There is a concentrated effort against trade unions and the labor movement, and this will surely continue during the Trump years. Just look at the billionaires that are the backers of Trump. — ssu
Heaven forbid that you would say something. :wink: — Leontiskos
I was simply explaining the ordinary grammar of the word "true". — Michael
Here's a post of mine from six days ago:
And the existence of gold does not depend on us saying "gold exists".
— Michael — Michael
If you're asking if planets exist that haven't been described, then yes. — Michael
You are asking this question:
Do you have to have those descriptions in hand in order for there to be true descriptions? Where no description is available (say about something across the galaxy), would you say there is no true description?
I don't even understand how to answer such a question. It's inherently confused. — Michael
I'm saying that a truth is something like a correct description, and that descriptions (whether correct or incorrect) didn't exist 50 million years ago. — Michael
Do they exist if language doesn't? This is the core of the issue. If sentences are features of language then even if sentences are abstract my point still stands: if there is no language then nothing has the property of being true or false, much like if there is no language then nothing has the property of being semantically meaningful. — Michael
There's no need to resort to Platonism. — Michael
Are they mind-independent? Do sentences exist even if language doesn't? — Michael
How can an abstract object have the property of truth? — Michael
How can a sound be "connected" to an abstract object? — Michael
Well, its a complex, multifaceted issue. A close approximation might be that being true is something we do with utterances, rather than saying that some utterances are true. It's not the noise or the marks that are true, after all - utterances are only true if a whole lot of other stuff is included. There's a tendency to try to make a messy process much neater, but the mess is perhaps ineliminable. — Banno
What I'm saying is what I've said above:
1. Truth is a property of truth-bearers, and
2. Truth-bearers are features of language, not mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism — Michael
Well, yes. But is the set of all possible sentences different to the set of all sentences? — Banno
1. Truth and falsehood are properties of truth-bearers
2. Truth-bearers are features of language, not mind-independent abstract objects
Which of these do you disagree with? — Michael
We don't need to know that a sentence is true for it to be true. — Michael
I mean what the word ordinarily means. It is possible to say something truthful that answers the question.
How is this not clear? — Michael
I'm saying that it is possible to respond to the question by saying something true. — Michael
No, when I say "there's an answer to the question" I am saying that it is possible to answer the question with a truthful sentence. — Michael
There's an answer to the question "why did Yoon Park disappear?" — Michael
That depends on what they're talking about. If they're talking about the existence of aliens then either they're saying that the truth of the sentence "aliens exist" is unknown or they're saying that the existence of aliens is unknown. — Michael
Truth is (only) a property of truth-bearers.
Truth-bearers did not exist 65 million years ago.
Therefore, truth was not a property of anything that existed 65 million years ago. — Michael
Truth bearers didn't exist 65 million years ago. Do you agree or disagree? — Michael
You're just repeating the same fictionalist account.
Truth-bearers didn't exist 10 million years ago, even if our informal language implies that they did. — Michael
See my previous comment. — Michael
Are they mind-independent abstract objects? I don’t believe in any such things. — Michael
Truth and falsity are properties of sentences, sentences are features of language, and language is a social (and psychological) activity performed by and between people. — Michael
So if there are no people there is nothing which has the property of being either true or false. — Michael
But none of this is relevant to what I’m claiming, which is that being true and being false are properties of sentences, not properties of rain (and that there is no Platonic third thing that “sits” between the two) — Michael
If by this you mean that the sentence “it is raining” is true if and only if the rain exists then that is exactly what I have been saying. — Michael
Notice the bit where we can chose between realism and antirealsim? That's my suggestion for the answer to the OP. That the choice between realism and antirealism is a choice about how we talk about stuff, not a debate about metaphysical actualities. — Banno