Don't you think great, powerful, master works of art afford "glimpses of a different facet of reality" by, like intense orgiastic sex or deep prolonged meditation or, in fact, psychotropic trips, loosening – even weakening – the grip of everyday reality on us? — 180 Proof

To my reckoning, what we usually mean by "reality" is simply that "facet of [ALL] reality" in which we can get hurt and die. Remove those pesky factors (injury and death) - not possible as of now - and I'm sure we'll all have a different opinion about what real is.

Nonsense. Definitions of "moral good & bad" are evaluated for how adaptive they are for 'prosocially coexisting'. There's nothing "meta" or circular going on. In other words, a morality language game works adequately for the form-of-life (e.g. social commons) within which it's embedded or it does not work adequately thereby requiring further development (i.e. playing that language game differently, so to speak).

That said, Fool, assuming my objection is without warrant, tell me where I go wrong – e.g. trip over Moore's "indefinability" canard – defining "moral good and bad"

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/518912

which I follow-up on a bit here

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/519090 — 180 Proof

I followed your link and here's the deal - you define morality as "how adaptive they are for prosocially coexisting" but is this, your, definition of morality itself, and I quote, "...adaptive for prosocially coexisting..."? You will need to demonstrate that if your moral theory is to not fall at the first hurdle. Right? However, that amounts to presupposing your definition is correct but that's precisely what you haven't done. In other words, to prove your definition is itself morally good, you will need to justify why your definition is the right one but, demonstrably, your definition will be either too broad or too narrow or if not that too vague. I suspect it's the last one - too vague - for the simple reason that you've attempted maximum generalization and that usually becomes possible with vague definitions.

My second-ever book, I think, was Politics of Esctacy. Don't think it has stood the test of time well, but it's got some scintillating ideas in it.

(Although based on that Wiki page, Leary was tame by comparison — Wayfarer

What bothers me is how entheogen-induced mental states have been lumped in with hallucinations as the other word "hallucinogenic" suggests. This smacks of a materialism bias; perhaps not, I'm unsure but it definitely and greatly diminishes the epistemic worth of such experiences. The consensus in the scientific community and by extension the popular view of these mental states is that they're episodes characterized not as a catching glimpses of a different facet of reality but as instances of losing touch with reality. I prefer the former interpretation but, for the moment, can't think of a good reason why? Being as open-minded as possible in this case feels like the right thing to do.

If you are transferred from a worse prison to a better one, you're still in prison. — Bartricks

Indeed! However, look at it this way. You'll be relieved and that must mean something.

You've lost me. I addressed your non-point, exposed and disposed of it, to wit: X can be good without being "morally good" as per my definition & follow-up here. Agree or not; any objection to it that (or any other) definition proffered by me I'm interested in considering. Semantic nonsense not so much. — 180 Proof

Ok, let's come at the issue from a different angle. I mentioned in one of my posts above that "...thoughts, words, and deeds..." are the kind of things that can be good (moral) or bad (immoral). I'm sure you'll find no cause for disagreement on that score. Now, ask yourself, what's a definition, in this case a definition of good? Is it not, at the end of the day, a thought? If it is, and it is, it not only can but has to be good or bad. That's what I'm trying to get across but, oddly, you seem reluctant to buy into what is essentially a very simple idea. By the way you're well-acquainted with this phenomenon. When thoughts, definitions, go bad, we find ourselves in hot water like slavery, racism, religious fanaticism, etc.

Fair enough. I rather like 'entheogens' but nobody knows what it means. I'm always impressed that Albert Hoffman, who sythesized it, lived until 104. (I've written an instrumental track in his memory called Bicycle Day. I think, regrettably, that Leary was a rascal, though. ) — Wayfarer

Biblical Entheogen Hypothesis (Benny Shanon)

@WayfarerI feel "hallucinogenics" is a loaded term and immediately discredits and devalues a person's experience with, what I prefer to call, psychotropics. We maybe ignoring, at great risk, a deeply significant side to consciousness when we, as we usually do, discount our mental experiences with such substances.

Plus, to open up a new channel for discussion, I'm just not comfortable with mind-altering substances present in plants; most such chemicals seem to be plant-based. Do plants "know" something we don't? They were here long before animal brains evolved. Puzzling...conscious plants.

This world is a prison — Bartricks

Tell that to the person who got transferred here [to this world] from hell. Of course, for people who were deported from heaven, it's exactly what you say it is. This results in much confusion, something you already seem to be aware of. All this assuming god exists.

Well, you're obviously mistaken, my friend. A definition of "moral good & bad" is not either 'morally good or bad' but rather either instrumentally good (useful) or bad (not useful) for "building a moral theory". A good cup of coffee, for instance, is not "morally good" – that's language gone on holiday. — 180 Proof

You're missing the point or, more probably, given your vast knowledge, ignoring it. Suppose X is the definition of good and furthermore, suppose X were morally bad. Would this situation not be akin to committing hara kiri? Reminds me of Useless Machines (Marvin Minsky)

Nonsense. Definitions of "moral good & bad" are evaluated for how adaptive they are for 'prosocially coexisting'. There's nothing "meta" or circular going on. In other words, a morality language game works adequately for the form-of-life (e.g. social commons) within which it's embedded or it does not work adequately thereby requiring further development (i.e. playing that language game differently, so to speak).

That said, Fool, assuming my objection is without warrant, tell me where I go wrong – e.g. trip over Moore's "indefinability" canard – defining "moral good and bad" — 180 Proof

What do you mean "nonsense"? To me, it's obvious that the definitions of good and bad - the foundations of any moral theory - must themselves be judged by the same criteria they employ to sort thoughts, words, and deeds into moral and immoral which is the very purpose of building a moral theory.

I mentioned to Banno that if we go down the utilitarian path as per which good is maximizing happiness (and/or minimizing suffering), the definition itself must do the exact same thing which it stipulates our thoughts, words, deeds must do to wit, maximize happiness. If this wasn't the case and the definition either did nothing or did the exact opposite i.e. decreased happiness or increased suffering, it would be a morally bad definition and, more importantly, it would render utilitarianism pointless.

Coming to the issue of the definability of good, let's see whether that can be done or not. Let's stick to utilitarianism according to which good is maximizing happiness. Clearly, this definition of good has been formulated based on some reason(s) i.e. it ain't arbitrary. In my book that means the "definition" of good as maximizing happiness is actually in need of a proposition which requires and is supplied with justifications.

What would such justifications for the definition proposition, "good HAS TO BE DEFINED AS maximizing happiness" look like? A utilitarian would probably begin by pointing out the many instances of happy consequences that people, for some reason, refer to or label as good. As you can see, there are two things to consider here viz.

1. Good HAS TO BE DEFINED AS maximizing happiness
2. Good is maximizing happiness

1 is what we might call a proposition and 2 is a definition. To get to 2, the definition of good, we need to justify 1, the proposition regarding how good has to be defined.

Returning to the problem at hand which is whether the definition of good js itself good or not [it has to be good]?, one obvious route to an answer is by testing the definition against itself - does it satisfy the condition of maximizing happiness it itself stipulates? It seems I've already mentioned that at the outset but is it acceptable?

It may seem that the obvious choice mentioned above is a reasonable one but, like it or not, luckily or unluckily, it bears the hallmark of a petitio principii, a big no-no which someone as knowledgeable as you should be more than familiar with. Why? The first step is to justify the proposition, 1. good HAS TO BE DEFINED AS maximizing happiness and unless that's accomplished, we can't do anything with the definition 2. good is maximizing happiness. Ergo, testing the definition against itself amounts to skipping a step - it begs the question, SHOULD good be defined as maximizing happiness? That, my friend, take us back to square one - what is GOOD?.

A similar argument may hold for other moral theories.

Pretty much. yes, it is an extraordinary insight, undermining much of what passes for moral theorising hereabouts.

Try using it next time someone tells us what it good and what is right. Or on 180. — Banno

I'm having second thoughts about what I said earlier. Allow me to explain.

Suppose I define good as maximizing happiness. as utilitarians do. Call this definition of good, U. Is U itself good? Does U maximize happiness just as it demands thoughts, words, and deeds do exactly that? Either it does or it doesn't. If it does, well and good, case closed and there's nothing to discuss - the definition itself is good. If it doesn't, then what we have on our hands is a paradox - an immoral/bad definition that determines what moral/good is. That would be like asking a man what it's like to be a woman? The man wouldn't have the slightest clue.

So, ok, U has to be good. One way for that to happen is if U itself does what it demands viz. maximizing happiness. Does U maximize happiness? Does it fulfill the criterion of goodness that it sets? How would we answer this question. We would have to check the hedonic effects of a moral theory based on the definition, good is maximizing happiness i.e. the impact utilitarianism has had in societies that adopt it as their moral theory. I have no idea how we might get down to doing that. Any ideas?

So the choices are, 1. Keep all our freedoms but prepare for another pandemic and all the problems that accompany it OR 2. Give up some of our freedoms and never have to experience global disasters like COVID-19. A tough choice for people by all accounts. Perhaps, we need to channel more money and other appropriate resources into health and medicine so that we could have the best of both worlds - freedom in world immune to catastrophes of this and other types.

Plus, I feel our fears of totalitarianism is unfounded especially since whatever emergency measures that were enforced for COVID-19 seem just to prevent the spread of the disease and once we either manage to rein it in or find a cure, things will normalize and we can go back to the life we had before 2019. In other words, we need to ensure the powers that be are fully aware that emergency powers are temporary and last only as long as a national crisis does.

systems — Thinking

As much as systems enable, free, and empower us, they disable, enslave, and weaken us. Remember the fable of the stag with magnificent antlers - they won over the does but also led to its death.

Is this thread still active?
I want to bounce this off you. It's my suspicion that either "good" doesn't mean anything i.e. it's meaningless or "good" is just another word for, taking a utilitarian standpoint, happiness. The difference then between good and happiness is the same as that between couches and sofas to wit, none at all. Is this, in your opinion, a case of "bewitchment by language"? After all, an entire branch of philosophy - ethics - has been established on the words "good" and "bad" and if these are nothing more than synonyms for happiness and sorrow respectively, ethics is akin to launching a ship on a mirage. I maybe wrong about this and would like some help in clearing up my confusion.

This criticism is an example of Moore's open question argument, which is generally taken to show that for any proposed definition of moral good and moral bad, it is possible to ask if that definition is itself good or bad. — Banno

Amazing insight! :up: :clap: Indeed, the definition of good and bad itself can be said to be good or bad (in a moral sense). That means the definition can't be just anything that fancies us, au contraire the definition needs to be justified morally i.e. the definition is actually a proposition. For instance, if I say good is maximizing happiness, I need to provide reasons for saying/thinking that and not just reasons, moral reasons. Since I can't use the "definition" on itself - that would be a circulus in probando [remember we need to justify the "definitions"], I'll need a completely independent and unrelated fully operational death star :joke: moral theory in order to justify a "definition" of good and bad but, the catch is, that's impossible for I'd need definitions of good and bad for that theory too...an infinite regress is what we have on our hands.

This gums up the works for moral theorists.

Admittedly, the term bears the negative connotation you've discussed - and it wasn't at the forefront of my mind, whilst creating this thread. Nonetheless, here's what I was suggesting:

By rationalizing their life, I'm implying that an individual seek and locate an underlying rationale, or a set of rationales that can engender, justify and/or demonstrate the proposition that their life is meaningful - therefore according them reason to continually exist, or an affirmation to their own being. For example, if one were a hedonist - they might instantly invoke that premise, to strive towards a life of mitigating sentient suffering, or maximizing the converse.

What I'm positing, is that if this process were undertaken in a manner that wasn't perfunctory - with sustained chains of reasoning - it'd almost certainly be arduous (since one might discover about themselves, or their being truths they'd rather not), and without an unequivocal end. — Aryamoy Mitra

Oh! It first looked like you were taking us down the path of the Socratic examined life but what you actually want to say is that the quest to discover the meaning of life is either going to end sad - no such luck - or going to end bad - you won't like what you find. I share your sentiment, all gloom and doom as it is but I wouldn't go so far as to say that such misery as this applies to each and every person without the possibility of a few pleasant surprises in the form of exceptions to this rather depressing rule. If I've learnt anything from my life it's this - be a cynic and it'll do you good but, every now and then, definitely even if rarely, you'll meet people - probably dumb or a wolf in sheep's clothing, doesn't matter - who'll make you wanna rethink your attitude. I digress but my point is to stick to your guns regarding your views on the meaning of life - the prognosis doesn't look good - but do expect some outliers, there usually are a few.

They're abstractions from what, in reality, is a unity, which has mental and physical attributes — Wayfarer

That's what I meant.

@Wayfarer I've already touched upon the gist of this post in recent posts addressed to you in other threads but you might've missed them so I reiterate my thoughts here again for your consideration.

When we speak of real, the gold standard seems to be real in a physical sense - touchable, visible, audible, tasteable, in short detectable by some physical method i.e. real is defined in terms of the physical. My last conversation with you in this thread ended on that note. If it's all the same to you, I wish to explore this a bit more.

To my reckoning, there are two distinct worlds we humans and probably some non-human animals experience and they are: 1. the physical world and 2. the mental world. The former is the world we can bodily bump into like chairs, tables, rocks, etc. and the latter is populated by what are basically abstractions.

It's evidently clear that what all of us are aiming for is an agreement between the physical and the mental - when the two are in sync, we feel good and when they're not, it's disconcerting. My theory is that the reason why we seek a convergence between the two worlds is that it's absolutely necessary for our well-being and survival. If we have the wrong mental impression of the physical, it has unpleasant, even fatal, consequences. Just ask the person who mistook a venomous snake for a coil of rope.


Since, as can be inferred from the previous paragraph, making a mistake in matters physical can lead to injury and death, the physical becomes our top priority and, on any given day, we'd rather side with the physical than the mental. In other words, given an inconsistency concerning the physical and mental world, e.g. that unicorns and demons aren't physical, we're, in the case of the former, disappointed and, in the case of the latter, relieved. These responses reveal the privileged status the physical world enjoys over the mental world. Our conception of real as physical is reflected in this.

Yet, if we ask for a reason as to why the physical should be treated in such a special manner, a reason other than concern for our own welfare as physical bodies, we find none. Too, if well-being is a priority and if that's the reason, it seems to be so, why our idea of the real is grounded in the physical, then what do you make of this short clip,




of people who die inside which, the way I see it, is mental death. We do, on many occasions, go through mental death and such experiences are, by all standards, equivalent to physical injury and death - the pain and suffering of dying inside is at par with the pain and suffering of physical injury and death.

In conclusion, the mental world, since it too has its own version of injury and death just like the physical world, shouldn't be treated as less real than the physical world. It must be mentioned though that most cases of dying inside happen when our mental impressions are shot to pieces by physical facts i.e. when our mental world fails to line up with our physical world. Despite this it can't be denied that there's something nonphysical about mental injury and death (dying inside); after all, why does our body not respond in the way it does to physical assaults.

To wind up, the mental world has all the features of the physical world even though they differ qualitatively. If so, we're not justified in treating them differently and if that's the case, mental objects in the mental world are as real as physical objects in the physical world.

Sorry for the long post, What say you?

I want to run something by you if you don't mind. It's got to do with an obvious fact viz. that there are two worlds - the physical and the mental - that define and constitute the human experience. It goes without saying that people are, in a sense, "biased" in favor of the physical world. What I mean is if ever there's an inconsistency between these two worlds, the usual course of action is to reject and dismiss the mental world instead of the physical world. For instance, consider unicorns - that they don't instantiate physically devalues them. Mental objects that don't manifest physically are dismissed and belittled as imaginary which, you're aware, has negative connotations. The ultimate goal seems to be to align the mental world with the physical. In other words, the physical world is given priority over the mental world. The reason for this is quite clear - if we fail to do that, we could plunge into a world of suffering and even end up snug in bodybags, something we definitely wish to avoid. To illustrate, if in our mental world, poisonous snakes are considered harmless, the physical world will revolt against this with fatal consequences.

However, apart from concerns for our own safety and welfare, there really is no other reason why the physical should, in all cases, trump the mental, why physical objects should be privileged as real and affectionately embraced and purely mental objects e.g. unicorns, fairies, leprechuans, god, etc. should be looked down upon as unreal, imaginary, and rejected outright.

What I'm getting at is the special status granted to the physical world and the way we treat the mental world with much contempt. There really is no good reason - apart from saving one's own skin - for doing that. One other factor that's apposite is that we spend most of our life in the physical world rather than in the mental world and thus, reason would advise us to give more attention to the former than the latter. Were it that the situation were reversed - we spending more time in the mental world than in the physical - I'm sure our views on what is real and what is not, with emphasis on god, would be radically different, in fact it would be exactly the opposite and god - a mental object - would be as real as a stone is in the physical world.

Me:
"beliefs can only be considered reliable when they are backed, (somehow), by observation."

I don't think this is backed by any observation. Therefore it contradicts itself. — John Chlebek

It is supported by observation. That's why the atheist is making this claim. To avoid more confusion, by "observation", the atheist is actually referring to, as @Banno said, justification. In the end though it doesn't matter because God statements are empirical statements and thus observation is key.

That said, we live in two worlds: 1. the physical world of tables, chairs, rocks, and rivers and 2. the mental world of ideas. The trend has been, beginning from when our ancestors had their first thoughts, to bring these two worlds into alignment. The obvious reason for that being the high risk of injury and even fatalities if they don't - imagine if in the mental world, you believed that lions were cute and cuddly cats; you would end up as lunch, dead.

However, that doesn't, in any way, diminish or eliminate neither the distinction between these two worlds nor the legitimacy of each. What I'm getting at is, god's an idea, a mental object and is as real as other ideas like numbers, the laws of nature, and so on. That god doesn't seem to be part of the physical world should bother us as much as an object in the physical world that we have never encountered and therefore isn't part of the mental world e.g. a novel object in some distant galaxy. Not at all!

Reason =

1. Cause - I yawn because I am tired.
2. Motive - I go to bed to get some rest.
3.Justification - if I rest I will be less tired and more able to explain things.
4. Function - rest allows the body to repair itself.

You equivocate the various meanings and confusion results. This thread is about "arguments". It's the first word of the title. So it is not about causes, or motives or functions, it is about justification.

The cause of having children is usually fucking.
The motive is usually that people like fucking and like children.
The function of children is to continue the species.
The justification for having children is that life is a good.

The justification in this case does not amount to an argument, it is a mere dogma. but it's as near as I wish to get. Someone will press me, and I will admit that suffering is good, because suffering is part of life. And then if someone pursues the matter I will have to stray from the topic and discuss the relation of pain to suffering. My children will suffer, and they will die. We all do. I see it and say 'yes'. — unenlightened

I'm not equivocating. To the extent that I'm aware I haven't made an argument in which I switch the meaning of "reason" from purpose/function to something else in my premises.

Function/purpose is a good basis for justifying existence. For instance, the existence of colorful flowers is justified by its function/purpose which you already know is insect pollination. A similar function/purpose-based argument can be made for having children. A counterargument, however, maybe grounded in suffering - an inevitability of life.

As for the motive for having children, it'll depend on the analysis of the various arguments made by natalists and antinatalists and seeing which side makes the best case for itself.

Coming to cause of children, only a fool would argue against f**king being the culprit and, if you really think about it, sex, since it's one of the most pleasurable activities people can engage in, seems highly apposite to the matter of why we should procreate. It's just too much fun.

The "default stance" comes from humans being probability / change-blind and intentionality-biased. We fill in the gaps with intentional/causal stories by default. Btw, what's the PSR for the PSR? What's the cause for every cause? Why everything has to have a why? — 180 Proof

I already gave you my views on that. It's obvious that the natural world is filled with objects and phenomena that have reasons with respect to their existence and states. To illustrate what I mean, take the seeds in a sunflower - they're arranged in spirals that follow the golden ratio (1.1618...) because that way the flower can maximize the number of seeds per flower. This is just one example of countless many occasions when nature behaves in a certain way for a reason. It's not gonna take long for people to go from that to the PoSR.

I don't quite get what you mean by rationalizing. To my knowledge, that term carries a negative connotation viz. the tendency to attribute one's actions to reasons that are better, therefore more easily accepted by our egos, than the real, usually embarrassing, reasons for them.

This kind of rationalizing takes place, as I'm led to believe, at the subconscious level, under our radar and therefore goes unnoticed. It makes one feel good so I don't get how rationalizing can be "arduous and painful".

Philosophers demand a sufficient reason to smile or dance — unenlightened

This statement reflects a disregard for an obvious fact. While the matter of whether the universe and life have any purpose or whether there's a reason for them isn't cut-and-dried, one has to be raving mad to believe that the various organ systems of living organisms and also our behavior, including smiles and dance, have no purpose i.e. there are no reasons why they are what they are.

I don't know how or why it is but our brains seem built for discerning purpose; in other words, our brains seem to be made for detecting and grasping reasons why this or that. Perhaps one reason for this our brain's ability is it comes in handy when survival is a big issue. When we figure out the reasons why something looks, behaves, etc. the way it looks, behaves, etc. it marks a turning point in our relationship with reality - we can bend nature to our will and the power to do that is the stuff that evolutionary success is made of, right?

Come to think of it, even inanimate matter finds a cozy niche in the world of reasons. I'm backtracking as you can see but it's the right thing to do given what's observable in the world around us. Take a look at pebbles and stone you can freely pick up from a river bed. Aren't they roundish and smooth while those found deep inland are rough and jagged? WHY? You get the idea.

If there's a point to all this it's that reasons are an intrinsic part of the natural world and all we've done is made that a cornerstone of our weltanschauung. The payoff is a heretofore unseen and obscence level of control over our environment. This, I suspect, is why we've made the principle of sufficient reason what it was and is - the bedrock of our understanding of the world.

Like coincidences. — 180 Proof

Yes, indeed. Coincidences are events that can't be causally connected. That's to say, the first order of business is to look for a causal relationship and then if none can be found, we might say, "oh! it's just a coincidence."

Notice what happened here. We had to assume causation and only when that turned out to be untrue did we conclude coincidence. The same applies to the PoSR. We must always assume the PoSR and then, if our search for a reason is unsuccesful i.e. no reason can be found, we can justifiably assert that we've found something that lacks a reason.

Btw, what's the PSR for the PSR? — 180 Proof

Please read my reply to unenlightened.

Someone as learned as you would know that our brains are pattern-detecting meat machines. You see a tree with all its branches bent to the west and you ask why? The reason you deduce is a constant easterly wind. You hear your pet dog barking loudly. Why? You quickly realize you have a visitor. You see someone laughing in the other room. Why? Oh! quite possibly the person was told a joke. The motif that unites these disparate experiences is reason and thus the PoSR.

"The principle of sufficient reason states that everything must have a reason or a cause."

Fucking is the cause of children. Job done. — unenlightened

Yes but the question the OP's asking isn't about causes. The OP wants to know if there's a reason why we should have children i.e. in what way does being born benefit anyone including the child faerself? What do children get out of life and what do we get out of children that we must make them?

What about it? Without begging the question (or infinite regress), there cannot be a "sufficient reason" for the PoSR (plus quantum uncertainty e.g. virtual particles, radioactive emissions, etc); so why bother with anthropocentrizing against the mediocrity principle in space, time & causality? — 180 Proof

I'm a believer in the mediocrity principle of course but just because there's nothing special about something doesn't mean it doesn't have a reason, right?

The PoSR (principle of sufficient reason) is a default stance - it must be assumed in all cases in which it matters. Think of it, suppose there's something, an X, that's uncaused, inexplicable, or unjustified. The only way we can come to that conclusion [uncaused, inexplicable, unjustified] is by first looking for causes, explanations, or justification; only if the search results = 0 can we say X is uncaused, inexplicable, unjustified. It's very much like the legal principle of innocent until proven guilty - we begin every time by affirming the PoSR until it's contradicted.

I prefer my take on Rosset's principle of sufficient reality (PSR) instead – to wit: the real consists only in contingent facts (i.e. conditional relations) which both constitute and encompass reasoning (i.e. algorithmic compression (i.e. totality), prediction & control) and which, in turn, reason (i.e. explicability) can neither encompass (i.e. exhaust à la Eudoxus) nor transcend (i.e. be unconditional); or (in sum) necessarily there cannot be non-immanent – separated, bounded, total-complete – ontologies (e.g. "real beyond/behind the real", "deeper/ultimate real", "realer real", "reals/forms projecting appearances/shadows", etc).

And so, therefore, no "unconditional" PoSR either. — 180 Proof

:up: :clap: but, just so you know, I ain't looking for "deeper/ultimate real" although I must confess such a notion did appeal to me as it does to so many others I believe.

Okay, fight me, Fool! :razz: — 180 Proof

Trying to. :lol:

I think so. One could raise his children in such a way as to deal with those pains, and at the same time combat the proliferation of such values. — NOS4A2

I suppose you're right. Most of those who make up the human tribe will manage to live relatively happy lives but an unlucky few will have to face the ugly side of nature and suffer for it, miserably so. The one's who manage to avoid extreme misery and expect a similar existence for their children shouldn't be held at ransom just because a handful of us got a raw deal.

quality of life — Yun Jae Jung

This approach to good & bad, morality in general, is promising for it seems to focus, rightly so, on the basics - the desired quality of life would include things like good health (physical and mental), a balanced diet, decent education, satisfactory finances, time and money for wholesome recreation, to name a few. I can see how Maslow's hierarchy of needs is part of your picture of morality. After all, if people's needs are satisfied, they can find time to pursue other activities such as the arts, music, philosophy, science, and so on which will go towards making them models of human flourishing.

I don't know where I heard this but it's said that there are two important facts that each and every one of has to realize viz. there are things we can't control (ramdomness) like other people's behavior and there are things we can control which is our behavior. Rationality is about how we can plot our course through all the randomness by calibrating our own behavior to produce desired results.

To make a family is the main reason I opted for children. The benefits include support, relationship, security, and a chance to shape a human life. — NOS4A2

Is all that worth the pain the child will have to go through in life? The way things are going - prevailing values which put money and power first - the present is a basket case and the future looks even bleaker and that's being optimistic.

There is no reason to require a reason for everything — unenlightened

I like what you said but what about the Principle Of Sufficient Reason?

I saw in a UK poll yesterday that even a year after the start of the Covid-19 pandemic about 50% of respondants could not name the disease's major symptoms. I find this level of ignorance staggering. I can only assume these people no longer access news media of any substance. Has the decline of newspapers and broadcast TV news, plus the rise of social media and the ability to choose among an ever wider selection of streaming or online 'news' providers resulted in people being more ignorant than say 10 or 20 years ago? — Tim3003

This would be the wrong way to assess knowledge levels of people. It's too narrow a window to get a clear view of how aware people are of facts. The way I see it, basing your conclusion on UK poll is like judging people's facts stockpile by asking them a question on Schrodinger's equation. Quantum physics is a highly specialized field and so is medicine and we can't expect laypeople to possess information on them. Plus, you're aware of course that this is the information age which to me translates as information explosion. There's just too much to grasp and real estate in our brain's memory centers seems not to have undergone any changes to accommodate that, meaning we have to be very selective as regards what we want to retain and perhaps COVID-19 symptoms simply fail to make it to the list of our priorities, explaining the dismal results of the UK poll.

What possible reason could there be for creating another person? — Andrew4Handel

We're nature's, life's, only hope of extricating itself from being at the mercy of chance. With our brains, excuse the hyperbole if one feels there's one, we can, given enough time and a decent amount of luck (??!!), get to the bottom of how evolution works and perhaps learn to control and give it a direction that would make it more efficient, more resilient, and more likely to survive catastrophic events. Ergo, in my humble opinion, if only to keep the torch of human progress in relevant fields burning, we should have children. Oddly, these very brains that seem to hold the key to success for life as a whole are also the source of life's biggest problems. Life, nature, is playing a game or risk...as usual. Keep the ball rolling, cross your fingers, wait and watch.

To reiterate myself, Carl Jung seems to have been unable to tell whether his feelings about god pointed to something real and objective outside instead of being merely imaginary and subjective inside. This state of doubt and uncertainty is of great significance and Jung may not have been the first in this regard but nevertheless the quote you referenced indicates that he qualifies as someone deeply concerned about it and if not that, at the very least, had experienced it. Why is this of "...great significance..."? It highlights something important about our attitude viz. that a thing is worthwhile if and only if it's real and objective and that a thing that's only imaginary and subjective is worthless. This issue lies at the core of Jung's predicament. Whatever the truth maybe about whether or not such a system of valuation is well-justified or not, it can't be denied that such a scheme totally ignores an important aspect of the human mind viz. the worlds that it can construct that may be vastly different and even, mostly, inconsistent with what we've been told is the "real" world. My take on this is simple: the matter of consistency as regards imagined vs "real" worlds is definitely something we have to take seriously but the only reason why the so-called "real" world is given a preference over, takes precedence over, the imagined world is that we spend most of our lives in it. Had it been the other way round and we lived out most or all of our lives in the worlds of fantasy that each and everyone of us is capable of creating, we would, in an instant, redefine what is real and what is not. Thereby hangs a tale, I believe.

I actually agree that 'both sides' have some vision of the way things are, with one side believing there's a god and the other side disagreeing. That's a massive oversimplification, since God-talk is highly complex and some positions are hard to classify (was Hegel a theist? and wtf is negative theology?).

The problem for me with this insight is (not to be rude) its triviality. It's like saying scholastic nominalism and realism are the same thing because they are opposed to one another.Any philosophical worldview tries to be factual, tell the truth. So what gets left out of this bin? Even your idea of this bin seems to belongs there. — T H E

I agree that the matter is far more complex than I've made it out to be. Nevertheless, I noticed something viz. the identical nature of the two with respect to truth - both sides claim it - and thought it would be nice to bring it to people's attention.

I'm not making an argument. Just reporting on what caught my eye.

Still no paradox. Atheism claims 'theism is false' is true and theism claims 'g/G exists' is true. If the latter (1st order claim – independent variable) is false, then the former (2nd order claim – dependent variable) is true; if theism is true, then atheism is false. (The inverse, of course, is nonsense.) Show me what I'm missing, Fool. — 180 Proof

You're absolutely right of course. I only meant to draw your attention to the fact that both atheism and theism claim to know what the truth is but, the catch is, their claims contradict each other. Since atheism and theism are mutually contradictory, both can't be true i.e. one of them has to be false but both claim to be the true. Both claim truth but that's impossible. Hence, the paradox.

Like being blonde and being bald? Do explain. — 180 Proof

Do both sides, even as belligerently opposed as they are, not claim to be right, to know the truth? They're indistinguishable in that sense. The two, atheism and theism, may differ in particulars, in fact they're contradictory, but the overall image each projects - each insisting that it's in possession of fact about reality - is identical...at least in spirit.

biggest paradox — Jack Cummins

We seek truth but hope gets in the way [theism]. We hope but truth gets in the way [atheism].

Kinda funny. Kinda stupid. Therefore perfection. — Hanover

:rofl: :rofl: Going into my quotes collection. :up:

I guess that boils down to Carl Jung being, like some of us, unsure whether god is real or a figment of his/our imagination. This inability to distinguish reality from make-belief is open to a dual interpretation. A theist-turned-atheist would consider it as faer first steps towards freedom, liberation from a falsehood that has huge swathes of people in its grips. On the other hand, an atheist-turned-theist will regard it (also) as faer first steps towards freedom, liberation from a falsehood that has huge swathes of people in its grips. You get the idea. — TheMadFool

They're the same thing, god (theism) and no god (atheism). " :chin:

some definitions of Moral Good and Moral Bad — Yun Jae Jung

Truth be told, you're asking the wrong person. My suggestion is that you read up on morality from a good source like :point: The Definition Of Morality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The definition you formulate can be your own, your quality of life meaning is promising as it, if I catch your drift, attempts to incorporate aspects of morality that go beyond the rather obvious hedonic dimension of what good and bad are. However, quality of life needs to be fleshed out, details need to be made explicit and so on.

maximizing the quality of life — Yun Jae Jung

Very utilitarian in flavor. Even the moral conundrums in your moral theory resemble those of utilitarianism. I suggest you don't waste time reinventing the wheel of utilitarianism and the problems that tag along with it.