• is the following argument valid (but maybe not sound)?
    got ya, yep!

    glad to know the way Allison presented is VALID (but unsound, at least for him...because of the vagueness I am still trying to work out if it sound or not...).

    yes, I agree....certainly is vague, but also the natural language, for me, appears a bit "clumsy"...
    he seems to be writing in a shortened form, too....
    for example, that first premise...in light of what you said, he should have stated "if anything that is known it is an appearance (because of x, y, z, etc).... then continue with the rest!

    Thanks again!!.
  • is the following argument valid (but maybe not sound)?
    I think Allison might be rendering the argument like that so that it's basically a non-sequiter — Moliere

    Great answer thanks!
    So if we look at the following;

    If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
    The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately ("action is known non-mediately")
    Thus, action cannot be an appearance.

    If p, then q
    Not q
    Therefore, not p

    you said that is a non-sequitur...did you mean appears like a non-sequitur?
    my logic is rusty, but a non-sequitur would be, i think, a fallacy of form, and thus invalid.
    But I can't see it as being invalid (as a modus tollens it would necessarily be valid)...

    so maybe Allison got mixed with validity and soundness?!

    Thanks again!
  • Thing-in-itself, Referent, Kant...Schopenhauer
    The so called "referent" would be the simple act of will - energy in today's term - — Manuel

    the concept of "energy" is an empirical one, a concept derived from the empirical world. this is consistent with Schop's concept empiricism (all concepts must trace back to representation), yet
    contradicts his notion of will as thing-in-itself. will as thing-in-itself is beyond all representation.
  • Thing-in-itself, Referent, Kant...Schopenhauer
    thanks for the reply! I know what you mean, but it seems Schopenhauer is a bit ambivalent about whether it is an "approximation"...i know the volume 2 statements he makes, but in other texts he seems to say, "yes will is thing-in-itself" (not as an approx)....
    the act of will.... when we are not in an act of will (of, say, moving to a ice cream stand to by an ice cream), we would still be willing, right? I have never cleared up the distinction between "just" willing and the ACT of willing....
  • Argument for establishing the inner nature of appearances/representations
    ↪Jamal

    Nice, thanks!
    Here, but, the above is not really an argument for will as being Kant's thing-in-itself....it seems only to establish will as the "inner side" of representations (he doesn't even mention thing-in-itself" in the above)... So he still needs to get from "will as inner side of representation" to thing-in-itself. How does he do that??
    he later relates will and thing-in-itself? I would assume it would be soon thereafter (one would think).
  • Argument for establishing the inner nature of appearances/representations
    Thanks!
    more context: (although i am still trying to work out the "PSR part" too...)

    "Suppose then, I (or anyone) am experiencing a field of representations. Within this field, I notice that a section of it, namely, my body, has a subjective aspect that is congruent with the very mind (that is, my mind) that contains the entire field of representations in which that body is located. Since my body is a representation, it is in my mind, but my mind also permeates and enlivens that very body from the inside. It does not, however, permeate and enliven the remaining representations in my perceptual field. Within this knotted context, Schopenhauer is struck by how incomprehensible it would be if the remaining representations in my perceptual field – the chair, table, knives, forks, etc. – were not also backed by a mentality similar to what I apprehend directly as underlying the representation of my body. Here is the same argument, formulated from a slightly different angle. From the subjective standpoint, every representation in my experience is “my” representation and is a mental entity. The representations are identical in this respect. From the objective standpoint, the representation of my body has a subjective backing, but since the other representations in my perceptual field do not display one, it is difficult to know whether they have one or not. The subjective backing to my body is my consciousness, and if – and this is the crucial point – there is to be a perfect parallel and consistency between the subjective and objective standpoints in general, as the root of the PSR would dictate, then the remaining representations in my perceptual field must have a subjective backing as well."
  • Can anyone help with this argument reconstruction?
    something like:
    No experience of appearance results in knowledge of noumenon
    All awareness of will is knowledge of noumenon
    thus,
    No awareness of will is experience of appearance.
  • Can anyone help with this argument reconstruction?
    A, B, C ---> P, M, S — bongo fury

    that's great! did you use an app??
  • Another logic question!
    did he offer any other reason why it has to be stated in modal terms? — jancanc

    not that I saw, but will look again!
  • Another logic question!
    There. The 'we can know' in the second statement refers back to 'it is known' in the first statement; to balance the knowing, not to modify the acting: the conclusion is valid through knowing. — Vera Mont

    understood.
    But, on second thoughts, the original argument... it is not a modus tollens. If it truly was, we would not need to modify the second premise (as fas as I knew, arguments having the form of modus tollens are all valid),

    can maybe express it this way:

    if any x is appearance, it is not knowable unconditionally;
    y is knowable unconditionally;
    therefore, y is not appearance.

    thus
    If P, then -Q
    Y is Q
    Y is -P

    denying the antecedent fallacy?
  • form and name of this argument?
    Almost certain the quote is in "The Nature of Historical Explanation (1952)"....skimming through now to find!
  • form and name of this argument?
    I'm also curious about the context now. Do you have a citation KantDane21 ? — Moliere

    it is by a English Philosopher called Patrick Gardiner, will try to find exact place where he said...
  • form and name of this argument?
    1. (A → ~B) v (A & B)
    2. (A → ~B) v ~(~A v ~B)
    3. (A → ~B) v ~(A → ~B)
    True     — Srap Tasmaner

    Many thanks all the replies! very helpful!

    one thing, in this argument (as such) we are dealing with an exclusive disjunction right??
    Thanks again!
  • Schopenhauer's Will as blind?
    "If the Will is blind it cannot know itself either directly or through the phenomenon, while, if it is the phenomenon, it must recognize itself as the phenomenon, setting itself in distinction, under its phenomenal aspect, from the noumenon and so turning the latter into object, idea, into phenomenon." — KantDane21
  • Schopenhauer's Will as blind?
    per Bernardo Kastrup's words, that Schopenhauer's Will is without metacognition; it is instinctive and striving. — Tom Storm

    but would you say it is a criticism per se? it seems very odd the wording...
  • What is "metaphysical contingency"?
    ↪Jackson
    cheers, this one here: David Baddon-Mitchell, David. 2004. « How do we know it is now now? » Analysis 64 (283): 199–203....
    it is one of the key concepts he frequently refers to... thanks!
  • Logical difference between (1.) being something and (2.) being linked to something.
    ↪Cuthbert


    If they mean the same (and I considered that), I think he is being pretty sloppy with terminology.

    I would say it is a non-sequitur (if (2) entails (1)).

    I am still trying to track the exact quote, but he stated elsewhere:

    one's will is is an object for a subject, but the “in-itself” of will—the thing-in-itself—differs from one’s “experience of it as an object".

    So the thing-in-itself is an object. we experience it as such.
    And the thing-in-itself has an inner essence that we do not experience.

    Doesn't really make a great deal of sense to me, although I think he is referencing a Platonic view, e.g.,...all beautiful things participate in the Form of beauty. But even then, Plato distinguishes the objects and the Forms.
  • Logical difference between (1.) being something and (2.) being linked to something.
    ↪Cuthbert

    Thanks for your comments.
    You mean the fallacy of equivocation?
    I am desperately trying to track down the precise words...
    It was a book by Henry Allison... I am sure he said "the thing-in-itself is appearance", or "the thing-in-itself is basically appearance" ...but he made the claim that they were the one and the same thing.
  • Logic of Subject and Object in Schopenhauer.
    a step removed from the thing-in-itself, — Manuel

    this is the problem, and the passage you cited. If thing-in-itself is totally demarcated from human experience (in the way Kant says-- and Schopenhauer repeatedly stated will is Kant's thing-in-itself, how can we get nearer to the thing-in-itself? is it not an all-or-nothing type existent?
  • Logic of Subject and Object in Schopenhauer.
    willing subject and not the individual itself? — Harry Hindu

    by "individual itself" do you mean the object of perception? How would you distinguish that from the willing subject?
  • The 'hard problem of consciousness'.
    ↪Brock Harding
    But these are still not fundamentally speculative right? No clear causal relation has been identified?
  • Big Pharma and their reputation?
    pharmaceutical companies as a kind of leach that creates expensive treatments that just about never go down in price, but very rarely cures. — TiredThinker

    I think that is fair to the majority of BigPharma, however not to the researchers behind their medicines.Big Pharma CEOs, and all general business majors and have little knowledge of science/pharmacology.
  • What do we call a premise which omits certain information?
    ↪jancanc
    Atwell is saying that Schopenhauer claims that our actions are known to us unconditionally from the inside, as will, that is, in a non-representational way since they are not subject to the PSR.
    (we also know our actions externally, we observe our body and our acts as intuitive representations, as appearance).... but since we have this "inside" unconditional knowledge of our actions, and all appearances are conditioned on the PSR, then actions and appearances (not known in equivalent) are distinct     — jancanc

    well stated. However, how could that then lead to Schopenhauer's thing-in-itself? He obviously uses this term--Ding an sich-- in a Kantian sense. Atwell's account? Schopenhauer's account?
  • What do we call a premise which omits certain information?
    ↪jancanc
    simply invalid premise, I would say.
  • The 'hard problem of consciousness'.
    physical systems in the human body — Brock Harding

    can you give me an example of how any perception/feeling/thought could be reduced to a particular physical system?
  • Subject and object
    ↪Banno
    Inseparable concepts.
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