"check out the strawberries that are experienced as red when they're not really emitting 700nm light" — Michael

Right. I don't know what you're talking about with what followed that.

Do you mean a pixel that emits 700nm light? — Michael

It's a range, but yea.

What's a red pixel? — Michael

A pixel that produces the frequency of red.

wasn't talking about a correspondence between stimulus and experience. I was talking about a correspondence between brain states and experience. — Michael

That isn't there either. All kinds of brain states can produce the same experience.

Gross disconnect between what? What do you even mean by "really" black and white? — Michael

There are no red pixels in that picture. It's an optical illusion. You were talking about correspondence of experience to neural processes. The point was to explain what multiple realizability is. There is no simple correspondence between stimulus and experience.

I don't know why but this thread seems to be about why they were blind sighted by such an ambitious goal, and historically failed at it. — Shawn

They consciously abandoned morality. They believed morality was conditioning from an era that was passing. They wanted to make their world into hell because that's what they thought was necessary to facilitate a natural evolution into a new phase of human life. Their plan was: destroy everything and something better will take shape. They were utterly and completely deluded

To the extent that one might want to argue for something like idealism or substance dualism or panpsychism, sure. So if that's how you want to defend naive colour realism then commit to one of them. — Michael

I was criticizing your use of science to support your argument. It's your worldview that says consciousness is confined to brains. Science does not confirm that.

But as it stands the scientific view is that colour experiences correspond to neural processes — Michael

Experience is associated with neural processes. If that's what you meant by "corresponds" then fine. If you meant something more, you'd have to explain what you mean. Due to multiple realizability, there isn't any straight forward correspondence. Check out the strawberries that are experienced as red, when they're really black and white. That's an example a gross disconnect. Minor ones are happening all the time.

and so that distal objects and their properties cannot causally influence colour experience except by causally influencing neural processes. — Michael

There isn't presently any working scientific theory about how experience works. It could involve some entanglement of the thigh bone for all we know. Again, you're confusing worldview for science.

Neuroscience doesn't say anything one way or the other about extension of consciousness. Therefore, if we want to talk about it, we'll have to back down into philosophy.

Yes, that’s what neuroscience shows. Human consciousness does not extend beyond the brain. — Michael

It sounds like you're saying that neuroscience shows that human consciousness doesn't extend beyond the brain. It doesn't show that. We don't presently have a working theory for how experience works.

My experience with ending a long term relationship was that I died halfway through it. I'm somebody else now. It was pretty bloody, too, in a poetic way. Wanting to change is the sickness unto death.

The pen has the property of causing the experience of red under certain conditions.

It's the same old song: the US overthrows a democratically elected government for 'reasons' and then proceeds to create a mess several times larger, leaving the country in ruins. — Tzeentch

That's how we role.

That we can't know everything doesn't mean we can't know anything.

We still landed a man on the moon even if we've not figured out Xeno's paradox. — Hanover

True. We still can't go beyond our limitations. That's what I thought you were trying to do with talk of what came before Adam's planets.

Assuming it possible the planets moved differently prior to human perspective, it does not follow they moved differently prior to human language. — Hanover

There's a profound paradox about motion: Xeno's Paradox. A paradox is a sign that we've butted up against the boundaries of the mind. Stay away from the boundaries and everything is fine. In other words, stop trying to be God and be happy with your lot as a tiny human, with limited understanding.

I can accept that language offers us a tool to understand the world and that it shapes some of our understanding, but the idea that non-liguistic organisms have no understanding of the world or that all that I touch and all that I feel and all that I know is language mediated is a concocted theory to sustain a Wittgensteinian model that is likely based upon a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. — Hanover

I understand what you're saying.

I say "likely" because Wittgenstein's communication skills were lacking. Ironically. — Hanover

He was echoing Plato, who has Socrates claim that every philosopher wants to die because it seems that that's the only way to get a vantage point on life: to sit outside it. As long as you're inside it, you have to be happy with the shadows on the wall.

How did the planets move before Adam looked up and saw it go from evening to the morning? — Hanover

The human viewpoint is that gravity did it. The view beyond human ideas is not available to me. That's a favored interpretation of the Tractatus: there are answers that lie beyond what we can know. When you realize that, you take a pause, sigh, and start asking again, knowing that you're reaching for something you can't have.

Prior to language, was there physics? — Hanover

No, you need language for physics, don't you?

We're talking past one another. You're focusing on physics. Philosophy aims deeper.

Think about the domain of the red percept. It's you, right? Red dwells in you. Lacan says that you are a product of language use. Language sets out the whole framework of physics.

If you want to know if my pain is like your pain, I can stick you with the same pin I stick myself. — Hanover

Can you wipe it with alcohol first?

Michael might well be able to see different shades of red without having names for them, and demonstrate this by matching colour swatches. — Banno

I mentioned that. Matching the swatch is using an external standard to pick out the shade. That he would require that, and I think he would, seems to undermine his claim that lone percepts are the source of knowledge about color.

Honestly, I think your attitude is more about posters on this forum than about language philosophy. The damnedest interpretations of Wittgenstein show up here.

The real thing is just about how language influences what you perceive. People who suggest that sensation has nothing to do with perception are, as you said, just being ridiculous.

And it is these percepts, not a surface layer of atoms reflecting various wavelengths of light, that constitute our ordinary, everyday understanding of colours. — Michael

Yea, I don't think that's the whole story.

How do you know how I experience?

I'm telling you there are plenty of experiences I have that language plays no role in. How do you know that to be false? — Hanover

I'm guessing you're like me. You use ideas, like tree to organize your sensations into something meaningful. Ideas usually go by names which you learn. You probably have an innate capacity for using ideas in this way, but it's developed and heavily influenced by your language and culture.

You very well may have nonverbal experience. I do. If I talk all day, I'll eventually become exhausted and nonverbal. It's not actually a whole lot of fun.

Which is wrong, because I don't (except insofar as an external stimulus is causally responsible for the sensation). — Michael

You're overlooking the very active role the mind plays in creating experience. You literally can't see the things your mind isn't prepared to see.

A fair amount of the stimulus your CNS receives is filtered out as irrelevant. Neuroscience speculates that experience is the result of applying filters to the data you receive so it can be compared to models. This is the reason you can't distinguish between shades and hues in a practical way. You haven't develop the modeling necessary to do it. Artists can do it because their minds are prepared to do it

All I need is visually distinguishable percepts (whatever their cause — Michael

As described above, this is not in keeping with the present scientific view.

Language is irrelevant. — Michael

This is very clearly not the case. Language plays a very important role in everything you experience.

Animals can distinguish between the poisonous red frog and the non-poisonous brown frog without having to converse with one another. — Michael

This is behaviorism. You could do with trying to understand what your opponent is actually saying. I don't see you doing that.

And I can see this despite not having individual names for each hue, proving my point and refuting yours. — Michael

My point is that you need both internal and external data to distinguish between colors. That's pretty easy to demonstrate. By the way, the picture you posted doesn't show different hues. It was all the same hue, just different shades of it. Different hues would be like cadmium red versus magenta.

I can distinguish between them — Michael

If that was true you would have easily been able to pick them out in the apple picture. You need an external crutch to distinguish between them.

Colour experiences, like other experiences, concerns sensory percepts, and often the sense organs and stimuli that they react to. It doesn’t concern speech or writing. — Michael

You just demonstrated that it's both. You see the shades of red, but you can't distinguish between them without an external crutch.

I don’t need words to see that there are lighter and darker — Michael

Yea, but you could do what you claimed, distinguish between the different shades, if you had words, like burgundy, cadmium red, cadmium red light, etc.. Or you might need to hold the sample up to the picture to tell the difference. Both of those would demonstrate color externalism.

I can distinguish shades of red. — Michael

Without looking at your sample, identity each of those shades in this picture... without any words.

Either way, it makes no sense to try to use Wittgenstein to prove that colours are not a type of sensation, comparable in kind to pain. — Michael

I think Witt's point would be that cognition is heavily influenced by language, which in turn reflects history, culture, and biology. Lacan says something similar, that language influences what you focus on, what you ignore, and what distinctions you make.

Would you agree that knowledge of color is somewhat language dependent? Some Asian languages didn't have words to distinguish green from blue. If you use the same word for both, that might diminish your awareness of a distinction, right?

Frank, how do you know that we do have "similar experiences of redness and pain"? — Banno

Commonly believed, no reason to doubt it.

If there cannot be global agreement to tax the rich, individual countries can impose taxes through tariffs. It might be argued that this puts the burden on those who are not wealthy, but if a company is going to pass on costs to the consumer it will do so whether that tax is in the form of a tariff or not. — Fooloso4

Placing tariffs causes tariff wars. That's partly how the Great Depression started. That did redistribute wealth, but not for long.

What gives our words stability is their place in our common, shared talk of what is around us. — Banno

In the case of sensation, it's that common biology gives us similar experiences of redness and pain.

Tariffs?

What is to be done: global agreement to tax the rich. — Fooloso4

I used to think in those terms too: property tax on the wealthy. Now I'd say there's just no way to do that. I'm presently reading a book about the early Iron Age. Time goes by, revolutions happen pretty regularly, either from external or internal events. Our world will be the same

Looks like she has a good chance of winning. Whodda thunk it?

Cool, but I meant someone who doesn't need a color sample to create a particular hue, like China red.

If Ukraine advances all the way to Moscow, all the Russians will disappear into the wilderness. That's what usually happens.

A sample of red exemplifies the colour and it's various looks — jkop

With regard to sound, most people would need to hear middle C in order to mimic it, but there are people who don't need that. If you ask them for middle-C, they can hum it exactly. A lot of these people have the same genetic anomaly.

Maybe the same is true of color.

we are all solipsists, in a way. — Manuel

In other words, I'm the king of the universe. I knew it!!

We do behave as if we had the same experiences even if my red is someone else's blue. But the color is not external to anyone, or any creature for that matter. — Manuel

Right, I agree. I'm not arguing that we do have different experiences. I'm thinking about the uncertainty, and also the general uncertainty associated with internal things. It's uncertain that what was red yesterday is the same red as today, and it doesn't appear that there is any fact of the matter. This is Kripkenstein.

One way out is to say that we're all dreaming the same dream. We really can read one another's minds. This is just to bring up how the problem ultimately comes from our worldview, that says we're each locked in to private worlds. See what I mean?

I don't think "Is my red your red?" can make much sense, since the experiences are localized occurrences, a bit like "Is my apple digestion your apple digestion?" also is a weird question.
Maybe Wittgenstein's approach is more fruitful, "The apple is red" attains meaning by common use, it's how we learn to identify red, whatever exactly it all is. — jorndoe

If the experience of red is a private, localized experience, then how would "red" attain meaning by common use? How would that work in your view?