Well said.

I'll take issue with the bolded bit; the certainty here is in language use. So it is misleading to talk of certainty being inherent; except perhaps as inherent in the use to which the language is being put. — Banno

This is where the majority of our difference lies. I think there is no certainty in language use. Look at the way you use "justify" compared to me. Look at this thread, and the different ideas of what
"God" means to different people.

You might claim that there is certainty "in the use to which the language is being put", meaning that you are certain of what you are saying, and certain of the effect you desire to get from that use of words, but this does not mean that you are certain that you will get the desired effect when you use words. If you are, then this is a false sense of certitude, because there is always the possibility that the other person will misunderstand and you will not get the desired effect. That is why we must choose our words carefully. This is the case with all things that we do, as human beings, there is always the possibility of failure in any endeavour. So we cannot take success for granted and we must proceed with care and caution, always aware of that possibility of failure, lest it be actualized due to carelessness. That false sense of certitude actually causes carelessness and therefore failure.

So you wish to distinguish things that are beyond doubt from things that we choose not to doubt. I'm not convinced that there is a reasonable distinction to be made here. The archetypal example is the movement of chess pieces. Is it that we choose not to move the bishop along a row, or is it that moving a bishop along a row is beyond doubt? Seems to me to be pretty much both. to doubt that the bishop remains on its diagonal is not to make a choice so much as to fail to understand what a bishop is. The justification for the bishop staying on a diagonal is that's what it does; no more, no less. — Banno

Oh no, this is completely false. The bishop doesn't do a thing. The player moves the bishop, and does so by choice. If a player decides to make a move which the other player thinks is contrary to the rules, they might consult the rules to decide who is right. The rules are there to resolve such doubt. It is not the case that moving the bishop in a row is beyond doubt, because one who has never played the game, and does not know the rules, will have doubt as to how to move the bishop. However, it is the case that doubt as to how to move the bishop is quelled by wanting to play the game, and understanding the rules. Then the player chooses to move the bishop in the correct way.

You must see that it's pure nonsense to say of the bishop moving diagonally, "that's what it does; no more, no less", when in reality this is what the player chooses to do with the bishop. What about the end of the game, when the bishop moves back into the box, isn't this a little more? And when a player gets frustrated and throws the board, the bishop will fly threw the air, and "that's what it does", but it can do a lot more and it can also do a lot less.

One way to look at this is to see the process as keeping track of what you are doing with you language. So one might wonder if the bishop could move along a row; and one might decide to play a game in which the bishop is able to make such moves. To do so is to change what one is doing; one is no longer playing chess per se. — Banno

Sure, but in the case of language use there is no rule which says that we must play this language game, and not some other language game. So you might be playing chess, while I'm playing checkers and tim wood is playing backgammon while wayfarer is playing Ouija, etc.. There's a lot more than four games to play with language so how do you propose to determine what game it is that another person is playing?

So as a mental exercise I might try to put together a coherent theism. To me, this is a bit like wondering what we might change in the rules of chess. — Banno

If this is your mental exercise, then don't you see that the theist is not playing chess at all? You are saying that you'd have to change the rules of your game (chess) to produce a coherent theism, without recognizing that the theist is actually playing a completely different game. Are you ready to play another game, or is chess all you are interested in?

If by "immaterial cause" you mean, "I - we - don't know," and further that "God" is just a shorthand expression for the "I-don't-know", and, the "I-don't-know" itself is meant to imply that we think that there is something to be known, then no further comment from me. — tim wood

The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial.

I find I'm obliged to suppose that those heavy thinkers understood this entirely well but felt for reasons sufficient to them that the idea of God had to be made both real and flesh for most people to find it both acceptable and accessible, as well as to make fate a little easier to reconcile to. . — tim wood

You've just gone off on a tangent without paying attention to a word I've said. First, instead of addressing the logical argument which proves why God is necessarily real, you replace the conclusion with "I don't know". Then, in your ignorance of that argument which demonstrates why God is real, (ignorance professed by "I don't know"), you go off to say that the thinkers "felt" that they had to make the idea of God real. Can't you see that it's not a case of having "felt" this or that sensation, or whatever type of feeling, it's a case of understanding the nature of reality, and therefore knowing that God is real?

No well informed, good Christian, claims that God's existence is material. — Metaphysician Undercover

it's a case of understanding the nature of reality, and therefore knowing that God is real. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's hope yet to reconcile these. First, though, to make clear as possible the opposition.

I hold:
Existence - being - is the highest genus, not a species of any higher genus
"Material" and "real" are synonymous terms that name a species of being/existence. That is, of things that exist, they may be real, material things, like a brick.
There also exist non-material "things." And the two species, material and non-material, are exhaustive of possible forms of existence. Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) Thus unicorns and the wicked witch of the West both exist. Included in this species are verbal constructs, like square circles, that can be named, but for which there is no corresponding idea.

Confusion occurs when ideas are said to be "real." That is, the real of existence side-slips to real as material.

"No... good Christian claims that God's existence is material." All right, a non-material God. For me, that leaves God as idea. And if you like, "real" as idea - but idea, mental construct. If you have a different account for the being of God, please make it clear. It must seem you will need at least a third species of existence. If you create one, please give an account of it that is not circular.

In passing, to say God is immaterial is to say that an isn't is, when in fact you're saying that an is isn't. That is, saying God is immaterial says what he isn't. i invite you to say what he is and in such terms as will command assent.

Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't buy this argument. But I note that in it you make the material/immaterial distinction. If you then deny that God is an idea, your work is cut out for you.

In all of this, I do not for a second disqualify any claim of yours or anyone else's if the claim is made as a claim. That is, as a given condition-without-which-not for your argument. Or, as the "if" in an extended hypothetical, or as a presupposition granted for the sake of argument, or even as an absolute presupposition foundational to your beliefs. But all of this goes back to the "We believe...".

I think in this I have taken the reasonable ground. You can have the unreasonable ground that religion essentially is, though it build structures of reason on it, and in some cases pretty good structures if properly used.

Finally, if a non-material existing God not a construct of mind be granted, then all o the same questions devolve to God. What is he? Where did he come from?

Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) Thus unicorns and the wicked witch of the West both exist. Included in this species are verbal constructs, like square circles, that can be named, but for which there is no corresponding idea. — tim wood

What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it?

So in your example, you choose not to doubt your judgement, that you've seen pumas, where the authorities claim there are none. So your judgement is to you, beyond doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it. I wouldn't say it is beyond doubt for a number of reasons: 1) that is contextless. I could certainly understand why others might doubt it. I wouldn't tell Banno that 'it is beyond doubt there are pumas in New Hampshire.' I have no reason to doubt it, myself. And I would likely make bold statements about it to those I know. Oh, actually, pumas are here...I might say. I might witness even in public contexts. But I would not presume others should just go along with what I say. 2) I could doubt it. Perhaps at some point I would. Maybe I end up seeing a lynx that is enormous and I might think, wow, I didn't realize they could be puma-sized. And further I could doubt in a philosophical sense. Perhaps I am in a simulation.

But in all practical terms, I would likely spend time doubting other things and not that.

Others will doubt you, based on the word of the authorities, so the onus is on you to justify your claim if you want them to believe. If you fail they will continue to doubt you. And, they may be capable or instilling doubt back into your mind. However, if you are certain, and persist, you ought to be able to produce an agreeable conclusion. You could bring the authorities there to analyze the evidence on the ground for example. I agree though, that sometimes an agreeable conclusion is not possible, and this is due to our natural inclination to doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this is often the case. Not just because humans have a tendency to doubt, but because if the experiences are different, then the conclusions will tend to be. Add in paradigmatic biases or model based biases and what is required as evidence can become enormous.

I think there is tremendous resistence to the idea that rational people can rationally reach different conclusions if they have different experiences.

But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible.

To be agnostic is another choice, but I believe that this is also contrary to the natural inclination to doubt. Agnosticism is an abstinence, a refusal to take place in the debate, and the accompanied doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case.

Here's an example: I have seen many doctors tell people they are not sick. IOW the doctor cannot find an illness he or she recognizes and cannot find a physical basis for the symptoms the person claims to have. I have experienced and know countless others have experienced doctors say with great certaintly that 'you' or 'your child' does not have an illness. Often there is a referral to a psychiatrist or psychologist.

Any doctor should of course know that new illnesses arise or ones previously known arise with idiosyncratic symptoms. A more honest and epistemologically grounded response would be: I can find nothing wrong with you. As far as I can tell there is no disease or illness causing your symptoms. It is possible that it is somethign we have not encountered, but I would like you consider that it might be stress related or psychological in origin.

IOW the doctor cannot know there is no underlying physical pathology and agnosticism is both grounded and honest. Even a look at the last 30 years in the history of medicines will innumerable cases where people have been told they are not ill and then it is found out later that they are. Not just individual cases, but even large groups.

And the problem with you example of a shift in technology is that such a shift can only come about as a result of doubting the old technology. Therefore abstaining from doubt, in the form of being agnostic, with the belief that disagreements will sort themselves out in the future, is unjustifiable, because beliefs do not sort themselves out without active participation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You seem to be seeing agnosticism as a permanent state. I don't take it that way. All I am suggesting is that people realize that there are, now, and here and for them personally, epistemological obstacles. These may or may not change.

I am nto suggesting we should just throw up our hands.

We should not assume that we can know all truths now. We should not assume that if something goes against current models (or seems to) it must be false. We should not assume that if the other person is rational and correct they can demonstrate it. We should not assume that individual experiences are irrelevent. We should not assume that two rational people with different experiences should nevertheless draw the same conclusions.

I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.

I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all.

Non-material things are in every case ideas - understood as creations of mind (understood for now as collective human mind, subject to adjustment when the aliens arrive.) — tim wood

This is where we disagree. As the argument I presented shows, there is necessarily a non-material cause which is prior to material things. This cannot be a human idea because the existence of human ideas is limited to after the existence of human beings.

So it is very clear that your definitions which assert that only material things are real, and that immaterial things are dependent on the human mind are unsound, incoherent in relation to other known principles, and need to be replaced with definitions which are closer to the truth.

don't buy this argument. But I note that in it you make the material/immaterial distinction. If you then deny that God is an idea, your work is cut out for you. — tim wood

The argument I presented is quite clear, expressed in very simple terms, and easily understood. "I don't buy this argument" does not demonstrate any weaknesses of the argument. However, the argument demonstrates weakness in your definitions. Therefore, without further ado, your definitions are rejected.

No, I would say that I have no good reason to doubt it. — Coben

But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it? Did you not look in books, or online to confirm that what you thought were pumas, actually were? I assume you were not a specialist on the physical characteristics of pumas prior to seeing them. It's only this activity of confirmation, which is inspired by doubt, which leads you to the position of having "no good reason to doubt". So the situation is not "at some point I would" doubt it, it's 'at some point I did'.

When the judgement is made, doubt is removed, and then a reason is required to revisit the issue with fresh doubt. These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before.

But I think it is the case I given my experiences I can believe that X is the case and this is a rational, sound conclusion for me, but that person B could reach a rational sound different conclusion if he or she lacks experiences I have or has experiences I have not had. I think we could all come up with examples around racism, for example. Hopefully some degree of agnosticism is used as an option in many cases. We do not consider ourselves invincible. — Coben

At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt".

agnoticism can be this, but I am using it in the sense of 'I don't know and can't be sure.' I lack epistemological grounds to dismiss X, but I doubt X is the case. — Coben

Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved.

I was using agnosticism in a metaphorical sense. One decides that one cannot know (for sure) now. Some agnostics will argue that one can never know if a God exists - and this is oddly enough a metaphysical assumption that God is transcendent and therefore one cannot ever know something abou this entity. This is, of course, a response, in part of theological definitions of God, but these will be restricted to, generally, just one camp of theologians in one religion.

I am using agnosticism here as a way of saying - but perhaps I don't know enough to rule out what you are saying. I doubt (perhaps even in the extreme) that what you are arguing is true, but I realize that my limited experience or tools or my biases entail that I cannot simply rule out what you are saying. I remain unconvinced, that's all. — Coben

OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved.

But when you first saw the pumas did you not doubt it? — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, probably I would. I was talking about after the events I listed. After I had sufficient evidence, for myself, that I no longer needed to doubt. I was not saying that in the first moment I see what looks like a puma I instantly believe.

These are the type of things Banno is referring to, things from which doubt has been removed by some prior judgement. Banno thinks that such things are beyond doubt, when clearly they are not, because all that is required to cast doubt on them is new evidence, not apprehended before. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't read all of Banno, so I don't know if you are framing this as he would, but I agree with you. Doubt can return.

At some point, we must trust others in their descriptions of their experiences because one person hasn't the capacity to experience everything. If the description sounds unreasonable we reject it, but when others explain things to us, and it sounds reasonable, then we can broaden our own field of "experience" by accepting what others say as true. Sometimes we are mislead, and that is why we must always maintain the option of revisiting the issue, and leaving nothing as "beyond doubt". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't disagree, though I consider this a different issue from the one I was addressing. Clearly related, but different. And, yes, I do take other people's words for things. There are various factors that weigh in when I do this. I could go into that topic, but I won't yet.

Strictly speaking agnosticism dictates that the truth or falsity of X cannot be ascertained. Being unprepared to answer at this point in time (suspended judgement), is more like a form of skepticism. To me, your example demonstrates skepticism rather than agnosticism, which would claim that there is no point trying to resolve these things because they cannot be resolved. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think either skepticism or agnosticism really fits. But I think you get what I mean. The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely.

OK, I respect this skeptical approach, and I've encountered this use of "agnosticism" before. I believe we need some definitions to separate these two forms of agnosticism, open minded and closed minded. The close minded agnostic will enter discussions like this with the intent of disrupting procedures because the closed minded form is validated by failures in such discussions. The open minded form (skepticism) on the other hand will have a genuine interest in learning and understanding the principles involved. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I don't think it has to be a universal, timeless and/or absolute position. I don't want to call it skepticism, since this to me implies a relation only to other people's beliefs. IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God. It may seem like they lack a belief, but actually they are taking a rather strong epistemological stand. I can't no anything about God and no one else can. That is a belief founded on a lot of supportint beliefs.

What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it? — Wayfarer

I think you will answer this better than I if you give thought to what you're referring to. Given a 3-4-5 triangle, what there is a 3-4-5 triangle. No theorem at all. You've got the rest of this, yes?

As the argument I presented shows, there is necessarily a non-material cause which is prior to material things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just this you have not done. And I am pretty sure that you never will, here or anywhere else. Because (as I'm sure you know better than I) the argument, notwithstanding validity or internally consistency, simply doesn't cut it for existential truth as that is understood to be.

It is akin, then, to an argument as to whether superman could beat aquaman under water. Maybe great fun, or even at one time considered substantive and therefore serious. But not today. As substantive, it's from the chest of toys in the attic and nothing for a grown man to waste time on beyond an appropriately few moments of remembered pleasure.

And neither you nor others seem to grasp that what you have as idea is endless possibility. Why claim reality? The signal feature of reality is, in addition to what things are, what they are not and cannot be. Claiming reality and at the same time unlimited capacity is simply an invitation for all the "antimonious" questions that necessarily follow such a claim. And I'm persuaded the authors of the "We believe..." had this worked out, and settled for the seeming lesser but ultimately more powerful claim of the "believe." As well it's hard to improve on Kant's denial of knowledge to make room for faith. Maybe that's a starting point: resolve the Kantian antimonies.

Make your case, then make it real. That would convert me.

What about Pythagoras' theorem? Is its reality dependent on someone thinking about it?
— Wayfarer
I think you will answer this better than I if you give thought to what you're referring to. Given a 3-4-5 triangle, what there is a 3-4-5 triangle. No theorem at all. You've got the rest of this, yes? — tim wood

That doesn’t address the point, however, which is kind of reality that such principles as the Pythagorean theorem possess. They’re ‘intelligible objects’ i.e. objects of reason only, but which are real in that they’re the same for anyone who can grasp them.

WE ought take care about what exactly our topic is. Yes, people may be uncertain about what it is that is being said. That is a distinct point.

Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess.

Nor does it mater that there is more than one game, except that its not a bad idea to keep an eye on what game you are playing, and what others are playing. The alternative would be quite confusing. As would mixing the rules of chess, checkers and backgammon. Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting.

For a moment there I thought you had a point, but in this last post you seem to have lost it. If I many...

There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading.

That doesn’t address the point, however, which is kind of reality that such principles as the Pythagorean theorem possess. They’re ‘intelligible objects’ i.e. objects of reason only, but which are real in that they’re the same for anyone who can grasp them. — Wayfarer

We agree here! Ideas! Real as constructs of mind. Indeed intelligible to any who can grasp them. Underlying this is nothing - but the ability of the mind to notice what happens when it combines in its considerations things that otherwise have nothing to do with each other. No mind, no theorem. No mind, no combining, no recognition of relationships. No mind, no relationships. And so on.

Real as constructs of mind. Indeed intelligible to any who can grasp them. Underlying this is nothing - but the ability of the mind to notice what happens when it combines in its considerations things that otherwise have nothing to do with each other. No mind, no theorem. No mind, no combining, no recognition of relationships. No mind, no relationships. And so on. — tim wood

But I still feel as though you’re missing the vital point here. In Greek philosophy, such principles are said to be real independently of any particular act of perception, but nevertheless only perceptible to the ‘eye of reason’. So - not constructs of mind, but rational percepts. That then goes back to the ‘is mathematics invented or discovered’ conundrum but my view is that the natural numbers and fundamental geometrical principles are discovered - they’re the same for all who can think, but they are more than simply acts of thought. They’re real but incorporeal.

This is why man qua ‘rational animal’ is able to ascertain the reason for things - the logos, which is root of knowledge. But again, this is not to say that these principles are a product of the human mind - rather that the human mind has evolved to the point of being able to perceive them through reason.

How is this relevant to philosophy of religion? Because it indicates the nature of ‘ideal reality’, which is not the product of the human mind, but is only perceptible through reason. In the broader Platonic tradition this was a fundamental principle and also an analogy to the nature of higher truths.

I get the Kantian point of view of seeing the world as a construction of some agency.
The difference of perspective you advocate for is not just about the history of philosophy but involves what being empirical requires.
I think you are correct about the change of language between the past and the present.
But perhaps neither structure is adequate for the needs of the time.

I get the Kantian point of view of seeing the world as a construction of some agency. — Valentinus

I don't think that Kant lent his arguments to the notion of an 'intelligent designer', and I'm pretty sure he wouldn't have agreed with today's ID arguments, although I could be wrong. (quick google....)

reflecting judgment enables us to discover empirical laws of nature by leading us to regard nature as if it were the product of intelligent design ....Since this principle only regulates our cognition but is not constitutive of nature itself, this does not amount to assuming that nature really is the product of intelligent design, which according to Kant we are not justified in believing on theoretical grounds. Rather, it amounts only to approaching nature in the practice of science as if it were designed to be understood by us. We are justified in doing this because it enables us to discover empirical laws of nature. But it is only a regulative principle of reflecting judgment, not genuine theoretical knowledge, that nature is purposive in this way.

(SEP entry on Kant)

Which is quite an interesting perspective!

The difference of perspective you advocate for is not just about the history of philosophy but involves what being empirical requires.
I think you are correct about the change of language between the past and the present.
But perhaps neither structure is adequate for the needs of the time. — Valentinus

Very perceptive, and I agree with you.

The person has made a decision, even, that patient X has a psychological problem and not an underlying illness, but they realize there is the possibility that it is a disease he or she has no encountered before. The leaving room that there may be something here the doctor is missing. I was using agnosticism a bit freely. — Coben

I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. They tend to believe that there are physiological conditions which correlate to the psychological problem, but the correlated physiological are not necessarily identifiable. This may be a type of compromise, but it's most likely just a justification for treating the psychological problem with medication. If it's a real physiological, medical problem, then the use of medication to treat it is justified.

IOW the closed minded agnostic has the belief that if there is a God we cannot know anything about that God. — Coben

I think what I meant is that the closed minded agnostic believes that we can never know whether there is or isn't God, so we ought not even talk about this, or try to determine the answer to this question. In other words, if we cannot know whether there is a God, what's the point in saying anything about God? This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism.

Just this you have not done. And I am pretty sure that you never will, here or anywhere else. Because (as I'm sure you know better than I) the argument, notwithstanding validity or internally consistency, simply doesn't cut it for existential truth as that is understood to be. — tim wood

Adding fancy words like "existential truth" to your claim that the argument does not "cut it", does not refute the argument. You need to show how the argument is existentially false. That you happen to be of the opinion that non-material things are not real doesn't cut it as a criticism, because the premises do not refer to any non-material things. The real existence of a non-material thing is necessitated as a conclusion.

It is akin, then, to an argument as to whether superman could beat aquaman under water. Maybe great fun, or even at one time considered substantive and therefore serious. But not today. As substantive, it's from the chest of toys in the attic and nothing for a grown man to waste time on beyond an appropriately few moments of remembered pleasure. — tim wood

In other words, it's extremely obvious that the argument is very sound, so there's no point wasting time trying to refute it.

Why claim reality? — tim wood

Quite clearly, that's because the logic is beyond reproach.

And neither you nor others seem to grasp that what you have as idea is endless possibility. — tim wood

Actually, the fact that "endless possibility" is truly impossible, is the key premise to Aristotle's cosmological argument. This is the principle which the Neo-Platonists use to prove that God is necessary. Endless possibility, if it were reality, would exclude any actuality. Therefore if this were something real, there would be nothing actually existing.

Make your case, then make it real. That would convert me. — tim wood

You've yet to address the argument. Which premise lacks existential truth, relative to your presuppositions? Is it that material things are contingent? Or is it that there's a first material thing?

WE ought take care about what exactly our topic is. Yes, people may be uncertain about what it is that is being said. That is a distinct point.

Nor is the move back to the box a move in chess. — Banno

Right, we were not talking about chess. You said there is certainty in language, and you tried to justify this by referring to the game of chess. Stay on topic. When we use language we are rarely playing chess, so this is irrelevant.

Nothing stops you form doing this, but if you wish to remain intelligible and interesting you ought at the least be clear about what it is you are doing. SO working out what rules the theist is playing by might be interesting. — Banno

Excellent, I can almost agree with you here. However, there are many instances where you can be intelligible and interesting without being clear about what it is you are doing. Ever read mysteries, for example? Interest is created by the suspense cause by not being clear about what is going on. Then there is poetry, where intentional ambiguity seems to rule the day. The poetry is still intelligible, and interesting, without being clear.

Furthermore, there's a very curious aspect of ambiguity which allows the author to create a huge audience. If I say something extremely ambiguous, it could be meaningful to you, and meaningful to various other different people, each having different reason for the meaningfulness, seeing different meaning in it. The simple, ambiguous phrase may be meaningful and interesting to all sorts of people from all different walks of life, while the precise expression of a clear thought will only be interesting to a few.

There is a difference that I did not pay sufficient attention to, between formative rules such as the rules of chess I set out, and preferences such as for vanilla. You might have picked me up on that. So is the notion of god's omnipresence a formative rule or an expression of some sort of preference? I'm thinking of it as a formative rule, part of what it is to be a theistic god, and in that regard the talk of vanilla was misleading. — Banno

The theologian doesn't play by the rules, you ought to have picked up on this by now. Rules are man made, and the theologian turns to God, who lets us know that we have free will. I think that was Moses' downfall, he wrote rules and pretended that they came from God. Jesus tried to rectify this by rebelling against the supposed rules of God.

I think, that most physicians now treat psychological problems as real medical issues. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but if you think you have a parasite but get sent to a psychiatrist for having chemical imbalances leading to hypochondriacal symptoms, it ends up being the same thing. The doctor is ruling out that you have a traditional physical illness caused by some organism or cancer, etc.
IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion.

This position would not allow an agnostic to ever proceed toward either atheism or theism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

IOW the doctor is acting like he or she has complete knowledge and that current medicine is complete and there is no physical pathology, but rather a mental pathology caused by some kind of chemical imbalance in the brain. Setting aside all my philosophical objections to the current pharma/psychiatric model, the doctor should not assume such completeness. They should know they don't know for sure. And they have a wealth of medical history to show this can be the case. It is in fact an irrational postion. — Coben

This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded. But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God.


Please reconsider my point now. If we are to define "God" we must refer to those who have real use for the term. It's wrong to say, "this use makes no sense to me so let's make a different definition". That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do. Therefore, if theologians see a real need to conclude that there's an immaterial cause which they call "God", it's wrong to say that an immaterial thing with real causal existence makes no sense to me, so I'm going to steal there term "God" and make it refer to something else. That is not philosophy of religion.

In Banno's terms, if the theologians are playing "chess", then we can either learn the rules which they've laid down, and join in, or else we stay out of their game. But it's wrong to say I don't like this game called "chess" that they're playing, and I have no inclination to abide by the rules and play that game; but I'm going to make another kind of similar game, one which better suits my inclinations, and I'm going to call this game "chess", just to spite the others.

This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strawman (1).

They then proceed to dismiss the vast field of theological knowledge without even considering it, on the presupposition that it is useless, and not knowledge, because the possibility of God has been excluded. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strawman (2). Special pleading (1).

But in reality scientific knowledge is very far from complete, and theology holds very compelling reasons for the reality of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Special Pleading (2).

Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as?

That's like saying that what physicists refer to as "quantum entanglement" makes no sense to me, so let's define "quantum entanglement" differently from the way physicists do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions. And evidently, theologians talk about 'things' which are, no matter how subjectively or discursively 'meaningful', indistinguishable from fairytales or hallucinations.

Of course, we could be mistaken; but ... to wit:

"No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish." ~David Hume

"The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness." ~Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace

"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence." ~Carl Sagan

"If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims."
~Tenzin Gyatso, The 14th Dalai Lama

This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

Or any of a wide range of phenomena. Just as medicine does somatic conditions. It's natural, we work with our models. But if you are going to put yourself in the position of claiming to be on the rational/sane team with the right to judge others irrational/insane, then having a basic knowledge of the history of your own discipline and what this implies about current knowledge seems a must to me.

This is the problem I have with many atheists. They act as if there is some kind of completeness to scientific knowledge which excludes the possibility of God. — Metaphysician Undercover


Strawman (1). — 180 Proof

I have enountered this argument made by atheists. That current scientific knowledge precludes the possibility of a deity. I suppose we could try to figure out if 'Many' in the assertion he made is fair or not, but otherwise it certainly seems true that some atheists believe this is the case.

I'm referring to the alleged "completeness of scientific knowledge". By definition and practice the natural sciences are defeasible, approximative, & fallible. (e.g. Feyerabend, Haack) Conflating scientism with science is objectionable, whether or not it's an atheist conflating them; and MU's claim is certainly not representative of most scientifically literate positions.

But notice you shifted from atheists - what he wrote about - to scientific epistemology. yes, I agree and I would guess MU would agree that there is nothing inherent in science - in fact quite the contrary as you point out - to support this attitude. And yet it is there. First off atheists need not be scientists. But even beyond this scientists themselves have encountered this kind of reaction when they present to peers research that does or seems to contradict current models. IOW even people who should know better since they actually work with the epistemology, rather than just being a fan of it's findings, can act as if knowledge is final, current models are final. Of course theists do this kind of thing also. It is a human tendency to consider one's models final. But it is a problematic one, and especially so if the epistemology you are implicitly or explicitly supporting as the rational one is open to revision, does consider it likely that knowledge is currently incomplete.

As a somewhat related example: advocates of evolution - and please note, I believe in current evolutionary theory: so many times I have found people arguing that evolution means survival of the fittest and this entails stronger organisms - rather than organisms well adapted to the environments they live in. Smaller physically weaker organisms my be better adapted. Or that any trait an animal has must be beneficial - when in fact it may be neutral, it just didn't lead to that species being selected out of existence. Or they engage in teleological explanations for traits.

Just because people tend to be fans of science - which atheists do tend to be, but need not to be atheists - does not mean they even understand basic things about science. I have often found myself in disagreement with people who are identifying as 'on the science team' who are confused about all sorts of scientific facts and theory, let alone what scientific epistemology entails. And I have encountered the implicit assumption that science is complete in a wide range of topics. If X were true, they would know.

What this all boils down to, it seems to me, is that (on the one hand) there are undeniably ideas out of which notions of g/G* arise, themselves as ideas. These ideas fit into the larger constellations of ideas - religions/theologies - as machined parts in an engine to make the thing go. In passing one notes there are different machines with incompatible parts, and even in the same families of machines, changes and adjustments over time. And these ideas are of undeniable - though varying - utility. Let us set aside as irrelevant this entire side of the discussion - not least because it is a matter of fact.

On the other hand. What is the other hand? The claim that behind the ideas there is a reality. "Reality" needs to be handled with care, qualified and defined, because the reality of the ideas as ideas - a reality that I think all acknowledge - is not in question. Ok, not that reality. - But here a caveat: if not an idea, then a thing, though a thing, to be sure, about which which we may have ideas, but not in itself any idea. E.g. - crudely - a hammer may be for driving nails, but it is not itself the driving of nails. And this an interesting and diverting tangent and qualification, but seems not to the point.

What is left? Material reality, but that is explicitly rejected. And the rejection makes sense because material existence is always, while at the same time a realization, also constraint and limitation. Which g/G can neither have nor be and still be g/G. (Although it's odd to reject g/G as idea and at the same time in seeking to explicate g/G as a reality, to allow that explication to be governed by ideas!)

So, non-material reality that is not in any way an idea or construct of thinking. Well, if I did not create it (e.g., as idea), then all that's left is that I encounter it, somehow. That is, g/G, originates - is (the door to a whole other set of questions centered on the "is") - either in me or outside of me.

An encounter through the senses is ruled out. g/G having no material existence cannot be a source of material effects. I cannot bump into, as with a tree, or smell, as with a flower, or hear, as with music or the wind, & etc., g/G. (Again observe how the search constrains that which is sought!)

That leaves encounters with the other that is g/G in which the senses play no part. That leaves reason. Yes? Is there any other via?

But - and here brevity if I can achieve it - reason is itself constitutive of nothing. That which reason thinks is just ideas. Deprive reason of the possibility of access to material, and all the work of reason remains ideas. The idea of driving nails, denied the possibility of a hammer, remains an idea. And, reminding ourselves, that idea as the being of gG is denied.

But spirit! God is Spirit! And this is just no answer at all, being subject itself to the above criticism. It would seem that the real-immaterial g/G is a conjuring out of theories and ideas. The idea requires it. For the sake of the idea, then, g/G must be real as a consequence.

In passing, many of the arguments as to this "existence" arise out of neither/nor thinking. It can't be this, it can't be that, therefore God. But taken in hand, it's clear these "God"s are just the machined pieces inserted to make an engine work, that because of confused thinking about the nature of the machine, are then supposed to be real - in a non-idea, non-material sense.

And to MU @Metaphysician Undercover, please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to. I have said that for cause you would not. Show me at least in this mistaken (or point me back to where it is so that I may look at it).

*Again, thank you to 180 @180 Proof for the g/G notation.

On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Btw, "very compelling reasons" such as? — 180 Proof

We could start with the cosmological argument, but if you're really interested, you'll have to pick up some books and read the material yourself.

Except that there is public evidence for the efficacy of quantum entanglement whereas there isn't any public evidence for the efficacy of g/G and yet there must be given the scale and scope of the claims entailed by the predicates attributed uniquely to g/G by many, if not most, extant religious traditions. — 180 Proof

Actually, this claim is false, because the very existence of religion is public evidence for the efficacy of God. Clearly "God" has an effect on us, so we cannot remove that concept from the category of efficacious, just like we cannot remove "quantum entanglement" from that category.

I'm referring to the alleged "completeness of scientific knowledge". By definition and practice the natural sciences are defeasible, approximative, & fallible. (e.g. Feyerabend, Haack) Conflating scientism with science is objectionable, whether or not it's an atheist conflating them; and MU's claim is certainly not representative of most scientifically literate positions. — 180 Proof

I was talking actually talking about some atheist who profess scientism. I wasn't referring to "most scientifically literate positions". Your claim of strawman is unfounded, because clearly there are many people who fit my description of the type of atheist I dislike. Please don't ask me to name names because I won't. But you, being offended by my claim without having been named, and seeing the need to defend those persons described, says something about you.

And to MU Metaphysician Undercover, please exhibit your argument, the one you repeatedly refer to. I have said that for cause you would not. Show me at least in this mistaken (or point me back to where it is so that I may look at it). — tim wood

Where have you been tim? I presented the argument at least twice in the last few days, you first ignored it, and when I referred to it, you said you don't "buy it", and "it doesn't cut it for existential truth", without ever addressing the premises.

On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the contrary, we observe that each and every material thing has a cause of it's existence, and we can conclude therefore that there is necessarily an immaterial cause which is the cause of the first material thing.
— Metaphysician Undercover

The conclusion is not "I don't know". The conclusion is I know the cause is immaterial. Can you not see this? Each material thing has a cause. The cause of the first material thing cannot be a material thing. Therefore this cause is immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thank you for re-presenting. I assume you're channeling Aquinas - doesn't matter though. The simplest critique is that this is not an argument but a claim - by which I mean that premises are accepted uncritically and logical implications are drawn, the quality of the argument regarded in the validity of its form.

Question: what is the standing or kind of your argument/conclusion? Is it a piece of physics? Religious apologetics? An exercise in drawing conclusions as a matter of logic? Maybe another way: if you had to give a billboard statement of it as if it were an ad for a motion picture, what would you say?

This one sentence summary of Aquinas's seems concise: "The Quinque viæ (Latin "Five Ways") (sometimes called "five proofs") are five logical arguments regarding the existence of God summarized by the 13th-century Catholic philosopher and theologian St. Thomas Aquinas in his book Summa Theologica."

He calls them logical arguments. How about you, what do you call them?

If I may, the underlying argument looks like this:

1) There are things, i.e., material things.
2) These things are caused; i.e., have efficient causes.
3) If things are caused by things, then there cannot be a first thing as cause, because it itself would need a thing to cause it.
4) Therefore the first thing is caused by an immaterial cause, that we call God.

Please accept this formulation as an agreed starting point, or edit or provide your own for me to agree with.

In passing, Aquinas acknowledged that God is unknowable, but that we can have indirect knowledge through "negative" theology - what I call above a neither/nor argument.

I think this is the relevant text in translation - it seems worth reproducing here (from http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm)
-------------------
"Article 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Hebrews 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Objection 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Objection 3. Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Reply to Objection 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".

Reply to Objection 3. From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence."

-------------------

As apologetics, I have no issue with Aquinas. And as well for us who are not Thomas, it becomes an exercise in what we want to believe, the presuppositions that stand as axiomatic to those beliefs, and what emerges from that mix and for what purpose. Inevitably this involves some close and careful definitions, themselves to be demonstrated if they're not granted. All trending towards a medieval-style argument of granting major and minor premises, agreeing to forms, and so forth. That, or we can jump right away to an evaluation of the argument in modern scientific terms.

Why modern scientific terms and standards? Because ultimately that's what you're insisting on (as I understand the argument of you and others). That is, you insist on the efficacy of yours or Aquinas's arguments in absolute terms beyond their original scope. If you want to be medievalist in your thinking and exhibit examples of that thinking as examples of what you believe, have at it and I stand aside. But as in any sense scientific is simply an absurdity - and a curiosity. And it might be argued that one should just let it pass in silence, but we live in a world that for too long lets too much pass in silence that is harmful. As someone apparently versed in the details of these quaint pursuits, you ought to know better! Do not even think of asking what harm!

Question: what is the standing or kind of your argument/conclusion? Is it a piece of physics? Religious apologetics? An exercise in drawing conclusions as a matter of logic? Maybe another way: if you had to give a billboard statement of it as if it were an ad for a motion picture, what would you say? — tim wood

It's a simple deductive argument, with two premises, the first an inductive conclusion drawn from observation (material things have a cause of existence), the second a logical statement concerning the nature of temporal order (there can be no material thing prior to the first material thing).

He calls them logical arguments. How about you, what do you call them? — tim wood

I agree that Aquinas' five ways are logical arguments.

If I may, the underlying argument looks like this:

1) There are things, i.e., material things.
2) These things are caused; i.e., have efficient causes.
3) If things are caused by things, then there cannot be a first thing as cause, because it itself would need a thing to cause it.
4) Therefore the first thing is caused by an immaterial cause, that we call God.

Please accept this formulation as an agreed starting point, or edit or provide your own for me to agree with. — tim wood

The thing I'd object to here, is 2). The cause of "a thing" is not necessarily an efficient cause, because an efficient cause is itself a thing, so an efficient cause cannot be the cause of the first thing. It is the understanding of this principle which makes the argument fit. The cause of a thing may be a final cause, and final cause, such as intention, can be understood as immaterial. This is why the human will is understood as "free", it is free from efficient causation. So in human acts of intention, we have an immaterial cause, (free will), working with immaterial objects (ideas), which causes things. This is how we can understand the reality of immaterial cause through the examples of intentional human acts.

Contrary to what you claim, the idea of an immaterial cause is highly intelligible. The problem is that the scourge of determinism has set into the minds of the many, punishing these minds by banishing them from associating with the free, immaterial world of the soul, to the point that only purge can rectify.

In passing, Aquinas acknowledged that God is unknowable, but that we can have indirect knowledge through "negative" theology - what I call above a neither/nor argument. — tim wood

As I said earlier, Aquinas clearly states that the existence of God and some things about him can be known by natural reason. it's in your quoted "Reply to Objection 1".

Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. — tim wood

See, "faith presupposes natural knowledge". So we first know the existence of God through natural reason, and by having this natural knowledge of God, we are then predisposed toward accepting on faith, other things, which other say about God. And so we have as "Reply to Objection 3", that from His effects, the existence of God can be clearly demonstrated, and known, though we cannot perfectly know God "as He is in His essence.

As apologetics, I have no issue with Aquinas. And as well for us who are not Thomas, it becomes an exercise in what we want to believe, the presuppositions that stand as axiomatic to those beliefs, and what emerges from that mix and for what purpose. Inevitably this involves some close and careful definitions, themselves to be demonstrated if they're not granted. All trending towards a medieval-style argument of granting major and minor premises, agreeing to forms, and so forth. — tim wood

I think there is a problem with classifying Aquinas as an apologetic, depending on how you understand "apologetics". Prior to him, Aristotelian principles were generally not accepted into Christian theology. Aquinas adapted Christian principles to accept his interpretation of Aristotelian principles, so he was more of a shaper, or creator of Christian principles than a defender of Christian principles.

Theology is always "an exercise in what we want to belief". It is accepted that we have free will, and can believe what we want. The question is whether we are ready to accept the truth. Many, as yourself it seems, are not ready to believe the truth, so you find excuses not to accept the very simple and straight forward arguments demonstrating the existence of God, casting them aside because they are not consistent with what you want to believe.

That, or we can jump right away to an evaluation of the argument in modern scientific terms. — tim wood

There's no point to evaluating the argument in "modern scientific terms", because it's not written in modern scientific terms. That would be like trying to play chess using the rules of checkers, it's fool's play. The terms are metaphysical, used in a metaphysical context, to be understood by metaphysicians. Either you have a desire to understand these terms, and understand the truth in these matters, or you do not. If you do not have such a desire, you can leave it well enough alone, and perhaps accept on faith the existence, or non-existence of God. But you are in no position to argue the non-existence of God without understanding the terms.

Why modern scientific terms and standards? Because ultimately that's what you're insisting on (as I understand the argument of you and others). That is, you insist on the efficacy of yours or Aquinas's arguments in absolute terms beyond their original scope. If you want to be medievalist in your thinking and exhibit examples of that thinking as examples of what you believe, have at it and I stand aside. But as in any sense scientific is simply an absurdity - and a curiosity. And it might be argued that one should just let it pass in silence, but we live in a world that for too long lets too much pass in silence that is harmful. As someone apparently versed in the details of these quaint pursuits, you ought to know better! Do not even think of asking what harm! — tim wood

I can't understand what is meant by this passage at all. it seems very confused. Are you suggesting that only scientific terms are meaningful? Science has no position on God, so clearly we must look beyond scientific terms for a philosophy of religion. Are you suggesting that medieval writings are not meaningful? The "original scope" of these referred writings is religion, and the existence of God, exactly the scope of this thread. Why would you think that referring to these articles, in a discussion about God is an attempt to take them beyond their original scope? In reality, God is beyond the scope of science, so it is you who has the desire to take something beyond its scope. You want to use science to judge metaphysics, when metaphysics is not a subject of science, and therefore cannot be subjected to science. I agree with you, that this is harmful.

(material things have a cause of existence) — Metaphysician Undercover

First things first. You clearly have not thought through the meaning of the words "material" and "things." On using those term uncritically, your argument fails. Now lets move on. ("Material" and "things" are abstract terms applied to abstractions.) Think. e.g., about what a chair is.

there can be no material thing prior to the first material thing — Metaphysician Undercover

And this presupposes a first material thing without defining "first." And I'll note right now that my objections would be absurd and ridiculous in most arguments, but are substantial here.

an efficient cause is itself a thing, so an efficient cause cannot be the cause of the first thing. It is the understanding of this principle which makes the argument fit. The cause of a thing may be a final cause, and final cause, such as intention, can be understood as immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is violence on the Greek word and its meaning. αίτία aitia, Aristotle's "cause," is understood to be that which stands as an answer to a question. Who made the sculpture? The sculptor made it. The sculptor, then, is the efficient cause. But this won't do for us. To say the sculptor made the sculpture answers the question who made it/how was it made, but that lacks a specificity that we need here. If the sculptor made it and is the efficient cause, then the efficient cause, at least in this case, would appear to be a thing (though subject to what "thing" means). But the sculptor did not make it! The sculpting made the sculpture. Again, a useless distinction except in this argument - but one I suspect Aristotle himself would indorse.

And the final cause, intention. I agree immaterial, but a thing-as-idea; i.e., an idea. Your reification of this, if that's what you're doing, is slipshod manipulation of an ancient word thorough multiple filters. But at the same time your usage may be revealing. Question: do you hold the Pythagorean theorem to be an immaterial existing thing not a mental construct? Wayfarer @Wayfarer mentioned it earlier. So we might as well find out now if mathematics and geometry, and all similar things are included in - or excluded from - the world of non-mental independently existing immaterial things.

But we need a starting place. Let it be with your first premise and the words therein in question, "material" and "thing" and "material thing." These are all concepts based in practical knowledge. That is, descriptive in functional terms. As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things. And that just is that all of these terms are ideas! Now, is that your understanding of God, an understanding of God as God? That is, as a functionality that you attribute to a Him? In short, an idea?

There is no such thing as a chair. If the chair is made of wood (or metal or plastic mutatis mutandis) there is no such thing as wood. And so forth. At each step you bracket away the idea of the thing, as far as you can, because the reality of ideas is a reality you reject. And as modern science tells us, the real reality of these is strange, and even temporally ambiguous.

These considerations and more are reasons that some - many - most old ideas are suitable for museum cases only. Relegated to the mothballed fleet of curiosities that modernity has ruled will never again - if they ever did - stand in the line of battle where knowledge is won. On your understandings, you cannot even speak intelligibly on these matters. You reject the only possible grounds, yet claim grounds that cannot be. You wave some words around that you cannot use correctly, announce "proved," and think you've done something.

And I'm sure your first premise will yield more problems, but let's dispose of these first ones first. Material. What do you say that is, keeping in mind what most of know at least in some part. And thing. Is there any such thing as a thing?

Are you suggesting that only scientific terms are meaningful? Science has no position on God, so clearly we must look beyond scientific terms for a philosophy of religion. — Metaphysician Undercover

And indeed we must - agreed. But this not a warrant to make nonsense of science. And it is you who claim independent real immaterial existence. Throw out the understandings that condition our overall understanding of the world, and you can claim to walk through walls. You can claim anything you like, and adduce "arguments" that will prove every claim. But unless you meet the criteria of reason, they will all be unreasonable nonsense.

we might as well find out now if mathematics and geometry, and all similar things are included in - or excluded from - the world of non-mental independently existing immaterial things. — tim wood

Well, if there is such a world, then these are precisely its denizens.

As a practical matter, chairs are real, existing, material things. — tim wood

I read once, as a throwaway line, in a polemic by (I think) Rowan Williams, with an allusion to Heidegger, that ‘there’s no such thing as a thing’. And indeed this or that chair is simply a ‘collocation of parts’ that serves a purpose. What, really, is a chair? It can be a log, or a rock, or an objet’d’art. (found the Williams reference.)