Yes, and "true" and "false" are adjectives that we use to describe a sentence. I think Wittgenstein's account of language is more reasonable than any account that suggests that our utterances are somehow associated with mind-independent abstract objects and properties (related somewhat to this, this, and this).
I think that language is behavioral and psychological, not something more as platonism would seem to require. — Michael
How can that be if we each were creating our own? — Banno
...to create the real.
— frank
I'd be happier if you said "...to construct the real". — Banno
We should also keep in mind expressions such as 'I'll eat my hat" and "eating humble pie". — Banno
The entire argument equivocates, — Michael
1. wV is a fictional world.
2. everything in wV is fictional.
3. fictional things are ideas
4. fictional vibranium is an idea
5. wV contains fictional vibranium
Conclusion: wV contains an idea. — frank
No. — Michael
(2) is a world without propositions but it's not empty; it's a world with vibranium. — Michael
Do you understand the difference between these two fictions?
1. A world in which magic exists but Santa is a fiction
2. A world in which magic exists and Santa is real
Something can be real within a fiction without being real within the real world. — Michael
A world with planets and stars but no people is not an empty world; it's a world with planets and stars. — Michael
we're talking about a fictional world in which there is actual, real, physical gold but no people. — Michael
It's a fictional world in which planets and stars exist but people and propositions don't, just as the Lord of the Rings universe is a fictional world in which orcs exists but computers don't.
Like Banno you're equivocating. The fact that we use language and propositions to talk about a fictional world does not entail that there are languages and propositions in this fictional world. — Michael
That depends on whether or not there is an (infinite) multiverse. If there is then there is likely some universe in which there is gold but no people playing chess or using language (and so no propositions). If there isn't then World X is just a fiction. — Michael
No, a world can be a set of physical objects situated in spacetime. — Michael
If "there are no propositions" is true at World X then there are no propositions in World X. — Michael
Firstly, "having ontological commitment to mathematical entities" does not entail platonism. Immanent realists and conceptualists also have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. — Michael
You don't need to believe in mind-independent abstract objects to believe in mind-independent physical objects, and you don't need to believe in mind-independent abstract objects to believe that these mind-independent physical objects move and interact with one another. — Michael
There's no mystical connection between utterances and mind-independent, non-spatial, non-temportal abstract objects; there's just actual language-use and the resulting psychological and behavioural responses. — Michael
I think I’m looking into it only as deeply as it needs to be. Platonism is a result of being bewitched by language, misinterpreting the grammar as entailing something it doesn’t. — Michael
An immanent realist about propositions would have to believe that propositions exist only in particular things, and presumably the only particular things within which a proposition can exist is an utterance. — Michael
Hence it seems that with respect to propositions we must be platonists (mind-independent propositions), — Michael
With respect to propositions, I think immanent realism collapses into conceptualism — Michael
I reject platonism. I'm undecided on nominalism and conceptualism, but the things I am saying are consistent with both. — Michael
Note specifically that a proposition being mind-dependent does not entail that its truth value is mind-dependent, which I think is where frank is making his mistake. — Michael
A platonist does, but I don't think that a realist must be a platonist. A realist can be a non-platonist by accepting that only the things we say are true or false but that some of the things we say are unknowably true or false. — Michael
But they sound like daemons escaping from Hell. — Banno
Stop stirring the possum. — Banno
I also don't think that a painting is accurate until someone has painted it. But that's because a painting being accurate (or inaccurate) before it is painted makes no sense. Just as a sentence being true (or false) before it is said makes no sense.
This isn't truth skepticism. — Michael
The anti-realist (at least of Dummett's kind) says that if a sentence is true then it's possible to know that it's true (subject to the appropriate restrictions as per Fitch's paradox), whereas the realist allows for the possibility that some true sentences are unknowably true. — Michael
And as the diagram shows, "there are no minds in World B" is a truth in World A about World B, not a truth in World B. — Michael
To me arguments for staying alive or for meaning only work if you HAVE to live. Filling life with good things, doing what you love, all that junk only has logical weight if one is unable to die until a set time. Baring that I see no reason for living. Desire for pleasures only applies if you are alive, if you die there is no need for any of that. Same with love, friendship, food, money, etc. — Darkneos
If you think that less goods with higher prices makes your life better, then let's follow the trade policies of the 1930's — ssu