I can understand it in the sense of "it is possible for things with heads to be decapitated", but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects. — Michael

'Things with heads' is an abstract objects. It's basically criteria for a set. That's abstract.

but that has nothing to do with the realist existence of abstract objects. — Michael

It does, since you haven't escaped talking about abstract objects yet. I propose that you can't do that. Universals and properties are too embedded in the way you think to escape them. For instance, try imagining an object that has no properties.

What you can do is just leave their status undetermined. What you can't justifiably do is say they don't exist.

There was a time when I didn't know what it was. I remember one guy told me that a baby is born with his fists clenched tight, but an old man dies with his hands open. I thought that sounded great, but it was meaningless.

Yes

So we are both just fishing. Fine.

Use your own bait. — Banno

So you're fishing? Have at it.

So we are both just fishing. Fine.

Use your own bait. — Banno

So you're fishing? Have at it.

Do you have a salient point? — Banno

Just noting that you state your theory as if it's a fact. May just be a custom.

Sounds sort of like trope theory.

You're offering a particular theory. It's about as well founded as any other, isn't it?

Numbers and other mathematical entities are not a thing we talk about but a way of talking, a grammatical form. Like money, property and institutions they are a construct of our collective intent. They do not "exist" in someone's mind, nor in some unseen parallel reality. — Banno

How do you know that?

Nietzsche by the lake with friend

Jesus with fish

Nietzsche with frog

It’s fascinating that these ancient philosophical quandaries will forever reappear. — NOS4A2

I know. The notion that we've made philosophical progress in the last 2400 years is an illusion.

Do you identify yourself as the brain, or some other internal locus? I ask because I can see such a belief orientating a person towards a belief in the reality of abstract objects, universals, representations and the like. — NOS4A2

I guess I do identity with an internal locus. Plus I'm very protective of my privacy. So I guess when privacy is an ideal, I don't want to hear that I'm something that's socially mediated.

How do you see yourself?

. I cannot put any value into abstract objects and universals when I cannot believe in them. — NOS4A2

That makes sense. For me, despite my attempts to see the issue in a neutral way, I lean toward realism, by which I mean that what each of us is directly aware of is a world of ideas. The mind can't do anything with a disparate hodge podge of data, which is what it would appear the brain is receiving.

I myself am an idea. I can't deny the existence of society without denying my own reality, and in fact, I see societies as being like giant people in some respects.

I can see why some people might see me as embracing the mythological as real, but I dont think they really have any contact with what they're calling real.

There is a Russian political philosopher known as “Putin’s brain”, Alexander Dugin, who claims that the advent of nominalism is the precursor to liberalism, and thus represents the inherent danger of The West. — NOS4A2

Interesting. Some see in Plato's Forms a hint of the real anti-democratic sentiment of Plato. I guess the accompanying folklore is that Plato saw in Socrates' execution, which was part of wave of post-war scapegoating, just how ugly the People can be.

Liberalism was partly about wresting power away from the aristocracy, who were kind of like social icons. Liberalism definitely has an affinity for a mechanical outlook. So yes, I see what he's saying.

He claims that it serves to destroy notions such as community and family and has led to the worst kind of individualism. — NOS4A2

Russia has never really had a strong sense of identity. Russians are traditionally difficult to govern because they're so independently minded. Community has been a concern of Russian thinkers for some time. The West, on the other hand, is marked by potent super identities like the British and the Americans. The West never has to worry about the community being endangered by individualism because each person is deeply marked by the looming figures of cultural personality.

I guess I'm saying Dugin is probably right that Russia has an allergy to nominalism. That doesn't mean it's bad for the West though.

What are your thoughts?

Instead the nominalist can focus on what has changed and come closer to accuracy in describing states of affairs. — NOS4A2

I agree. My point is that he'll continue to speak in terms of universals and abstract objects while maintaining that the things he's referring to don't exist.

There's some arbitrariness in what he's decided to call real, or rather it's probably a matter of the bias of his times.

If he lived in 2nd Century Rome, he'd just as confidently speak of forms as the truest reality, with just as much justification. He'd argue that this talk of particulars is just a trick of speech.

I'm sure you realize stones don't have any weight in outer space. By your account, the nominalist is pretty confused.

But Hume was a nominalist? — Michael

Sorry, I should have said his account is an alternative to traditional nominalism like Occam's. He didn't believe in objects. A thing is a bundle of properties and properties are identified by resemblance of perceptions.

The Platonist might say that height is real iff height is a mind-independent abstract object. — Michael

Hume gives a non-Platonic alternative to nominalism.

I wasn't really interested in pushing any particular account of abstract objects and universals. I was pointing out the problem with denying that they exist, which Hume's bundle theory explains pretty succinctly.

Your question for NOS4A2 should be "is an electron's spin a mind-independent abstract object?" rather than the ambiguous "is an electron's spin real?" — Michael

You've misunderstood the discussion between NOS and me.

It's not an ontological claim, it's a methodological suggestion. If we have two explanations and both work, we might as well use the simpler one...that's just easier. But no one has to follow this suggestion. — Bylaw

Sounds reasonable.

OK, then is there a difference between spin being real and a top really being able to spin? — Michael

I've lost track of your point. It seems like you're constructing word salad.

My question to NOS about whether spin, as an essential property of electrons, is real, was aimed at his earlier statement that nominalism addresses the concept of existence better than the alternatives.

You started talking about the verb "spin", which electrons don't do. So I tried to adjust by talking about tops, which do spin, and have the property of spinnability, spinness, or the ability to spin, however you want to put it.

Could you clarify your point?

That's the question I asked of you. Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? — Michael

Yes, there's a difference. Saying that tops have the property of being able to spin is not the same as saying that tops sometimes spin. You could have a top that spends its whole existence in a drawer. It still has the property of being able to spin.

If there is a difference then prima facie one can deny that spin is real but accept that things really spin. What issues would arise from this? We have evidence of things really spinning. What evidence is there of spin being real (as something else)? What need is there for spin being real (as something else)? — Michael

Have you ever heard of Hume's bundle theory?

But when you dismissed me and my arguments with a dismissive gesture, — god must be atheist

I wasn't being dismissive. I just didn't have any response.

The concrete behaviour of physical objects is a sufficient account of spin. — Michael

I think you're saying that you're satisfied that things sometimes spin. That tops have the property of being able to spin is a different proposition, though.

Are you ok with that proposition?

The fact that I use an object pronoun ought not to suggest I believe “us” exists as an object. — NOS4A2

Then there's no real foundation for descriptions. Right?

NOS has been more gracious than I could ask for. He's rational, to the point, and eminently non-abusive. :up:

put down my proposition: Abstractions and universals (non-physical things) exist but not in the physical world. — god must be atheist

The whole discussion takes place in the shadow of Plato. You're offering his middle period view.

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. — Michael

I don't know how they exist, although I have speculations. I just know there's a logical problem with denying that they exist, which is the nominalist claim.

It depends on the sense in which you use it. If it is a “state of affairs”, then it is a statement. Do you mean it in another sense? — NOS4A2

Propositions are the primary truthbearers. It's the content of an uttered sentence. Multiple sentences can be uttered to express the same proposition. This shows that propositions are not equivalent to sentences or utterances.

If you really want to wade into those thickets, we can, or we can go back to the fact that you provided "us" as the foundation for descriptions. That's an abstract object. No one individual creates language. It's created by humans. See what I mean?

What need and evidence is there for some additional abstract property, above-and-beyond the physical act? — Michael

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects.

Do they deny that it’s appropriate to say that tops spin? — Michael

They would allow that some tops spin some of the time. Their starting point is that there are only individual entities. Think of M. Thatcher saying that there's no such thing as society. She was speaking as a nominalist.

Propositions do not transcend space and time. I’ve quoted your propositions right here, the product of a particular mind. If it’s easy to demonstrate that a proposition transcends space and time perhaps you might entertain us by doing so. — NOS4A2

It would probably bring clarity if you explained what you think a proposition is.

Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? Is an answer to one also an answer to the other? — Michael

The spin of an electron isn't like a top spinning. Electrons don't actually spin. So to address your question, let's think of tops. One of the properties of tops is that they can spin. The noun/verb issue showing up in this property isn't relevant to nominalism. The nominalist denies that it's appropriate to say that tops have this property.

More AI generated art:

Socrates' (I really like this one)


Nietzsche as a Russian icon:



Karl Marx as Uncle Sam



Random other stuff:

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

It’s not independent, though. You said yourself it’s made of propositions. We make propositions, descriptions, abstract objects, universals, and so they are forever dependent on the human mind. They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else. — NOS4A2

A proposition is a state of affairs. Propositions transcend time and space by definition. It's easy to demonstrate that they can't be the product of any particular mind, and if they're products of mind at all, it would be in a Kantian sense. An individual human may give expression to a proposition by uttering a sentence, but in that act, the only thing with spacial and temporal extension is the marks or sounds of the utterance.

But even if you reject the above and opt for some sort of hard behaviorism, you've still given an abstract foundation to descriptions: us.

If abstractions like words do not exist then this debate is non-existent. — I like sushi

I agree we can't escape the use 9f abstract objects and universals.

the contention for the nominalist is that abstract objects and universals do not exist independently of descriptions — NOS4A2

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

Or you can define "description" as a specific action on the part of a specific human, in which case electrons are only negatively charged during those describing activities.

Do you have another option?

Your belief in universals indicates knowledge of the world — Gregory

In the OP, I offered to take either side of the debate. I'm interested in where the arguments lead.

Do we say they have the universal of tree-ness and shrub-ness at the same time? — Gregory

Sometimes things have contrary properties, but the forms don't. :grin: That's from Plato's Parmenides.

Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is — Gregory

This suggests that the whole issue is beyond our ability to answer because we can't see beyond our own minds.

But we struggle to say something about it anyway. I think universals and abstract objects do have something to do with the architecture of the mind. I don't have the vantage point necessary to go further though, and say that this architecture fools us. How do we decide which part of our experiences are lies? Occam says properties are lies. Hume said the object is. How would I know who's right?

I don’t know. I’m not a physicist. I’m only saying that we’re speaking about electrons when defining their movements in mathematical terms, such as with “spin”. — NOS4A2

Spin is a particular kind of momentum, which is mass times velocity. Spin is represented as a vector. The electron itself is a point particle. It doesn't have any volume. Electrons are negatively charged.

The above description of spin and electrons is full of universals and abstract objects. If you deny the existence of those properties, you have no real terms with which to explain what an electron is. "Electron" becomes a blank.

But we already describe what an electron is. We’re speaking about an electron when defining its movements in mathematical terms. So I do not see what you mean. — NOS4A2

Are you saying that speaking of a specific electron's movements is sufficient to give the word "electron" its conventional meaning?