Again, unfortunately I still don't have too much time to deconstruct in detail all of your misconceptions and correct them — boethius

Surprise surprise.

Yes, obviously the point of pointing out Russia can be invaded from Ukraine is to point out that is therefore a legitimate security concern of Russia, as well as to emphasize that Russia will be much more committed to the war than the US — boethius

.

Exactly this argument, the way you expressly formulated it, is a NON SEQUITUR, logically speaking. To be logically valid you should argue something like this:
Premise 1 : If X can be invaded from Y by Z, then X has a legitimate security concern,
Premise 2: Russia can be invaded from Ukraine by the US,
Conclusion: Russia has a legitimate security concern

Once you explicit all the premises, for your inference to be valid we can discuss the premises, their meaning, the evidence that support them or their likelihood and assess the explanatory power of the argument vs alternative arguments (like Russian imperialism).

BTW here 3 Russian sources questioning that Putin's alleged "security concerns" were a good reason to start his war against Ukraine:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/930199
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/930301
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/930306

It's in the situation of wanting to come to an agreement with Russia that assigning legitimacy to some of their concerns is necessary. Some of that could be purely pragmatic (we don't genuinely agree, but some compromise is needed for a deal) and some could be genuine agreement (for example because we would have the same concern if the situation was reversed; aka. the Soviet Union placing missiles in Cuba) — boethius

.

All right, now the possibility that the US can invade Russia from Ukraine once Ukraine joins NATO is something the US negotiators have conceded to Russia? Or something YOU (A SELF-ENTITLED ANONYMOUS NOBODY) THINK the US has to concede to Russia to reach a deal? Or for a cooperative understanding of security concern? In both cases, on what grounds do you believe that is what the US should concede?

Now, if you say "Bah!! Nothing the Russians want is legitimate!!" then ok, you can hold that position but what follows from that is therefore more fighting and if that's your position then you need to justify more fighting as a worthwhile endeavour: aka, what's the plan? how to win? what does more fighting achieve for Ukraine? and so on. — boethius

If with “you” you are referring to me and not to your imaginary friend, then I told you many many many times how I reason, so that you do not need to invent things at your convenience. In this forum I’m arguing in light of my understanding of geopolitics and history, once we clarified such understanding of mine we can talk my preferences (why I side with the West/NATO/Ukraine/US). But these are two separate things.
Concerning geopolitics, in short, state leaders and governments determine security concerns based (at best) on perceived “national” interest (that’s important to gain popular political legitimacy) and means to pursue them relative to their potential competitors and allies. If states are security maximisers then they will be compelled to project their power beyond their borders at the expense of their competitors. Those states in the middle that can’t compete are compelled to ally with the one perceived as less oppressive amongst the most powerful competitors, if they can't afford to remain neutral. I interpret everything else concerning military, economic, political, propaganda moves in light of this core assumption. The US and Russia are examples of competing powers and Ukraine allies with the one perceived as the less oppressive. ALL THREE as sovereign states are compelled to pursue their national interest, each of them according to their means.

Which you've never done!! It's always ... well Ukrainians want to fight, it's their choice. — boethius

I don’t feel compelled by your framing so I raised objections to it which you keep avoiding to address.
On the other hand, my answer is in line with my geopolitical assumptions as applied to the Ukrainian conflict.
So if you want to sound challenging to me, then you have to address my objections to your framing assumptions and/or raise objections to my framing assumptions, NOT to keep repeating your claims based on your framing assumptions.

To which my response is that coercion is not free choice and the West bribing Ukrainian elites as well as bold faced lying to the Ukrainian people is called coercion. Likewise, forcibly drafting people and forcing them to front is also coercion and not "Ukrainians want to fight". — boethius

First, so far, these are just allegations. I’m still waiting for you to list the lies Ukrainian elites have been bribed to tell the Ukrainian people by the West, and provide documented cases supporting it.
Second, there is the strategic perspective: if Ukrainian elites can be bribed by the West to lie, they can be bribed by the Russians too, right? [1] So, as far as I'm concerned, even bribing and lies can be better understood in light of foreign competing powers whatever the environment of domestic corruptible political elites is. Still it’s up to Ukrainians elites and their base to decide what to do about it.
Third, “forcibly drafting people and forcing them to front is also coercion and not ‘Ukrainians want to fight’” is a fallacious argument as I explained. There is no contradiction in episodes of forced conscription and ‘Ukrainians want to fight’, nor any inherently compelling proof of immorality or illegality in forcing conscription, that’s in the Ukrainian constitution and civic duty.
Fourth, my argument that ‘Ukrainians want to fight’ is grounded on geopolitical principles (it’s up to sovereign states’ political leaders to determine national interest also in accordance to popular sentiment) and history of Ukraine (the ethnic rivalry between Russia and Ukraine has a long history which also Mearsheimer discussed in the article you cited), as I argued. In several previous posts I also provided additional supporting arguments from their institutions, polls, social media research, access to foreign media and reports, and so on. What I can acknowledge is that ‘Ukrainians want to fight’ comes with more caveats now than it used to. Understandably so.

[1]
https://www.politico.eu/article/voice-of-europe-russia-influence-scandal-election/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-is-weaponizing-corruption-to-weaken-europe-from-within/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/19/ukraine-corruption-us-accountability-war/
https://www.csce.gov/articles/russia-s-weaponization-corruption-and-western-complicity/
https://visegradinsight.eu/russia-bribe-eu-corruption-ukraine/
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/36723
https://apnews.com/article/russian-interference-presidential-election-influencers-trump-999435273dd39edf7468c6aa34fad5dd
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-burisma-terror-financing/32898922.html

You're theory around these questions is so hopeless confused that unfortunately I don't have the time at the moment to explain exactly why they are hopelessly confused. — boethius

That’s why I have no pity for you. Apparently you have enough time to repeat once again arguments you have repeated already thousand times. But zero time to respond pertinently to objections, though.

And this is on top of never answering simple questions such as how many Nazis in Ukraine would be too many Nazis with too much power and therefore appeasement of said Nazis to not invade? If you have a theory of just war then you should be able to answer this question and then go onto explain that the Nazi levels in Ukraine do reach the required number and influence to morally require un-impeasement which would therefore be exactly the invasion we see. — boethius

I never claimed that I have a theory of just war, and you never explained to me why a theory of just war should answer “simple questions such as how many Nazis in Ukraine would be too many Nazis with too much power and therefore appeasement of said Nazis to not invade?”
Besides the video YOU POSTED (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MUgKTfe-IqA) offers some input on this:
- 
At minute 9:39 the guy says “if you look at the electoral results of the far-right political parties in Ukraine, they actually only add up add up to 1.65% IN TOTAL, which is less than some INDIVIDUAL far-right parties in other European countries have achieved” and that doesn’t even reach the bar for obtaining any seats.
- At minute 15:54, the guy answers to question about the scale of the Azov phenomenon as follows: “In absolute numbers, it’s a TINY TINY TINY of the Ukrainian population. None knows for sure, but I think the last reliable figures were about 2000 active fighters at any one time”, while the wider Azov movement is max 20k people.

- At minute 12:32, the guy goes even so far to concede: “If there wasn’t a neo-nazi problem before this war, there might be afterwards”. So Putin’s war would be the reason why there is a neo-nazi problem for Ukraine that wasn’t there before the war.
I could go on with the Russian Nazis that started the invasion in Ukraine. But I did that already, abundantly, in previous posts which you missed or ignored. And will still miss or ignore. Start from here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/882175

Also, generally speaking, everything I have predicted is now coming to pass, so it seems redundant to point it out everyday. It's sort of perfunctory at this point, but I'll keep repeating myself when I have a moment. — boethius

I don’t care about your predictions. I care about your arguments.
But yes keep repeating, pls. I can’t get enough of your poison.

I'll quote myself when I have the time, but within the first weeks of the war I predicted that as soon as it no longer served US interest the throwing-under-the-bussing would commence and that at anytime the US can simply paint the Ukrainians as losing, and one thing Americans don't like is people who lose, and that the loss is Ukrainians fault, that they should have tried harder and won instead — boethius

.

The purpose of this article by CNN is to signal to the American elite that the "Ukraine show" is just about wrapped up and to inform them who the blame will be assigned to. — boethius

One can make certain predictions based on historical patterns in American foreign policy and related propaganda. But identifying historical patterns depend also on how blind one is to other relevant circumstantial factors that may differ from one case to the other. You are overly dismissive of the Ukrainian agency and the relevance of the challenges that the US is facing now wrt to the ones the US when it was the unique super power immediately after the end of the Cold War. So your prediction doesn't make your argument more compelling, even in case it turns “roughly” right.
Besides your self-promoting routine of manipulatively interpreting conveniently chopped claims from mainstream media as evidence to support your grand denunciation of Western conspiracy propaganda, is intellectually repellent. Propaganda for the good and for the bad is part of the game, so we have to take it for what it is and assess it in the context of the political game we think it’s being played. I and you do not only differ in the way we understand the political game which is being played, but you seem to believe that spinning pro-Russian counter-propaganda is a master piece of deconstructionist analysis of pro-Western propaganda.

But they also appear to be struggling with problems of their own making. — CNN

So ... who's to blame for the West putting the Ukrainians up to fighting a war with the Russians that every single Western analyst and "decision maker" knew they would lose? (especially as they 100% knew that "whatever it takes" and "for as long as it takes" are obvious lies) — boethius

Your universal claim “every single Western analyst and ‘decision maker’ knew they would lose” was and is evidently questionable:
https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202207-ukraine-final-web_0.pdf
https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/survival-online/2024/01/making-attrition-work-a-viable-theory-of-victory-for-ukraine/
And I doubt that every Western analyst would ground his/her analysis on "whatever it takes" and "for as long as it takes" declarations. Indeed, there is no mention of these claims in the 2 articles I posted. You are embarrassingly unfamiliar to or purposefully ignoring basic notions of logic and argumentation.

If memory serves me right, when I said the Ukrainians will be thrown under the exact same bus that we threw our "Afghani friends" it was you that explained that it's different because the Ukrainians are more "culturally close" or something along those lines (aka. we wouldn't let down white people) — boethius

Yes indeed, I still think that Ukrainians are culturally closer to the West than the Afghans or Iraqis or the Russians, for that matter. I still do believe so. But this claim is only part of a larger argument explaining the ratio of Western/American support for the Ukrainian resistance, to my understanding.

This is reminiscent of the old sentiment about the weakness of democracy in a fight with authoritarianism, isn't it?

I think the reality is more complicated. Democracies are often clumsy and inefficient, but the plurality of views they offer also makes them more resilient. History has not been kind to autoritarian regimes that assumed that a democratic state would just fold because it's people and government would lack the will to fight. — Echarmion

Sure, but one must assess pros and contra of the Democratic vs Authoritarian decision process as it applies to evolving circumstances influenced by differences in economic performance, military capacity, demographic and cultural factors, technology advancement, systems of alliance, so I’m not sure that what held in the past, will still hold in the future. The other institutional issue with Western democracy is due to several comparative advantages that favour anti-West authoritarian regimes:
1. Western democracies can be infiltrated by propaganda from hostile authoritarian regimes to sow confusion and division in the West more easily than the other way around.
2. Western democracies can be corrupted by authoritarian regimes more easily than the other way around since in the latter case surveillance is tighter and traitors risk their lives, if not also that of their family (even abroad). You may have heard about the American youtube influencers paid by Russia (https://www.npr.org/2024/09/07/nx-s1-5101895/doj-says-russia-paid-right-wing-influencers-to-spread-russian-propaganda, Margarita Simonyan - the editor-in-chief of the Russian state-controlled broadcaster RT - is even publicaly boasting about RT's covert propaganda targeting Americans https://x.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1831398758137127099, https://x.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1761911899363426795 )
3. Institutionalized humanitarian concerns in Western democracies (way more acute now than in the past see the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan, plus 2 nuclear bombs during WW2 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_casualties_of_strategic_bombing) can be weaponised against the West: i.e. enemies of the West are more free to execute all sorts of war crimes , and by this means destroy public moral more easily than Westerners can afford, while accusing the West of hypocrisy at every suspicion of war crimes committed by the West (no matter what laws of war say about collateral damage).

With regards to aid for Ukraine especially, one aspect that seems underrepresented in the discussion is that there might be more going on internationally than we are directly aware of. The narrative is usually that western governments limit aid and restrict weapon use in order to not anger domestic constituencies. And that is certainly the case. But it might also be the case that a number of important international actors wouldn't be too happy to see the west throw it's entire armaments capacity in behind Ukraine. Chief among them China.

It seems plausible that China is threatening western nations with much more significant support for Russia because China does not care to hand the West a clean "win" in Ukraine. — Echarmion

I agree, the conflict in Ukraine in an emergent multi-polar world order brings with it all kinds of security dilemmas , including the ones about all other relevant geopolitical actors actual or potential moves (like the race for strategic autonomy in terms of commodity supply for supporting a potential war effort, adequate military industrial complex, military conscription, nuclear weapons, plans to deal with asymmetric warfare which democracies are vulnerable to, strategic alliances, etc.)

Another prediction I'm pretty extremely confident on is that these kinds of hopeless offensives are mainly about getting rid of these dangerous morons: you want to fight Russians? You think "not-attacking-Russia" has been the big mistake? Have we got the operation for you!!! — boethius

You mean that Biden has bribed Zelensky to get rid of the Ukrainian ultra nationalists by sending them to certain death with "these kinds of hopeless offensives" because they do not serve anymore the US and then Biden will pay some CNN journalist to write an article to fault the Ukrainains also for this, right?
Here some options, the CNN journalist will:
- Blame Zelensky for sacrificing its best combatants and dooming his country to certain defeat since other Ukrainians are too peaceful, coward or corrupt to fight patriotic wars as only Western men of honor can do, right? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly?
- Or blame Zelensky for understanding too late ultra-nationalists were a real danger (since they pushed him and all Ukraine to a catastrophic war after committing a 8-year genocide in Donbas) after years of lies to silence Western concerns about Ukrainian neo-nazis? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly?
- Or blame Zelensky for realizing too late that defeat was inevitable and getting rid of the ultra-nationalists was the only way to finally surrender to Russia's peace conditions, which he didn't need to. Indeed, if he only accepted the Russian deal (see Instanbul Communiquée) as advised by Biden behind doors (to keep publicly honoring Ukrainians' free decision) instead of spreading the lie that the West tried to block it, none of this would happen. And therefore blame Zelensky should be also blamed for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly?
- Others?

Kind of sad that Ukrainians have to suffer and die because they’re in between a proxy war instigated by the United States. I feel for them. Still hoping for a ceasefire.

that's sweet to share your feelings with us, buddy... and you know... it's also kind of sad that you have to suffer because Ukrainians have to suffer and die because they’re in between a proxy war instigated by the United States. Do you think a popsicle would make you feel better, buddy? What about going back to watch some Peppa Pig on TV on the sofa?

I wonder why noone ever expresses their sadness for all the young Russian men who have to die in Ukraine (and now also Kursk I guess) because their leadership embarked on a destructive war.

If they had just not done it, they'd all be fine. It's very strange to me that the position of the anti-war left us simultaneously that war is terrible but also apparently that war is inevitable.

war is inevitable. — Echarmion

Nope.

So you'd agree countries are not literally forced to start an offensive war? That whatever government does actually order it's soldiers to cross the border and start shooting did in fact decide to do this?

Humble advise, don't challenge him too much. Mikie is a typical case of "emotional flatulence":

"Fart in the Wind is a metaphor for emotional flatulence. [...] It compares the act and response to "farting,” to the act and response to sharing honest feelings, shock, shame, embarrassment and desire to run from the scene."

Here @Mikie, see if you can find some help: https://www.amazon.com/Emotional-Flatulence-Establish-Healthy-Relationships-ebook/dp/B0079QQDP4

So you'd agree countries are not literally forced to start an offensive war? — Echarmion

“Forced”? Of course not — no one had a gun to Bush’s head to invade Afghanistan or Iraq, or Bibi’s head to start a genocide in Gaza. Or Putin’s head to invade Ukraine. In a certain sense, no wars are “forced.” In another, whenever you want to justify one, just say it was “defensive.”

I see 573 pages has done no good. We’re apparently still at “If you disagree with me you think Putin is good.” Pity.

I see 573 pages has done no good. We’re apparently still at “If you disagree with me you think Putin is good.” Pity. — Mikie

This is convenient framing that you, like some other posters, like to proscribe for us.

Just like the convenient framing that excludes Russian or Ukrainian decisions from the equation and reduces everything to the US as the great Satan and the Ukrainians as the hapless victims.

That framing is leading you to exclude the russian war dead, who on an individual level certainly also include many victims, from your consideration. I think this is a notable omissions from someone who purportedly is worried about the human cost of the fighting.

This war is also a russian tragedy. How do you propose to understand it if you're not even seeing that side of the equation?

This is convenient framing that you, like some other posters, like to proscribe for us. — Echarmion

It’s a framing because that’s what you, and others, are constantly doing. You just did it above, and you know it.

For example:

US as the great Satan and the Ukrainians as the hapless victims. — Echarmion

The US is not a great Satan and Ukrainians are not hapless victims, although most of the population is. Ditto Russia.

That framing is leading you to exclude the russian war dead — Echarmion

I feel for the Russian dead as well. But they’re the invading force, so yes I de-emphasize that. Doesn’t mean it’s right to kill innocent people — regardless of nationality.

This war is also a russian tragedy. How do you propose to understand it if you're not even seeing that side of the equation? — Echarmion

I think it’s an unfortunate move by Russia— even stupid in a political and strategic sense. But they do seem to be winning, and now have a lot of leverage. I don’t necessarily like that, but that seems to be the case so far.

So it’s tough to say it’s a “tragedy” for Putin. The Russian people on the other hand— yeah, maybe it is.

Ukraine's status as a country, independence, sovereignty, whatever was established in 1991, a couple of years after the Berlin Wall came down. Changes.

^{During Vladimir Putin's tenure (1999-), various positions have been filled by ex-KGB and such (almost resembling a slow coup).
In 2003, one of the richest Russian oligarchs, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, talked about widespread corruption in front of a dismayed Putin (in a public meeting), putting numbers on the money, and what happened? The same year he's tossed in prison where he'd be for a decade. Control. Signaling.
Starting around 2009, Barack Obama (and Hillary Clinton) tried to "reset" and improve US-Russia relations. Around 2011, Putin had troubles at home, there were protest against him in various cities across Russia, and what happened? Putin blamed Clinton.}

Sometime, whenever, before 2009, the Kremlin circle (apparently uncompromisingly) decided that it would be unbearable to lose control over Crimea, and perhaps lose their empowering influence over Ukraine, something along those lines. Likely not an overnight thing; perhaps there'd been an "entitled", irredentist, "ownership", revanchist sentiment since the end of the Cold War in those circles. They'd need to secure a land bridge to whatever they hence might have to grab. A new or extended Kharkiv Pact wouldn't do, for example. Couldn't be left for an independent country to decide. Planning.

And so that decision marked the — henceforth seemingly inevitable — collision course of which we've seen the results. The Kremlin circle (whenever before 2009) against Ukraine (1991).

After all, we're talking about the largest country in the world, assertive, powerful, to be respected — and regressive. Well, meanwhile, despite resistance from early on and later invasion, Ukraine has been working towards implementing a modern, free, transparent democracy.

Ukraine has been working towards implementing a modern, free, transparent democracy. — jorndoe

:lol:

It’s a framing because that’s what you, and others, are constantly doing. You just did it above, and you know it. — Mikie

Calling the war a "US proxy war" implies that the US and not Russia is primarily responsible for the Russian decision to invade. Do you disagree with that?

I think it’s an unfortunate move by Russia— even stupid in a political and strategic sense. But they do seem to be winning, and now have a lot of leverage. I don’t necessarily like that, but that seems to be the case so far. — Mikie

How do you define "winning" for Russia though? In terms of territory?

You mean that Biden has bribed Zelensky to get rid of the Ukrainian ultra nationalists by sending them to certain death with "these kinds of hopeless offensives" because they do not serve anymore the US and then Biden will pay some CNN journalist to write an article to fault the Ukrainains also for this, right? — neomac

It's honestly incredible that you're able to get this close to the truth and yet not get it.

The only thing to change is that the US bribes all the Ukrainian elites with billions of untraceable funds and weapons as well as essentially de facto full immunity for laundering the money anywhere in the West. It's not just Zelensky getting bribed and also Zelensky is an idiot so I have little problem believing that the money is less important to him than playing the war hero in the script given to him.

But yes, spot on, these "ultra nationalists", aka. literal Nazis, are no longer useful to US interests.

These idiots were needed to start the war (i.e. keep shelling the Donbas for 8 years), and impose a terrorizing fascist dictatorship on the Ukrainian people in order to force people to the front (i.e. just straight up assassinate anyone engaging in critical thinking), as well as be propped up as elite soldier heroes for the part of Ukrainian society that actually wants to drink the coolaid.

However, in the phase of the war we're in now, called the fronts are collapsing phase, these Nazis are simply more trouble than their worth.

Solution, let them do what they've been asking for (and sometimes just going ahead and doing themselves on occasion) and invade Russia. For, the weakness of these particular delusional idiots is that they're delusional enough to think their "ultra stupidity" can actually defeat the Russians.

- Blame Zelensky for sacrificing its best combatants and dooming his country to certain defeat since other Ukrainians are too peaceful, coward or corrupt to fight patriotic wars as only Western men of honor can do, right? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac

- Blame Zelensky for sacrificing its best combatants and dooming his country to certain defeat since other Ukrainians are too peaceful, coward or corrupt to fight patriotic wars as only Western men of honor can do, right? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac

I'm honestly feeling this vibe pretty hard. You're not just warm, I'd say you're burning hot on this one.

- Or blame Zelensky for understanding too late ultra-nationalists were a real danger (since they pushed him and all Ukraine to a catastrophic war after committing a 8-year genocide in Donbas) after years of lies to silence Western concerns about Ukrainian neo-nazis? And therefore for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac

Cold, very cold, far from the prize. This is just way too complicated for a Western audience. What you're describing here sometimes goes by the name of "introspection" and we'll have none of it.

But sure, maybe a little "turns out there's a lot of Nazis" hints and nudges to smooth out "not supporting Ukraine's reconstruction".

- Or blame Zelensky for realizing too late that defeat was inevitable and getting rid of the ultra-nationalists was the only way to finally surrender to Russia's peace conditions, which he didn't need to. Indeed, if he only accepted the Russian deal (see Instanbul Communiquée) as advised by Biden behind doors (to keep publicly honoring Ukrainians' free decision) instead of spreading the lie that the West tried to block it, none of this would happen. And therefore blame Zelensky should be also blamed for obliging the West to take the hard decision to not support Ukraine's reconstruction after they squandered the Western aids so recklessly? — neomac

Again, way too complicated for a Western audience, but elements of what you're talking about maybe tossed around. For sure, "they wanted to fight!" will be the main refrain whenever the absolute disaster is pointed out.

I think you should consider the possibility you're just overthinking things.

US doesn't feel the need to justify anything at all, nor even talk about it.

Even if random Neo-cons blurt out these kinds of talking points (whether true or made-up) the moral of the story is that it won't matter anyways in the mainstream media.

We're entering the "see you in the next war" denouement on this one and things are falling apart, nothing makes sense but it doesn't really matter if you don't actually live in the house you just trashed with your "arch nemesis" frat bro rivals.

Like, you're talking as if these people are accountable to someone or something and would need to like someday makeup justifications or something for their actions and even try to make those make some sort of sense or whatever.

You're honestly really starting to scare me.

The first rule of start wars for profiteering club is:

We don't talk about the previous wars.

The second rule of start wars for profiteering club is:

We don't talk about the previous wars!

The THIRD rule of start wars for profiteering club is:

WE DON'T TALK ABOUT THE PREVIOUS WARS!!!

This is convenient framing that you, like some other posters, like to proscribe for us. — Echarmion

I've literally been called a paid Russian intelligence officer by members of your "us", multiple times.

Yet, I'm the only one who explained how US / NATO boots on the ground (before or at the start of the war), creating a crisis, could have worked militarily and more importantly diplomatically and avoided the war, and that I'd be totally for that.

The reason that such direct action was and is unthinkable in any Western policy analysis or decision or talking heads of even this forum (except by me), is because obviously Ukrainian sovereignty is not the objective, but "Overextending and Unbalancing Russia" ... which to remind this exact war and it's likely consequences are described in a Rand summary of that very name, presented in a nice little slide show summarizing a much longer document that explains this very war, how to start it, how Russia would react and what the result would likely be.

CHAPTER FOUR
Geopolitical Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Measure 1: Provide Lethal Aid to Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 — Extending Russia - Rand

Rand discusses exactly the measures that would likely lead to "escalation" by Russia:

The United States could increase its military assistance to Ukraine—in terms of both the quantity and quality of weapons. — Extending Russia - Rand

The United States could also become more vocal in its support for NATO membership for Ukraine. Some U.S. policymakers—including Republican Senator and 2016 presidential candidate Marco Rubio—backed this approach in the past and Ukrainian President Porosh- enko recently promised to hold a referendum on the issue in the near future. While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washing- ton’s pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while lead- ing Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development. — Extending Russia - Rand

And what are the likely benefits?

Well, we don't have to guess as there's a section clearly titled "benefits":

Benefits
Expanding U.S. assistance to Ukraine, including lethal military assistance, would likely increase the costs to Russia, in both blood and treasure, of holding the Donbass region. — Extending Russia - Rand

and of course Rand is full of clever, straightforward and there's always risk when contemplating benefits, and we don't have to guess what those are either as the very next section is clearly titled "risks", starting with:

Risks
An increase in U.S. security assistance to Ukraine would likely lead to a commensurate increase in both Russian aid to the separatists and Russian military forces in Ukraine, thus sustaining the conflict at a somewhat higher level of intensity. — Extending Russia - Rand

Which a full-blown large scale war I'm pretty sure qualifies as "somewhat higher level of intensity".

But by this wording are the authors being simply being coy or do the authors actually believe "somewhat higher" rather than "a lot higher" is the upper bound of risk?

No, because they clearly state what the risk outcomes are in the next section putting it together:

Likelihood of Success
Eastern Ukraine is already a significant drain on Russian resources, exacerbated by the accompanying Western sanctions. Increasing U.S. military aid would certainly drive up the Russian costs, but doing so could also increase the loss of Ukrainian lives and territory or result in a disadvantageous peace settlement. This would generally be seen as a serious setback for U.S. policy. — Extending Russia - Rand

The authors are clearly describe exactly the likely result of escalation which is exactly what has happened:

Loss of Ukrainian lives has increase.

Loss of Ukrainian territory has increased.

This is all generally a serious setback for U.S. Policy.

Notice nowhere in this document or any other U.S. document is there any concern for Ukrainian sovereignty or the wellbeing of Ukrainians. Loss of Ukrainian lives and territory is noted as one drawback of the policy of escalation, but the goal is clearly to evaluate whether that would extend Russia or not. This action is not ultimately counselled by the authors not because a lot of Ukrainians would die in a war but because Russia would very super likely win a larger war and the it would be on the whole worse for the US to simply lose the proxy war in simple terms.

Notice nowhere in this document nor any other similar US policy analysis document you'll find anything describing how Ukraine can actually "win" or discussing US direct intervention to "save the day" if the likely outcome of expanding the war occurs.

Why you may ask?

It's because Ukraine is being used as a proxy to damage Russia without any concern of the outcome for Ukrainians or "Ukraine" as some special entity we should care about apart from the people in it.

The only question this brings up is why does the US not follow the Rand advise and "calibrate" support to avoid a larger war that Russia would win and thus embarrass the US.

The answer, as described above in my previous posts, is called "war profiteering".

If you want to continue the giant war profiteering engine that was Iraq and Afghanistan you're going to need another war. This document in 2019 an answers the question of how to start a larger war in Ukraine, also why that's bad for both Ukraine and US long term interests.

But what if you don't care about Ukraine and US long term interests? What if what you care about are 2 super important things to you:

1. Keeping the war profiteering engine going and even increase military and covert budgets, corporate defence profits, black market laundering, exports!

2. Show the Biden administratoin to be "strong" militarily rather than open to the critique of the pullout of Afghanistan.

Well, this exact war we are considering accomplishes those two things. Maybe the Rand authors really did and do care about US long term interests, but that does not mean people who make policy and reading this document do.

If you have other goals than US long term interests then the questions you'll be asking yourself when faced with the extremely likely loss by Ukraine in a larger war is:

Yeah, but defeated by Russia when?

For, as long as the war can be dragged out until the next election then, after the election, Ukraine dropped like a hot shell, it doesn't really matter that Russia is going to win and US be embarrassed and a new Cold War started and all that, as that doesn't concern you.

What you'll do is have the military war game things out (just not publicly as with this Rand paper) and what those war games will reveal is that Russia has no means of simply overrunning all of Ukraine. The initial invasion will run out of steam, then more will need to be mobilized as Russias standing army in 2022 was simply not that big, with the addition of the problem of pacifying conquered regions and so on. They don't know what Russia will do exactly but what they do know is that Russia is very unlikely to win in direct military terms in any short period of time. They'd also know on the off chance they're wrong and Russia does simply overrun Ukraine then that doesn't really embarrass the US as we all knew "Russia would win in 3 days" anyways, and then Russia is anyways the big meany and sanctions can continue and gas sold to Europe and so on.

Long story short, any war gaming this situation out would likely conclude what is likely to happen in a larger war is exactly what has happened, and what has happened is what was desired by policy makers. We can also be pretty sure of this as independent analysis before the war concluded the maximum Russia is likely to achieve in any short period of time is exactly what has been achieved: a land bridge to Crimea.

Further wargaming would reveal that once fronts stabilized the next phase would be high intensity attrition due to the immense artillery capability of the Russians and that Ukraine, being smaller and less well equipped, will reach a breaking point, but that takes years (aka. after the next election).

So, what we can glean from the US establishments own documents is that they knew exactly how Russia would respond to their actions described in their publicly available document dedicated to finding ways to harm Russia, and then Russia did respond in exactly that way in response to those actions.

If you can look at all this publicly available info and come up with quibbles about Ukraine's status as a US proxy to advance US interests at the expense of Ukraine, then you're engaging in what is obvious propaganda to advance US interests at the expense of Ukraine.

Promulgating the entirely false and ludicrous narrative that the West's policy is to help Ukraine out of the goodness of our hearts, doesn't help Ukrainians but gets more Ukrainians killed.

As for Russia's actions, they are a signatory and so also guarantor of the Minsk agreements, both Ukraine and Western leaders have publicly admitted those accords were done in bad faith with no intention of following them, and indeed Ukraine didn't follow them as was the plan and so therefore Russia is entirely justified in forcing Ukraine to abide by the accords, such as respect the people of the Donbas and stop shelling them.

If implementing these accords by force is somehow breaching the previous Budapest Memorandum then the guarantors of that agreement would of course be justified in similarly implementing that agreement by force.

The guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum do no such thing and so we can conclude that they agree there's no breach happening or then they simply don't care about Ukraine enough to fulfill their written obligations from which we can conclude Ukraine has already been fooled once by the West and is now in the process of being fooled again with the "as long as it takes" talk.

An important question we should be asking is why the US is insisting on escalating the war in ways that do nothing to improve Ukraine's position on the battlefield, and are similarly unlikely to hurt Russia in any meaningful way.

It's easy to understand the mechanism the Americans are using here: as Russia inches closer to victory, Moscow will be more and more reluctant to escalate. Conversely, the Americans will be able to provoke Russia in increasingly risky ways.

But why?

It appears they are seeking to raise the threat environment for its own sake.

Perhaps the sole purpose is to placate Kiev without any regard for the threat environment, but my sense is that at this point even Kiev understands that strikes into Russia will do nothing to improve their position in the war.

Rand discusses exactly the measures that would likely lead to "escalation" by Russia: — boethius

And did any of that actually happen?

Which a full-blown large scale war I'm pretty sure qualifies as "somewhat higher level of intensity". — boethius

No, it doesn't, since what we're seeing is an entirely different category of conflict. The paper clearly does not describe a full blown war by Russia, since the writers did not expect Russia would take such a step. If they did want to predict that, they'd have stated it directly.

This is all generally a serious setback for U.S. Policy. — boethius

You're not reading that properly. It says that a disadvantageous peace settlement of the Donbas conflict would be a setback to US policy. But we're no longer in that stage of the conflict anyways.

Notice nowhere in this document nor any other similar US policy analysis document you'll find anything describing how Ukraine can actually "win" or discussing US direct intervention to "save the day" if the likely outcome of expanding the war occurs.

Why you may ask? — boethius

Because putting boots on the ground in Ukraine would be so widely unpopular that no government could afford it.

The only question this brings up is why does the US not follow the Rand advise and "calibrate" support to avoid a larger war that Russia would win and thus embarrass the US. — boethius

You haven't actually described any of the actions the US took to escalate the conflict so this is an empty claim.

This document in 2019 an answers the question of how to start a larger war in Ukraine, also why that's bad for both Ukraine and US long term interests. — boethius

It doesn't, and you can't start a war that's already ongoing.

Well, this exact war we are considering accomplishes those two things. — boethius

A war which does not exist. You're talking about a theoretical scenario which did not end up happening.

What you'll do is have the military war game things out (just not publicly as with this Rand paper) and what those war games will reveal is that Russia has no means of simply overrunning all of Ukraine. The initial invasion will run out of steam, then more will need to be mobilized as Russias standing army in 2022 was simply not that big, with the addition of the problem of pacifying conquered regions and so on. They don't know what Russia will do exactly but what they do know is that Russia is very unlikely to win in direct military terms in any short period of time. They'd also know on the off chance they're wrong and Russia does simply overrun Ukraine then that doesn't really embarrass the US as we all knew "Russia would win in 3 days" anyways, and then Russia is anyways the big meany and sanctions can continue and gas sold to Europe and so on. — boethius

So why the hell did Russia invade?

So, what we can glean from the US establishments own documents is that they knew exactly how Russia would respond to their actions described in their publicly available document dedicated to finding ways to harm Russia, and then Russia did respond in exactly that way in response to those actions. — boethius

What actions did the US take? And the result is not remotely described in the document. The document does not describe a full blown invasion by Russia.

If you can look at all this publicly available info and come up with quibbles about Ukraine's status as a US proxy to advance US interests at the expense of Ukraine, then you're engaging in what is obvious propaganda to advance US interests at the expense of Ukraine. — boethius

Yeah you're making sweeping claims and then accusing everyone who disagrees with you of being a propagandists. Weren't you the one complaining about being called a propagandist? Pot, meet kettle.

As for Russia's actions, they are a signatory and so also guarantor of the Minsk agreements, both Ukraine and Western leaders have publicly admitted those accords were done in bad faith with no intention of following them — boethius

This is a lie. If you don't want to be accused of being a russian propagandist, maybe don't lie.

indeed Ukraine didn't follow them as was the plan and so therefore Russia is entirely justified in forcing Ukraine to abide by the accords, such as respect the people of the Donbas and stop shelling them. — boethius

This is complete nonsense. Russia did not abide by the terms either. Not only is your conclusion that Russia would be justified to escalate the war in order to enforce Minsk complete nonsense, it's also factually wrong.

An important question we should be asking is why the US is insisting on escalating the war in ways that do nothing to improve Ukraine's position on the battlefield, and are similarly unlikely to hurt Russia in any meaningful way. — Tzeentch

We can't really answer this if you're not telling us what you're actually talking about.

The only thing to change is that the US bribes all the Ukrainian elites with billions of untraceable funds and weapons as well as essentially de facto full immunity for laundering the money anywhere in the West. It's not just Zelensky getting bribed and also Zelensky is an idiot so I have little problem believing that the money is less important to him than playing the war hero in the script given to him. — boethius

But if billions of funds used to bribe ALL Ukrainian elites by the US are “untraceable”, how can you claim with such a certainty that the US is bribing ALL the Ukrainian elites, besides Zelensky?!

These idiots were needed to start the war (i.e. keep shelling the Donbas for 8 years), and impose a terrorizing fascist dictatorship on the Ukrainian people in order to force people to the front (i.e. just straight up assassinate anyone engaging in critical thinking), as well as be propped up as elite soldier heroes for the part of Ukrainian society that actually wants to drink the coolaid. — boethius

I prefer to review criteria, compelling facts and, possibly, metrics backing up such sweeping assertions. So far you didn’t offer much to me, but you keep talking as if you did. Rather surreal.

Like, you're talking as if these people are accountable to someone or something and would need to like someday makeup justifications or something for their actions and even try to make those make some sort of sense or whatever.

You're honestly really starting to scare me. — boethius

Don’t be scared man of honour, it was just a passtime exercise about you predicting the likely content of a future article which Biden would have "untraceably" bribed some CNN journalist to write.
At this point I think you yourself could write this article for CNN, since you have it all figured out. You could earn some dollars from the US (instead of the usual rubles) , you know,
and come back at us with: "once again, as I’ve predicted, motherfuckaaaas!"

At this point Tzeench can only talk with the only serious guys who remained in this thread: namely, Tzeench, he and himself.
He comes here, asks himself questions, and then answers to himself. There is lots of agreeing with himself going on, apparently. And then he goes in another thread to do the same.
Serious as shit.

And did any of that actually happen? — Echarmion

It's exactly what happened. We're at the WTF are you talking about stage of the debate.

The RAND paper describes what will likely lead to "higher intensity conflict":

1. Supplying arms
2. Keep saying Ukraine will join NATO

Then describes the likely outcome:

3. "doing so could also increase the loss of Ukrainian lives and territory"

Ukraine has lost 20% of its territory (so far) and upwards of 700 000 lives, maybe more, and if conquered Ukrainians who are now Russian and emigration that won't return is counted then it's millions of lost Ukrainians.

What RAND says will happen is exactly what has happened and likewise the predicted "serious setback to U.S. policy", which RAND also explains the reason being that Russia will be more committed than the US to any escalation and therefore win.

Which RAND predicts is exactly what has happened.

No, it doesn't, since what we're seeing is an entirely different category of conflict. The paper clearly does not describe a full blown war by Russia, since the writers did not expect Russia would take such a step. If they did want to predict that, they'd have stated it directly. — Echarmion

You have to actually read the paper to play the "what do the authors say in the paper" game.

What I already cited is definitely sufficient, as if the authors are predicting Ukraine losing more lives and territory in an escalation with Russia ... that process obviously happens due to an invasion and therefore war. They use euphemistic and open ended language because that's how people talk in these circles.

But they are extremely clear, they repeat the point several times, here's another:

Alternatively, and more likely, Russia might escalate, possibly seizing more of Ukraine, supporting further advances of the Damascus regime, or actually occupying a wavering Belarus. Such moves would likely impose serious additional strains on Russian defense and economic capacity, but would also represent a serious setback for U.S. policy. Given this range of possible responses, any U.S. moves of the sort described in this chapter would need to be carefully calibrated and pursued within some larger policy framework. — Extending Russia - Rand

What this is the alternative to, and note more likely, is the idea of Russia pulling back due to US escalation in Ukraine.

This is clearly "big moves", including straight up occupying Belarus.

Most importantly for our discussion, Russia escalating and seizing more of Ukraine in a way that induces serious strain.

The authors are clearly describing a process of Russia conquering parts of Ukraine in high intensity conflict that causes serious strain: AKA a war and not just waltzing in unopposed in certain places because it's quick and easy and does require a war to do so.

The authors view is that any escalation of the Donbas hot war is bad for US policy (as Russia will win those escalations) so they make that argument. Escalation results in Ukraine losing more territory and lives and so it follows from this position that escalating to a maximum extent would result in maximum loss of Ukrainian territory and lives.

The authors recommend seeking a diplomatic solution to the Donbas conflict in which lethal aid could be one point of leverage to do so but only makes sense in a larger diplomatic strategy.

You're not reading that properly. It says that a disadvantageous peace settlement of the Donbas conflict would be a setback to US policy. But we're no longer in that stage of the conflict anyways. — Echarmion

No, it says that either Ukraine will lose territory and lives or then be forced into a disadvantageous peace (to avoid said loss of territory and lives).

The authors correctly predict those are the options and we're in the scenario in which Ukraine chose to lose more lives and territory. Had Ukraine taken the peace deal at the start of the war that would have been the disadvantageous peace option, and that too would be a setback to US policy; a much smaller setback but a more sooner and immediate setback where you don't get to play war hero until the next election. Pretending Ukraine can win, is winning, will win allows the setback to be delayed by many years.

Because putting boots on the ground in Ukraine would be so widely unpopular that no government could afford it. — Echarmion

If you're talking costs, Western governments can definitely afford it and it would be a lot cheaper than the hundreds of billions sent to Ukraine.

If you're talking political costs due to unpopularity, obviously true and we can draw several conclusions from this obvious fact.

First, this fact simply emphasizes the disconnect between what Western leaders say and their actual practically available mandate from their own people. Sure, people love putting Ukraine flag emojis everywhere, makes them feel good, but actually going and helping Ukraine directly is essentially unthinkable as Westerners don't wish to pay any real cost. Therefor, when Western leaders say "as long as it takes" and "whatever it takes" and "we'll stand by Ukraine" and talk about how Ukrainian sovereignty is so important and even more extreme things like "Russia must be defeated" and so on, those are all total lies that do not represent what the West is actually willing to do. What the West is actually willing to do is extremely limited in comparison with what is practically possible, and the extent of the willingness is prop up Ukraine just long enough to lose the war (just after the next election), and this policy is maintained by a drip feed of weapons systems into Ukraine, supplying the next only after the impact of the previous is absorbed and adapted to by the Russians and attrition degrades Ukrainian capacity generally speaking.

The second conclusion we can draw is that while Western people don't want lives lost or a nuclear war, they would actually be thrilled by the West seen to "win" some direct confrontation with Russia. The strategy of direct confrontation with Russia did not involve any loss of Western lives; the strategy would be Cuban missile crisis 2.0 which would obviously result in a negotiated resolution.

The reason is not thinkable is because we know Western leaders are duplicitous, corrupt, ineffectual, and have no moral foundation. No Western leader actually cares about the Ukrainian people and we all know that and therefore (unless you have an imagination) there exists no premises out there in which to build such a process in one's mind. Western leaders do not care about Ukrainian democracy, Ukrainian sovereignty, Ukrainian territory, do not care about saving Ukrainian lives, do not care about avoiding violent escalation in Ukraine, simply do not care, they have no principles, they are not moral people, and we all know that and implicitly accept that as the start of any analysis. The mention of principles is only relevant in terms of a game of scoring political points and at no point does anyone in the West believe our leaders have any actual truly felt moral principles.

Therefore, they would not even contemplate going in and "standing up to Putin" because while that could save Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian lives, it what wouldn't it accomplish?

First, it wouldn't accomplish a long war and all the war profiteering that goes along with that.

Second, it wouldn't create a second Cold War.

The result would actually be exactly what Russia has been asking for: a new security architecture in Europe that reduces tensions overall in the long term.

For, if you start war gaming out sending troops into Ukraine to defend Ukraine (something people, especially Western leaders, love to mention at every opportunity that Ukraine is sovereign and therefore can do what it wants, join whatever alliance it wants and so on), the only next step is a negotiated de-escalation of the situation. The chances of nuclear war if the fighting actually starts between Russia and Western troops and aircraft is so great as to be completely unacceptable. The situation would be so intense and obviously dangerous that Western leaders (lacking any actual statecraft skills themselves) would be forced (by common sense and obviously the overwhelming demand of the people) to effectively give up control of the process to the experienced senior diplomats that are still around to rapidly come to a settlement with the Russians.

Had this happened, the end result would be good for everyone, and the maximum good result for Ukraine by avoiding the war that happens instead. We'd be "talking the language" that Putin understands and we'd actually gain respect in Putin and in Russia by having balls.

Once the deescalation occurs Western leaders would be viewed as geopolitical geniuses that "saved Ukraine" by bold action.

Why this is completely unacceptable to the people that actually rule us is that the long term effects are more peace, less arms profiteering, less buying up all the Ukrainian land (that's still Ukrainian) on the cheap, and actually rehabilitating Russia as a player in the Western political system.

The strategy here is not to maintain the "rules based order" but rather to carve it out for the US exclusive dominance, which means separating this system from the other major players: namely Russia and China. Countries that can be dominated by the US will continue to function under the "rule based order" and countries that can't be dominated need to fuck off from it.

As important to ejecting Russia from the system through a war (rather than a standoff that can end in a hug and "we didn't want to blow you up nukes bro", single tears and various hugging memes) is that the war also weakens Europe. With Russia as a energy and resource partner of Europe, the Europeans, with their competitor to the US dollar the Euro, could become equal partners of the US in the "rules based order"; you'd end up with three economic centres: the US, Europe and China all relatively equal in international influence. The US could also simply collapse financially in this scenario due to continued mismanagement.

I could go on, but the point is that it's super telling that when I explain how NATO could use it's "mightiest might that ever might the earth" to deter Russia from killing hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and taking large parts of Ukrainian territory, it's "No! NO! Can't do that!! Uh-uh! NO".

But why not? The reason is because our cynical use of Ukrainians not only for Western interests but for US war machine and energy interests, at the expense of both Ukraine and pretty much every other sector of Western society, is completely internalized in the minds of most Westerners.

It doesn't, and you can't start a war that's already ongoing. — Echarmion

"The war" in the context of this debate has been used to refer to the war that started in 2022 of Russia regular forced invading Ukraine in multiple fronts. When people want to refer to the Donbas civil war that preceded that, they usually specify that.

But yes, thanks for recognizing the reality that the invasion in 2022 is an escalation of an already existing 8 year civil war, in which the independent Donbas regions have the right to declare independence and form their own alliances just as Ukraine can form theirs, and that Russia therefore did not start any war but interceded on behalf of allies as allies are want to do. For, in our system, separatism is completely legitimate ... as long as you win. Obviously no one's demanding the US reintegrate as a UK colony.

It doesn't, and you can't start a war that's already ongoing. — Echarmion

Again, if Russia didn't start a war in 2022 then there's not even potential violation of international law, so thanks for that clarification.

However, as mentioned above "the war" refers to the war at hand, and my use of "the war" refers to the war we get starting in 2022, whereas in the paper they use the term "increased intensity" to refer to a larger war between Russia and Ukraine directly, and they refer to the civil war in the Donbas as a Russian proxy war. Sometimes different words refer to the same thing; since this conversation has taken "the war" to refer to the 2022 invasion, as the mainstream media uses that language so we easily know what we're talking about, I use our language to explain the authors meaning. Of course, the authors don't know exactly what escalation will look like, how big it may get; they don't get into that analysis because they view any escalation as bad for US policy.

But thanks for your pointless quibbles that clearly demonstrate you are a a complete idiot.

A war which does not exist. You're talking about a theoretical scenario which did not end up happening. — Echarmion

The war definitely exists, we can see it.

Whether you want to use language in which the war started in 2014 and is one continuous war up until now or then language that breaks up the fighting into first a civil war from 2014 to 2022 and then a Russia-Ukraine war since then.

Of course, the authors wrote in the past, so from their perspective in 2019 the war that starts in 2022 is a hypothetical scenario that is covered by their "higher intensity" language. Obviously what we see is higher intensity and their analysis of higher intensity is exactly correct: Ukraine will lose more territory and more lives and the whole ordeal will be a setback for US policy.

So why the hell did Russia invade? — Echarmion

Simply because the US provokes a larger war to extend Russia and Russia know the US is provoking a larger war to extend Russia does not imply that therefore Russia should not do exactly what the US is provoking.

The same RAND analysis that explains what would the US would need to do to provoke an escalation by Russia explains exactly why Russia would do that: it would be a setback for US policy and a win for Russia.

The paper does not explain why Russia going to war in Ukraine would be bad for Russia as a nation state, but the opposite: summed up in clearly stating escalation will likely be a setback for US policy. Since the paper is dedicated to finding how to extend and weaken Russia, then a setback for US policy is an advancement of Russian policy in this context of relative power analysis.

I can go into all the details (for the n'th time) of why "Russia" when considered as a nation state benefits from the war, but basically: more territory, more people (from refugees out of Ukraine and said territory), more respect in the international system, more arms sales, more "national unity" and a long list of other benefits to the "power" of a nation state (that is a fictitious shared construct of the mind but with very real world effects).

But the main reason for this much bigger war is exactly what you keep mentioning that there's anyways already a war in the Donbas since 2014. This situation simply wasn't sustainable and ending that war is an inevitable necessity. It could be ended diplomatically, that Russia and Ukraine and the West did nominally a whole two times, or then it could be ended by force. By simply maintaining the War in the Donbas (by supplying arms, and training and support and encouragement; i.e. using US leverage to prop up the war rather than US leverage to try to find a resolution) an escalation by Russia is inevitable. Russia could not simply let the Donbas separatists be crushed. Unlike Western people who do not care enough about Ukrainians to take on any actual risk, the people's overwhelming demand in Russia is to defend the ethnic Russians in Ukraine.

By refusing outright to negotiate it then puts Russian leaders in the position of needing to issue ultimatums, which Putin then did, and when your "bluff is called" and you aren't actually bluffing then you are obliged to act on your threat to maintain credibility. Putin made clear that we either come to a a deal, a new security architecture in Europe, or he'll invade Ukraine. The US and Europe "called his bluff", so to maintain credibility when you're not actually bluffing you are obliged to act on your word.

Why try to avoid war if the likely outcome of a war is good for Russia and bad for the US in terms of national state power dynamics? because the likely outcome isn't guaranteed so you have to take into account low probability but disastrous outcomes. A negotiated settlement can easily be worse in terms of likely outcome, but is a lot more predictable process without the risk of low-probability but extreme bad outcomes.

Why then go to war when a peace negotiation doesn't work is if the situation and trajectory have anyways those low-probability but high impact events (such as nuclear missiles in Ukraine being used) in addition to the worse likely outcome (being humiliated by US missiles in your face, loss of economic integration with the Donbas and so on). In terms of the most extreme risks, nuclear war, at some point letting NATO stroll into Ukraine increases the likelihood of nuclear war more than conquering Ukraine. With enough such calculations, a giant war now is the peaceful option.

What actions did the US take? And the result is not remotely described in the document. The document does not describe a full blown invasion by Russia. — Echarmion

When a doctor says "consuming more alcohol increases adverse effects" they are also covering the scenario of consuming a lot more alcohols and getting blackout drunk or even overdosing and dying.

You logic would be that if someone actually went and overdosed and died that the doctors advise is at fault because he didn't specifically say that and therefore we were free to conclude that what he's really saying is that enough alcohol is actually good for you.

I hope even you can see how that logic simply doesn't work; if you say more of A is bad you don't need to go through every level of A and explain in detail why it's bad. If an extreme amount of A turns out to be super bad, that is entirely covered from your relating A to badness.

The authors argue to de-escalation in the Donbas and that arming Ukraine more could be part of a bigger strategy that results in de-escalation. You're basically complaining that they say going in that direction is bad but didn't describe in detail just how bad it can get if you go super far in that direction.

You haven't actually described any of the actions the US took to escalate the conflict so this is an empty claim. — Echarmion

Yes I have, I quoted RAND saying what would escalate the conflict: further arms to Ukraine and simply unilaterally declaring Ukraine will join NATO even if that won't happen soon due to ally objections, I then stated that's exactly what the US did.

Yeah you're making sweeping claims and then accusing everyone who disagrees with you of being a propagandists. Weren't you the one complaining about being called a propagandist? Pot, meet kettle. — Echarmion

First, "pot, meet kettle" if you're starting with the premise that you're a propagandist as there's no other kettles here in the context.

Second, I literally just explained how I'm the only one who's actually explained how to "protect Ukrainian sovereignty" with Western power and why that would have likely worked, avoided all the death and destruction in Ukraine that has happened since, and that I would have been completely in favour of that. Since, as you point out, West is obviously not coming to actually help Ukraine in a "tough bro" way, well it's as obvious as that that Ukraine can't win a war with Russia by itself and so the rational course of action for Ukraine is to negotiate a settlement sooner rather than later (as the more Ukraine is destroyed the more its leverage in a negotiation is destroyed; things don't get better, they get worse when you're losing a war).

Third, my claims are not sweeping, but very specific: you parrot US talking points without any concern for Ukrainian welfare (at no point do you wonder whether Ukraine is accomplishing anything with the price in blood paid so far and what it would accomplish with more blood) because you are a propagandist.

You make up pointless quibbles like "the war" referring to the civil war that started in 2014 rather than what is commonly accepted it refers to in this conversation and the mainstream media of the Ukraine-Russo war proper that started in 2022, a pointless quibble that establishes the point that therefore Russia is simply coming to the aid of their allies in the Donbas who have declared independence (as nearly every country has at some point). You address no substantive point; at no point do you argue that Ukraine losing so much territory and lives is accomplishing something for Ukrainians.

This is a lie. If you don't want to be accused of being a russian propagandist, maybe don't lie. — Echarmion

How is it a lie?

Under normal circumstances both sides would be accusing the other of not abiding by the agreement so this point would be largely moot. However, because our leaders are exceptionally arrogant and stupid, simply came out and said they made the agreement in bad faith, never intended to abide by it and planned from the start not to, but instead prepare for the exactly the war that would result due to reneging on commitments. Therefore, the point of who didn't abide by the peace agreements is not moot but we are entirely justified in assuming it's the people who blatantly say they had no intention to follow the agreement and therefore Russia entirely justified in using force to hold people to their word.

This is complete nonsense. Russia did not abide by the terms either. Not only is your conclusion that Russia would be justified to escalate the war in order to enforce Minsk complete nonsense, it's also factually wrong. — Echarmion

Where's your proof?

We have proof of Western leaders own words they didn't abide by the agreement and never intended to, from before the signing of these agreements. Not only do you provide zero proof Russia violated anything, but anyways any of its violations are subsequent to Ukraine and Western violations who made clear at no point, not even for a single second, was the agreement intended to be followed nor actually followed. These agreements came into being with Ukraine and the West already violating them by already actively planning and continuing actions that breach them.

Now, feel free to provide actual evidence of Russia breaching these agreements and why those breaches aren't anyways justified by the other parties breaching the agreements first.

If you've even read these agreements that is, which I doubt.

But if billions of funds used to bribe ALL Ukrainian elites by the US are “untraceable”, how can you claim with such a certainty that the US is bribing ALL the Ukrainian elites, besides Zelensky?! — neomac

Really stupid quibble considering both the US and Ukraine has admitted that money and arms disappearing is a significant problem.

However, I'm not saying Zelensky isn't also bribed with money, just that he's also an idiot who can be easily controlled by just blowing smoke up his ass that he's a real war hero and not a clown actor in a show.

I prefer to review criteria, compelling facts and, possibly, metrics backing up such sweeping assertions. So far you didn’t offer much to me, but you keep talking as if you did. Rather surreal. — neomac

These are not sweeping assertions. They are very specific assertions that the RAND experts make, all I'm adding since the war started (as the RAND document is written in 2019) is that what RAND describes in their document comes to pass: US did escalate with more arms assistance and more boasting that Ukraine would join NATO, this caused Russia to take more territory and killing more Ukrainians, which is obviously what is called a "war" (or then a "bigger war" if you want to start the war in 2014).

Don’t be scared man of honour, it was just a passtime exercise about you predicting the likely content of a future article which Biden would have "untraceably" bribed some CNN journalist to write.
At this point I think you yourself could write this article for CNN, since you have it all figured out. You could earn some dollars from the US (instead of the usual rubles) , you know,
and come back at us with: "once again, as I’ve predicted, motherfuckaaaas!" — neomac

Biden doesn't need to bribe CNN journalists to do specific things. If you don't see that mainstream journalists are simply on "team elite" and say what their told to say, then there's little helping you.

The RAND paper describes what will likely lead to "higher intensity conflict":

1. Supplying arms
2. Keep saying Ukraine will join NATO — boethius

It doesn't say that. You quoted it yourself, it said the US could become more vocal and increase lethal aid. How, specifically, has the US done either?

Which RAND predicts is exactly what has happened. — boethius

Yeah this is nonsense and everyone but you will understand that, so I won't bother engaging with this further.

The authors are clearly describing a process of Russia conquering parts of Ukraine in high intensity conflict that causes serious strain: — boethius

Yeah no.

The authors recommend seeking a diplomatic solution to the Donbas conflict in which lethal aid could be one point of leverage to do so but only makes sense in a larger diplomatic strategy. — boethius

And, since according to you the US has done exactly what's outlined in the paper, that's what they did, right?

The reason is not thinkable is because we know Western leaders are duplicitous, corrupt, ineffectual, and have no moral foundation — boethius

Any analysis that starts from such premises can only end up with nonsense.

The result would actually be exactly what Russia has been asking for: a new security architecture in Europe that reduces tensions overall in the long term. — boethius

And you wonder why people think you're a paid russian propagandist... Western leaders are all corrupt and eeeevil, but Russia really only wanted the best for everyone.

Why this is completely unacceptable to the people that actually rule us is that the long term effects are more peace, less arms profiteering, less buying up all the Ukrainian land (that's still Ukrainian) on the cheap, and actually rehabilitating Russia as a player in the Western political system. — boethius

More importantly, it's completely unacceptable to the people that vote, because they are actually afraid of a nuclear war with Russia. We can blame the people for their short-sightedness, but ignoring the very obvious balance of popular opinion is silly.

For, in our system, separatism is completely legitimate — boethius

It's not. Separatism is very clearly not recognised by international law.

I use our language to explain the authors meaning. Of course, the authors don't know exactly what escalation will look like, how big it may get; they don't get into that analysis because they view any escalation as bad for US policy. — boethius

You seem to be forgetting that the authors couldn't have been talking about a war in the future.

But thanks for your pointless quibbles that clearly demonstrate you are a a complete idiot. — boethius

From you, I consider this a big praise.

Simply because the US provokes a larger war to extend Russia and Russia know the US is provoking a larger war to extend Russia does not imply that therefore Russia should not do exactly what the US is provoking.

The same RAND analysis that explains what would the US would need to do to provoke an escalation by Russia explains exactly why Russia would do that: it would be a setback for US policy and a win for Russia. — boethius

More utterly insane bullshit. So now it's not Russia that obviously invades against it's own interests, but the US that obviously acts against its own interests by provoking Russia. I guess it fits with your whole "all western leaders are corrupt evil idiots" delusion.

Putin made clear that we either come to a a deal, a new security architecture in Europe, or he'll invade Ukraine — boethius

Putin made completely absurd demands that obviously weren't going to be granted. This was Austria issuing an ultimatum to Serbia.

Yes I have, I quoted RAND saying what would escalate the conflict: further arms to Ukraine and simply unilaterally declaring Ukraine will join NATO even if that won't happen soon due to ally objections, I then stated that's exactly what the US did. — boethius

And I'll call this a bold faced lie unless you can actually point to specific actions.

Second, I literally just explained how I'm the only one who's actually explained how to "protect Ukrainian sovereignty" with Western power and why that would have likely worked, avoided all the death and destruction in Ukraine that has happened since, and that I would have been completely in favour of that. — boethius

Everyone can claim to have been in favour of past actions that cannot now be taken.

But for the record, I don't believe you're intentionally making propaganda for Russia, I think you're just very far gone from reality.

However, because our leaders are exceptionally arrogant and stupid, simply came out and said they made the agreement in bad faith, never intended to abide by it and planned from the start not to, but instead prepare for the exactly the war that would result due to reneging on commitments. — boethius

Yeah, you've apparently hallucinated a lot of stuff that was never said. Yeah western leaders said that they agreed to the Minsk agreements to gain time, which is neither bad faith nor particularly surprising. They said none of the rest.

Where's your proof? — boethius

You can read Wikipedia or any other news source you care about. I won't educate you about things that are part of the public record.

We have proof of Western leaders own words they didn't abide by the agreement and never intended to — boethius

No we don't.

These agreements came into being with Ukraine and the West already violating them by already actively planning and continuing actions that breach them. — boethius

Absolute bullshit.

Now, feel free to provide actual evidence — boethius

How about you start?

It doesn't say that. You quoted it yourself, it said the US could become more vocal and increase lethal aid. How, specifically, has the US done either? — Echarmion

It's just dumb discussing with you at this point.

No one disputes American military support to Ukraine before the war started, and you have both Western leaders and Ukrainian leaders, including Angela Merkel simply coming out and saying the goal of the Minsk accords was to buy time to build up Ukrainian military capacity.

US continuously affirming Ukraine will join NATO from 2008 all the way to today. Blinken literally just gave another "Ukraine will join NATO" speech like yesterday.

You're just gaslighting at this point because you have nothing, including not a sliver of soul worthy of existence.

Ok so you got nothing. I guess you're right about this being a total waste of time.

I'll still be calling out falsehoods when I spot then though.

What falsehoods, you don't bother to read the document and then want to play "what does the document mean" game.

The document is perfectly clear:

While NATO’s requirement for unanimity makes it unlikely that Ukraine could gain membership in the foreseeable future, Washington’s pushing this possibility could boost Ukrainian resolve while leading Russia to redouble its efforts to forestall such a development. — Extending Russia - Rand

This was and is US policy.

Note that it not only clearly describes Russian reaction to US stating Ukraine will join NATO, they also correctly describe that it also boosts Ukrainian resolve, the other key element to escalation.

You seem to be literally trying to memory hole the entire start of the war in which NATO was the main justification. "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" was repeated a zillion times, Zelensky pleading also for NATO no-fly-zone intervention.

As for lethal aid, both Western and Ukrainian leaders have boasted about using Minsk to build up militarily.

And why would the Russians be provoked by the US being vocal about Ukraine joining NATO (which includes such things as rebuffing Russian offers to negotiate a peace architecture with a neutral Ukraine, private leader-to-leader discussions and so on) because even if it's low probability as the authors note, it's not zero possibility (things could change or the US could pullout some diplomatic coup of some sort and the like).

The authors explain the policy is already provocative and being even more vocal is more provocative. US has been super vocal about "Ukraine's right to join NATO", including in the direct lead-up to the war: no negotiations about European security architecture, full rebuff to Russias draft and ultimatum, Ukraine has a right to join NATO, Nord Stream will end if Russia invades Ukraine, was the US diplomatic position that Biden and Blinken made perfectly clear.

And you're just denying these obvious facts that when I have the time I can easily find video of Western leaders and top officials saying all the above on camera.

The document is clear on what will likely provoke a war (or "bigger war" if you prefer), which is what the US does, and the document is clear on the likely outcome of military escalation: loss of territory and lives for Ukraine and a US policy setback. All of which has happened.

You are simply gaslighting and obviously don't bother reading the paper, which is prescient on many points such as the arms sent to Ukraine getting on the blackmarket.

And what's their conclusion on the "lethal aid to Ukraine" chapter?

Again, we fortunately don't have to guess as they have a section conveniently titled "conclusion".

Conclusion
The option of expanding U.S. military aid to Ukraine has to be evaluated principally on whether doing so could help end the conflict in the Donbass on acceptable terms rather than simply on costs it imposes on Moscow. Boosting U.S. aid as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to advance a settlement might well make sense, but calibrating the level of assistance to produce the desired effect while avoiding a damaging counter-escalation would be challenging. — Extending Russia - Rand

The authors are clear: counter escalation by Russia (such as what we see) is damaging to US interests. US interests, in the authors opinion, is served by ending the war in the Donbas, using leverage like arms supply as part of a diplomatic strategy (which the authors even emphasize would be challenging to do even that).

If you want to pretend the authors are somehow only referring to a "small" counter escalation and therefore are not right about the "big" counter escalation, such as interpreting a doctor saying alcohol is bad as somehow not-saying more alcohol is more bad for you, it's simply idiotic gaslighting.

As I explain above, you continue and increase the policies that lead to war because US long term policy interests are not your concern but rather: 1. war profiteering (go ahead and deny that has occurred just so we can all have a good laugh) and 2. being a "tough war president" until the next election, as well as weakening Europe and the Euro and selling LNG and maintaining a little circle of vassals.

In other words, whereas military escalation with Russia through the US proxy that is Ukraine does not serve US national interests in any coherent sense the authors of the RAND paper know of, if you step back from "national interests" and consider US elite interests, the war makes perfect sense.

And it's all documented in honestly surprising detail (such as Merkel just telling us the Minsk agreements were done in bad faith), so you need to practice your memory holing somewhere else because I see no reason to toss pretty clear and vivid memories that have supporting documentation down the memory hole.

Your propaganda is just dumb at this point in the war as Ukraine is clearly losing, the cost to Ukraine clearly enormous, Western policy to prop up this disaster clearly self serving and duplicitous, the weapons drip feed to Ukraine simply to prop them up just enough to experience severe destruction entirely obvious.

Propaganda at least made a bit of sense when the costs to Ukraine was in the future and people could engage in magical thinking that a ragtag group of Nazis could take on the Russian army with sheer grit and tough guy tattoos.

For those interested in actual analysis and understanding, rather than just repeatedly gaslighting that a document doesn't say ... exactly what it plainly says in direct terms.

I honestly recommend reading the whole RAND document cited, it's a fascinating read.

And if you read the whole document, not only is it perfectly clear that escalating the various wars at the time, most notably Ukraine, are bad for US interests ... we know because it literally says so in the introduction:

Most of these measures—whether in Europe or the Middle East— risk provoking Russian reaction that could impose large military costs on U.S. allies and large political costs on the United States itself. Increasing military advice and arms supplies to Ukraine is the most feasible of these options with the largest impact, but any such initiative would have to be calibrated very carefully to avoid a widely expanded conflict. — Extending Russia - Rand

Which again "widely expanded conflict" is another way to say "war" just like "losing territory" in a "higher intensity" conflict is another way of saying war, but correctly describes what we're seeing today: the widely expanded conflict in Ukraine is a large political cost to the United States, along with costing Ukrainian lives and territory as the authors note later.

However, steps that can be taken to provoke a larger war in Ukraine with Russia is not limited to just what happens in Ukraine.

If you bother to read the whole document, you'll also find the authors understand things are connected:

Withdraw from the Treaty and Deploy Missiles in Europe

The United States could formally withdraw from the INF Treaty, develop and deploy ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and deploy those missiles in Western Europe. This would enable the United States to deploy ground-based nuclear missiles in more-secure locations that could still be used to target positions along NATO’s eastern flank that are potential, or at least hypothetical, targets for Russian invasion. More worryingly from the Russian perspective, the United States also could target locations inside Russia, enhancing the U.S. capability for a rapid strike on command and control systems or other strategic assets (although the United States already has air- and sea- launched missiles capable of such missions). This policy option could further enhance U.S. conventional capabilities to target Russian air defense assets that could hinder U.S. and NATO aircraft in the event of a crisis. Moreover, the deployment of missiles could send a strong signal that the United States intended to defend its NATO allies in Europe, including with nuclear weapons.

With regard to the potential benefits for extending Russia, deployment of such missiles in Western Europe would definitely get Moscow’s attention. Russia remains highly concerned about the potential for such decapitation strikes with the INF Treaty in place, given U.S. sea- and air-launched intermediate-range missile capabilities, as well as the potential for Aegis Ashore missile defense sites to be altered to fire GLCMs. Those concerns would spike in the event of the return of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear missiles to Western Europe, particularly if they preceded the deployment of any substan- tial Russian intermediate-range nuclear missile capabilities, and could even be interpreted as a prelude to NATO aggression against Russia. This would almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is difficult to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities rather than offensive or retaliatory ones. It is worth noting that numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and launch platforms specific to their delivery are not constrained by New START, and that Russia likely retains vastly more such operational weapons than does the United States, with the potential to rapidly deploy more. — Extending Russia - Rand

Which there's a lot to say about. First that obviously the Russians are naturally and reasonably concerned about the a decapitation strike and the obvious possibility that nominally defensive missile systems are converted to offensive capabilities, indeed literally saying "highly concerned" and "then as the potential for Aegis Ashore missile defense sites to be altered to fire GLCMs" along with the sea based systems. We should note this because at least a dozen pages have been devoted to what is essentially gaslighting that Russia should not be concerned about these systems in the slightest.

But even more notably for the topics at hand, the authors clearly predict that withdrawing from the INF treaty entirely would likely "would almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is difficult to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities rather than offensive or retaliatory ones" which is exactly what Russia does!!

So, if you read this paper and are wondering how to start a big war (rather than the smaller war that was already ongoing) in Ukraine then withdrawing from INF would be one thing on your lists to do in order motivate Russia to "involve substantial resources" in things like defence capabilities ... but also "offensive and retaliatory" actions.

US withdrew from the INF treaty ... when again?

The United States formally withdrew from the treaty on 2 August 2019. — Wikipedia Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

But interestingly US already suspended the treaty in February 2019 and the RAND paper is printed in 2019, so it's almost like this paper was written, someone read it, and the US withdrew from the INF treaty.

Keep in mind also that this is the one measure where the authors use the strongest language to emphasize Russia will definitely for sure respond pretty hard.

Which is exactly what happens.