Or if you are by yourself, you might come back tomorrow and puzzle as to if the smell has changed.
. — Banno

It's puzzling that I could have recognized the smell as something I'd experienced before. It might seem that the private language argument excludes this. The trick is to see that this conclusion is based on the notion that meaning is rule following. Kripke shows that it's not.

By the way, I'm presently detecting an odor that I know I've smelled before, but I can't remember what it is or what it's called. I think it may be a flower, but I don't know. That shows that you don't have to know a name for something to recognize it and be keenly aware of it. Although I have Asperger's, so I may be wired differently.

Glad to know another user who uses Celsius like me!
When I read posts with Fahrenheit references... hmm... it is very obnoxious to me. — javi2541997

Whisper words of wisdom: let it be.

There is a "blind spot" in each local visual field where the optic nerve enters the eye. — Agree-to-Disagree

Cool. Did you know spiders don't have a blind spot because their eyes evolved in a different way.

So this is something you learned to do? You learned not to see the cow, but to see the colour, shade, shape and so on? — Banno

Yes. Anyone who learns to draw has to learn this. This is what the mind wants to do:



What's happening is that the mind has a hoard of stock images. When you go to draw something, the power of these images appears. Egyptians didn't know how to override that. That's why their figures are basically fleshy stickmen.

The next development was perspective. This was huge from the Renaissance onward. In the 20th Century, artists decided that perspective is also a stock idea rather than how visual experience really works. Cubism was one sprout from that soil.

So I'm just explaining that people focus on the nature of experience quite a bit. A lot of art is really about that rather than the object of perception: the cow.

At least some times we are incline to say we see the same cow... — Banno

True.

Is it clearer, better, to say that you see the cow, or that you see the model or image or representation of the cow that your neural network constructs? — Banno

I've been a visual artist for a long time. I can put aside mental shorthand and tune into my visual field. I see color, light, dark, and lines. I can do that so thoroughly that I forget what it is my looking at, but this is something new artists struggle with. The mind strongly insists it knows what things look like and it will override attempts to draw what's actually in the visual field. I've known about this since childhood, so it's obvious to me that a person can voluntarily shift focus depending on what their concerns are. If it's an incoming car, I probably won't dwell long on how the car is foreshortened in space as it approaches me.

By way of argument in favour of the former, we sometimes might claim that you and I are to be said to be looking at the very same cow. It seems difficult to say this if what you see is the product of your neural net, and what I see is the product of my neural net. You see the product of your neural net, I see the product of my neural net, and hence we do not see the same cow. — Banno

We say we see the same cow, yes. Our experiences are different though.

That is, saying that what you see is the model or image or representation of the cow, and not the cow, makes other things we commonly do, oddly complicated. — Banno

It depends on the situation and what point you're trying to convey.

Does that make sense to you? You experience the cow by your neural nets building some sort of model or image or representation of the cow. Add to that the smell, the feel of the hide, and so on. — Banno

Yes. That makes sense.

I don't understand why this seems so difficult to comprehend. — Banno

:grin: It's just one of those things.

Well, where are those representations? If you are interacting with them, then presumably they can be distinguished from you... hence you see them, and we havn't an explanation of what seeing consist in at all. — Banno

I would propose that instead of trying to explain sight, let's first do a quick analysis of what we do with the concept of self:

You saw a cow.
You tasted a sesame seed.
You heard a song.

The "you" in these sentences refers to a single entity who experiences a sequence of things. The self stays the same, and the things change, going by like a stream. This means the logic of these sentences rules out the self being equivalent to the things. It appears that if we do that, the self will be a fragmented, schizoid stream. If you choose to allow the self to fragment in that way, a pretty large chunk of your own speech will become nonsense.

Now lets look at what we know about what's happening when you see a cow. Our best guess, as set out by scientists, is that the brain is creating an experience of a visual field. We know your brain has to be creating this because your eyes are constantly shifting direction and focus. Somehow you put all that data together into a seamless, unified image. I would say you experience the image. It's a visual experience. Where is the experience? I don't think that question has an answer. Where is the image? I don't think that question has an answer either. I think it's an element of neural algorithms, or something like that. Could we say that you are the experience? As I mentioned before, that will slice and dice your capacity to speak coherently. Is that what you wanted to do though?

I understand the idea of seeing the tree by way of a representation, but like Michael, I would say that's indirect realism. I don't think it matters what we call it as long as we both know what we're talking about. It was this that made no sense to me:

You are not separate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room?

But doesn't it strike you as odd that the "mental image" is not part of the mind doing the observation? — Banno

This comes down to the nature of the self. I think what you're trying to do is eliminate the self along with the homunculus. Is that true?

I would not take Aristotle as an idealist. Direct realism has trees and cups and stuff that we see. Indirect realism falls short of that, since we never see the tree or cup or whatever. — Banno

Aristotle thought you could directly see ideas. Trees and cups are part idea and part physical. That framework, that we're all in the mind of God, is the original basis of direct realism. Indirect realism came from the beginnings of the materialistic age. It's ironic that for some, the backgrounds have come to be switched around.

You are not seperate from that model, in such a way that the model could be said to be what you interact with. The model is you interacting with the room. — Banno

I appreciate the attempt to streamline the issue here, but that just doesn't make any sense.

@Banno

Aristotle was the first to provide a description of direct realism. In On the Soul he describes how a see-er is informed of the object itself by way of the hylomorphic form carried over the intervening material continuum with which the eye is impressed. — here

Direct realism was a resident of an idealistic world where the mind directly contacts the forms of things. Indirect realism came into existence when people started trying to become more materialistic about the mind and body. What do you think neo-directness is a response to?

That explains it. Goddamn it. — Lionino

We're switching now. This excludes you, where the weather will be similar to a sauna most of the time.

Two updates;

1. We're switching to La Nina now, so the weather will be cooler than last year.

2. The US economy isn't showing any signs of slowing, so no rate cuts and many frustrated investors. This is good for Main St and bad for Wall St., in other words the Antichrist has risen and we're all going to die.

Mmm... You don't have "access" to a percept. A percept is identical with either the whole, or a part of, the conceptual-perceptual state of an organism at a given time. That's a numerical/definitional identity, rather than an equivalence. Like the percept is not what perception or experience is of, the percept is an instance of perception. The taste percept of my coffee is the same as how I taste it.

The distinction there is between saying that a percept is an instance of perception vs saying that a percept is what perception acts upon. — fdrake

You're giving up on the integrity of the self over time. We usually assume it's one self and a flood of everchanging perceptions. You have the ability to direct your perception as you wish. If you allow yourself to become fragmented, you've entered into complete nonsense.

We have access to percepts. And we have access to the world. — Moliere

The indirect realist isn't denying this.

Perhaps, yes. Both direct and indirect realists are realists rather than subjective idealists because they believe that the existence and regularity and predictability of experience is best explained by the existence of a distal world which behaves according to regular and predictable laws. — Michael

True. I once asked a neuroscientist why he believed he had access to the real world, and he said "practicality."

What is the source of the direct realist's confidence that the dot is caused by some unobservable entity? — Michael

Practicality probably. Is that the source of the indirect realist's confidence?

The indirect realist claims to directly perceive the mental phenomenon as caused by the dot on the screen as caused by the unobservable entity. — Michael

Right. The question is: what is the source of the indirect realist's confidence that the mental phenomena are caused by the dot?

If the direct realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter then the indirect realist can believe in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and the Big Bang and in the veracity of a Geiger counter. — Michael

But the direct realist relies on the observations that support belief in electrons (like the light dots on a CRT). The indirect realist has to say that those light dots are creations of the brain, and so may not reflect the facts. Btw, the idea that there was a Big Bang is declining these days (according to Matt O'Dowd from Spacetime.

I don't quite get what you're saying. Flat earthers assume that the Earth is flat, do experiments, and determine that the earth is not flat. It's not a paradox; it's just that the experiments have proven them wrong. — Michael

The question is about why you have confidence that your observations reflect the facts, when you've concluded that your observations are creations of your brain. It's just that indirect realism opens the door to skepticism.

One salient feature of hallucinatory and dream states is that when we experience them, our abilities to notice their anomalous nature is diminished or suppressed. — Pierre-Normand

Yea, but I've had dreams that were complex, with customs and history to it. One involved physicists who had giant potatoes where their torsos should be. It all seemed perfectly normal to me in the dream. What that demonstrates is sophisticated world-building capability. While awake, I start to think about how much of this world I'm in is a creation, and I realize it's actually quite a bit. I'm filling in blanks.

I think what the direct realist might be driven by is the necessity of a world. There's really no way to verify all of what we call the world, though. I think the difference between us is how comfortable each of us is about accepting that the mind is a masterful creator.

The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it?
— frank

I wouldn't say so. That scientific realism entails indirect realism is contingent on a posteriori facts, not a priori truths. — Michael

It's that the scientist starts by assuming direct realism, then disproves direct realism. It's an ouroboros.

Ok.

Well, for instance, it's hard to see how disjunctivism could be indirect. That a veridical viewing of, say, a tree, could be an instance of viewing a mental image of the tree, while an hallucination was not.. — Banno

I agree that there's a big difference between hallucinating and seeing our shared world. I think if indirect realism is specifically the situation with a homunculus, it's probably not true. I don't think there's a little person in there.

Indeed, which is where you err. — Banno

Quite likely.

Firstly, if direct realism is true then scientific realism is true, and if scientific realism is true then direct realism is false. Therefore direct realism is false. — Michael

The first sentence is a paradox, isn't it?

:up:
— Michael

If that is what they modern DRist is trying to do — AmadeusD

One of the conundrums with indirect realism is that it seems to start as direct realism, where the scientist assumes he sees the world exactly as it is, then he concludes from what he's observed that he's not seeing the world exactly as it is. How do you deal with that problem?

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time.
— frank
The most accepted vies is representationalism, which is neither direct nor indirect. — Banno

I think everything on that list was indirect realism.

since it is understood that we perceive by constructing a representation, which is better described as neither direct nor indirect. — Banno

I thought that was indirect.

Sure. That does nothing for the competing theories. Hence, certain levels of "wtf bro". — AmadeusD

Indirect realism is the prevailing view of our time. I think the contemporary direct realist is trying to steer clear of the problems associated with it?

Would you choose to be uploaded if it became available tomorrow? — Truth Seeker

I don't think so. When I'm done I want to sink down into the warm ooze of a worm's belly and come back out as something else. Fertilizer for an oak tree maybe.

As far as I know, our consciousness, personality and memories are substrate dependent i.e. they need the living brain. — Truth Seeker

I think the previously mentioned science fiction writers would say that nobody thought tuberculosis was curable, until it was. There were those who claimed it was impossible to go to the moon. I say put your biases aside and let yourself know the truth: we don't know. :blush:

So, is the self an entity the way a soul is an entity that can be resurrected or reincarnated? — Truth Seeker

I don't know. It's uploadable in a lot of science fiction, and those writers weren't thinking of anything mystical. I've always assumed it was some sort of pattern they were supposed to be uploading. Don't know.

I think my self is something like music, with notes and chords like a piano. There's a physical component, and intellectual and emotional ones.

Or I might think of it as a landscape like in the Divine Comedy. I can go exploring with my Virgil.

The fact that I have to resort to metaphors to think about it doesn't mean it's a illusion.

But a person can experience the world without engaging it in any way. If you mean the character of experience is shaped by interaction, I would agree to some extent. Some of it is just innate, though.

I think the idea that one must start with "atomic" concepts isn't wholly inconsistent with the sort of holism Wittgenstein advocated — Pierre-Normand

Atomism is indispensable. As long as the advocate of embodied consciousness understands that, all is well. It's just a shift in perspective of the sort that already exists in biology, so really, it just comes down to a matter of emphasis.

ecently, I stumbled upon a paper titled "Alignment of brain embeddings and artificial contextual embeddings in natural language points to common geometric patterns" (published last month in Nature Communications) and I asked Claude 3 Opus to help me understand it. I was puzzled by the fact the the researchers had chosen to look into Broca's area rather than into Wernicke's area in order to find semantically significant neural correlates of linguistic representations. Claude 3 informed me that:

"Historically, the Wernicke-Geschwind model of language processing has been influential, positing a division of labor between Broca's area (in the IFG) for speech production and Wernicke's area (in the superior temporal gyrus) for speech comprehension. However, more recent research has challenged this strict dichotomy, suggesting a more distributed and integrated network for language processing in the brain. — Pierre-Normand

On this point I'd offer rather than an objection, just the reason I've had trouble understanding those who talk about embodied consciousness. It's that in order to explain what you mean by holism, you'll use atomic biological concepts. So it's a case where the revolution needs the previous regime to make sense of itself.

This is vaguely inspired by Fodor's criticisms of meaning holism. As appealing as Wittgenstein-inspired meaning holism is, it doesn't work out on the ground. It's not clear how a human could learn a language if meaning is holistic. Likewise, the student of biology must start with atomic concepts like the nervous system (which has two halves). Eventually it will be revealed that you can't separate the nervous system from the endocrine system. It's one entity. But by the time this news is broken to you, you have enough understanding of the mechanics to see what they're saying. And honestly, once this has happened a few times, you're not at all surprised that you can't separate the lungs from the heart. You can't separate either of those from the kidneys, and so on.

This isn't new. As I mentioned, the boundary between organism and world can easily fall away. Organisms and their environments function as a unit. If you want to kill a species, don't attack the organisms, attack their environment. It's one thing. And this leads to my second point: you said that philosophy is the right domain for talking about this issue, but philosophy won't help you when there are no non-arbitrary ways to divide up the universe. Your biases divide it up. All you can do is become somewhat aware of what your biases are. Robert Rosen hammers this home in Life Itself, in which he examines issues associated with the fact that life has no scientific definition. The bias at the heart of it is the concept of purpose. He doesn't advise dispensing with the concept of purpose because there would be no biology without it. What he does is advise a Kantian approach.

So I'll throw those two things at you just as food for thought: you can't dispense with science and atomic concepts, and what you're calling a philosophical problem is really a matter of biases. Maybe an anti-Descartes, anti-Chalmers bias? I know it's not that simple.

I don't think that it's science's job to either establish or disconfirm this thesis. I think the mind/body problem, the so-called hard-problem of consciousness and radical skepticism stem from distinctive philosophical outlooks regarding the disconnect between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" that Wilfrid Sellars identified as "idealizations of distinct conceptual frameworks in terms of which humans conceive of the world and their place in it." On my view, it's entirely a philosophical problem although neuroscience and psychology do present cases that are illustrative of (and sometimes affected by) the competing philosophical theses being discussed in this thread. — Pierre-Normand

You're suspicious of scientific findings because you think they're tainted by false preconceptions. Are you proposing that science sort of start over with a more holistic outlook? I mean, we have a vast wealth of information about how organisms interact with their environments, and "environment" is not a fixed entity here. Living things transform their environments to suit their needs, such that we could dissolve the boundary between organism and world and see both as a whole. We could and do extend that into the concept of biosphere. The holism doesn't end once its starts.

Which makes me think of Davidson's meaning holism. Have you ever looked into that?

Well said.