In the case of the demonstrative, "This lectern might not have been wood" can be understood in two ways. On the one account, this wooden lectern might have ben replaced by some other lectern, which was not made of wood. On the other account, this very wooden lectern might not be made of wood, and an inconsistency occurs, since we would have a wooden lectern that was not made of wood. — Banno

That's not what he said.

So the first is the better option. The demonstrative rigidly designates the lectern. — Banno

No, it doesn't. As he explains in the passage you quoted, it doesn't even make sense to say the lectern could have been made of ice. It's not even imaginable.

But as regards Banno, I would ask you if you think that his thinking is significantly removed from the vicinity of Davidson and Anscombe, who he admires, and who are certainly not naive realists. — Joshs

I don't know. Probably doesn't matter.

You said unit.

Wait a minute. You didn't understand Kripke when we started. Why are you trying to assign shit?

Banno may or may not be emotionally attached to naive realism and uses his intellect to find ways to ignore challenges to it and deny others the right to entertain those challenges. His strategy is to somehow use language as a foundation while simultaneously denying that foundationalism of any kind is appropriate. Thus he can't really allow any ineffable components because that screws with his foundation.

Josh's foundation is some sort of ever evolving change. Where Banno abhors privacy in a sort of neurotic way, Josh abhors stasis. And this is the central conflict. Josh needs part of the world to always be slightly out of reach, unknown, unexplained, etc. He needs an open window for his foundation of Becoming, so he's fond of the ineffable.

The rest is really kind of ad hoc.

:razz:

The thing about a lifeworld which allows someone in it to cotton onto a rule in one of its discursive practices.

Then generalise that to an arbitrary judgement, perception or practical activity. What it is about (the relationship between us, the world, and what we make of it) that lets us cotton onto it and renders it cotton-on-able.

And keep that it's "shown in the doing". Showing is the giving that makes given-ness. — fdrake

This makes as much sense forwards as backwards.

Can you explain the long term consequences of this war?

A = A is central to Leibniz's project, although I've dropped a lot of that in the bit bucket apparently.

take him here to be saying that the argument (1-4) applies when a and b are proper names and F a property. — Banno

Yes, you're right.

Didn't Kripke mention Leibniz's law? Although I've thought A=A was Leibniz's law since I read a book about him. Don't know how I got that confused.

A=A is the Principle of Identity. — Banno

Oh. I thought that was Leibniz's law.

is not Leibniz's Law. — Banno

(2) is Leibniz's law: A = A.

The necessity we're talking about is with regard to the truth of statements. Some statements are necessarily true, some are contingently true.

Note that I won't debate this with you. It's explained by Kripke in the essay, and that's the scope of his interests.

Would you call someone who had almost no use for formal logic , and thought ‘ truth’ was a confused idea an analytic philosopher? — Joshs

If someone described truth as a confused idea, I'd say they're not any kind of philosopher. Want to start a thread on it?

Rorty is just an ontological anti-realist. There's a whole spectrum of that including various hard and soft options. It's all analytical philosophy, though. If you want to read an article about it, it will be an analytical philosopher you're reading. Nothing particularly reformed about it, I don't think.

What does "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact necessarily one and the same" add to "if two objects have all the same properties, they are in fact one and the same" — RussellA

I'd say necessity is implicit in Leibniz's law. He's just making it explicit because he's about to challenge the notion that apriori=necessary, and aposteriori=contingent. He's going to show that there can be a statement that is known aposteriori, but is necessarily true.

You're asking what earth shattering consequences follow from Leibniz's law. Kripke is just setting the stage to show off a contradiction. That's all. Keep going.

If x and y are identical, that means x and y are two different names for the same object.

Like say John's nickname is Tweezer.

x is John
y is Tweezer

now plug that into the argument.

We can say what we like, and define what we like, and while that will change how we talk about things that won't change whatever "stuff" is. — Moliere

He makes the point that what we're doing is epistemology. It's about truth.

But given that it is not made of ice, it is necessarily not made of ice. — Banno

Correct. Not being made of ice is an essential property of the lectern. The basic idea here generalizes.

Wow!

Well, thanks for all your help. — Banno

No problem.

Was it a misquote, or an interpretation? I thought it was the latter. — Moliere

If it was an interpretation, it was a misinterpretation.

Do you have a substantive point to make? — Banno

I'm not sure why you're getting miffed. I simply pointed out that you misquoted the text.

At this point, that is the substantive point I have to fucking make. OK?

This is what you wrote:

Kripke asks "could this lectern have been made of ice?" His answer is that it is entirely possible that the lectern before us is made of ice, but that if this were so it would be a different lectern. — Banno

That is incorrect. He doesn't say the lectern before us could be made of ice. You misquoted.

Kripke asks "could this lectern have been made of ice?" His answer is that it is entirely possible that the lectern before us is made of ice, — Banno

I don't see where he says the lectern before us could be made of ice. I think he's saying it couldn't be.

@Banno
Are we up to the wooden lectern?

How would a phenomenal conservativist accept my definition when there is no reason we should think an intuition increases the probability that a belief is true? — GodlessGirl

A justification is something you need in order to appear rational. That gives you deposits in your social bank account among some circles.

If you're a symbol of the fundamental irrationality of nature, someone will ride out on a whaling vessel and try to harpoon you.

Queen Victoria:



Sacagawea:

It's "sad statue covered in moss in a forest"

I used a few styles: studio light, photo, and hyperrealism. With the Leonora Carrington ones I imported a picture as a basis. It was a moss covered statue.

It's funny that a lot of the Leonora Carrington ones both have her likeness in them and her style of painting. The Yayoi Kusama ones do that too. It's kind of convoluted. Try "Yayoi Kusama made out of tree roots." Trippy.

Not Russia. Putin.

That's because the thing itself with its true identity is understood as independent, so it appears like it's identity must be "discovered" — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you misunderstood what he meant by discovering identity. It appears that a lot of the time identity is something we declare. That's what's happening when a baby is baptized by the Catholic Church. The baby is henceforth identified by that name.

There are other ways to identify that kid, though. I would tell the police that he has a mole on his knee.

In Spanish there are two different words for predication. One signifies identity: things that don't change. The other signifies passing states (although it's not always cut and dried, but that's the basic idea.)

That's one reason we shouldn't get carried away with philosophizing by the way people speak. Different languages are structured differently and so would produce different philosophies.

I can't stop.

Apparently we're free to monetize these generated images. — Nils Loc

I've been wondering who owns them. How did you do the landscapes?

I can't stop making people covered in moss:





These are various stages of putting Leonora Carrington as a prompt.







This is an AI generated Leonora Carrington painting. That's insane. It looks just like her stuff.

Instead, we ought to be content in knowing that we simply cannot make any true identity statements, — Metaphysician Undercover

What's an identity statement?

Russell says that the name John is a description rather than a reference. — RussellA

The first part of this essay explains why that's problematic. How do you respond to Kripke's point?

What I can say is that there is but one world with a Hanover where Hanover is defined as the one living in this world, and it would do you no good to search for Hanovers in other worlds because each one you find will not be a Hanover by definition. — Hanover

And this is the problem Kripke is addressing. If your identity is a description or definition, then it makes no sense to say you could have become a plumber.

But we can say that. There's a possible world where you're a plumber, so it doesn't look like your identity can't be a description. So what is it?

Let go of fixed plans and concepts, and the world will govern itself. (Tao Te Ching, 57)
:nerd:

That's about metaphysical de re/de dicto. That's a question about whether what I believe about you is a property of you, or is it just a relation between me and a proposition. Or something like that.

De re is about something. — Shawn

It sure is.