Systems philosophy, from what I can tell, appears to be speaking only of access consciousness, the subject of the so-called "easy" problem of consciousness. There is no question in philosophy of mind about the possibility of that to be emergent in that sense. We're talking about the hard problem of consciousness, and thus, phenomenal consciousness. Claiming that phenomenal consciousness emerges from wholly un-phenomenally-conscious parts is a completely different thing.

Temperature, for example, emerges from simpler mechanical motion, in a way that makes perfect sense. We can explain what it is about the simple mechanical motion of the constituent particles of a macroscopic object that we are considering in aggregate when we talk about the property of "temperature". Temperature is in that sense reducible to mechanical motion. My body has a temperature. Each my my organs has a temperature. So do each of their cells. And their organelles. At some point we get to talking about individual molecules and then it doesn't make so much sense to talk about temperature, but we can still talk about the kinetic energy of those molecules, which is what temperature is an aggregate measurement of. And then we can talk about energy more generally when we get down past the level of molecules, and so on. There's something that has precursors to "temperature" all the way down, such that if you modeled just those precursors in a simulation, you would end up modeling temperature for free along the way, just in way finer detail that you need to if temperature is all you're concerned with.

Phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand -- the topic of the hard problem of consciousness, the subject of this thread -- is by definition something independent of properties like that. Phenomenal consciousness is what a philosophical zombie is supposed to lack that a real human has, where a philosophical zombie is by definition identical to the real human in every physical way. One could say that there is no such thing as that, that nothing has it, not even humans, and so dismiss the problem completely, but that's not to give an answer to the "hard problem of consciousness", it's just to dismiss it as a non-problem. If one wants to say instead that real humans do have phenomenal consciousness, but that something like a rock doesn't, then you're going to have to explain where along the way this property that is defined to be something wholly irreducible to the properties that humans and rocks have in common "emerged", and how. If you disassemble a bunch of rocks and then reassemble their atoms into cells and assemble those into tissues and assemble those into a human body, where along the way did this new phenomenal consciousness property spring into existence, and from what? There's no doubt that you can in principle show where the access consciousness sprung into being, because that's just a more-or-less mechanical function of neurons (though actually showing the details of that in practice is a much harder problem, but a problem for neuroscientists, not philosophers). But when and where and why did this wholly new thing start happening? That's the spooky magic (@180 Proof) that emergentism about phenomenal consciousness claims happens.

The third alternative, besides nothing having phenomenal consciousness or anything like it, and it suddenly springing into existence out of whole cloth from things that had nothing like it, is that everything has something like it, which is what panpsychism is. A real human brain has it. A chimp brain has a different kind of it. A rat brain has an even more different kind of it. A slime mold has something even more different, and a tree likewise. Even rocks, and electrons, and quantum fields, have precursors of it. This is almost tantamount to dismissing the problem just like eliminativism does, except rather than denying that anything has this first-person phenomenal experience, it just says that everything has that and there's nothing remarkable about merely that -- it's the first-person phenomenal experiences of being the complex access-conscious things that we are that is remarkable. And that complex functionality is describable in ordinary mechanical terms, and can emerge from simpler mechanical systems uncontroversially. But that's not the "hard problem of consciousness" we're talking about any more, that's the "easy" problem instead.

It absolutely does address the hard problem of consciousness. The solution is called "biperspectivism". It is quite neat. I've read a number of books on systems theory and systems philosophy in the last few months, I can't remember if it was Laszlo or von Bertalanffy that had the really concise description. I actually mentioned it in another thread about neurophilosophy here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/6692/does-neurophilosophy-signal-the-end-of-philosophy-as-we-know-it-/p1

God did it! What a satisfying answer, let us pretend that explains everything about us and our world, so we are only left to explain it all over again for the gods and their worlds. Why make the problem worse for no reason at all? — Zelebg

Do you prefer the Magic Bang answer? Is that satisfying to you? Apparently, it's not for many astronomers, who postulate a hypothetical Multiverse as a "turtles all the way down" alternative to the mathematical creation event. How is that better than a One Big Turtle solution? Does an infinity of invisible universes satisfy your curiosity about an origin theory that most scientists at first rejected as a religious explanation?. My thesis does not try to explain G*D, but merely takes the First Cause hypothesis as a reasonable axiom. After that assumption, it's all a process of Enformation (applied mathematics). My reason for pursuing that hypothesis is because all materialistic explanations ignore Qualia, which is of more significance to living humans than dead Matter and aimless Energy.

At least my hypothetical "G*D" creates via gradual evolution and physics, not by instantly inflating space faster than the speed of light. And the attribution of Enformation and Entention to the First Cause explains the existence of Mind & Consciousness much better than mindless Materialism. Besides, which is a faith-based explanation : "Imaginary God did it!", or "Imaginary Multiverse did it!" Which is "lunatic fringe" : a Mother-verse, or Eternal Mind? *1


*1 " a dynamic evolving space that once had some sort of childhood --- and perhaps some sort of birth about 14 billion years ago."
"Inflation is like a great magic show --- my gut reaction is : this can't possibly obey the laws of physics!"
"Q. What caused our Big Bang?
A. There's no explanation --- the equations simply assume it happened.
Q. How could an infinite space get created in a finite time?
A. There's no explanation --- the equations simply assume that as soon as there was any space at all, it was infinite in size."
"where multiverses have gone from having lunatic fringe status to being discussed openly at physics conferences. . ."
Max Tegmark, physicist, cosmologist
Our Mathematical Universe : My Quest For the Ultimate Nature of Reality

Note: Tegmark's Mathematical Universe is equivalent to my Enformationism, except that I use G*D as a First Cause metaphor instead of a "Level 4 Multiverse".

It absolutely does address the hard problem of consciousness. The solution is called "biperspectivism". It as quite neat. — Pantagruel

I'm familiar with Laszlo , but not with that abstruse theory. However, the term sounds like Cartesian Dualism to me. His solution was "neat", in that it got the church off his back, by arbitrarily defining Non-Overlapping Magisteria. And materialistic Science has flourished for centuries since cutting itself off from Philosophy and Metaphysics. But since the Quantum revolution in Science, the overlap between Mind & Matter has become ever harder to ignore. Anyway, I'll check it out, because the notion of Complementarity is essential to my own abstruse thesis. :smile:

my reason for pursuing that hypothesis is because all materialistic explanations ignore Qualia, which is of more significance to living humans than dead Matter and aimless Energy. — Gnomon

Agreed, well said. It warrants a refresher:


ineffable; that is, they cannot be communicated, or apprehended by any means other than direct experience.

intrinsic; that is, they are non-relational properties, which do not change depending on the experience's relation to other things.

private; that is, all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible.
directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness; that is, to experience a quale is to know one experiences a quale, and to know all there is to know about that quale.

If qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete explaination.....

It's in the Introduction to Systems Philosophy. That was the only one of the systems books I didn't buy - it was over $200! When I first read it I was amazed at how neatly it resolves the issue. Once you understand how emergence works, and that it is a ubiquitous feature of reality and quantifiable, the whole mind-body issue just doesn't seem like a real problem anymore. Which is I think the hallmark of a paradigm shift...

Consider molecules. Molecules exist...now. But in the early universe, not so much. So while the universe was a mish-mash of fundamental forces, did molecules exist? No, molecules "emerged" when the requisite set of systemic properties settled into a stable form. Likewise for...well pretty much everything really. Consciousness is no different. Systems philosophy is pretty slick.

That's the spooky magic (@180 Proof) that emergentism about phenomenal consciousness claims happens. — Pfhorrest

Soooo ... by "magic" you're signifying that you don't understand how emergence works in dynamical complex systems (e.g. inanimate matter --> animate matter --> cognition --> language-thought-intelligence; or simpler: quark interactions --> chocolate-covered strawberries). Nothing "spooky" about that. Assuming you'd overlooked my first post on this thread, Pfhorrest, maybe the link provided will go some way towards showing (via references to neuroscientific literature) how the magic trick (i.e. phenomenal consciousness rabbit gets pulled out of the brain-body-biosphere hat) might be done. No misdirecting sleight-of-mind (woo) needed. :smirk:

From your description in that other thread, that is exactly the same thing that I am talking about under the more traditional name of panpsychism. It says nothing at all about the "emergence" of things with "cognitive descriptions [...] appropriate for the internal/introspective perspective" (phenomenal consciousness) from things without one, which is the meaning of "emergence" used in philosophy of mind, in the sense that distinguishes it from panpsychism.

(@180 Proof I was typing this paragraph as you replied and it appropriately addresses your response as well). There is absolutely no contention whatsoever that the function of cognition, the likes of which even a philosophical zombie is supposed to have, can emerge from aggregates of other, simpler functions. That is not the thing that is at question here, there is no doubt about it, and that's why it's called the "easy problem".

What is at question in the "hard problem", to use Pantagruel's terms again, is whether nothing has an "internal perspective" (eliminativism), whether some things have no "internal perspective" but if you combine those things right suddenly something does have an "internal perspective" (emergentism), or whether everything has an "internal perspective", that varies along with the function of the thing (panpsychism). I hold to the last position.

On a panpsychist account the specific kind of internal perspective that humans have "emerges" along with our evolving functionality just like the "external perspective" of our behavior does (because the experience and the behavior are just two sides of the same functional coin), but the mere having of an "internal perspective" at all is something that was always there at the fundamental level, and didn't suddenly pop into existence when things with no "internal perspective" were combined just right. @180 Proof you seemed to be applauding this when I said it earlier; to quote myself where you bolded me: "The mere having of a first-person experience isn't some special phenomenon that occurs only in humans and so needs an explanation, it's just a basic feature of existence."

From your wikilink to Emergence, look at the section on Strong and weak emergence, especially the Viability of strong emergence subsection, which includes a quote saying of strong emergence that "it is uncomfortably like magic". There is no contention at all over weak emergence of functional properties like access consciousness; that is, again, why that is the "easy problem". It's the strong emergence of phenomenal consciousness that is a contentious position regarding the "hard problem".

My thesis does not try to explain G*D, but merely takes the First Cause hypothesis as a reasonable axiom

Your thesis explains nothing, it postulates another question as an answer. And questions are not answers, you know?

Besides, far more reasonable axiom is that it is actually me who created both tHe FiRsT cAUsE and *G&O%D#, and you see how that already explains much more.

Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is.

"Functional analysis" makes me doubt he explains anything. Can you sum it up what does he say about what a 'consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is'?

Everything we know in science dealing with the natural phenomena, every law, discovery, explanation... everything is about some kind of motion, — Zelebg

More to the point, it's about something which is objective. Whether it's the 'ghostly neutrino' or the black hole at the center of the galaxy or about a function of the body or whatever subject you chose, science is concerned with objective measurement and observation.

The simple reason the problem of consciousness is 'hard' is that the observing mind is never an object, by definition. This is a succinct way of expressing the idea at the centre of Chalmer's original paper.

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

And that subjective reality is precisely what can never be made an object - at least, not without completely changing the perspective from which it is being examined.

There is a distinction between distraction and daydreaming, yes?

Some people continue to play piano or drive a car as if nothing happened while having an epileptic seizure, which means totally unconscious. They of course don't remember anything, but can function almost normally - stop at red light, make correct turns, drive home safely. They only fail to react when something novel or surprising happens, they loose ability to act creatively.

More to the point, it's about something which is objective.

Yes. What I mean is that people keep putting forward different theories in terms of some process, function, some dynamics without realizing they are all the same in a very basic sense, which is that this type of mechanical explanation could never really end our curiosity and actually answer the question. It's simply not the category of description that could scratch that itch.

Consider emergent properties of liquidity or acidity. Imagine hypothetical entity living one complexity layer below at the scale of electron, and say, they actually can calculate and describe dynamic of molecules and chemistry, which to their scale are like galaxies are to us. They can describe liquidity and acidity in terms of motion without knowing what is it they are describing. How could they ever really comprehend those emergent properties which on their scale of existence simply have no meaning?

Functional properties can emerge from complex arrangements of other things with simpler functional properties, but if some wholly new irreducible thing is supposed to emerge, you’re talking magic.

Emergence is what connects all sciences from atoms to galaxies. If emergent, then by content it must be reducible to lower level elements it emerges from, like everything else. Whether emergent properties are irreducible is another question.

Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete explaination

Perfectly simple solution is that 700nm actually equals 'red' in some specific circumstances and in a way we yet don't understand.

From your description in that other thread, that is exactly the same thing that I am talking about under the more traditional name of panpsychism. It says nothing at all about the "emergence" of things with "cognitive descriptions [...] appropriate for the internal/introspective perspective" (phenomenal consciousness) from things without one, which is the meaning of "emergence" used in philosophy of mind, in the sense that distinguishes it from panpsychism. — Pfhorrest

It is exactly about how in every sense the states you are describing are real and emergent, but, okay. Read the original if you want to be sure.

Guys, Emergence in itself, as a description of how the cognition works (parts working together to comprise the whole), is one very plausible theory. Emergence that would explain the nature of our conscious existence (cognition) is yet another altogether.

To that end, you would still be left with the metaphysical mystery of causation (or Will), right?

To that end, you would still be left with the metaphysical mystery of causation (or Will), right? — 3017amen

No. Simply another emergent phenomenon within a nested-hierarchical system of complex-adaptive systems (CAS). Explicable with respect to the properties of top-level system.

No. Simply another emergent phenomenon within a nested-hierarchical system of complex-adaptive systems (CAS). Explicable with respect to the properties of top-level system. — Pantagruel

Okay, just a few questions for now:

1. What is your interpretation of a 'top-level' system?
2. A process that creates complex systems out of pre-existing properties but yet cannot make "entirely novel" properties, is what?


Great topic BTW!

The top level system is whichever system contains the entity being evaluated from an internal/operational perspective. Every entity is simultaneously itself a complex system, having an internal systemic nature, and a functioning element of a complex 'container' system.

Importantly, complex systems are not 'created' in the sense of A makes B. Complex Adaptive systems are that precisely because they arise spontaneously through the ongoing interaction of an initial set of elements.

It is all quite fascinating, and the role of chaotic/fractal mathematics (attractors) and non-linear equations is central to getting the big picture. Basically, these self-organizing emergent systems exhibit causal regularities which are not of a linear (B follows A) nature but are real and measurable nonetheless using complex (non-linear) modelling. Essentially it is like a self-caused a-causally connected mechanism. And a lot of traditionally stubborn problems in virtually every field you'd care to look at it turns out can be successfully modelled following this paradigm.

Color is analog variable, exactly like wavelength of EM waves. What meaning does it have if I say 'red' is just another name for 700nm wavelength? Is there not a possible reality where that statement is actually the answer, and what exactly would be missing from that description to make it fully satisfying?

Thank you. My interpretation is that Emergence/Panpsychism (which is a wonderful paradigm/metaphor for consciousness) would explain the cognition phenomena itself, but it wouldn't explain the actual true nature of conscious existence itself. In other words it's not explaining truly novel phenomena. Or maybe I'm not understanding.

In that way, I don't feel you got the gist of my questions. I don't know if you could logicize your thoughts/theory in this way, but can you explain the hard/soft problem viz Emergence/Panpsychism in a syllogistic bullet-point style?

For example,
1. The metaphysical properties of consciousness work:...…
2. The true nature of consciousness is made from:.....
3. The human sentience is made from:.....
4. Mental properties can be reduced to physical properties by way of:....
5. There are truly no emergent properties of complex systems because:....

What I'm trying to parse is the distinction between a micro v macro view of consciousness. For example, in a micro view, it's conceivable emergence explains EM fields of conscious cognition alone, but to make the leap to a macro view of evolution would require more work.

Is there not a possible reality where that statement is actually the answer, and what exactly would be missing from that description to make it fully satisfying? — Zelebg

I think what is missing are the metaphysical elements of existence.

For example:
1. Sentience
2. Wonder
3. Purpose

In other words, why does one care if the color is red, yellow or black? Red makes one feel excited, while yellow makes one feel happy, while black makes one feel... .

Great questions

Hmmm. It is really about recasting the questions in a way that fits the best explanatory paradigm, essentially a paradigm shift. It's not that consciousness no longer requires explanation, however its essential reality is on par with everything else empirical, no longer a mystery. Likewise the mechanism of its operations. Social theories explaining social effects are adequate, especially when the effects are cast in a systems view. Consciousness is no less tangible than atoms. Yet it is also just as mysterious as the underlying laws governing universal forces. You just press forward using the systems paradigm, which will allow us to expand our body of knowledge. Just as the "new" Copernican paradigm did. And the new relativistic paradigm. Etc.

Edit: if you think about it in terms of coherence vs. correspondence theories of truth. Reductionism essentially relies upon some form of tangibility-correspondence. However quantum physics decisively eliminates this. What you are left with is a mass of equations, theories, which "hang together" without contradiction and form the basis for the 'best approximate world view'. Systems philosophy likewise emerges as the most comprehensive and coherent framework.

Consciousness is no less tangible than atoms. — Pantagruel

Neither is perceptible to touch.

But then there are ways to look at an atom: with an electron microscope. Or see its effects: in particle cloud chambers.

But I can only experience consciousness in myself. I can infer it in others. But I cannot, for example, say what is not conscious. Perhaps plants are. Once, not long ago, we thought we could only say we were conscious - in science that is. Up to the late 60s and even somewhat beyond, it was taboo to assume animal consciousness (that is awareness). Now we feel like the inference is strong enough. Great. But we have no way to measure it - how much there is. Whether is is present in an organism or not. Whether it is a facet of all matter or not.

We can look at behavior and functions. We can check the memory of something. We can see if reacts to stimuli and decide it is conscious. But we cannot be sure a consciousness, rudimentary or otherwise, is not presence. Just the reactions. The behavior. But behavior need not be present in relation to consciousness.

We don't know what is aware or not.

We cannot measure it.

It is not like atoms or anything else. Not yet can we say it is, at least.

So, all I can really say is that minimally understanding the theory is the explanation, per the synopsis I offered.

:up: :cool:

“Consciousness” (I reject the term) remains unexplainable for the simple reason that our eyes point outward, and it is unethical to do certain experiments while humans are fully conscious or without anesthetics.

Consciousness is no less tangible than atoms. Yet it is also just as mysterious as the underlying laws governing universal forces.

Let us see how low can we get the bottom line. We only have one concept to explain everything - “property”. At atom scale there is electric and magnetic property of individual subatomic elements. Causal interaction between properties gives rise to forces. All the way up through emergent layers this repeats with new emergent properties which give rise to new emerging forces.

Can we agree then, sentience, or basic element of it, must be either property or force?

Does it make more sense if sentience was property or force, or neither? Why?