ignoring realities". — Echarmion

I agree with this objection but it’s nothing new: Mearsheimer too can be easily accused of such bipolar attitude. On one side he claims to describe “geopolitical realities” when he talks about Russia’s behaviour, on the other he is all about condemning “geopolitical choices” which do not seem to match his “geopolitical theory” when he talks about US’s behaviour.

Tzeench's double standard reflects on his rhetorically conflicting claims such as:

A - “What the US or Europe want is hardly a factor in this. These are geopolitical realities - forces of nature, almost - that they cannot ignore (though admittedly, Europe has been a king at ignoring geopolitical realities).

B - “Where I diverge from these scholars is that they believe this to be a result of US incompetence, whereas I believe there is no way the US would pursue and double down on these policies for as long as they did, if they weren't getting exactly what they wanted”.

“there's no way the US would have provoked this conflict unless the Europeans were willing participants”.

A - “Europe in terms of its economic, intellectual and human potential is way too big for US to maintain its artificial status as suzerain. which is why Europe will simply break free from the US orbit once the US is forced to divert its attention elsewhere”.

“the US is seeking to prepare its pivot to Asia by leaving long-lasting conflict as its parting gift to Europe.”

B - “Even when the US pivots, it doesn't mean the US 'is gone’, and you're suggesting handing the US the biggest trump card it could hope for? Haha, what a 'sensible' strategy”.[/I]

The will and ignorance of the West is contrasted to the Russian geopolitical realities and forces of nature (…almost). The US is doomed to leave Europe, but not really.

Unfortunately, he himself can’t help but talking about the Putin’s “sensible” choices and intellectual failures in light of perceived “vital strategic interests”.

“the Russians after over a decade of warnings chose to use force to secure what they believed to be their vital strategic interests”

“Putin probably banked on the Europeans pursuing a sensible strategy. They didn’t”.


Double standard is still at play when Tzeench is lecturing people about history and propaganda.
While from the US history (”There are plenty of western scholars who voice these ideas, and it fits neatly in the historic behavioral pattern we see from the United States”) it should follow that “despite all the historical evidence, Europe seems chronically incapable to view the United States as a ruthless great power which follows realist logic” or “The only proper way to view its actions is through a lens of utter cynicism, which comes natural to a realist anyway”. An yet from “Ukraine and especially Crimea are of great geopolitical and historical importance to Russia and always have been”. doesn’t follow any claim about Russian cynicism or ruthless behaviour according to realist logic.
While Europeans are under the pernicious spell of the US propaganda machine, apparently Russian-spun propaganda in the West has no pernicious impact on the West worth mentioning. Putin’s claims are cherrypicked to support a defensive, minimalist, unequivocal, and self-contained understanding of Russian posture and war goals (what about Ukrainian denazification? What about demilitarising Ukraine? What about the denial of Ukrainian national identity as opposed to Russia? What about nuclear threats and escalatory rhetoric made him and his lackeys like Lavrov and Medvedev?), while European claims get shamelessly misreported to make them look as confessing their warmongering oompah loompahs proclivity.


Notice also how much his arguments need to rely on painstakingly mystificatory and question-begging expressions like “geopolitical realities”, “forces of nature, almost”, “vital strategic interests”, “the realist framework that says cooperation cannot happen when it is rational to cooperate” which he is rather reluctant to elaborate, especially on how they would apply to all relevant actors beyond Russia, including the US, Ukraine, European countries.

Take the example of the role played by the Black Sea Fleet as part of Russia’s “vital strategic interests”.
First of all the Black Sea Fleat is gone from Crimea despite the annexation (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russias-retreat-from-crimea-makes-a-mockery-of-the-wests-escalation-fears/). So there is no vital link between Black Sea Fleat and Crimea, and so far this is an unquestionable success by the totally disastrously Ukrainian losers. This was in defence of Ukrainian vital strategic interests as the Ukrainian economy still heavily relies on its wheat exports (https://www.cfr.org/article/how-ukraine-overcame-russias-grain-blockade).
Second, what is the purpose of the Black Sea Fleat really? Sure it CAN be used to DEFEND Russia proper from NATO hostile activities (if there are any), absolutely true. What however is also absolutely true is that the Black Sea Fleat is ACTUALLY AND OVERWHELMINGLY used for hegemonic power projection i.e. to undermine Ukraine’s exports, to keep control over the Caucasus regions, to support friend-countries in the Middle East, to expand presence and control over North African countries or in the Balkans, and sea routes in the Mediterranean. These are the kind of “geopolitical realities” has to take into account when reasoning over the alleged “vital strategic interests” of Russia, and margins of economic cooperation with Russia.

I can get that there are honestly compelling reasons for Europeans to bring Russia on their side, for cynically exploiting its resources to benefit corrupt Russian oligarchs who then spend money in Europe and get European elites richer, and to defend christian societies from Islamic terrorism, immigration and the LGBTQ "perverts", and economically compete with the US or look less as US lackeys to non-Westerners: no matter how despotic its political leadership is, no matter how brutal is their repression of independence movements, no matter how exploited materially and intellectually its society is. And I can get that there are compelling reasons for honestly committed European pacifists and humanitarian advocates to radically question military interventions and their actors.
And, notice, even these reasons wouldn't suffice to me. I just would find them honestly compelling for Europeans (for sure, to many Europeans). And I can't dismiss this fact.
But, really, all this talking about provocations, broken promises, bad faith agreements, 15 years warnings about vital strategic interests, refused peace offers, Western warmongering bullshits (allegedly grounded on historical analysis and geopolitical realism) with such self-conceited moral indignation and intellectual self-entitlement is intellectually disgusting. I feel shame for you, really.

It's really hard to catch up with Tzeench's inconsistent and auto-referential bullshit rate:

Tzeench: “deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it.”

What a dumb rebuttal. Sure, “deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it” once you “have a credible deterrent against Russia”. Not yet if one wants to build it up to catch up with his neighbour’s deterrence build-up, especially if your neighbour wants to subdue you.


Tzeench: “NATO leaders admitted to signing a peace agreement not with the intention of maintaing peace, but with the intention to arm for war”.
“First-hand accounts from Merkel and Hollande tell us that NATO entered the Minsk Accords in bad faith, and used it to buy time to arm Ukraine.”.

What is he even talking about? Any evidence of this admission?
If he refers to Merkel’s statement from the Zeit interview: ”The 2014 Minsk Agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as you can see today.” The expression “not with the intention of maintaing peace” is not there, nor it can be LOGICALLY inferred from that statement, arguably NOT EVEN SUGGESTED. Indeed, you must have heard the Latin adage "si vis pacm, para bellum" (= "if you want peace, prepare for war") therefore admitting that Minsk Agreements bought time for Ukraine's military build-up is no sufficient evidence that peace agreements were made "not with the intention of maintaing peace" AT ALL. So the alleged admission is just your manipulative and defamatory interpolation based on your implicit and highly questionable understanding of the situation. This is evidence of your intellectual misery.
The same goes with Holland’s claims: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point," he told the Kiev Independent media outlet, while commenting on Merkel’s remark that the Minsk agreements allowed Kiev to gain time, but by no means prevented further hostilities in the Donbass. "Since 2014, Ukraine has strengthened its military posture. Indeed, the Ukrainian army was completely different from that of 2014. It was better trained and equipped. It is the merit of the Minsk agreements to have given the Ukrainian army this opportunity." https://tass.com/world/1558075
And notice how Holland complements his claims: “for a dialogue to be fruitful, it must be based on a balance of power.”, but how does one state pursue balance of power on matter of security? Russia’s own behaviour shows it: military build-up and economic dependence, he himself suggested it.


The following Tzeench's claim is more foolish than the foolishness he attributes to Westerners:
”This is why I emphasize the foolishness of combining the build up of a deterrent (presumably to avoid war) with economic decoupling, refusal of diplomatic talks and maximalist war rhetoric, etc.)”.

Indeed prior to 2014, the West (including the US) and Russia was NOT decoupled, there was no refusal of diplomatic talks no maximalist war rhetoric, there was not even build-up a deterrent (NATO was brain dead, expenditures for NATO was declining, NATO membership for Ukraine always postponed). Actually it was doing business with Russia that FINANCED Russia’s military build-up and it was security cooperation in the Middle East that proved Russia’s power projection wasn’t at risk. The US-led West was dominated by a logic of APPEASEMENT of Russia (despite voices contrary to it within the US, INCLUDING Mearsheimer's) not provocation/humiliation, hence the push for Ukraine to return the nuclear arsenal to Russia in exchange for a promise of respecting the Ukrainian territorial integrity and national self-determination (while the warmongerer Mearsheimer was against this! now tell me if NOT returning the nuclear arsenal to Russia was a provocation from the US and Ukraine!).
And yet having discussions of Ukraine inside NATO and EU was perceived as an unbearable provocation and security threat worth a conventional war against Ukraine and its Western allies?! WTF?! What the fuck can Russia sensibly expect from the US which just beat Russia in a world hegemony competition and while Russia was at its lowest also economically and politically (remember the August Coup by revanchist hardliners?!).
AND THAT's NOT ALL, IF Tzeench CLAIMS EUROPEANS ARE THE US's LACKEYS THEN IT MUST FOLLOW FROM HIS OWN LOGIC THAT THE US WANTED THE WEST TO DO BUSINESS WITH RUSSIA AND TO DE-ESCALATE WITH A MILITARY BUILD-DOWN AND TO POSTPONE UKRAINE ACCESS TO NATO IN ~20 YEARS OF GLOBALIZATION PRIOR TO 2014. SO IF THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN LACKEYS WERE SO COOPERATIVE TOWARD RUSSIA SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION, IT IS THE US AND ITS EUROPEAN LACKEYS WHICH WERE BETRAYED AND PROVOKED INTO WAR BY RUSSIA FIRST WITH A GROWINGLY HOSTILE RHETORIC AND THEN WITH AN ACTUAL ACT OF WAR AGAINST UKRAINE AND, INDIRECTLY, ITS WESTERN ALLIES (BTW SHELL WE MAKE A COMPARISON WITH PUTIN’s MAXIMALIST WARMONGERING RHETORIC AND NUCLEAR THREATS AGAINST THE WEST, REALLY?), NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

Russian imperialism allows us to predict Russia hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine centuries before Putin and Mearsheimer were even born.
And Mearsheimer based his predictions about Russia on history as well, not only on abstract security dilemmas (which are extrapolated from history anyways). Here:

Second, there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and
Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet collapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast suffering under
Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological backdrop, small disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism on either side.
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf

And Putin himself made a historical point (however questionable) in rejecting Ukrainian as an independent nation to justify his war:
In essence, Ukraine's ruling circles decided to justify their country's independence through the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation. The common tragedy of collectivization and famine of the early 1930s was portrayed as the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
https://www.prlib.ru/en/article-vladimir-putin-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians

What Mearsheimer did NOT predict is the window of OPPORTUNITY that Putin chose to aggress Ukraine.

In a nutshell, a nation building their military, even as deterrence, can be seen as a threat to neighboring nations. — Tzeentch

Really? Military build-up is what Russia was doing for decades (especially under Putin) while Europeans were doing the opposite for decades and did business with Russia. So you are saying that Europeans were wrong in ignoring the RUSSIAN THREAT coming back after the collapse of Soviet-Union, since doing business with Russia wasn’t a credible enough deterrent against Russia's hegemonic ambitions, right?

The logic of doing business and pursuing deterrence is what Russia, China and Iran COULD do in the pursuit of their regional hegemony when the West bet on globalization. Why they could and Europeans couldn't?
To me the main difference is that Russia, China and Iran are authoritarian regimes with revanchist aspirations, while European people are governed by democratic regimes focusing on economic issues more than on security issues. But that’s FAR from being all European political and economic elites' fault, indeed they were at least pursuing some form of economic and monetary integration, as a step toward greater political integration, however questionable. While the rest of the political debate was dominated by self-deprecating peace&love anti-EU anti-US populists and make our nation great again far-right nationalist/populist anti-EU, anti-US and anti-immigration (also financed by Russia). And they were far away from perceiving the Russian threat and support policies to boost deterrence AGAINST Russia.

Your pathetically naive assumption (not the only one) is that anti-EU and anti-US populism are best fit to do business with Russia AND build a credible deterrence against Russia, than the pro-EU and pro-US political elites.

One point that I don’t see stressed enough also by views critical toward Russia is the political hazard which Western countries are exposed to while dealing with hostile authoritarian regimes like in Putin’s Russia, and how this relates to security.

Security and deterrence are not just granted by military capacity and readiness, but also by efficient and consistent decision making about security-deterrence and hegemonic conflicts. What Western democracies and system of alliance have shown also during the current conflict is that authoritarian regimes have a comparative advantage over democracies in taking decisions about deterrence and security that are more efficient and consistent over time: indeed, Russia can count on a more hierarchical decision process (so no obstacles from the parliament or the judicial system), repression of political opposition and popular dissent (no obstacles from media and political representatives, INCLUDING those corrupted/infiltrated by the enemy), and consistently pursue strategic goals over decades (because the political leadership remains the same over decades). For democratic countries (including the US) is the opposite.
Exporting democracy, however poorly implemented or questionable in principle, still is/was not just matter of empowering foreign people in defending their rights against foreign authoritarian regimes for humanitarian purposes. It’s also about Western own political vulnerability AND SECURITY.

Russia can replace neither the US nor China as an economic partner to Europe. All it can offer is cheap raw materials. It's neither a big market nor a big manufacturer. — Echarmion

One thing I wouldn’t discount about Russia is that Russia has its military-industry complex to supply other countries and also offer security as a service (as with Wagnerites in African countries), and that means its influence over markets, commodity supplies and migration fluxes can extend well beyond Russia.

If China and the US go onto a direct collision course, Russia is in no position to materially soften the blow for Europe. — Echarmion

Tzeench may still try to claim that, in addition to their economic partnership with Russia, Europeans can still try to turn themselves into some greater supplier for the US/Chinese market (also for military supply?).

Anyways such an hypothetical future scenario seems grounded on the preposterous assumption the Europeans can coordinate their efforts in a way to maximise their benefits apparently at low/no cost/risk with the support of Russia while the rest of the World (including the US) is distracted by a war between the US and China. A “ruthless great power which follows realist logic” (not Russia of course, which is known to be a merciful great power which follows Peace&Love logic, but the US, the Great Satan) which masterminded a proxy war against Russia but now it is evidently doomed to fight China while Europe will economically exploit them and eat pop corns with Russia. How genius is that painstakingly detailed plan?!

Nor is a security partnership plausible given the military capacities and the way the Russian elite justifies it's rule (as a bulwark against westernisation). — Echarmion

Unless Russia manages to de-Westernise Europe by propping far-right authoritarian lackeys and populists which do not like super-national governance/market, civil freedoms, democratic regimes, immigration, women rights, secularism, etc. I bet Orban might be happy to rely on Russia for its security.

All the other contradictions just follow from the premise that the theory trumps the details. How can the following statements be reconciled?

In other words, there is no reason Europe should treat Russia as the big threat. The only point Russia becomes a threat is if we A. constantly play our cards wrong, and B. let mercurial powers like the US whisper into our ears. — Tzeentch


Sure. But it needs to do so without pointlessly antagonizing Russia, otherwise rearmament is going to lead to mutual tensions and militarization (which we are already in the process of), which will not achieve security, but the exact opposite: war — Tzeentch


Ordinarily we would suppose that war is a threat. But the war here is supposed to be the result of an unnatural manipulation by the US and thus not actually a threat by Russia. — Echarmion

But Tzeench ignores the theory of his guru Mearsheimer [1], so also its ambiguities (if not implicit contradictions), and limits. Russia is a security threat to European countries because it has offensive military capacity to wreck European countries, it aspires to a regional hegemony if we are lucky (under the assumption that regional hegemony concerns at most all the Eastern European countries which Western Europeans, or just Tzeench, do not give a shit about) and beyond regional hegemony if we aren’t lucky. In any case we are uncertain of either. The theory however suggests a maximalist trend for all great powers (including Russia with its imperialist ideology, very popular among political elites, one may dare to add). And notice the total irrelevance of talking about provocation within such offensive realist views because any aggressive move is justifiable in defensive terms (be the US against Russia, be Russia against Ukraine, etc.). Actually if one takes into account the geographic proximity of Russia or the US wrt Europe, Russia is a GREATER threat than the US or China.
Hence the need for Europeans to ally and re-arm to balance PRIMARILY against Russia, with or without American manipulation.

Concerning Tzeench’s painstakingly detailed pro-Russian propaganda, I would say:

- Any re-arming, military alliance, military activity, military industry which Russia can’t veto or contain or influence is a threat for Russia too. Especially if we are talking about countries geographically close to Russia. So there is no way that Russia will be just fine by letting Europe turn into a regional power with deterring military capacity (see how Macron, the one who tried to appease Russia and bypass NATO, was re-paid by Putin) . So here is the Russian deal which Tzeench is advertising here: as long as Russia can preserve the military capacity to overwhelm Europe and impose its will around European countries (or just the ones Tzeench’s sponsors), then Russia is not a threat to them. This argument sounds as smart as saying: the weaker you appear to your potential enemy the less likely your potential enemy is a threat to you.

- If the US can manipulate weaker states, so can Russia. That’s perfectly in line with Mearsheimer’s theory. And Mearsheimer’s theory offers enough reasons to claim that Russia is a threat to Europe, INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE US and its alleged manipulation or ear whispering. In other words, as far as propaganda is concerned, it's the offensive realist logic that explains the propaganda of "provocation" and "Great Satan" not the other way around.


[1]
The theory of his guru is called OFFENSIVE REALISM and these are the major tenets:

1. Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system is anarchical
2. All states possess some offensive military capability
3. States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
4. States have survival as their primary goal
5. States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival



Mainly, it diverges from defensive neorealism in regards to the accumulation of power a state needs to possess to ensure its security and the issuing of strategy states pursue to meet this satisfactory level of security. Ultimately, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism draws a much more pessimistic picture of international politics characterised by dangerous inter-state security competition likely leading to conflict and war

As Mearsheimer puts it: "they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals",[24] since "the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is".[25] States seek to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system with hegemony—being the only great power in the state system—as their ultimate goal.[26]

John Mearsheimer summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.[27]" Accordingly, offensive neorealists such as Mearsheimer believe that a state's best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will bring them closer to hegemony.[28][29]
Since global hegemony is nearly impossible to attain due to the constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces, the best end game status states can hope to reach is that of a regional hegemon dominating its own geographical area.[28][29] This relentless quest for power inherently generates a state of "constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background".[30] Only once regional hegemony is attained do great powers become status quo states.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism

Sorry dudes, I didn’t finish to shit over @Tzeench’s hypothetical “grand strategy” where Europeans will chum up with Russia and eat pop corns together while China and the US “beat each other to a pulp”.

Indeed, it’s funny to see this dude completely overlooking another hypothetical scenario which his guru Mearshaimer would likely support, and even Trump (his beloved American President) would arguably welcome: the scenario where the US reconciles with Russia to better contain China using Ukraine as a bargaining chip.

Now let’s consider a scenario where Russia:

- can be flattered by 2 great powers like China and the US,

- can experience a boost in its fuel and wheat exports (nurturing its power projection in all contended areas, including in Europe), even more so if Ukraine will completely surrender to Russia (something which is welcome because apparently Ukrainian lives matter to Trump voters! And it’s totally risk free and harmless for Europe because if Russia could blackmail EU for its fuel supply when Ukraine was NOT under its control, how could Russia blackmail EU for its fuel supply AND wheat supply when Ukraine is completely under its control ?)

- can enjoy free pass for expanding in North Africa and the Mediterranean (namely, ENCIRCLING EUROPE)

- can have UK+East Europeans locked in an anti-Russian stance due to their historical fear of Russian imperialism conveniently boosted by the US of course (Trump didn’t like North Stream 2, right? nor the German or European economy outperforming the American one, right?) and the rest of European countries with self-conceited anti-US/pro-Russian lackeys (replacing the pro-US lackeys’) as political oppositions or leaders

In this scenario, who doesn't give a fuck about Europeans to put their heads out of their ass more than Russia?

Not only Europe won’t get completely rid of the US but it would completely get split in smaller regional spheres of influence between the US and Russia (however not with the same antagonism as in the Cold War, at least as long as China remains the greatest security threat to both), and with no prospect of boosting their economy or army other than as a function of their hegemon’s interest (BTW I let you imagine how fantabulous is the prospect of experiencing an economic boost under far-right populist political elites when Russia is your hegemon, it’s enough to see the envious example of the ex-Soviet Union republics).
In a wonderful multipolar world, market/industry/technology inputs and outputs and commercial routes are under the political/military control of regional hegemonic powers, negotiating on trading conditions or imposing them for everybody else.

In short, in this hypothetical scenario, there is no way that Europeans simply chum up with Russia and economically profit from the conflict between China and the US, living in happiness, peace and bliss ever after.

Supposedly we were going to feed Ukraine weapons to hurt the Russian military so they couldn't pull another stunt like Ukraine, yet it's the European militaries which are completely stripped and the Russians who now have an army several times the size of their peace-time standing army. — Tzeentch


Just because no-one has challenged this false claim yet: Europe's militaries are not "stripped". Most frontline equipment that has been handed over has been old models from storage. — Echarmion

Tzeench’s claims are plagued by rhetorical inconsistencies which betray his pro-Russian propaganda.

On one side he’s dismissing the European military capacity in the face of Russia’s army and on the other side he’s all about dismissing the Russian military threat as well: “Russia has a fraction of Europe's GDP and population. Russia is hardly a threat if the Europeans would just get their heads out of their asses.” (notice the hypothetical)

On one side he wants the Europeans to take their “heads out of their asses” in matter of security and military readiness and yet he’s all about dismissing “this type of fearmongering nonsense” from our side against Russia. But if Europeans wouldn't get their heads out of their ass out of fear for the Russian military threat, then what else would make them do that?

On one side he wants Europeans and Russia to strategically ally (so see themselves more as partners than enemies) because “while the US and China beat each other to a pulp, Europe and Russia would remain intact and grow in relative power. Why do you think the US is trying so hard to embroil Europe and Russia in a war with each other? It's trying to prevent either of them from becoming the laughing third. It's easy to understand why the Russians are so keen on a diplomatic settlement when you understand this context. The only people who don't seem to understand anything are the Europeans.” On the other if Russia is no threat to Europeans because it seeks an economic partnership, and China and the US are beating each other to pulp, against whose threats would European be compelled to unite and rearm?

On one side NATO is a legitimate security threat for Russia, and on the other side apparently Russia would be just fine with letting Europe be united and rearmed as a geopolitical nuclear power right at its side in name of an economic partnership.

On one side he is all about populist views “European populism threatens to slip Europe from Washington's grasp, turning it from a vassal into a potential rival.”, but on the other side European populism is against EU and pro-nationalist (and also at Putin's pocket) so arguably against political-economic-military integration which might be necessary pre-condition to talk about security threats and economic interests for Europeans COLLECTIVELY (BTW lack of unity and moral are also reasons why Europeans have been and still are so hesitant toward Russia in the current conflict).

@Tzeench do yourself a favour, take your head out of Putin’s ass, and put it back in yours.

Poll says 32% of Ukrainians open to territorial concessions for quick peace
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/poll-says-32-of-ukrainians-open-to-territorial-concessions-for-quick-peace/

The first big difference is the Russians aren't committing a genocide in Ukraine, as I just explained. — boethius

But again, mainly, the most important thing, is that Russia isn't carrying out a genocide whereas Isreal is. — boethius

Legally speaking, allegations of genocide. And there are allegations of Russia committing a genocide against Ukrainians too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

Russia is following the law of armed conflict pretty well: extremely far away from starving whole civilian populations to death. And this is born out in the stats of civilians killed during the conflict and in particular children. — boethius

Some more allegations, that one can find in the Ukrainian case too:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/24/war-crimes-dossier-to-accuse-russia-of-deliberately-causing-starvation-in-ukraine

The second big difference is that Russia is not implementing apartheid system and occupying parts of Ukraine without giving those occupied peoples any rights. — boethius

Allegations of discriminatory policies from Russians against indigenous people, you have aplenty:

https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/human-rights-situation-in-territories-of-ukraine-occupied-by-russia-committee-of-ministers-gravely-concerned

https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/EUR5078052024ENGLISH.pdf


People involved in the Crimean Tatar civil rights movement repeatedly noted strong similarities between the conditions suffered by designated "special settlers" and victims of apartheid as well as Palestinians under Israeli occupation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatarophobia

Third, the territories occupied by Russia have large portions, arguably a majority, of ethnic Russians that actually want to join Russia (hence the separatists fighting for 10 years), so there is not only an element of self-determination in the Russian speakers taking up arms against Kiev oppression of their language and culture, but also no one really cares all that much whether Russian speaking Ukrainians become Russian speaking Russians. Russia isn't conquering territory and then keeping Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians that don't want to be occupied by Russians in a giant ghetto with zero rights and lot's of murder, sexual abuse and so on, for the foreseeable future. Of course there will be exceptions, but in general there has been no insurgency against Russian occupation nor Ghettoizaton of conquered territory. — boethius

There is no need to ghetto anybody if forced displacement can do the trick. Mearsheimer has argued that’s the intent of Israel, cleanse territories to dodge the accusation of apartheid.
There is a recognisable historical pattern. Indeed, when territorial disputes are triggered by people aspirations to build a nation-state as for both Israel and Palestinians, cleansing and genocide are likely consequences. Western countries in Europe (https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/35457/) and overseas like in the US , Austrialia, Canada are not immune from this phenomenon either (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Native_American_genocide_in_the_United_States, https://nwac.ca/media/2023/06/is-a-genocide-taking-place-in-canada-short-answer-yes, https://kooriweb.org/foley/resources/history/genocide.html) .
The appeal to self-determination sounds more compelling to me when it’s matter of people aspirations against political leaderships imposing their rule by authoritarian means (inspired by devine mandate?) or against foreign imperialism, less compelling when it’s matter of conflicting national aspirations between different ethnic groups over the same land, or a minority over a majority within the same nation state.

In otherwords, Russia is implementing a "one state solution" in their occupation of new territory. The one state solution is one of the two solutions that everyone agrees solves these kinds of problems, therefore all is well and you can rest your pretty little head.

The situation in Gaza is simply not similar at all to the situation in Crimea or the Donbas.

Israel does not offer Gazans citizenship and equal rights.

There is not one state or two state solution, but oppressed stateless people in a ghetto that have a right to fight the forces of oppression.

Now, Ukrainians in territory occupied by Russia would have the same right of insurgency against an occupying force (just it's less palpable because they are offered equal rights) — boethius

It’s not up to me to decide for the oppressed ones what is palatable. I do wonder if all Palestinians in occupied territories find it palatable to convert to Judaism, which would bestow them a right to join Israel and definitely have their own nation-state without spilling a single blood drop.
Anyways, Russia is annexing territories AFTER forced cleansing, colonization and russification in the occupied areas, so I wouldn’t be surprised if the majority of people in the occupied areas (arguably ethnic Russians) would be fine in being part of Russia (however I don’t think they have the ultimate decision on this matter, that’s all) and Russian would welcome it.
For Israel, the situation is different and the comparison to immigration in Western democracies can help understand why. No Western democracy (ESPECIALLY with a regime supporting populist views) would accept mass migration (ESPECIALLY from alien ethnic groups) that would dramatically alter the demographics of a State, for security and economic reasons. Discrimination and oppression of stateless people are very common conditions in the West for illegal immigrants (apartheid state, here too?).
So it’s politically questionable to expect Israel to accept a one state solution altering its demographics in favour of the Palestinians minority. Besides there are Palestinian living as Israeli citizens and enjoying the rights which the Palestinians in the occupied territories do not have. So the problem for Israel is not the civil/democratic integration of Palestinians per se, but how to deal with those Palestinians that are pressing outside its borders. Which is even worse than the case of the illegal immigrants for Western countries, since those Palestinians pressing on the Israeli boarders are fighting for their right to same land and they are led by Hamas (with the support of foreign powers hostile to Israel) into an asymmetric war against Israel and Israelis. So security concerns are in order and no state is expected to intentionally sacrifice the security of its own citizens at large for humanitarian concerns over alien people perceived as hostile at large.



To me, Western priorities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should not ideologically withdraw from historical tragedies and people’s nation-state aspirations , but take hard decisions informed primarily by ideological proximity, political-economic-military cooperation and common challenges.
Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

4. Regardless of what you think about fighting a disastrous war to (maybe) get something that would offer protection (maybe) from disastrous wars, it still only makes sense to do if you can actually win.
For example ssu's argument at the start was that while agreeing with me that he saw no way Ukraine could win, well maybe Ukrainian general have something or know something we don't and will pull off a brilliant victory. Turns out Ukrainian generals had no such thing and exactly what was predictable given the available information is what happened. The corollary of @ssu's position is that if Ukraine had no surprise then their war effort is a disastrous mistake, immoral, got many people killed for nothing, and definitely they should have taken the Russian's offer at the start of the war (or before the war). But these positions are just conveniently swept under the rug of "Ukrainian agency". — boethius

I won’t argue for SSU’s claims, he can do it by himself. I can argue for my claims.
And I think here again you are playing with words, like “victory”.
I’m less concerned with a military notion of “victory” and more with a strategic notion of “victory”. I doubt that a military notion of “victory” automatically translates to a strategic victory.
The problem from the West and the US perspective is the political, economic, and military threats posed by authoritarian regimes growingly powerful, ambitious and hostile to the West and the US. That means that there is a serious risk for the West its elites and its people to lose all the economic, political, security privileges they could enjoy in a Western led world order.
If enemies can/should not be military defeated in a significant way, then enemies need to be contained or deterred. Ukraine is an important piece to counter-balance hostile powers like Russia which aspires to lead the revolt against the West by the Rest of the World.
Ukraine has decided so far to side with the West and now pays the consequences for its choice, as much as Palestinians decided to side with Iran and now they pay the consequences for their choice. Was this worth it? I’d let the Ukrainians (and Palestinians) decide. This is why I’m talking about “Ukrainian agency".
And I don’t think that “their war effort is a disastrous mistake, immoral, got many people killed for nothing, and definitely they should have taken the Russian's offer at the start of the war (or before the war)” at all. So far, Ukraine managed to keep its political independence, to control its most important cities (including Odessa), and to control a good part of economic resources against a much stronger enemy. As long as Russia will keep fighting, Ukraine will be out of NATO and EU and wear out its capacities, but this also ensures that there is no buffer state between Russia and NATO, and that Europeans have more time to properly regroup against Russia. I wish the West could do more and better for Ukraine, but they seem unable/unwilling to do it. So I don’t need to exclude that, for the Ukrainians, this war can turn to be as endless as the Israeli-Palestinian war is, and as disastrous to Ukrainians as the Israeli-Palestinian war is disastrous to Palestinians. But I wouldn’t say it’s immoral and people died for nothing in either case just because they were disastrously defeated. BTW, how strange it is to read such an objection from a self-proclaimed man of honour: aren’t men-of-honour those ready to sacrifice life, wellbeing of themselves and people they are responsible for to save their honour? There are people who kill themselves and their children with their own hands to save their honour.
Concerning the Russians’ offer which Ukrainians should have accepted, the problem remains: both were requiring Western security guarantees with no benefits for Western alliance, only for Russia. So Ukraine could have accepted the deal with Russia without the Western assistance. But they preferred not to. You can speculate it wasn’t good for Ukrainians, but I do not give a shit about your speculation, you are not Ukrainian, right? And even if you were, it doesn’t seem to reflect the views of Ukrainians at large.

5. Regardless of what you think about fighting a war you can't win, the West's policy has clearly been to make sure of this result by drip feeding in weapons systems. Now that the drip feed of weapons systems has run its course, the West has turned to drip feeding "maybe we will, maybe we won't" send in ground troops to turn the tide, to maintain the policy of having Ukraine fight, giving them hope (such as the next wonder weapon or wonder intervention; something we've already seen at the start with all the hullaballoo about a "no fly zone" which was critical in encouraging Ukrainians to fight while the weapons drip feed system was put into place: as that takes logistics).
As I've argued, this is my main problem with Western policy. We are clearly not even trying to help Ukrainians, but just propping them up to take an absolute beating in order to accomplish other things, all harmful to Europe. — boethius

Western policies look pretty disappointing to me as well. But while I’m more sure about the underlying strategic reasoning for the West to support Ukraine, I’m very much less sure about what the West could actually do, especially because the West harbours its own internal conflict of interests and nasty devisions, even in the face of such dramatic and epochal historical events. On the other side these constraining factors are expected since we live in countries with democratic institutions (i.e. more exposed to people’s mood and opposing political views) and a system of allegiance which grants greater political autonomy wrt the hegemonic power (i.e. less submissive to hegemonic power pressure, see Hungary). It could have been very much different for Russia if European countries had authoritarian regimes like Belarus and responded to USA’s demands like Belarus responds to Russia’s. This leads me to believe that your effort to discredit the drip-feeding approach of the West is DEFINITELY not only a pro-Russia argument, but a pro-authoritarian regime argument.
Your critic of the drip-feeding approach would be more compelling if you could actually argue for MORE EFFECTIVE Western policies to counter anti-Western authoritarian regimes’ political/economic/military challenges in general or Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in particular, in a democratic and peaceful way. But you didn’t offer any so far. Also because if you really could do such a thing, I do wonder: why aren’t you leading the Western world instead of wasting your time on the internet as an ordinary nobody like me?
The drip-feeding approach is arguably also the result of conflicting interests: the US wants to contain Russia but also wants to reduce its engagement in the European defence. The US wants Russia to lose but not too much to favour the collapse of the Russian Federation which may also benefit China. Leading EU countries want to contain Russia’s hegemonic ambitions, but they do not want to sacrifice their economic ties with Russia and China, or worse risk a nuclear war in Europe. Leading EU countries need the US protection for their national security, but they do not want to contribute to it significantly nor want to align with the US foreign policies in the face of anti-Western challenges. So what you are framing as “we are clearly not even trying to help Ukrainians, but just propping them up to take an absolute beating in order to accomplish other things, all harmful to Europe” is questionable. There is no single Western head taking decision wrt Ukraine as in Russia. And the Ukrainians without Western help would have not lasted 2 years war against Russia as they did which is still very far from being disastrous or absolute beating as you claim. The Palestinian aspiration to their nation state is what looks to me disastrous and an absolute beating so far. And yet Palestinians are still fighting, foreign powers support their fight materially as much as people like you support their fight politically. And once you accept that the Palestinians misery, destruction and alleged genocide is worth if done in the name of their nation-state (that’s Hamas argument) and support for anti-US forces (like Iran) how credible are your objections against the Western support of Ukraine, really?
On the other side Russia has neither made Ukraine a pro-Russian buffer state (actually it achieved the opposite) nor strengthened its international status and regional control (like in Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict and on Kazakhstan) nor secured its Black Sea backyard to support its power projection.

6. Regardless of what you think of the drip feed theory, if there was some genuine intent to use the leverage of clearly being willing to drip feed weapons into Ukraine to seek a diplomatic solution that is favourable to Ukraine, the Western leaders would put on their big boy pants and go and try to negotiate that happening and using their leverage (such as the sanctions and so on; whole point of sanctions being to serve as leverage to compel compliance, if the goal to effect Russian decision making and not just have a big giant war for the sake of all the sweet, sweet profiteering).

Furthermore, sending money to a pervasively corrupt polity is a de facto bribe to the elites of that polity. That the West puts zero controls or supervision on the money nor the weapons sent into Ukraine is making explicit there's not even pretence that this money is not a de facto bribe. That the West recognizes a lot of that money and weapons "disappears" but has not found one single Euro of laundered money or laundered weapons outside Ukraine, is explicitly participating in the money laundering scheme. — boethius

Surely sanctions are not a magic wand to fix international conflicts, they are a double edged swards since they can damage the economy of the sanctioning countries, not only the sanctioned one. But also excessive fever can kill people, still fever can be effective in killing parasitic bacteria. And even though sanctions may not be effective in inducing compliance, still they can increase costs and constrain power projection opportunities, so they have an attritional force. If sanctions were utterly pointless there was no need to strengthen them against Iran (as Trump did) and for China to refrain from openly doing business with Russia and Iran, and avoid sanctions. It’s a power struggle so also economic sanctions can be a valid defensive mechanism within a wider and long-term strategy. What the impact of sanctions against Russia or Iran shows is that Russia can count on a network of strategic alliance, which needs to be countered by a network of strategic alliance not by a single actor, no matter if it as powerful as the US.
Concerning the bribing argument, assuming it’s broadly or decisively true or just plausible what you claim (but what are your evidences to support it, really?), I would counter as easily that Russia too is bribing Ukrainian politicians (oh… and Western politicians too!). So if Ukrainian politicians are there to be bribed, better to be bribed in support of pro-Western objectives than pro-Russian. A similar argument to that one about dumb people who believe in propaganda, better they believe pro-Western propaganda than pro-Russian propaganda. The point is not propaganda or bribery but efficacy in advancing pro-Western objectives with whatever leverage currently available. Politicians do not operate in a world starting from ideal conditions, effective and efficient tools, universal good will and patience, to fix a cosmetic local issue but from any shitty predicament humanity ended up with at certain time in history where one problem is connected to every other problem, and conflicting interests press in all directions from all directions. So they are compelled to use whatever they can afford to gain relative advantage wrt competitors. And this reflects in the policies of the countries they lead as well as in the off the record measures they take to advance national interest (if we are lucky).
Moreover it is naive to expect that a country struggling for hegemony or national aspirations would spare itself from using a questionable but effective measure (be it bribing, torturing, exploiting terrorists, committing war crimes, using weapons of mass destruction, concentration camps, provoke famines, killing civilians, etc.) if the enemy doesn’t do the same, unless its power to impose its will with other means (including a valid network of allies) on its enemy is overwhelming. There is also some karma here: the more unfairly demanding our expectations about our politicians versus foreign politicians are, the more easily we will get disappointed.

Therefore, the policy of propping up Ukraine is to have it destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians killed and maimed and traumatized, depopulate the younger generations making the existing demographic collapse that much more catastrophic, simply for the gesture of "our hearts being in the right place" of wanting Russia to lose a war and "learn a lesson”. — boethius

…unless you are projecting on the West the martyrdom rhetoric of Hamas (which btw you support, right?). One could also argue that Iran is propping up Palestinians to have them destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of Palestinians killed and maimed, traumatized or cleansed, depopulate the younger generations making the existing demographic collapse that much more catastrophic, simply for the gesture of "our hearts being in the right place" of wanting Israel to lose a war and "learn a lesson”. And this is perfectly in line with what was declared by the Palestinian political leaders governing Gaza.
My counter argument is that you may be confusing reasons and consequences: precisely because "our hearts being in the right place" are not wanting Russia to lose a war and "learn a lesson” that Ukraine may be utterly destroyed, have hundreds of thousands of people killed and maimed and traumatized, and trigger a demographic collapse. Indeed, it’s people like you underestimating the Russian threat and pointing at the US as the Great Satan, among the reasons of why many Western politicians can afford at best a drip-feed strategy policy. You are pointing at a problem rooted in people more persuaded by pro-Russian arguments like yours than by pro-US ones, but simply too scared to irritate the US. And, my objection sounds even more plausible to me after reading your defamatory argument: indeed, your argument shows how you cornered yourself into a position where whatever Russia does against Ukraine and the West, this will be nothing compared to what the US has done and is responsible for (that’s actually one of your major claims, you argued a while back if I remember correctly). So the more perverse you can depict Western intentions in Ukraine the more self-rewarding your feel it is your piece of propaganda against the Great Satan. As far as I’m concerned I find such arguments more speculative than evidence-based, more rhetorically appealing than analytically appealing. Yours is just populist porn. Intellectual misery at its finest.

The war is not existential for the Ukrainian people, Russia has no way of conquering all of Ukraine anyways and clearly doesn't want that headache if they could, the Russian speaking regions have pretty solid evidence they (a lot, perhaps even a very solid majority) happy being in Russia (considering the real repression they experience by Ukrainian speakers). — boethius

I disagree. The Ukrainian war is existential in that it has to do with the very existence of an independent nation state with its territorial integrity. In order to do that Russia is ready to destroy Ukraine, massacre Ukrainians, reject Ukrainian national identity and commit war crimes at convenience . So yes Russia is an existential threat to the Ukrainian people too.
On the other side, even Russian security concerns which Putin is waving at to justify his war in Ukraine are not existential for the Russian people, since Ukraine (or the US, for that matter) has no way of conquering all of Russia anyways and clearly doesn't want that headache if they could. So if Russia has security concerns, Ukrainians too has.
This raises another issue: not only the claims that the war in Ukraine is not existential for Ukrainians and that Russian security concerns are legitimate are questionable, each one in its own merit, but why are you using different criteria?! Why are you assessing Russia’s case in terms of its legitimate security concerns but not Ukraine, while Ukrainian’s case in terms of existential war?! And if legitimate security concerns and existential wars are related then why Russia’s aggression of Ukraine can be explained/justified in terms of security concerns but Ukrainian self-defence can not be explained/justified in terms of existential war?!
Concerning the UKRAINIAN MINORITY happy of being part of Russia against the Ukrainian majority, either they could pursue a war of independence (no matter if the autonomy of related Ukrainian regions was already acknowledged prior to this war) but that wasn’t their choice. The alleged civil war was imported from Russia, actually by Russia private imperialist and neo-nazi militias (with the blessing of Russian politicians), plotting with a few local likeminded (or bribed?) politicians, as far as I can tell. Or they could migrate to Russia to avoid persecution, as Jews fled to Israel to avoid persecution. I’ve heard Russia is plenty of unpopulated lands where they could host their fellow pro-Russian Ukrainians. I’ve also heard Russia is also impressively effective in forced migration of non-Russian people and Ukrainian children, so I let you imagine how effective they could be in supporting wilful migration of fellow pro-Russian Ukrainians eager to be enrolled in military armies in the pursuit of imperialist goals, right? But if a minority of Ukrainians want to keep Ukrainian land while rejecting the Ukrainian rule and replace it with a Russian rule, why on earth should the majority of Ukrainians let them do it? Russians too repressed Chechen independence movement for the same reasons with two (civil?) wars. So, under the questionable assumption that there were all the premises for an indigenous civil war, also Ukraine should be allowed to repress independence movements within its territory in blood, and Russia’s military siding with the independence movement should be deemed as an illegitimate interference.

Therefore, if the war is not existential, there must be some reasonable cost to waging it to accomplish the objectives.

This is the core question, which no one on the self described "pro-Ukrainian" side has even attempted to answer: no matter what you think of "justice" there must be some limit to the cost to Ukrainians in their war. Likewise, regardless of what you think of Ukrainian just cause, it is not good for this so called just cause nor moral in and of itself for the West to continuously manipulate Ukraine with false promises and false assurances. — boethius

I’ve attempted to answer your and your sidekicks’ analogous “core” questions sooooo many times that I was really looking forward to doing it again, of course. The answer that best fits your “core question” to me is that your “core” question is dumb, so I’m not surprised if other representatives of the “pro-Ukrainian" side didn’t answer. People can't take seriously answer so grossly misleading questions. It's like asking people how many grey-looking hair has the current king of France on his head. If the question is flawed, then it should be denounced as such.
Indeed, you are asking people who do not put their skin in this war to answer for those who put their skin in this war, based once again in non-shared assumption surreptitiously taken to be shared (that the war in Ukraine is not existential for Ukrainians?! But Russian security concerns are legitimate?! Are you crazy?!). The “reasonable” costs of fighting for a Ukrainian Westernisation are decided by Ukrainians as much as the “reasonable” costs of fighting for a Palestinian nation state are decided by the Palestinians. Ukrainians have agency as much as Palestinians. And Ukrainians are arguably better equipped in terms of military support and strategic allies than the Palestinians. These people do not fight because they are brainwashed by Western or Iranian propaganda into fighting, they are struggling for their nation-state and they rely on the support of INTERESTED strategic allies accordingly. Palestinians strategically allied with Soviet Union and then with Iraq before allying with Iran to oppose Israel, while Ukrainians allied with Habsburg and then with the German Nazis, before allying with the West to oppose Russia’s hegemonic ambitions.
Besides when people are driven by identitarian motives there are uneconomical sinking costs which explain why nations are built into blood, genocides and cleansing over generations, and their wars can be ENDLESS (see the Afghans and the Kurds).
So I gave you two reasons why your “core” question looks preposterous to me: first reason, national interest is by definition identitarian, and costs and benefits are shaped by identitarian national interests. This is why you should not ask me what is worth fighting against Russia for Ukrainians, I’m not Ukrainian. In the end, it’s their motivations that guides their choice of fighting Russians not Western motivations for Ukrainians to fight the Russians. Second reason, identitarian aspirations are grounded on uneconomical sinking costs, such uneconomical sinking costs of human life and welfare are very much essential, intrinsic, inherent part of nation building processes. And such aspirations can go as far as the logic of martyrdom by Hamas (which you support, right?) goes. I don’t think it’s the case of the Ukrainians though.
Your one-sided moral blackmailing is a goofy way to dispense Russian leaders from the moral burden of starting and prosecuting this war until Ukrainians surrender to all their demands. And if you dispense the Russians, I’ll dispense the Westerners.
All I can concede is that the West will more easily succumb to its enemies if Westerners are not ready to fight against its enemies as much as Ukrainians are ready to fight against Russia, when the time has come. So Ukraine, far from being a dumb puppet of the US proxy war, is giving the West a bitter but decisive moral lesson and precious time to regroup against the common enemy.

Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

1. Regardless of what you think about Russia, countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns. A nuclear power creating missile bases nearer and nearer to you is one such obvious security concern. — boethius

You don’t seem to follow through your own reasoning here. Indeed, what is true for Russia, it is true for the US and Ukraine too: regardless of what you think about the US and Ukraine, “countries in our system have a right, and rationally do anyways, act in preemptive self defence. What's been referred to as legitimate security concerns.” A re-arming nuclear power with hegemonic ambitions over the US own sphere influence (e.g. Europe) and elsewhere (like in Africa and Middle East), engaging in Russia’s direct/conventional threats or asymmetric/unconventional threats, programmatically hostile to the US-led Western hegemony and pledging a strategic allegiance with other hostile authoritarian regimes like China, Iran and North Korea is a legitimate security concern for the US-led allegiance. Actually, the security dilemmas you think explain or justify Russia’s imperialist war are very much the same that led the US to become world hegemon, build-up a Western alliance and turn into some Great Satan to people like you. Russian elites imperialist's ideology and military build-up, supporting Western enemies and projecting military power in Africa and Middle east at the expense of Western interests, are all provocations from Russia against the US and its allies in their backyard. That’s why your argument looks so self-defeating to me.
Concerning the idea that a “nuclear power creating missile bases nearer and nearer to you is one such obvious security concern”, that’s currently the case of Russia at the expense of the US allies (see Kaliningrad). States can live with it. And also the Cuban missile crisis shows another way in which hostile hegemonic powers dealt with their security concerns, without engaging into a war with territorial annexations. If Russia wishes to be treated as the US in terms of security concerns, but the US and its allies don’t acknowledge the right of Russia to be treated as the US in terms of security concerns, then Russia has to impose its will against the US and its allies like enemies do. Western DO NOT need to feel rationally compelled by Russia’s claims of legitimacy about its security concerns, other than for the threats the go along with it. Russia and the US are not the same, do not play the same role in the Western world so they do not have to enjoy the same status AT ALL. Europeans have American bases in Europe, and yet they can live with it despite they may be seen as a national security threat. Switzerland borders with countries with US military bases, and yet they can live with it despite this may be national security concerns. So Europeans have to take position wrt Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe and all its implications in terms of security, political stability, and economic opportunities.

2. Regardless of what you think about point one above, it is just dumb to provoke a war, then actually fight a war, on the principle of denying Russia has legitimate security concerns that would lead a rational actor in the international system to wage preemptive war ... when apparently we all now agree that Ukraine would never join NATO anyways, but also not really we'll just go ahead and claim that's going to happen someday from time to time. Fighting for something you can never actually have is dumb. — boethius

There are several issues with such claims. The idea that the war was provoked PRESUPPOSES the idea that Russia has hegemonic ambitions over Ukraine either for very limited security concerns (e.g. by creating a “neutral” buffer state between Russia and Nato which doesn’t exist yet, right?) or for wider imperialist ambitions and power projection, because 1. Nobody attacked Russia proper, as Hamas attacked Israel proper (this is where I would talk about provocation but I guess Israeli has no “legitimate” security concerns even in this case, right?) 2. No NATO missile bases have been installed in Ukraine yet. But this war started by Russia made this undesirable outcome for Russia more compelling for Westerners (as in a self-defeating prophecy). 3. There was no arm race against Russia (“NATO is brain dead”, Trump’s willingness to have Russia on the US side against China). That’s also why Westerners have great difficulty to military supply Ukraine. BTW it was Mearsheimer himself who suggested Ukraine shouldn’t have returned the nuclear arsenal to (a however much weaker than today’s) Russia at the end of Soviet Union, for Ukrainian preemptive security concerns, especially given their historical beefs. But the logic of appeasement of Russia prevailed in the US back then, not provocation.
I put “neutrality” under quotes because the very existence of the Russian Black Sea Fleat in Ukraine shows that a “neutral” Ukraine is nothing more than a base for Russian power projection led by corrupt politicians bribed by Russians with a pretence of autonomy as Russians understand it.
You are playing with the word “legitimate” in “legitimate security concerns“. To me security concerns are “legitimate” because acknowledged according to relevant politically commitments. Westerners could acknowledge Russia’s security concerns based on international laws and treaties, or based on a strategic logic like that of strategic allegiance in response to security concerns and hegemonic ambitions. Neither case holds for Russia. Russia is not a Western ally nor there are treaties that commit the West to comply with Russia’s security concerns at their own expense.
So according to such an understanding of “legitimate”, Russia has NO “LEGITIMATE” SECURITY CONCERNS to justify this war. Russia is an enemy to the West and should be treated accordingly. At this point, talking about Russia’s “legitimate” security concerns is like talking about mafia’s, terrorists’ and nazis’s “legitimate” security concerns. The enemy has no “legitimate” security concerns. The enemy has just “illegitimate” security concerns.
The problem for the West is to understand Russia “illegitimate” security concerns to better weaken Russia not to acknowledge them, as much as the law enforcement would need to understand mafia “illegitimate” security concerns to better weaken mafia.
Ukraine doesn’t need to be inside NATO as long as circumstances are not amenable to such an outcome. The point is that NATO is taken to be a military alliance which challenges Russia’s hegemonic ambitions in Europe. Other forms of wide military allegiance comprising Ukraine but not Russia could be a problem as well for Russia. Ukraine not turning into a buffer state and neutralising the threats coming from the Black Sea Fleet would help against Russia’s hegemonic ambitions as well. WHATEVER security system that involves Ukraine and Western countries, BUT EXCLUDES Russia may be perceived as a security threat by Russia. And it’s even worse for Russia if Europe manages to become a competing power that could engage in an arm race, build its own security system of alliance, with its own nuclear weapons, and power projection in Africa and Middle East (historically Russia got invaded from Europeans not from the US). Russia needs a weak, defenceless and submissive or divided Europe to counter balance China, even in the case where the US has completely withdrawn from Europe.
So containing and deterring Russia is an imperative ALSO for Europeans, including Ukraine, not only for the US, if Russia can not (or should not) be significantly defeated. There is a balance to be found of course, given the emergence of other hegemonic powers in the international arena (e.g. China) that could profit from Russia’s defeat, the growing challenges coming from the rest of the World with all their aspirations or grievances against the West (which are in good part nurtured by Westerners themselves, including random nobodies like you), the growing discredit and lack of unity suffered by political elites in the Western world. Not easy task I guess but there is nothing inherently dumb in struggling for this goal, that’s part of the game with all its hazards. Once we agree that Russia and its sidekicks are definitely the enemy then we can discuss how, how long it takes, at what cost. And uncertainty remains no matter what path one follows.
That’s not all, talking about “provocation” has little explanatory power wrt the timing of Russias’ gambit. Actually it hides the OPPORTUNISTIC motives which led Russia to aggress the West in a time where the US looks much weaker than it looked after the end of the Cold War while Europeans look extremely vulnerable to economic and security shocks. Pro-Russians underestimate the Ukrainian and the European agency as much as they underestimate the Russian agency. There is only one agent morally and politically responsible for every evil: the Great Satan. All the others are mechanically reacting to the US abuses. So the perceived weakness of the West is the relevant motivational factor for this war NOT provocation. And so the West has to take more seriously its weaknesses as perceived by self-assertive anti-Western authoritarian regimes. The msg here is not: “they wronged me so this is the pay back” or “they made me do it”. But “the US is weak, now it’s time to challenge him, turn its coward allies against him, stab the boss in the back”.
Anyways, I’m looking forward to hearing you whining about China’s security concerns threatened by the US and Western provocations in China’s own backyard.

3. Regardless of what you think about how smart it is to fight for a right to have something the relevant parties never give you (which, if they did, the whole point would be to then avoid a disastrous war such as what is happening right now[b/]). Fighting a disastrous war to (maybe, hopefully, wishfully) get something to protect from fighting disastrous wars, is completely moronic. — boethius

You can conclude it’s all moronic if you present things as moronic in all your premises. It’s tautological. But I do not share your questionable assumptions so the conclusion has no appeal to me.
There is not metaphysical necessity in saying “fight for a right to have something the relevant parties never give you”, right? It’s matter of choice, so one has to make an effort to understand the reasoning behind such choices. I find moronic to consider “moronic” certain political moves just because some random dude thinks politicians are playing or should play in the way he suggests, as much as I find moronic to consider “moronic” certain game moves just because some random dude thinks people are playing or should play the ball as in soccer, whiteout considering that maybe people are playing basketball and fine with it.
To me, the reasoning behind such political choices transcend HOW THINGS ARE PRESENTED TO PEOPLE, so beyond pro-Russian and pro-Western propaganda (in the press, on TV, in the social media, etc.), and it is grounded on my understanding of how politicians are compelled to reason in a highly competitive and uncertain political struggle, constrained by all sorts of conflicting interests and limited resources. Besides, the conflict we are discussing has long term and worldwide consequences that most likely will survive us, so I would refrain from putting too much credit on drawing lessons limited to how things look now.
Concerning your onanistic propaganda criticism you so tirelessly and self-conceitedly indulge on, my argument is that if people are dumb to engage in a war because NATO will save them from future wars with Russia, they would still be dumb to not engage in a war because their economic welfare, social freedoms and political autonomy would be safer under Russia.
Dumb people will believe things based on dumb arguments no matter what they are, even when arguments are based on whatever propaganda one wishes to denounce. So politicians are compelled to ensure that dumb people would believe their own propaganda not that of their rivals or, even worse, enemies. Surely, also propaganda war can be played badly, but that’s not necessarily an argument against propaganda in general (no matter how misleading, false and dishonest), just against the efficacy of specific propaganda moves vs others. In that sense, I have no problem to acknowledge that Western propaganda wasn’t as effective as desirable and that Russian propaganda was more effective than desirable, no matter how false.
But, besides the fact that propaganda is only one aspect of the problem, there is also a legitimate security concern about propaganda wars, which you keep ignoring with your populist rhetoric: assuming that there are dumb people believing in propaganda in the West, Ukraine, Russia, China and Iran, the problem is that Western propaganda can be easily infiltrated and instrumentalized by hostile foreign powers while the West can’t do the same against them if they are authoritarian (see Russia, China and Iran). Russia can exploit useful idiots (or honorable men as you wish) in the West but the West can to the same as easily, so Russia has an advantage over the West in terms of propaganda war, which is multiplied by the network of anti-Western authoritarian regimes supporting Russia.

Try to address the points I’m making (wording and phrasing included), not the ones you wished I made.

far right and nazis uncorking bottles of champagne in Europe with Putin's great satisfaction but sure the Ukrainian denazification by Putin is what we should be concerned about and welcome.