IE, it is a problem of circularity, in that there are two objects provided we have already determined that there are two objects. — RussellA
what is entailed by 'mental only' — AmadeusD
I have. "What are the experiences of" is a good enough question to at the very least, put the position you're driving at on the rocks, if not infer a position that requires externalities (in a 'proper' use of the word - not the economic one) to inform any type of experience. Otherwise, we have infinite regress - at what point would content be involved, if it's experience all the way down? Seems a massive gap here. — AmadeusD
As noted a couple of times, and apparently ignored: Experiences must be OF something(if you do not accept this, we may be at an end of the road we travel together). — AmadeusD
Mental objects do not exist outside of mind, by definition. What's not getting through? — AmadeusD
This is the exclusion you seem to just straight-up ignore. — AmadeusD
"why isn't anything conscious"? The latter is not irrelevant, in the discussion we're having. — AmadeusD
This is not a problem, and it does not suggest this. I would recommend reading all of Chalmers, if this is where you're going. — AmadeusD
Can you explain why this would have any weight in displacing the (potential) property dualist account? — AmadeusD
He would posit that nothing you've said changes the fact that Consciousness is irreducible. — AmadeusD
I'm beginning to think you're confusing yourself. — AmadeusD
Do you know any idealist scientific realists? — AmadeusD
But we know, for sure, that cognition happens sans any experience. — AmadeusD
"why are social practices what they are? why do they evolve the way they do? etc." — Count Timothy von Icarus
Scientific realism posits there is an external world we can accurately measure. Perceptual realism posits that we, without measurement, can directly access an external world — AmadeusD
What's your take here, then? Pure curiosity. To come to table, 'cognition' doesn't seem to me something that is the same as experience. So, all cognition is 'conscious' but barely any cognition arises in experience — AmadeusD
Atomization (also mistakenly termed 'individualism'/'individualization') is a result of these types policies — Tzeentch
with senses other than sight I'm not sure what is representative. — Moliere
If consciousness does not reduce to the physical — AmadeusD
I'm not quite sure I'm understand thsi reply. — AmadeusD
One question here is going to be (or more accurately "How do we produce conscious experiences of the external world?") but another, separate and probably more profound question is "How could we know that anything in the external world is actually as-it-seems? Even if we have 'direct' perception we still have the issue of Descartes Demon and all that fun stuff - whereas the question around scientific realism addresses the problem of whether our perception is of actual things. In world A' we may have direct perceptions of things which are not actually things, for instance. It is a false perception, but its a direct relation with the mental substance that it arises from. Even in world A, we might have indirect perception yet trust that our scientific instruments are relaying the actual behind our perceptions. — AmadeusD
So in the Scientific sense, are we even metaphysically able to ascertain the world as-it-is? And for Perception its do we, humans, naturally, perceive the world in direct causal relation (regardless of whether the world actually allows for accurate measurement. — AmadeusD
You can keep question one, and simply swap question two for the more specific version: Why is anything in the Universe conscious? To essentially outline the two distinct questions that idealism would still post. Consciousness not supervening on the physical simply doesn't explain it as the majority of cognition is not accompanied by any experience. — AmadeusD
That literally is the hard problem. Perhaps you have an erroneous idea of what it is? The hard problem consists in this exact question. — AmadeusD
AS above, clearly this is not right. — AmadeusD
Its just ignoring one problem for another. — AmadeusD
It's very hard to see how this could matter. If one is having an experience, that's all that's needed. The framework in whcih is sits isn't relevant the Hard Problem. It is the experience per se that needs explaining. — AmadeusD
An idealist rejects that there are external objects. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding what you're getting at here. — AmadeusD
Because you're misattributing what 'realism' stands for within each framework. — AmadeusD
My take is that there isn't really evidence for indirect realism as much as indirect realism is an interpretation of what we know -- so I'm providing an alternate interpretation to weaken the justification for indirect realism. Or at least that's the strategy. — Moliere
It seems so to me, yes. — Moliere
I don't understand what a representation of my toe would be when I'm stubbing it or not. — Moliere
Minimally I have a hard time thinking of the perception of my body as a representation: I can go as far as to say it's a bundle, and there is no "I", but I don't think my body is a bundle of representations. — Moliere
all Russian peasants held their land in a form of communal ownership known as obshchina or mir, which was similar, but not identical, to the commons-based communities in pre-industrial England — Monthly Review
These are explanations for phenomena used to support indirect realism which don't resort to the position of indirect realism — Moliere
I think "information" counts as kind of idealism, if you're positing it as a kind of fundamental substance that everything is composed of. — Moliere
Isn't that pretty much what the topic of indirect or naive realism is about? Fundamental metaphysics? — Moliere
I'm uncertain of the best way to put it, but at the very least what it means is that though direct realists directly perceive objects in the world that does not then entail that what they see is a fixed property, or that there are not other properties which a given perception is not perceiving.
It's mostly the notion of permanent objects and their essences that I'd try to avoid -- things are in constant flux. — Moliere
- a term of art meant to contrast with "properties", is what I was thinking. — Moliere
Perhaps this is a way of differentiating the naive from the direct realist: I think the naive realist is seeing something real, that literal objects are a part of their experience, but that does not then mean that every judgment about that real thing which a naive realist makes is going to be true or comprehensive. — Moliere
While I've come to discount the notion of an information ontology, you're far from alone in thinking like that. — Moliere
in a sense I'd say that every judgment has a dual-awareness -- the judgment ,and what the judgment is about) — Moliere
But how do we really differentiate which is the better way to talk? — Moliere
No theory has an explanation of why experience compliments activity. Idealism still cannot answer the hard problem. It just shifts from having experiences of 'the world', to having experiences of one's mind. But the problem of experience remains. — AmadeusD
therefore there is no hard problem. Experience is a brute fact of reality.
The bolded, appears to me, an absolute fact as long as one is not an Idealist. There is the world. There is inside the head. — AmadeusD
I'm not entirely sure what's being suggested here. AI doesn't have conscious experience, that we know of. — AmadeusD
but hallucinations like one experiences on hallucinogens or when they don't have enough sugar to make the brain function as it normally does. — Moliere
if we do not analyze them using Cartesian assumptions, are evidence that our mind is a part of the world because the world influences it, rather than the other way about — Moliere
So I'd claim that I am aware of my toe — Moliere
If it's all just experience then wouldn't that be a kind of direct realism? There wouldn't even be a self as much as a local bundle of experiences which gets in the habit of calling itself "I", erroneously. — Moliere
I think objects have affordances more than distinct properties. — Moliere
though it's not all that satisfying to me to say that the hard problem presupposes anything. — AmadeusD
If there's no conscious experience, there's nothing to compare with mind-independence. — AmadeusD
Is that not different to your mind? — Moliere
So how does the indirect realist account for error about perception, if not another intermediary? — Moliere
To me it seems like it's much more elegant to simply say we can be fallible — Moliere
I'd believe that if we recreated the conditions for creating perception then we'd produce the same results, but I don't believe anyone really knows those conditions. — Moliere
there is no direct link between most things in the world and our experience of them. This is, in fact, the hard problem — AmadeusD
using arguments like this seems to me to entirely side-step the question, and assumes that the very concept of 'direct'ness is somehow intensional and not something which can be ascertained 'correctly' seems both unsatisfactory, and under-explanatory. — AmadeusD
I don't think it's a matter of knowledge as much as an interpretation of what we know. — Moliere
I don't know why I'd prioritize ipseity over the object... the sacrifice of fidelity to our intuitions. — Moliere
Rather, I can't see how we'd be able to tell the story about retina, photons, or brains without knowing -- rather than inferring -- about the world. — Moliere
Else, "retina, photons, brains" are themselves just inferences about an experiential projection in a causal relationship with a reality we know nothing about, but just make guesses about. — Moliere
The only problem with this view being that we do know things, so it falls in error on the other side -- on the side of certain knowledge which rejects beliefs which could be wrong, when all proper judgment takes place exactly where we could be wrong. — Moliere
There's a difference between being able to accomplish something, and knowing something.
I'd liken our neuroscientists to medieval engineers -- they can make some observations and throw together some catapults, but they do not know the mechanical laws of Newton or its extensions.
It's more because we're ignorant of how this whole thing works -- even at the conceptual level, which is why it's interesting in philosophy -- so I wouldn't believe it without more. I'd think the person was making some sort of mistake along the way, in the same way that I thought about the Google employee who thought that later iterations of ChatGPT are conscious. — Moliere
Rather, we directly interact with the world as a part of it -- the world interacting with itself, in the broad view. — Moliere
and all that seems to justify doubt that were some scientist of consciousness to claim they have a brain in a vat which is experiencing I'd simply doubt it without more justification. It's entirely implausible that we'd stumble upon how to do that given the depth of our ignorance. — Moliere
Nevertheless, we don’t know what goes on under the hood, yet we rise to the occassion of making it comprehensible to ourselves, in some form, by some method. Representation is merely a component which fits into one of those methods. — Mww
so we throw stuff at the wall, see what sticks — Mww
Representationalism makes perfect sense metaphysically, which just indicates an logically necessary method describing how our intellect works. — Mww
I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life. — Moliere
Banno — Moliere
I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate. — Moliere
"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about. — Moliere
I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects — Moliere
I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us) — Moliere
In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea. — Moliere
But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head. — Moliere
if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception. — Moliere
it could just be a direct link between me and the world. — Moliere
models that are populated by sensory input? — frank
I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others' have been doing the heavy lifting. — Moliere
If you divide it by 0.5 you get two of them, bizarrely — bert1
The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment. — Pierre-Normand
Such behaviour would then be far less subjective than what such camps would like to admit. — jasonm
There is no fact of the matter as to whether perception is direct or indirect, they are just different ways of talking and neither of them particularly interesting or useful. I'm astounded that this thread has continued so long with what amounts to "yes it is" and "no it isn't". — Janus
I'm having trouble following your posts. — fishfry
I indicated in my post. — fishfry