• Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    As far as I can tell, your assertions about consciousness relegate it permanently to the status of a nescio quid. You affirm that there is a consciousness but aver that it cannot be measured or known in any way. — Pantagruel
    Cannot presently be measured. It can be known because we have it ourselves. We experience experience. WE notice there is experiencing. It is a facet of the most immanent there is. All else is derived from it. But the kinds of third person knowledge of it, which one has in science, it is currently beyond. We cannot know it like we can know electric eels' electric field strength, to pull an example out of a hat. With this latter we can get readings on devices. We don't know what it fees like, if it does, for the eel itself when it instigates the field. And then with consciousness in general, we don't know where it is and where it is not. We can however experience it from inside.
    I don't know what this mystery thing is, but the consciousness that is under investigation, which does include any and all qualia typically associated with conscious experience, is what I myself am speaking of when I use the term consciousness. — Pantagruel
    That's what I am referring to also.

    and then, well, there's all this, I also said earlier....
    Actually it's not. I am not assuming that minds and consciousness are different things. I am simply pointing out that epistemologically we can track minds and what they do, but we cannot track consciousness. Perhaps these are indeed facets of the same thing. But we can measure one and not the other. Just as we can track behavior - which is how we track minds - or we can track glucose uptake, but we can't track consciousness because we do not know what is conscious and what is not. And perhaps that means we do not also know what has mind or not. Current research into plant intelligence - a phrase that is no longer fringe - is finding many of the behaviors of animal minds. But then we can't communicate and the chemisty is different. So we can neither rule out consciousness nor can we confirm it. Perhaps plants and some computers now can do many things that minds can do without being aware, without experiencing. Perhaps the functions always correlate with being aware. We don't know. I am not asserting dual substances. I am saying we don't know where consciousness begins and ends. Perhaps yes mind, where there is mind, is always the same as the consciousness that is there, but perhaps there is a rudimentary consciousness in all matter. I am blackboxing the monism vs. dualism debate and also being cautious.

    And given the history of science's rather late getting it that animals had both minds and consciousness I am wary of leaping in an assuming we know what experiencing must be coupled to. Perhaps it need no be coupled to what we call minds. Which does not mean that our consciousness is a separate substrance from our minds (or brains).
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    There wouldn't be a distinction between minds and consciousness. That is just continuing to use the false-dichotomy from the material-mind paradigm. — Pantagruel
    Actually it's not. I am not assuming that minds and consciousness are different things. I am simply pointing out that epistemologically we can track minds and what they do, but we cannot track consciousness. Perhaps these are indeed facets of the same thing. But we can measure one and not the other. Just as we can track behavior - which is how we track minds - or we can track glucose uptake, but we can't track consciousness because we do not know what is conscious and what is not. And perhaps that means we do not also know what has mind or not. Current research into plant intelligence - a phrase that is no longer fringe - is finding many of the behaviors of animal minds. But then we can't communicate and the chemisty is different. So we can neither rule out consciousness nor can we confirm it. Perhaps plants and some computers now can do many things that minds can do without being aware, without experiencing. Perhaps the functions always correlate with being aware. We don't know. I am not asserting dual substances. I am saying we don't know where consciousness begins and ends. Perhaps yes mind, where there is mind, is always the same as the consciousness that is there, but perhaps there is a rudimentary consciousness in all matter. I am blackboxing the monism vs. dualism debate and also being cautious.

    And given the history of science's rather late getting it that animals had both minds and consciousness I am wary of leaping in an assuming we know what experiencing must be coupled to. Perhaps it need no be coupled to what we call minds. Which does not mean that our consciousness is a separate substrance from our minds (or brains).
    Everything that emerges establishes functional systems at its own level. Consciousness qua consciousness is perfectly explicable and can be studied to the extent that its activities exhibit systematicity. Which the activities of consciousness certainly do. — Pantagruel
    You are talking about activities. We do not know that all consciousnes is active.

    You also use the term 'emergent', but we do not know at what point consciousness emerges or why it does there.

    We used to think it emerged only in humans, and not that long ago, in fact in my lifetime.
    In fact, there are people designing neural nets now that don't solve a problem directly (the problem is coded at the level of the hidden neurons) but solve it by having the neurons link in a way that mimics neurons in the brain. So the physically-faithful neural net can solve the same problems as the concept-driven neural net, but the physical model is much larger and less efficient. — Pantagruel

    But none of this lets us know if they have designed a non-conscious problem solver or something that is conscious. We don't know.

    Perhaps it's only present in carbon based complicated systems...for some reason.

    We don't have this yet.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    ↪Pantagruel
    If I go back to your first post in the thread...
    ↪Pantagruel

    it seems to me you are writing about minds, not consciousness. Yes, we can look at what minds do, especially if they can talk and write.

    Experiencing is another story.
  • Hard problem of consciousness is hard because...
    Consciousness is no less tangible than atoms. — Pantagruel
    Neither is perceptible to touch.

    But then there are ways to look at an atom: with an electron microscope. Or see its effects: in particle cloud chambers.

    But I can only experience consciousness in myself. I can infer it in others. But I cannot, for example, say what is not conscious. Perhaps plants are. Once, not long ago, we thought we could only say we were conscious - in science that is. Up to the late 60s and even somewhat beyond, it was taboo to assume animal consciousness (that is awareness). Now we feel like the inference is strong enough. Great. But we have no way to measure it - how much there is. Whether is is present in an organism or not. Whether it is a facet of all matter or not.

    We can look at behavior and functions. We can check the memory of something. We can see if reacts to stimuli and decide it is conscious. But we cannot be sure a consciousness, rudimentary or otherwise, is not presence. Just the reactions. The behavior. But behavior need not be present in relation to consciousness.

    We don't know what is aware or not.

    We cannot measure it.

    It is not like atoms or anything else. Not yet can we say it is, at least.
  • Is there a spiritual dimension
    ↪Marc
    I was mainly responding to the idea that I 'could conceive them in waking life'. That's not true for many of my dreams. I simply cannot do those kinds of conceptual blendings intentionally and when I awake I cannot really see what I saw in the dream. I just sort of know that the house was sort of a body of water and it made sense in the dream.

    But even going beyond that: I have had dreams that were sort of two dimensional visually, but with the sense that the patterns I was looking at were beings, but not like beings in this universe. There were feelings - unpleasant in the specific one I am thinking of that I had semi-regularly when I was younger. I I did make a couple of descriptive statements here, ones that gesture to what I experienced, but that's as far as I can go.

    Most of my dreams I can give more description, like I did for dreams that while I cannot create them in waking life, I can describe to some degree. But now and then I have experiences in dreaming sleep that are not describable.
  • Is there a spiritual dimension
    Whenever I dream it is always of something that I could conceive of while conscious, or something derived from my past experiences. — Marc
    I think that verb 'could' is very problematic. I often have dreams that include content I could not have made in waking life. Where I am talking to someone who is a bit like three different people in my life but not quite any of them. In a room that is a body of water but also somehow at the same time a school I went to.

    Now that I have described a recent dream, a bit abstractly, and thought about it. I could try to think about something like that. Try to combine a few different people and imagine a conversation with that composite, while in that composite environment and as a person not quite like my wakign self experiencing this. I could try to do that. I don't think I have the skill to end up with that even already knowing what it was like.

    You are focused on nouns. And most of my dream objects and entities are nouns I am aware of in every day life, However some are not even that. They are composites or things that make no sense on waking. There are landscapes that make no sense and have no real life correlates.
  • Do you lean more toward Continental or Analytic philosophy?
    ↪Pfhorrest
    continental philosophy is more right brain, analytic more left brain. I mean this not so much in the pop psychology sense, but more in the sense Iain McGilchrist presents in his The Master and His Emissary.
  • Pursuit of happiness and being born
    How about slavery, conquering other peoples, public executions, torture, etc. that happened for millenia? These people would tell you the same thing. The wrong actions are a pattern. Doesn't mean they are right. — schopenhauer1
    I am not arguing that a pattern that is present for a long time is right. I am arguing that breaking that pattern bears the onus. My values, which I don't consider objective, include disliking all those things on the list. I would assume when encountering someone who thinks those are ok and can point to a long tradition would consider me to have the onus, especially if they have the power to carry them out in their country or culture. I don't consider them right, but it would be something I would, and do, struggle against. I feel not the slighest urge to try to end the continued existence of all sentient life. That doesn't fit with my values.
    Being a parent is a preference, a want. I don't need to prove this any more than I need to prove wanting a new car is a want. We would have to define what is natural and not natural. If you don't do X you will die is natural. Wants and preferences are a mixture of cultural cues and personal preferences. Procreation falls under this. Breathing does not. Without breathing you will die and be in horrible pain and discomfort. Breathing can be stopped and will lead to death. Procreating does not. Someone not getting a new car might be upset, but they will not die. — schopenhauer1

    I notice that you did not respond to all the other examples I made: running, eating meat, and so on. You just focus on breathing and parenting. Nor to do you address the fact that every single species, including all other social mammals and thus primates procreate. Procreation seems to be natural to all life. And note here we are nowhere near the territory of the naturalist fallacy. The issue is, is it natural. And the answer is obvious. You avoided dealing with the fact that your argument that one can choose not to means it is not natural does not hold, since there are many natural things that we can choose to do or not. Even individual animals may not choose to do the same things other individuals of their species do. This does not suddenly mean the others are not being natural.

    Again, forcing people into life, even with some positive outcomes is still forcing. How does this get to bypass the non-aggression principle? — schopenhauer1
    I don't think framing it as aggression works. We all make decisions every day that affect other people without their consent. Perhaps these can be framed as aggression, but generally I think it is misleading. In any case I don't follow some 'never aggress' principle.

    I had a whole thread on this.. things that cause physical pleasure can be considered "natural".. but procreation still doesn't fall under this, only sex. Please see this link to see what I deem to fall under "natural" and reasoning for this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6896/what-distinguishes-natural-human-preferences-from-simply-personal-ones — schopenhauer1
    Hello. I mentioned sex to demonstrate that just because some people choose not to have sex, it does not make it unnatural. If you agree then your argument that procreation is not natural because we can choose not to do it does not hold. You are shifting the context. You argued that if we can choose not to, it is not natural. Your link only backs up my arguing, as do the other examples of things that we do that are natural that some members of our species abstrain from and all could abstain from.

    I can only say causing suffering and forcing others are first principles. — schopenhauer1
    They may be your first principles, but they are not mind. I certainly try to avoid hurting people, unless other values arise. I do not give either of those a veto power, and I doubt you do either. I doubt you will stop arguing for anti-natalism if you find that some people find the discussion unpleasant. I doubt your personal life involves avoiding all possible ways your actions might lead to people suffering. But in any case, you assume that your values are correct and see others as having to accept your principles by default. I don't accept either as a veto value. Your onus to show I should and that they are somehow objectively good.
    I already stated earlier that we've held popular notions about other things such as slavery and this is not excuse for why something is justified. — schopenhauer1
    I have not made any argument saying that X is popular so it is good. There is a practical onus on anyone wanting to change things. I don't share your values. You have done nothing to convince me that it was best if all sentient species stopped procreating. That that would be a better universe. All fauna stop existing. That doesn't seem better to me. I think others will disagree also based on their values. Since procreation is natural, sentient life will continue. This doesn't mean it is therefore right, but the onus is on you to stop this all somehow. Personally I would hate it if you and the other anti-natalists managed to end all animals life - there is in fact growing evidence that plants may feel pain, so it might be the end of all life that will satisfy your value.

    If there are objective values, it seems possible to me that you, a fallible human, should admit your values might be incorrect or incorrectly prioritized and you are therefore risking causing harm. And that's if there are objective values.

    But my main reaction to your post is that you avoided actually dealing with my points. You recontexualized at least one - the sex one, which was not arguing that sex being natural means procreation is natural or good, but rather that sex is natural DESPITE it being something we can choose to abstrain from - countering you conflation of things we can choose not to do and unnatural acts.

    I had to repeat myself in the previous post and yet you continued to conveniently interpret things incorrectly and then added in the evasions I mentioned above. And in this post I have had to repeat things a third time since you recontextualize in convenient ways, making up straw men arguments and not dealing with arguments.

    To put it simply, you are wasting my time.

    I'll ignore you at least for a while.
  • Pursuit of happiness and being born
    This is a non-sequitor. How is procreation being "natural" good because it is natural? That is the fallacy at hand here. In that regard, I don't see the onus met. — schopenhauer1
    AGain, I didn't argue it was. But since it is natural the onus is on the other side to say, wait, now we know more stuff than we used to, we should stop. IOW there is no reason to stop being natural and following our urges unless it can be demonstrated it is wrong. This is different from me saying it is good because it is natural. Killing over mates is fairly natural, but I don't think that it's good or even neutral. But if there is something - swallowing, socializing, running, playing, singing, play fighting, whatever - that we have done and desire to do, it seems to me the onus is on those saying we should stop doing this. We should interfere with the pattern we already have. We have this pattern. If you want to stop it, I think you bear the onus.
    Yes I am. I am arguing that in the human species it is social cues and pressures- that of the family, tribe, larger society that instill a preference. It is not an inborn preference per se. Of course the effect of sex is naturally the possibility of procreating a child, but that is not talking about a natural instinct, but a natural consequence. — schopenhauer1
    Well, there certainly are cultural pressures and norms. But i think it would be odd that out of all the social mammals and every other creature on the planet procreating is not natural since we can choose not to. I think that's a category error. And the fact that there are norms and pressures does not demonstrate that it is not natural to want children. It might raise the issue, but it is not evidence that it is not natural. You would need to do some kind of control group testing - or find some actual evidence that without cultural norms we would not have children. Personally I consider this unlikely. This is partly given that I would think our genes would select for the desire to procreate and seems to have in all surviving species. This is partl because women I know have talked about a physical desire to be pregnant. And then desires from parents related to having a family, having that role, seem more that simply culturally detemined. I see a bit of swingroom in that last one, but next to nothing in the first. And little in the second. There might be fewer children, but that the human race would stop procreating...I'd need to see some serious evidence of that. Further you are now saying that human culture is not part of nature. I think that also bears an onus. And yes, I realize that we often contrast nature and culture, but here we are talking about what members of a species do and we procreate and always have, obviously, going back before cultures arose.
    I think this is non-analogous. Breathing and not feeling immediate pain would indeed be more natural instinct and reflex. Procreation is much more nuanced. It is a decision that can be deliberated upon, not like the immediate need to go to the bathroom or breath some oxygen. — schopenhauer1
    I can deliberate on suicide and choose it. And I think I even said one can choose to overcome the urge to breathe, in fact override the resistance to not inhaling water. We can choose to fast, after deliberation, even for weeks. This does not make eating unnatural. Or that eating daily is unnatural. We can choose to always walk, thinking that running is stressful. This does not make running unnatural. I could choose to be a vegetarian or a vegan. This does not mean that eating meat is unnatural. I could choose to be celibate, this does not mean sex is unnatural. I could easily come up with many other examples in many other categories.

    There's a lot of fallacies that I see in there. If I am incorrect, literally no actual person suffers. — schopenhauer1
    Well, you have to point out the fallacies. And yes, no one would suffer.

    You have as the one criterion 'suffering'. That's your value.

    Obviously not everyone shares that value as the only one or even the top priority.

    So, you bear the onus to prove that we all should make that the veto value. If someone suffers and it could be prevented or not caused, we must do that.

    IOW you have created, more or less, a deontological commandment. So you need to demonstrate 1) objective values like this exist and 2) this is the one that must have veto power over all other values, if any.

    You can take the line, which I think you and some of your peers have, that we must be contradicting ourselves, but that's going to be a tough line to take if we don't believe in objective values.
    Causing someone to feel bad and causing a whole lifetime for someone else I don't see as comparable. If someone feels bad because they can't force someone to do what they want, that is not necessarily bad. — schopenhauer1
    Not necessarily. So it might be. And this means you might be doing something bad here. Further trying to end all sentient life, in order to prevent suffering that was not consented to, it seems to me bears quite and onus. Yes, no one suffers. But then no one does anything else.

    You have stopped all that. You need to show that those of us who value parts of that or all of that that our values are wrong.
    A lot of people would like to force their views and agendas on others. It doesn't mean they should. — schopenhauer1

    I am not saying anyone should give birth.
  • Pursuit of happiness and being born
    Not quite sure your argument here. You seem to make a point, and then realize that one can object to it because it falls under the naturalistic fallacy. So there can be two points..

    1) It is naturalistic fallacy to think that if something is natural, it is good.     — schopenhauer1
    Right, but the onus is on those saying it is bad to show it is bad. I don't see that onus met.
    2) Procreation maybe a natural consequence of sex, but the preference for procreating new people is not necessarily natural — schopenhauer1
    It is present in all species of mammals we know of. Yes, there are exceptions. Some people don't want kids. But it is certainly natural to procreate and have children. Are you really arguing that it isn't?
    The human doesn't have a mating system, and a human can choose to do any number of things. There is no "if then" absolute instinct to procreate like other animals. Rather, we understand a whole range of outcomes that come from procreation. — schopenhauer1

    It seems like you are conflating natural with 'something one is forced to do.' Yes, we don't have to have children, but that doesn't mean it isn't natural. I can choose to override my natural urge not to drown. That doesn't mean that my urges to not drown are no longer natural.

    It seems to me that the logical end of your position would be the end of all sentient life.

    I don't see how you can make the decision that that is moral and strive towards that outcome, given that you might be incorrect that this is a better universe simply to make sure that you haven't caused suffering in someone who has not consented to it - even though every cell will grab and choose life. You want to make decisions without consent for all future life. Yes, you will not have caused suffering - though perhaps you will cause suffering in those who come to view themselves as immoral when they are not.
  • A listing of existents
    Clearly, of things that exist, a whole raft of them exist as ideas. I think material existence still stands, notwithstanding Berkeley, of which we discovered that while he could deny material - and what that means is another topic - he affirmed reality and the reality of things like stones. And it seems there are two to be added that don't fit in these: force, and process. — tim wood
    I wasn't questioning it along Berkleyian lines. I was saying it no longer means anything. It is a placeholder term for real. Or verified. It sounds like it is describing a certain substance type, but it isn't. It just means it exists.
    The list, then, of classes of things that exist (as how they exist):
    1) material things,
    2) ideas/mental constructs,
    3) forces,
    4) processes.     — tim wood
    Materialists consider forces real and material. As they do processes. And most would consider ideas merely a facet of certain kinds of (conscious) matter. Something like length or vibration. Not a new substance. Obviously you disagree, but you need to show how they are wrong because scientific materialism has swallowed everything. Even though it no longer means anything.
  • "Agnosticism"
    ↪NOS4A2
    I have made that exact same arguments with certain agnostics, but it does not hold for all agnostics only for those who say that no one can know. The one who uses possibility in sense number two in my post above. Someone who says they cannot rule something out. And I think they would be correctly estimating their ability to rule out.

    There are a variety of agnosticisms, some being simply factual descriptions of the person's beliefs/lack of beliefs, some epistemological and these latter in a variety of forms.

    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/#DefiAgno

    I think some of these need not in any way be coupled with smugness. In fact, if anything, some strike me as the opposite.
  • Immodesty of an Egoist Mind
    ↪Gus Lamarch
    Here's the only applicable point...
    What i'm doing that put my state-proclaimed liberty in danger is that i'm trying to aware what i call the "intelectual minority". People who have desire for self-freedom, individuals who are willing to destroy the order, to built a new, functional, egoist, society, but with this act, the state, through its power in the "herd majority", can very well exile, punish, and even rob my own self.
    I see nothing you have written in your threads here that would annoy the State. It is at a level of extreme abstraction. Has the State made any noises through any of its bureaucracies or law enforcement to punish you in any way. Can you point to someone who has written the types of posts you have written here that has been punished? I do understand that you are critical of certain ideas and of states and certain values and complacencies that if you got thousands of followers might very well anger the state. Though in that case you would have to get into specifics and also have prescriptive portions of your posts. I still don't see it. It seems like dramatizing without foundantion.
  • A listing of existents
    1) All material things.
    2) All other things existing by reference, but not material, as ideas/mental constructs.     — tim wood

    I don't think 'material' is a meaningful term. It changes over time and includes things that have qualities and lack qualities people a couple of hundred years ago would have considered material. It is an expanding set with shifting criteria. I think Terrapin's mock or perhaps serious suggestion 'stuff' works much better, since that rules out nothing and has no metaphysical baggage - that is obvious, at least.

    My list

    1) Things/processes we consider real - some of which we are likely incorrect about - some things simply don't exist, others did once, but no longer do.
    2) Things/processes we consider possible and in fact are real. Some stuff that is possible might not exist yet and so it is non-existent, unless time is not what some of think it is.
    3) Things/processes we consider not real/impossible - but which in fact are real
    4) Stuff we haven't imagined that exists.
  • Abolish the Philosophy of Religion forum
    You could say the same thing about discussions elsewhere on the forum, with the same justification. — SophistiCat
    I agree and I also think it is taking two to tango in all of those not up to snuff discussions. People rarely seem to notice what their own team is doing in these threads, and it ain't pretty.
  • Abolish the Philosophy of Religion forum
    Because after years of reading in the Philosophy of Religion Forum, I cannot remember any thread there that was a philosophical discussion. — tim wood
    We should also get rid of discussions of metaphysics, politics, feminism, definitely anti-natalism...

    in fact as I think of it, most threads seem to not meet the criteria of good philosophical discussion. People talk past each other. People cherry pick. People use straw man arguments. People insult. People go in circles and repeat arguments I have seen years ago.

    Let's make the whole thing a Lounge.

    (and yes, I know, there are likely differences of degree between subjects and I am being polemical, though that quality should fit in well in the thread.)
  • "Agnosticism"
    ↪NOS4A2
    There are two ways of thinking something is possible.

    1) Given the nature of the universe and what I know about it, it is possible X happened or exists. I see know that the basic ground for such a thing is there. Whether it does exist or did happen is contingent.

    2) Given that I am a limited being with limited knowledge, I cannot rule out that X happened or exists.

    These are very different types of claims. In fact the second is much more an acknowledgment of limitation rather than a claim about what is.
  • "Agnosticism"
    The agnostic's facade of humility and caution conceals a smug superiority: you fools believe that God exists, or doesn't exist; I'm above all that. Mind you, as smartarse Nosferatu annoyingly points out, agnostics have to believe in the possibility of God. — Chris Hughes
    I have seen this stated. But again, I don't think it is necessary, especially in the case where one notices that knowledge changes over time and some things that are ruled out have turned out to be the case. I am sure some agnostics are smug. I don't think it necessarily follows from their beliefs (which are epistemological, at least in the main on this issue).
  • Exploring analytical philosophy with Banno
    they might very well get very different ideas about Jack.
    — Coben
    . Yes, indead. About Jack.     — Banno
    Was someone suggesting that there are actually two objects of discussion? Or was it more like each of you is discussing your model and not Jack? If it is the latter case, this certainly happens? I would guess you encounter people who are referring to a person or a thing, but in their description you are convinced they are not really experiencing that thing. For example their ideas about what the thing is like are so strongly affecting their descriptions they are not describing that thing. As opposed to somewhat accurately describing their experience of the thing or person their itneractions have eilcited. So it seems possible that people can be talking about their models, at least to me. Then to me it is a question of how much they are doing this.
  • "Agnosticism"
    ↪Chris Hughes
    It allows that something that is called supernatural might exist. It also allows, in some versions of agnosticism, that some things/phenomena currently not verified, for example scienctifically, might be verified later. One might say it is open to the possibility that somethings considered not simply unreal but impossible to detect (supernatural) may, it turns out, be real (natural) and detectable. I don't see that as a smug position - though humans can be smug about just about anything - but tending more likely towards an epistemologically humble or at least cautious position.
  • Exploring analytical philosophy with Banno
    ↪Banno
    Don't you have to have a head to be bald? I'd say it's false. I wouldn't say my dishwasher is bald. Even if a few hairs were stuck to its top.
  • Exploring analytical philosophy with Banno
    For me it's a carry over from critique of indirect realism. When I talk about my cat, Jack, I'm not talking about a model-of-Jack that sits in my head; I'm talking about that cat. When you talk about Jack, you are talking about the cat, not your model-of-Jack. So we both manage to be talking about the very same thing - Jack; and not two seperate things, our distinct models-of-Jack. — Banno

    If Jack relates to each of you differently - which is at least minimally likely - then what you talk about when you talk about Jack will be different. The ideas you have about Jack will be different - unless you are tracking carefully what the other is likely experiencing of Jack. If one of you was bitten by a cat when young and doesn't realize how this affects how you view cats or feel around them, this will affect your senses of cats and Jack. You are both trying your best to talk about one creature. I am not suggesting that there are two cats or some kind of immenent multiverse. It might make more sense to say you are each talking FROM your models (though I might prefer some other term like aggregate of assumptions/impressions and conclusions (pardon it's unweildiness.)

    In any case, if you each spoke to others they might very well get very different ideas about Jack. And that's even if neither of you were quite careful to work from your experiences and both good observers. This would likely be even more true if Jack was a person.
  • Immodesty of an Egoist Mind
    In the age in which we live, which is called by the nomenclature - "Contemporary" -, it's inhospitable to the thoughts and emotions that overlap the individual's overlapping reins — Gus Lamarch
    What emotions do you find the age we live in inhospitable to?

    You earlier said people were not willing to take risks for liberty. What risks do you take?
  • Pursuit of happiness and being born
    Indeed, I think procreation violates a principle of non-aggression. Oddly, borrowing from the political discourse of the libertarian right (non-aggression principle), by procreating a person, you are aggressively forcing your view (LITERALLY!) on someone else. — schopenhauer1
    Are animals aggressively forcing their view on their offspring?
    At what point in evolution did having children become an aggression against not yet existing creatures?

    Having children is natural to animals. The anti-natalist, it seems to me, bears the onus for demonstrating why a natural process should not occur. This does not mean I think if it happens in nature it is good. I just see natalist arguments as intending to stop all further generations from existing and all sentient creatures from procreating. I haven't seen anything remotely like a strong enough argument for this. One can project a natalist argument on everyone and then attack that, as you do here, but I don't see it as carrying much weight in relation to the AN project.
  • The False Argument of Faith
    I understand faith to be a method of acquiring belief rather than justification as your diagram seems to suggest. Perhaps people use the word "faith" in that manner and I'm not aware of it.

    By definition, faith as a method of acquiring belief short-circuits the "normal" or preferred use of well-crafted logical arguments. This logical failing stands out like a sore thumb for all to see and pick apart at will.     — TheMadFool
    But then precisely as you say, it is not a logical argument. It is not a reason for you to believe. It is how they come to believe. It isn't failing as an argument just as an orange doesn't fail to be a bicycle. Though this seems to be what you are saying in the first paragraph above. But shifting in the second.

    Again, I am sure some humans might throw faith as a step into an intended to be logical argument to convince others, but in general it seems to me faith is presented as precisely not logical. And also not something to convince others, but part of what one can do (and it is recommended by some, generally Christians) to do in relation to God adn the idea of God.
  • The False Argument of Faith
    ↪Gus Lamarch
    Is faith an argument? I know there are all kinds of theists, so some theists may use their faith as an argument for your belief. So anything is possible. But in general, it seems to me, faith is precisely not an argument. One might use the fact of one's faith in part of an explanation. But in general is seems to me faith is precisely not an argument. It is not based on reasoning and is presented as this. One can reason to the side of faith. One can say other reasons why one believes. But faith itself (as in a leap of faith, for example) is about chosing to believe directly.
  • Why is so much rambling theological verbiage given space on 'The Philosophy Forum' ?
    Trump claims to be a christian; I'm sure all the sociopaths running corporate america do as well. That's the problem: there are millions of people who claim to be christians whose hypocrisy is flagrant. Unless it is perfectly all right for christians to lie, cheat, steal, worship money, grab women by the pussy, etc. — uncanni
    Sure, they add this label on. It doesn't cost them much and it gains them something with some people. But they'd be sociopaths if everyone forgot Jesus tomorrow.

    I think there are less public figures with tremendous power who do not bother to claim to be Christian. They will tend to speak up for other ideologies, like neo-liberalism or neo-conservatism and the atheist technocrats do their bidding without blinking.
  • Do you lean more toward Continental or Analytic philosophy?
    ↪Terrapin Station
    I think that's all fair and generally true. I have a some college philosophy behind me, but mostly its been my own pursuit, so I take my conclusions with a large grain of salt, but I would add that analytic philosophy seems more ahistorical. I think there is a sense of getting at culture free truths and not by cateloguing a lot of contingent or potentially contingent stuff: history, culture, psychology. And then working in relation to the sciences, coming up with definitions for already existing terms and being, in general, fairly content, once definitions are in place. Continental seems much more focused on culture - language and power being habitual focii, psychology, history. It is much more likely to create terms, as you say, though I would add that I think they think this is their job: to come up with new concepts. I think there is some fairness in saying Kant was continental since he was fairly pro sitting around and working it out non-empirically. On the other hand vast sections of his work seem very happily in the analytical tradition. I think he can be used by both.

    Both groups seems extremely problematic to me when they have overweening confidence (I know, that's tautological, given 'overweening') The conteninentals can drive right into the Sokal controversy making up a lot of shit and cherry picking from a dozen fields on their way there for a picnic. The little journey sounded grandiose, tale told by an idiot type stuff, however. And the analytical can think they have evaded all that contingent, cultural, psychological stuff. They can think of themselves as the rational team, under control, knowing their assumptions, when this is simply because their culture seems obvious to them.

    But it also seems to me they are trying to do rather different things and solve different problems.
  • Why is so much rambling theological verbiage given space on 'The Philosophy Forum' ?
    ↪uncanni
    Well, sure. I am not saying they are 'without sin' (lol). But I think the real threats come from people who are much more cynical about belief and generally secular. And who will happily say whatever, depending on the audience, to increase their power.
  • Why is so much rambling theological verbiage given space on 'The Philosophy Forum' ?
    Yes, indeed it does, but whose delusions cause harm to other people? — uncanni
    Pharma, the gm industry, the nanotech industry, the neo cons....the list is long. Fundamentalists, on the scale of global or even national power, come in low on the list. They get used by the real power centers and yes, they align themselves, often, but not always with the real power abusers - but then so do good old regular secular people.
  • Immodesty of an Egoist Mind
    but none are willing to put their own state-proclaimed "liberty" in danger!
    — Gus Lamarch
    How are you, now, putting your state-proclaimed 'liberty' in danger?

    What is it you are hoping others will do     — Coben
  • Why is so much rambling theological verbiage given space on 'The Philosophy Forum' ?
    This is a philosophy forum, and the concern ought to be what is real, what is true. Just because fundamentalism provides a kind of artificial refuge for those who can't handle reality, doesn't make it right. — Wayfarer
    Perhaps fundamentalism is on the extreme edge of the bell curve as a 'refuge for those who can't handle reality', but that covers most of us to varying degrees. How many of our beliefs about the opposite sex, good parenting, politics, ontology, epistemology, identity, the value and place of emotions, how good and competent we are, why we have problems, what leads to success, when enhances learning

    are actually founded on anything but guesses and hand me down introjected ideas
  • Is life sacred, does it have intrinsic value?
    ↪DingoJones
    No worries. I thought it was a large jump and now I got where you're coming from.
  • On beginning a discussion in philosophy of religion
    ↪180 Proof
    But notice you shifted from atheists - what he wrote about - to scientific epistemology. yes, I agree and I would guess MU would agree that there is nothing inherent in science - in fact quite the contrary as you point out - to support this attitude. And yet it is there. First off atheists need not be scientists. But even beyond this scientists themselves have encountered this kind of reaction when they present to peers research that does or seems to contradict current models. IOW even people who should know better since they actually work with the epistemology, rather than just being a fan of it's findings, can act as if knowledge is final, current models are final. Of course theists do this kind of thing also. It is a human tendency to consider one's models final. But it is a problematic one, and especially so if the epistemology you are implicitly or explicitly supporting as the rational one is open to revision, does consider it likely that knowledge is currently incomplete.

    As a somewhat related example: advocates of evolution - and please note, I believe in current evolutionary theory: so many times I have found people arguing that evolution means survival of the fittest and this entails stronger organisms - rather than organisms well adapted to the environments they live in. Smaller physically weaker organisms my be better adapted. Or that any trait an animal has must be beneficial - when in fact it may be neutral, it just didn't lead to that species being selected out of existence. Or they engage in teleological explanations for traits.

    Just because people tend to be fans of science - which atheists do tend to be, but need not to be atheists - does not mean they even understand basic things about science. I have often found myself in disagreement with people who are identifying as 'on the science team' who are confused about all sorts of scientific facts and theory, let alone what scientific epistemology entails. And I have encountered the implicit assumption that science is complete in a wide range of topics. If X were true, they would know.
  • Is life sacred, does it have intrinsic value?
    What about in the case of life in prison, do you think we should spend the resources to lock the worst of us up in a cage untill they die of natural causes? — DingoJones

    That's an extremely different example from what you said below...

    It was more the context of something like someone braindead but kept alive by medical technology. — DingoJones

    I don't think that's the same context at all. I can see making a solid argument in favor of considering life in prison no real life, but you just expanded the context.

    Who decides for the person in prison?
    Who decides what is a high enough quality of life?

    In the context of the brain dead patient, we are presuming that there is no one experiencing anything. That, to me, is a qualitative difference. IOW if we compost that body other life can flourish. We can easily think life is sacred and turn off that person's life support, without even the loss of complicated advanced life being lost.
  • On beginning a discussion in philosophy of religion
    This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover


    Strawman (1).     — 180 Proof
    I have enountered this argument made by atheists. That current scientific knowledge precludes the possibility of a deity. I suppose we could try to figure out if 'Many' in the assertion he made is fair or not, but otherwise it certainly seems true that some atheists believe this is the case.
  • On beginning a discussion in philosophy of religion
    This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Or any of a wide range of phenomena. Just as medicine does somatic conditions. It's natural, we work with our models. But if you are going to put yourself in the position of claiming to be on the rational/sane team with the right to judge others irrational/insane, then having a basic knowledge of the history of your own discipline and what this implies about current knowledge seems a must to me.
  • Is life sacred, does it have intrinsic value?
    ↪DingoJones
    I guess my only sense in which I would think that life is important is if they had a chance of coming back. In this case we have something that is quasi-alive. Only kept going via artificial support. Which is fine if it might come back to being full life again.
  • On beginning a discussion in philosophy of religion
    I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. — Metaphysician Undercover
    Yes, but if you think you have a parasite but get sent to a psychiatrist for having chemical imbalances leading to hypochondriacal symptoms, it ends up being the same thing. The doctor is ruling out that you have a traditional physical illness caused by some organism or cancer, etc.
    IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion.

    This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism. — Metaphysician Undercover
    Agreed.
  • Supernatural magic
    But what do you think? — jorndoe
    I think some of what gets classed as supernatural magic is real. I said 'classed as' since I think these phenomena are simply things that science has not (yet) or perhaps cannot confirm or won't in the near future, but they are real phenomena. One could say I consider them natural, in the sense that they are part of the potential processes of reality. Not things that are 'super' to reality. They are not breaking rules, they follow rules or laws or potentials. I have experienced enough of some of these pheneomena to be convinced.
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