Go Somalia! :rofl:

If you disagree with Chalmers you must have brain damage — Isaac

We can't get to the question of whether Chalmers' view is true or false because there's no agreement about what his view is.

See, I told you that without resorting to insults, so I'm the better man. Obviously.

Obviously, I meant that I'm familiar with his ouvre.
1h — bongo fury

If you actually read his stuff and you're still this confused about what he's talking about, I don't know what to tell you. You may have something akin to aphantasia so that you have no frame of reference for understanding qualia.

Chalmers is pretty rigorous. Check him out.

Do you think that's what Chalmers and Nagel are suggesting? That a picture glows in the head?
— frank

Pretty much. Do I slander them? — bongo fury

They're talking about experience. Remember that pan-psychism is on the table as a possible explanation. I've never heard of the glowing picture theory.

How would you paraphrase

the felt quality of redness,
— Nagel/Chalmers

? — bongo fury

I wouldn't. I'd say that if you aren't willing to read an essay or book by Chalmers, you probably aren't really interested in the issue.

for there is this impossible "outside" of the "unhiddenness" of what we deal with that we face when we encounter a creative moment: the nothing of an unmade future possibility. Our freedom is the nothing. — Constance

Maybe so. But the first awareness of the concept of being accompanies recognition of nothingness. Nothingness is the background that allows being to appear to the intellect.

But how is this to be taken? I remember reading Hegel once, and he, as I recall, placed the nothing in dialectical opposition to being, thereby producing becoming, which God works out through our historical progress. That is pretty out there, but I have to look again to see how he spells it out. — Constance

I thought Hagel said becoming is primal and being and nothing emerge from it on analysis.

Unsurprisingly we often have to unpick an apparently reliable (because habitual) account alleging that a picture glows, somewhere inside our head. — bongo fury

Do you think that's what Chalmers and Nagel are suggesting? That a picture glows in the head?

Ah, the nothing. It is such a great, disturbing read. What thoughts have you here? — Constance

You were talking about being. It's a twin of the nothing.

is not about ’how the brain works’, it’s about the question of meaning. — Wayfarer

How is it a question of meaning? It's about a theory of consciousness.

We should do a reading of Heidegger's What is Metaphysics? It's so good.

Thread closed. — Isaac

Fine. Have a good day. :razz:

What's the answer to "how does a DVD contain audio and video?" — Isaac

How does a DVD player work?

It could be. But we suppose to save the most possible lives. If we only use the naturally immunity there would be a lot of weak people dying just for an experiment and I see it unfair... I think everyone deserves to be safe from covid. — javi2541997

Vaccinated people don't get as sick as unvaccinated, so it definitely is a life saving measure for many.

In the other hand, China has two main issues related to their current crisis: 1. Opaque data so we don't truly know what is going on there. 2. The Chinese vaccines are not good enough so these are not helping the citizens. I think that with European/American vaccines the context would be different. — javi2541997

I don't really understand what they're doing. No one thinks lockdowns can stop the Omicron strain. It's just too contagious.

So we get a necessary conclusion from a proposition believed due to a posteriori methods. — Moliere

Yep. We find necessarily true statements that are known a posteriori.

The bits on what we can and cannot imagine are somewhat opaque to me. Not that imagination isn't involved in thinking philosophically, but I'm naturally hesitant to say that imagination is the limit of philosophical thinking. — Moliere

There's a long tradition of examining the ways we're bound to think. I think all philosophers make some use of that kind of exploration, but Hume and Kant are particularly notable for asking about the things we can and can't imagine. Kripke joins them in this for the purpose of showing that if we insist that all necessarily true statements are known a priori, this conflicts with the way we think about counterfactuals.

So there's no recipe here for speaking in a certain way. We're not identifying elements of grammar. We're analyzing a historic philosophical bias with the scalpel of...

the way we think. :grin:

Or it could be that naturally acquired immunity is just better for some reason.

We've learned that locking down has a downstream cost in terms of flu and other viral outbreaks. Hopefully someone in China will pay attention to this and start thinking in post-lockdown terms. Lock downs can't stop the pandemic. All they do is preserve healthcare capacity.

I agree with all of that. I think the quest for a theory of consciousness will be a grand adventure. It's fed by a lust to know. Maybe it will generate technologies that allow some aspect of subjectivity to be recorded and that could be used for medicinal or artistic purposes.

Every step of the way, someone will be pointing out that we're fooling ourselves and the truth we're finding is relative to a particular culture? That's ok. That's always how it is, right?

That's why using "this" (though I'm picking up what you mean by "this" not being a name, now, ala Kripke -- since that's what he's speaking against, is Russel's theory of "this" counting as a name) with the lectern sunk home with me -- if descriptions are really all there are to names, then "this lectern is made of ice" is already picking out another lectern. That's why he's focusing on negative predicates, since the lectern he's talking about is necessarily itself, and it is a wooden lectern. And then the description is not picking out another lectern (another "name"), but the same one, even by the description — Moliere

"This lectern" is quite likely to be used as a rigid designator. Banno was throwing some spin in there. There might be cases where "this lectern" is non-rigid, but you'd have to pick that up from context.

Keep in mind that Kripke is focusing on ordinary language use. This is not an examination of a logical language, so meaning is truly use here.

In a case where "this lectern" is a rigid designator, the baptism is likely to have just happened. It's as if I named the lectern "Bob" but Bob equals this lectern.

The wooden lectern example is pointing to the way we think about objects. Note Kripke's emphasis on what we can and can't imagine. What he's saying should be very intuitive to you.

No, I don't. How about you? — Baden

Only accidentally. I don't have a tv. I don't do Facebook or Twitter. I might be out of touch.

Do you watch commercials?

Notice that this doesn't mean you can't have a description in mind when you talk about Paris, for instance. It just means it isn't necessary.

I just want to clarify my own position that identity is always fragmented; it is something one does in thought, to reflect on oneself, that divides one between the identifier and the identified - the reflection and that which sees it - and simultaneously divides one from the world, which becomes 'other — unenlightened

Guilt is a pain that forces the dragon to peer into a mirror and see itself. In Gnostic myths, this the gift of Sophia. Before she came, there was murder and insanity, but it all went on in darkness. Sophia split the psyche into actor and audience.

I see.

That is precisely the distinction which the 'eliminativists' seek to get rid of - hence the attempt to describe human subjects as 'robots' or as 'aggregatations of biomolecular structures', and not as beings per se. — Wayfarer

Yes, but that's not what the hard problem is about. It's about identifying phenomenal consciousness as a thing to be explained. Does the blind spot extend to that as well?

It’s absurd, in principle, to think that science can step outside it. The ‘life-world’ of human experience is the ‘grounding soil’ of science, and the existential and spiritual crisis of modern scientific culture – what we are calling the Blind Spot – comes from forgetting its primacy.

Yes, exactly. Do you agree with that?

Alternately, we could say that to make progress, the realm of the physical will have to be rethought such that we recognize that the subjective was always baked into the very structure of physical science, but in such a thoroughgoing manner that it was never noticed. We artificially split it off it and now are trying to append it back on like a new object. — Joshs

Nice. I've been pondering lately the notion that there's some quantum shenanigans at the heart of consciousness.

What do you think about the "eye can't see itself" issue? Is it ultimately futile to look for a theory of consciousness?

Do you believe a question should be considered to be coherent if we have no idea what an answer might look like? — Janus

That's what we did with gravity.

So, I am yet to be convinced there is a coherent question there. — Janus

Doesn't sound like you're likely to be.

What exactly do you think the so-called "hard problem" is asking for? — Janus

The "easy problem" refers to explaining functions of consciousness like how memory is laid down, how the visual cortex works, stuff like that.

The "hard problem" refers to explaining the experiences that accompany function. Why is there an experience that accompanies sight? Why aren't we like computers that see, process visual data, and respond per protocols, but without any accompanying experience?

Science has the conceptual framework to address the easy problem. It lacks that framework to address the hard problem. To make progress, the realm of the physical will have to expand to include subjectivity. At first, the addition will be along the lines of what gravity originally was: just a name for something we know about. Adding gravity as a thing to be explained by science was the first step in creating theories about it. At the time, some people objected to including gravity because it was thought that this was an injection of mysticism into science. Fortunately, flexible minds prevailed and progress began. Same thing here (one hopes).

It sounds like you're saying that social fragmentation ends up being reflected in individual psyches.

It is much more problematic trying to explain consciousness without reference to physical processes — Edmund

True.

If you have a genuine criticism, set it out. — Banno

You make this kind of statement a lot. Set out your argument, do you have anything substantive, if you have a point, make it. Then you promptly respond to the first three words someone wrote and ignore the rest.

I'm sure you can find someone to engage you. It's not going to be me. :razz:

Now Kripke shows that proper names do not rely on descriptions. But that need not apply to demonstratives. — Banno

It appears someone's been reading the SEP. <--- That sentence has a rigid designator in it. It actually comes down to what I meant by it. Don't forget that meaning is found in use, not in analyzing abstract collections of words.

As for the rest, you've gone out into controversial territory trying to find a way to deny what pretty much everybody else thinks: which is that Kripke was contradicting Quine regarding essentialism.

Bon voyage.

Go back to the shoutbox where you belong, bub.

Science fiction has been calling for a theory of consciousness since Capek's RUR. Those who aren't interested, don't know why anyone would ask, and are irritated because philosophical texts aren't dumbed down enough for them, should leave those who are interested in peace.

In this world, Hesperus exists. If Hesperus didn't exist in this world, it could exist in a possible world. — RussellA

That's not true. We hypothesize about possible entities all the time. Sometimes we make them real.

once you put something out there in a statement, a thesis, you have, and this is really what Wittgenstein was on about in the Tractatus, you commit it to the finitude of language — Constance

That's a novel interpretation of Witt, isn't it? I think he was pointing out that when we propose to know transcendent facts, we're positing a vantage point that we don't have.

If you're saying that the eye can't see itself, yes, that's a concern.

Some adrenaline here, some dopamine there" is the experience of hunger. there's not the mechanisms and then something else. The car isn't an additional thing on top of the engine, the wheels, the chassis, etc.. — Isaac

How do you know that?

We could give an evolutionary account, some natural advantage to consciousness. Random changes in neurological activity one time resulted in proto-consciousness which gave an evolutionary advantage to the creature and so it passed on that genetic mutation. There...is that satisfactory, and if not, why not? — Isaac

Mainly because functional consciousness would serve all those purposes adequately. What evolutionary advantage is there to having the experience of hunger when all that's needed is some adrenaline here, some dopamine there, and voila.