Do you watch commercials?

Notice that this doesn't mean you can't have a description in mind when you talk about Paris, for instance. It just means it isn't necessary.

I just want to clarify my own position that identity is always fragmented; it is something one does in thought, to reflect on oneself, that divides one between the identifier and the identified - the reflection and that which sees it - and simultaneously divides one from the world, which becomes 'other — unenlightened

Guilt is a pain that forces the dragon to peer into a mirror and see itself. In Gnostic myths, this the gift of Sophia. Before she came, there was murder and insanity, but it all went on in darkness. Sophia split the psyche into actor and audience.

I see.

That is precisely the distinction which the 'eliminativists' seek to get rid of - hence the attempt to describe human subjects as 'robots' or as 'aggregatations of biomolecular structures', and not as beings per se. — Wayfarer

Yes, but that's not what the hard problem is about. It's about identifying phenomenal consciousness as a thing to be explained. Does the blind spot extend to that as well?

It’s absurd, in principle, to think that science can step outside it. The ‘life-world’ of human experience is the ‘grounding soil’ of science, and the existential and spiritual crisis of modern scientific culture – what we are calling the Blind Spot – comes from forgetting its primacy.

Yes, exactly. Do you agree with that?

Alternately, we could say that to make progress, the realm of the physical will have to be rethought such that we recognize that the subjective was always baked into the very structure of physical science, but in such a thoroughgoing manner that it was never noticed. We artificially split it off it and now are trying to append it back on like a new object. — Joshs

Nice. I've been pondering lately the notion that there's some quantum shenanigans at the heart of consciousness.

What do you think about the "eye can't see itself" issue? Is it ultimately futile to look for a theory of consciousness?

Do you believe a question should be considered to be coherent if we have no idea what an answer might look like? — Janus

That's what we did with gravity.

So, I am yet to be convinced there is a coherent question there. — Janus

Doesn't sound like you're likely to be.

What exactly do you think the so-called "hard problem" is asking for? — Janus

The "easy problem" refers to explaining functions of consciousness like how memory is laid down, how the visual cortex works, stuff like that.

The "hard problem" refers to explaining the experiences that accompany function. Why is there an experience that accompanies sight? Why aren't we like computers that see, process visual data, and respond per protocols, but without any accompanying experience?

Science has the conceptual framework to address the easy problem. It lacks that framework to address the hard problem. To make progress, the realm of the physical will have to expand to include subjectivity. At first, the addition will be along the lines of what gravity originally was: just a name for something we know about. Adding gravity as a thing to be explained by science was the first step in creating theories about it. At the time, some people objected to including gravity because it was thought that this was an injection of mysticism into science. Fortunately, flexible minds prevailed and progress began. Same thing here (one hopes).

It sounds like you're saying that social fragmentation ends up being reflected in individual psyches.

It is much more problematic trying to explain consciousness without reference to physical processes — Edmund

True.

If you have a genuine criticism, set it out. — Banno

You make this kind of statement a lot. Set out your argument, do you have anything substantive, if you have a point, make it. Then you promptly respond to the first three words someone wrote and ignore the rest.

I'm sure you can find someone to engage you. It's not going to be me. :razz:

Now Kripke shows that proper names do not rely on descriptions. But that need not apply to demonstratives. — Banno

It appears someone's been reading the SEP. <--- That sentence has a rigid designator in it. It actually comes down to what I meant by it. Don't forget that meaning is found in use, not in analyzing abstract collections of words.

As for the rest, you've gone out into controversial territory trying to find a way to deny what pretty much everybody else thinks: which is that Kripke was contradicting Quine regarding essentialism.

Bon voyage.

Go back to the shoutbox where you belong, bub.

Science fiction has been calling for a theory of consciousness since Capek's RUR. Those who aren't interested, don't know why anyone would ask, and are irritated because philosophical texts aren't dumbed down enough for them, should leave those who are interested in peace.

In this world, Hesperus exists. If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world. — RussellA

That's not true. We hypothesize about possible entities all the time. Sometimes we make them real.

once you put something out there in a statement, a thesis, you have, and this is really what Wittgenstein was on about in the Tractatus, you commit it to the finitude of language — Constance

That's a novel interpretation of Witt, isn't it? I think he was pointing out that when we propose to know transcendent facts, we're positing a vantage point that we don't have.

If you're saying that the eye can't see itself, yes, that's a concern.

Some adrenaline here, some dopamine there" is the experience of hunger. there's not the mechanisms and then something else. The car isn't an additional thing on top of the engine, the wheels, the chassis, etc.. — Isaac

How do you know that?

We could give an evolutionary account, some natural advantage to consciousness. Random changes in neurological activity one time resulted in proto-consciousness which gave an evolutionary advantage to the creature and so it passed on that genetic mutation. There...is that satisfactory, and if not, why not? — Isaac

Mainly because functional consciousness would serve all those purposes adequately. What evolutionary advantage is there to having the experience of hunger when all that's needed is some adrenaline here, some dopamine there, and voila.

Whatever you're going on about, it has nothing to do with the hard problem.

You have fallen prey to the Who gives a shit logical fallacy. — T Clark

:lol: You said a mouthful, Cuz!

:blush: I just worked 52 hours in the last four days due to the little triple pandemic of COVID, flu, and RSV knocking out our department. What's your excuse, Skippy?

Hope you're doing well!
— frank

Well, thanks! (although one of the reasons I had stopped posting for six months was because of this debate, I am continually mystified as to why people can't see through Dennett.) — Wayfarer

Dennett has a minority viewpoint. Don't sweat it. :grin:

There's been very little discussion of the actual issue. — Wayfarer

True. It's good to see you. Hope you're doing well!

I just don't see what the big deal is. I think it's just one more case, perhaps the only one left, where people can scratch and claw to hold onto the idea that people are somehow exceptional. — T Clark

Since Chalmers imagines that once we have a working theory of consciousness, we'll be able to predict what it's like to be a bee, this clearly has nothing to do with human exceptionalism.

Chalmers is one of the most influential philosophers of our time. Seems like you'd be more interested to discover what his views actually are.

He's not suggesting that information processing gives rise to subjectivity. He's point out that it's two different things. There's functional consciousness such as seeing, and there's the experience of seeing.

Computers can see and process visual information. There's no accompanying awareness, though. Providing a scientific explanation for the experience that accompanies function: that's the hard problem.

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell? — T Clark

No.

. After all, what is it that is "extended"? — Constance

That's what we want to know. Chalmers is a good start if you're interested in the philosophy behind developing a scientific theory of consciousness. He explains the difference between functional consciousness (the easy problem) and phenomenal consciousness (the hard problem.). He's very well versed in theory of mind and the amazing success science has had so far in explaining functionality.

agree. Objects such as lecterns cannot exist in the world independently of their properties, as objects in the world are no more than the set of their properties. — RussellA

You're pushing Hume's bundle theory. Fine. Kripke isn't saying that objects exist independently of their properties. That would just be ridiculous.

Chalmers proposes that things like neutral monism or the extended mind would help us get closer to a theory of consciousness. He's flexible. But strictly speaking, he's part of the analytical tradition, so the physicalism you're speaking of is not essential to analytical philosophy.

I proposed that if in this actual world, all the properties of Hesperus disappeared, then Hesperus would also disappear. — RussellA

Since an object with no properties is beyond imagination, it's not so much that Hesperus would disappear as that we're no longer talking about a possible (or the actual) world. We would just talking nonsense.

This is not what Kripke intended by specifying rigid designators. He was just adjusting some old assumptions about necessity to allow for our use of hypotheticals.

So Banno and MU on the same thread are double trouble — Metaphysician Undercover

Yep. :scream:

: S knows P is the issue. One cannot disentangle P from justification, and it really looks like P and the justification are the same thing — Constance

The beginning of a theory of consciousness would just start with guessing at what kind of system could produce the experience of gazing straight ahead, being aware of sights and sounds in a seamless unity.

I think you're focusing more on the philosophy of propositions?

Then, working with a physical model seems hopeless. I actually suspect that the brain does not produce conscious experience, but rather conditions it. Experience exceeds the physical delimitations of the physical object, the brain. Call it spirit?? — Constance

You're basically describing the hard problem, the point of which is that science needs to grow conceptually in order to have the tools to create a theory of consciousness.

I don't debate MU, and I don't debate you, for pretty much the same reason.

I'll respond when you're inserting your own garbage in Kripke's mouth, for the reason I mentioned.

It wasn't for your benefit. It was in case someone reading along was thrown by your bizarre interpretation. I was confirming that you're intentionally veering from Kripke's thinking and inserting your own untenable views.

That's right. It's what some call an explication. — Banno

I agree that you have some reading comprehension issues.

order for science to do this, there must be in place at least some working concept of epistemic relations that is grounded in observational discovery. I can't imagine. — Constance

Integrated information theory is a stab at creating a theory grounded in direct experience. It's a beginning.