Yes, yes. I think we must have got some wires crossed in this topic. I don't think people necessarily really mean h2O when they say water.

Other notes:

It seems to be idealizations everywhere though. Even if you want to go past the idealization of water=H2O, then the less idealized descriptions will include idealizations as per the nature of chemistry where various models still involve idealization.

I think even if a model is considered true, there are ways that we can envision it being underspecified in some way. Maybe the example of quantum mechanics interpretations. Two different interpretations may afford the same empirical description of water in terms of quantum theory, physics, theoretical chemistry. Yet they may have radical metaphysical different implications for what water is. So then, is water picking out the same thing everywhere if it cannot distinguish between interpretations of H2O with extra interpretational or underlying structure like this?

Well I think this is a different topic to what I was saying in my post you replied to but I would say this causo-historico thing presumes a coherent ontology of the individual to which the causo-historical connection has a non-trivial consequence for. When I think about it deeply, I am skeptical about such coherent ontology of the individual where the causo-historico thing has any signicance beyond a kind of bookkeeping role of keeping track of things.

I best be careful then. If my account means that people cannot refer then it's in trouble since we do successfully refer! — Moliere

I think there's been some wires crossed as I don't understand whats being implied here.

Quite so. Not wanting to be picky, but what makes these abstractions arbitrary? Isn't it rather that the idea of natural kinds proposes a certain kind of model, but the facts (nature) undermine it. — Ludwig V

Yes, I think you are right about proposing a certain kind of model and it being undermined in the sense that either the model is outright wrong or the idealization ignores meaningful distinctions.

I was meaning that once you lift the lid on the issue of the model and probe past what was once seen as some essential nature; then, in probing the specifics about how something like H2O may behave in different contexts then there is not really a limit on how specific you want to go or where you want to place the boundaries for classification or on what basis you want to make separations between different things. H2O with different ion concentrations, isotopes. Ice, vapour, etc. We can always cut arbitrary lines or boundaries.

though very little in comparison. — Moliere

Yes but they are still necessary for the properties of water like electrical conductivity, even if little in comparison - if they were not present, it would imply there was no water there or at least that the water didn't possess its characteristic properties. Hence why different concentrations lead to different properties. The isotope example is also interesting because its not trivial at all the changes it makes. D2O can kill things because of how different it is to water.

I think the concept of idealization always strengthens this kind of direction you are going in since at the very least it questions or complicates the idea that people are actually referring to what they say they are referring to when they use particular terms or phrases.

It just means that H2O represents more than just "H2O" perhaps. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I was reading an article suggesting that it isnt really problematic for saying H2O is water since you can say that all that is required (under certain conditions) is that you have many H2O molecules and in their interactions, these ionization phenomena happen... so you still don't need anything more than H2O really. I don't have a problem with saying H2O is water since there is a pragmatism of ignoring these kind of details.

But at same time to me that means acknowledging an aspect of pragmatism or choice into it about where I draw the lines/boundaries. It complicates the notion that we are talking about some essentialistic natural kind here imo.

But the point is that it becomes a posteriori necessary, which is Kripke's controversial theory. The evidence provides the necessity of identity's content, which can be changed with more evidence. So the content can change, but the link of necessity does not, with whatever it is that that content provides. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I see this but it seems that was is posteriori necessary trivially depends on what I happen to decide I should call something so to me it doesn't seem that interesting or have deep consequences. Can you even call that necessary?

Then it comes to the issue of deciding what is water in all possible worlds. Does that trivially mean that water in all possible worlds is identical to water in this world? Or might there be other possible worlds with water that is different in some way but still similar? It seems this is down to my decision in some ways about what I want to deem as water or not depending on what I want to ignore in possible worlds.

But even here I'd note that a chemist differentiates between aqueous solutions and water, and the normal usage calls the sea "water" even though it's actually a mixture of water, ammonia, salt, etc. So that the common usage does not always pick out the very same thing even in our world, and so the claim to necessity is hampered by that possibility. — Moliere

I'm afraid common usage is too messy for us. Common usage can distinguish between water, sea water, sewage water, rain water, &c. Pure or distilled water is part of that range, but is really a technical idea, now adopted by common usage. Perhaps we need a natural kind for each of them? — Ludwig V

Its interesting because really, we can get arbitrarily specific about different kinds of water. When H2O molecules react it results in various different ions which are essential for its properties so if you want to be more specific, you could say that water isn't really just H2O - that water is H2O may be a straightforward statement since it emerges from H2O molecules interacting, but then it has to be qualified that this is idealizing the details.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-ionization_of_water

We might then see that different concentrations of these ions result in different properties of water and then we might have water with different isotopes of hydrogen which impart different properties too.

Seems to me anyone can get as precise as one wants in distinguishing things and all "natural kinds" require ignoring some kinds of details, differentiation, contextual relevance. Nothing we categorize in the world avoids arbitrary abstractions.

Ha, have any of your suspicions been verified? I had a suspicion of that kind of nature once about another poster who hasnt posted in this thread, there was just another poster with a very similar writing style who started posting in the same thread as them.

Totally agree about this water thing. I more or less have the same idea but I extend it to individuals too.

Well said on these various posts.

I wouldn't say research like this would be helping with the Hard Problem of consciousness though. Ofcourse, the more we learn, the more we might precisely we will be able to relate experiences to neural activity but that isnt necessarily the same as explaining why specific phenomenal experiences are related to certain mechanisms.
And I don't think there an explanation to that is even possible as I think such a duality is illusory.

Oh, this is an actual question about another poster?

No I am not him. Why did you think that? Never heard of that name until I looked it up just now.

I am 100% sure, there is absolutely no way that neuroscience can solve the hard problem of consciousness in a way where our descriptions in neuroscience fully explain our experience in the sense that there is some kind of necessary entailment between some neuroscientific description and some experience. This is impossible I think. Your wave example doesn't help. It wouldn't explain why the wave is associated with some particular experie ces in the same way that current descriptions of vidual cortex activity cannot tell us what experiences we are having. I think consciousness is a place where the natural limits of self-explanation really becoming prominent... the thing is, there is no reason we should be able to explain everything, especially the self (i.e. experience). I think its almost analogous to how self-reference always results in paradoxes in logic. We can never know just as a dog will never know somethings because its brain is designed in a way that is limiting to it.

P-zombies are definitely incoherent by any normal standard of a good, coherent description of how the world probably works.

It makes absolutely no sense that there could be things out there with no conscious yet they routinely claim they are conscious and enter into debates about the hard problem of consciousness.

Moreover, because our brains are the things which are functionally responsible for our conscious claims, it follows that the reason I, as a conscious being, believe that I am conscious is for the exact same reasons that a p-zombie believes it is consciousness, even though the p-zombie is wrong and I just happen to be correct.
To me, science doesn't seem to give or necessitate any room for anything additional to routine physics and biology as explanations for why our brains behave the way they do so it is strange that a p-zombie would make these claims from the physical interactions of the brain. And the fact that my brain is only interacting with physical things brings up the question of how I can even know I am phenomenally conscious if the brain mediates all my knowledge. My knowledge about my own consciousness would be entirely incidental.

So it follows that phenomenal consciousness is entirely redudnant.

The simplest explanation is that there is no duality between the mind and brain. P-zombies are incoherent and don't make sense in the actual world at all.

For me here I think it gets hazy because since in my example everything is completely identical except for this gamete part, it seems to me I could plausibly say they are the same person.

At the same time, I do see the causal intuition. But then again, in this context, I am inclined to ask what makes the causal-historico thing impart this you-ness in a way which is not just kind of arbitrary labelling. And I don't think that I can give myself a good response of what it is that is being imparted by the historico-causal connection.

As I mentioned in another poster, the closest I can find is some kind of intuitive notion that in this world, the lights of my consciousness are switched on, while in that world they are switched off. But I don't think that is well founded at all or gives some good criteria in terms of identity either.

What about a possible world where the only thing that was different was that George 1 came from gamete 2 instead of gamete 1, which just happen to be "twin" gametes. Everything else in that world is identical.

Well given that a p-zombie:

1) Behaves identically to a regular person;

2) The reason it behaves are for the same reasons as a regular person (i.e. it has a human brain that performs functions just like ours); and

3) The circumstances about the world under which I myself am "accepting" or "considering" things is the same as which apply to the p-zombie (in regard to the p-zombie performing acts of p-"considering" and p-"accepting", etc);

Then maybe it makes sense to attribute to it these things you mentioned after all. For all intents and purposes they cannot be distinguished in either case.

Edit: attempt at clarification same points, partly by formatting.

But that's my point about the gametes. That is the point where that very individual cannot be that very individual anymore. Then it is back to being open to simply "a possibility of some individual". — schopenhauer1

Well in the the gamete example, it is about a world where that person was not born as opposed to a world where some property of the person has been changed.

Very interesteing reading all of these experiences.


Thank you, this has been very insightful!

When we think of ourselves as experiencing something, don't we generally think that what we experience is other than ourselves? — Janus

Well yes, but our selves are also experiences. And then consider that experiebces are going on in our heads as part of the goings on of a physical system which one might consider to be their self. So its interesting to see where the dividing lines are. Thinking about this, it seems that my experience of self is just a model of my body interacting, exercising its agency with its environment. Even though, given a thought experiment of removing my brain from my body, I wouldn't necessarily identify myself with my body.

You can lose parts of your body that are not critical to your survival and still be a living, experiencing body. — Janus

Yes, no doubt.

However, if you lose your eyes or lose your hearing you will not experience in those domains. A mere population of cells does not necessarily experience anything like you as an organism consisting of a self-regulating population of specialized cells does — Janus

I'm not sure I understand what you are saying here.

Roughly speaking the boundary of your being is your skin; it is natural enough to think of whatever is sensed within that boundary as part of oneself and whatever is sensed outside of that boundary as other. — Janus

There's lots of counterexamples to this kind of thing I think, such as the thought experiment of a brain transplant or something. At the same time, your body is itself full of living systems with their own boundaries. It is ofcourse natural to think that way, but I am skeptical that it is like an objective fact of the matter. *We might also characterize ourselves as parts of broader social and ecosystems, parts of a China brain perhaps even. There is also people who even propose extended mind theses about how our environment is an important part of cognition.

I would say your dead body is the dead you, which is very different than the living you, because it is no longer capable of internal self-regulation or of experiencing anything at all, either internal or external to it. It has become like any non-living object, but every particular non-living object is still thought to have a unique identity. — Janus

Yes, it seems complicated. There are a few different ways I could distinguish the concept of self here.

Edited: Minor addition * ... *

Do you mean in the sense that I might think of my identity as consisting in being a mother, a scientist, an artist, a policewoman or whatever? — Janus

Uhh maybe not necessarily against that way of looking at it but I was thinking more just about exactly what parts of your physicality you consider you, what bits are essential, what bits could be changed and you would intuitively still consider yourself yourself.

Some people believe in an immortal soul and would say it is that soul and not their body that constitutes their identity. — Janus

I wouldn't say soul but then again I do think what I am experiencing in an ongoing way is what I liken to the self strongly. I imagine its plausible that my brain being transported into a vat, my self could be maintained. Then again, I don't think I identify all parts of my experiences with myself even though they are going on in parts of my brain... which are part of me???

then what alternative do we have but to think of the body — Janus

Yes but clearly its not all essential and I think identifying myself just as a population of cells misses something in the same way that I don't think there is necessarily a single way of identifying or labelling or drawing boundaries within/around bodies or animals, other objects etc., even though doing so and thinking about it may have practical benefits or be interesting in some ways.

If each body has a unique genotype and phenotype, then DNA would be the most accurate way to establish bodily uniqueness, since differences of form can sometimes be hard to discern as can be the case with identical twins. — Janus

Yes true, DNA certainly makes it easy to discern or pick you out; but then again, my dead body will have my DNA. I think there is at least a debate to be had about whether my dead body is me. Since I wouldn't be alive anymore. Maybe you would say it is me.

Yes, I think I understand your view.. at least the notion that alternative gametes wouldn't be you.

I guess my view is just that there isn't an objective fact of the matter about identities or self.

but strictly consisting of meanings, or else the content of concepts (rather than their labels). — javra

Would you say these are like specific experiences? With phenomena? Its strange because I don't think I can express meanings without words so it is not clear to me what active cognizance of wordless meaning could be like in the moment.

The whole notion of identity and discerning it. I don't even have to look this up, and I would guess there would be hundreds or more papers written on things tangential to this regarding identity, essence, genes, and the like. It just seemed you were a bit too hastily dismissive of any sort of notion related to that. But we don't have to dwell on this odd dismissiveness and hostility to the concept — schopenhauer1

Well I haven't had a deep look at the topic so myabe, but this type of view is my general inclination, which I think I could argue as holding in this area too. I would gladly discuss opposing points though. But I did say I get the intuition of what you said; it makes sense to me from an intuitive standpoint that the different gamete would not be you. At the same time, it brings up the question of what that statement actually means - that the different gamete person would be you, or the same gamete person not being you - beyond just the labelling of something as "you". When I think more about it, I am inclined away from a kind of essentialistic view of the self or even criteria for identity (or even truth) counterfactually.

It's also a function that you missed a broad portion of the debate on the thread here and then just came in with these ideas focusing mainly on the genetic component aspect of my argument, and not the idea that it is combined with the causal. — schopenhauer1

I did read the thread or I wouldn't have acknowledged some people made some good points.

I was just clarifying my views on the genetics as I was preoccupied with that bit.

I also mentioned that the genetics aspect is not some blank slate. It does have uniqueness that contributes to various aspects of the self that would be different than if the gametes were another set. It isn't just "any set of gametes" that makes you, you. It has to be those gametes, along with the other factors I mentioned. — schopenhauer1

Yes, sure, I just think its interesting to think about whether the genetics are the most important bit or not. If you have different gametes that all are genetically different, its not exactly a good experiment for answering that question. So I was think about that beyond whether just being a different gamete would make you a different person counterfactually *to the question of the role of genes in general in identity... whether they are incidental or not to identity*.

Edit: Just clarifying * ... *

It is well established that the links between genes and specific characteristics are very complicated and often surprising. — Ludwig V

I admit was thinking in a much more simplistically. These are some excellent points and the kind of complexities I find very interesting about biology! I will have to consider more subtleties like this into my view.



That definitely is an interesting way of looking at it, certainly worth thinking about. I think the stage view looks a bit more appealing to me. I guess it really depends what you want from a theory of identity.

I think it is uncontroversial from a science perspective that each sperm would produce a different genotype and hence a different phenotype (body). — Janus

Very much so, but I think there are still important questions about whether you would consider your phenotype the same as your identity. Realistically, yes I am sure every conception event leads to a different person who is very different from every other person. But then I think that our biology incidentally does this (as a matter of just how our biology seems to work), it doesn't let us probe exactly the limits on how we might perceive a change of DNA to affect identity like you would in an experiment. I think DNA can be a good way of identifying different individuals, but is that just incidental to the actual identity itself? Do all DNA changes, do all phenotype changes correspond to identity change? Is DNA essential to what characterizes my identity as a person (could something else perform a similar role)? All that is why I said in another post my intuition was that maybe the historical chain role in the gamete fusion scenario may be just as if not more important as the blueprint role. The blueprint role is in many ways limited if the actual phenotype that emerges depends hugely on the environment... in fact it must always depend on the envrionment. I imagine just in many cases, the environment is very well controlled (e.g. inside a womb), which in some ways is incidental. Someone could have genes which normally produce five digit hands but in the wrong prenatal environment, they only end up with 4. The role we attribute to genes normally is not inherent to the genes but, we can just assign that function because of how nature happens to be commonly.

I am sure philosophers have broad range of beliefs on the issue. I doubt I am the only person drawn toward that kind of view.

I am not sure what you're saying I dismissed

Still has a causal link tied with it. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I already said. It is interesting though to think though what if you could replace it with something else functionally identical? Would that interrupt the identity?

The start of an object isn’t just the substance so it was more nuanced. Also isn’t there volumes of philosophical literature on identity, essence, and similar issues?

Seems rather dismissive, so I wonder if it’s just you don’t like when I argue it rather than X “legitimate” philosopher in SEP. — schopenhauer1

Not sure what you're getting at.

Thanks, I will take a look!

How would you characterize what happens in your head when you think? Like whenn trying to solve a problen?

Some random shower thoughts on the issue

I think really in physical systems of many components the whole notion of objective identity might be moot because we can draw the boundaries where we like on same/different.

Often we can pre-stipulate identity on counterfactuals though. What if I were born in Rome in 1823?

One question is if counterfactual causal chains leading to the development of gametes would mean different gametes (even if same genetic components), meaning different people? Is the counterfactual of "What if I was born in Rome in 1823" make it trivially that I am not that person since the causal chains leading to the gametes would be different necessarily?

What if I was synthesized of artificial components and artificial genetics but the same biological development and identical history of events?

I guess that certainly wouldn't be me (or would it?) but then can't I just imagine myself if that was the case? Whose to say that isn't me if I am imagining it (it isn't real anyway). If thats what counterfactuals are... just postulating what if... and postulate changes to relevant part.

What then exactly does it mean to say that different gamete wouldn't be me other than pre-stipulating the gamete is me? Must have another consequence other than just labelling it as me or not me. If we use the distinction of causal chains to say something is me or not, there must be some substance to what that me is other than just pragmatic bookkeeping? But again, that seems moot on the physical components case.

I think it must have something to do with experience. The other gamete would not be having my experiences that I am having. I would never have been born, no lights would have been turned on (a common phrase I have heard to describe phenomenal experience) in the same way that I know someone else right now is having experiences I am not having and don't have access to.

Other than that, its hard for me to envision what it actually means for the other gamete to not be me. But then again, I think this is getting into a awkward metaphysical territory surrounding identity in experiences and also things like the hard problem of consciousness. It might even be presupposing a kind of dualism I don't agree with. What does it mean to be having my own experiences as opposed to someone else's (in the sense of previous paragraph)? Doesn't seem well defined to me.

My intuition is that if experience has is its basis in the degrees if freedom found in biology and physics, it will have similar moot problems of identity as with physical component systems.

If we have the momentary unfolding of biophysical processes or functions in flux then is the continuity of consciousness illusory?

If knowledge and memory is also embedded in this momentarily unfolding flux then is there a fact of the matter about being the same as I was 5 minutes ago? After all, to generate the right expressions of memory or knowledge only requires the right momentary states in terms of physical states of my neuronal membranes. Continuity is not necessary and it is questionable whether my brain is ever in the same two states even for similar experiences at different times.

Yup, I was just saying that when I think about it more deeply, I just discard identity or self from an objective standpoint entirely.

The genes obviously contribute but seems intuitive one might change genetic information or phenotypic traits of a person and retain the identity. Its not clear where the dividing line is. I can even conceive of changing lots of genetic information which otherwise has little effect on the parts of the person crucial for its identity.

Yes, I get the intuition. It seems to make sense, more from the causal link standpoint than the blueprint one because I am not sure that DNA can be identified with us as opposed to picking out us in a way that is somewhat incidental.

But then again when I think about identity or what it means for a counterfactual person to be you, I don't really find sound criteria or meaning anyway.

I am claiming that it is necessary not sufficient, which is harder to say about almost any of the other subsequent things in the causal history. If we took those away, they might or might not contribute to identity, but what is absolutely needed is that initial gamete combination and blueprint. — schopenhauer1

So what is it about the gametes here is the important thing?

Edit: I may as well ask to clarify specifically about why exactly the timing bit is important since that comes under the original question too.

I think I need more information before I decide whether to agree with you.

Very interesting thread with some good posts. Don't think I have any interesting insights beyond what others have already mentioned. I think without a well-defined, self-consistent, non-trivial notion of identity for a person, it *(the gamete thing)* might just be moot. I personally don't subscribe to such a thing. I do get the intuition about the gamete thing though, but maybe the intuition gets a bit hazy when we start talking about very precise timing effects and things like that. At the same time, I think arguments similar to the gamete point could possibly be applied to points all along the causal history in different ways but where the consequence for identity would plausibly be different.

But how about a more radical position? Avoid speaking about "reality", just as one avoids speaking about "existence". (I don't remember whether you ever looked in on the thread about Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia", but the argument is in there.) Suppose we treat concepts as instruments (cf. telescope, microscope, galvanometer, etc.). Instruments do not make claims about particular empirical truths (or the generalizations we derive from particular truths). They enable us to establish empirical truths. You would be a realist and an anti-realist at the same time. — Ludwig V

Yes, this seema actually quite similar to what I mean by being instrumentalist. I will have to take a look at the Austin thread; maybe you have a particular post in mind, or page in the thread?

Yes, that sounds sensible. But that's an ideal and there may never be answers that are more than provision (see philosophy of science). Can you suspend all judgement while people work out all those answers? And can people work out all those answers without negotiating the issues we are bothered by - just without us? What do we do with our confusions while we are waiting? — Ludwig V

Yes, thats definitely a good point. We don't know nearly enough about the brain, cognition, etc. But I do think we know enough about the world to make some general arguments about the kind of manner in which these things should work, maybe some of this being in the field of philosophy of mind, for instance, maybe other areas too. Following from this there's also room for making arguments about why I think its good to let those explanations speak for themselves, why I might want to deflate certain things which I do not think can add anything else substantial or veridical. And obviously philosophers have been making arguments of that kind of nature for a while.

Well, I would go further than that. — Ludwig V

Aha, yes I think I would too. Its one of those things where I am aware that the initial motivation was to make notions of "realness" redundant in this area but also feels like just another form of anti-realism. I think its not that inaccurate to say that I think of myself as a kind of instrumentalist about everything which most would say is just anti-realism. I guess it has just got to the point where the anti-realist becomes anti-realist about anti-realism.

The meaning of a word is its use in an utterance. — Banno

Well I think that implies a very deflated notion of truth which basically aligns with what I just said there.

The closest anyone has got is Banno's weirdo move of just claiming 'brute fact' without anything whatsoever to establish that claim — AmadeusD

If Banno's view is realism, it is an extremely thin, watered down realism where "truth" is nothing more than how we use the word, regardless of what "truth" actually means. Neither does it rule out moral truth relativism. Its therefore probably not a kind of realism that is problematic for an anti-realist.

The referee is not a player, but is just as much on the field as any player. They are not somehow separate and above the game, but immersed in it. Ditto judges.
A dictionary uses the same language that it describes, but is just as much a book as any other.

My line would be that the debate doesn't pay attention to the actual use of "real" vs its many opposites and the muddled idea that "real" is somehow equivalent to ontology. — Ludwig V

Yes, I think this kind of thing is very much in my preferred domain. My inclination right now I think is to just not try to shoehorn my understanding of science into the "real" or "not real", at least not use words like that as the focal point. Rather, I would want explanations of how science works, how people's cognition works, how brains work, how language works and let those things speak for themselves.

My inclination is that how these things all work are in the same way that the scientific instrumentalist does science. Its just about predictions (parallel to predictive processing in neuroscience) or use like tools. For me, words are no deeper representation-wise than how they fit in the dynamics of our experiences. Uses of words like "truth" and "real" are no different. So because they are no more than where they fit as part of our experiences, their ontological significance is kind of deflated somewhat... just in the sense that they are nothing more than how they might fit in the dynamics of experience... because that is exactly what happens, I say words, hear words, read words in the context of other experiences... and thats all there is to it (a lot of help from neuroscience would be required). Obviously knowledge and science are trying to explain our experiences but then, the words / concepts we use as part of "explanations" and "knowledge" are effectively just moving parts embedded in the stream of the very thing trying be explained (experience... as a whole).

Well I wasn't making an argument for or against the merits of some view or claim, I was just saying what I think would happen. I was just thinking it would be ironic that a viewpoint attempting to resolve the realism/anti-realism debate might lead to a meta-realism debate. I wonder if there could be a similar middle ground position to that debate as well (maybe not; hard to visualize).