A realist may think the different perspectives we have on the world are different ways of viewing the same thing, an anti-realist may say those same perspectives block knowledge of the thing in and of itself. A realist may say theories are approximately true, an anti-realist may say the notion of "approximately true" is arbitrary and just highlights that the theory does not explain all of the data. — Apustimelogist

That is a brilliant account of the debates. It makes it look as if it just a question of different ways of saying the same thing. The catch is that it's hard to see why it matters which way one jumps.

Yes, I think when it comes to Kuhn at least, his mention of translation is not talking about languages generically but about words thats constitute specific scientific theories. — Apustimelogist

That may well be true. But that makes his use of "translation" very different from what translation between languages involves. Word-for-word translation is almost always a mistake. Perhaps it would be better to talk about "equivalence"; but then the concepts of a theory are inter-related, not defined one by one. Perhaps we should just stick to "incommensurable".

For what evidence is there empirically for "conceptual schema" to be a "thing" as applied to language use itself (not necessarily as a meta-theory of differences in scientific frameworks aka "incommensurability"). — schopenhauer1

That question reads a bit convoluted to me. Can you rephrase the question?

I am tempted to say that any notion of conceptual scheme would claim that putting empirical evidence prior to determining the scheme is the wrong way about: in the strong version the scheme determines evidence, in the weak version the scheme is part-and-parcel to the evidence. At the very least there are beliefs around empirical evidence which can be questioned from a non-evidential standpoint -- there's a certain sense in which we have to delimit what evidence even is.

For example: there are beliefs about how temperature is measured, but those beliefs are different from empirical evidence of temperature, which is just the measurement itself. But in order to be able to measure we already understand temperature conceptually to be a measure of heat, that heat transfers to the thermometer and equilibrates at the same temperature as the object it's surrounded by, and that this effects the density of mercury such that if we put regular marks on the thermometer we can see just how hot or cold it is in accord with some standards, like the boiling and freezing point of water, and because it's equal in temperature to what's being measured after such and such a time, how hot or cold some other object is is the same as what the thermometer's temperature is. These beliefs coincide with but aren't identical to evidence.

At least this is what seems to be meant by the notion of conceptual schemes. The Underdetermination of a theory by evidence is frequently cited in favor of conceptual schema, for instance. They are what's posited as an explanation for our understanding a theory at all. Given this underdetermination schema or the conceptual frame is that which evidence is situated within and made intelligible by. The "raw, unmediated empirical" is sort of the very thing being questioned: concepts, though unarticulated, are there from the first observation, rather than something we come to construct from non-conceptual empirical reals separate from conceptual articulation.

So, given that, I'm wondering what would even be in the domain of possible evidence? Either people talking to one another is support for the idea, or it's not. We're sort of at a level of generality where appeals to evidence aren't going to be easy to even understand as being in favor of or against schemata, much less be persuasive.
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EDIT: Question 2 seems a bit too off the beaten path to me -- I think the question between science and philosophy and their merits deserves at least a thread of its own, unless I can see how it'd relate to incommensurability.

That question reads a bit convoluted to me. Can you rephrase the question?

I am tempted to say that any notion of conceptual scheme would claim that putting empirical evidence prior to determining the scheme is the wrong way about: in the strong version the scheme determines evidence, in the weak version the scheme is part-and-parcel to the evidence. At the very least there are beliefs around empirical evidence which can be questioned from a non-evidential standpoint -- there's a certain sense in which we have to delimit what evidence even is. — Moliere

So I see "conceptual schemes" in Philosophy of Language, as applying Kuhn's theory meant for paradigms in the history of sciences (and science in general) to that of individual schemes for understanding the world and language communities in general. So that's what I meant by language "itself", if that helps.

Thank you for expressing so much more adroitly the view I had attempted to set out previously. — Banno

It always pleases me that I manage to set out something which actually manages to capture some sort of agreement, so thanks for letting me know.

I've re-read Feyerabend - Against Method and Science in a Free Society - with a view to tying down his notion of commensurable and incommensurable, and decided that his view changed over time. I think he started with something like Wittgenstein's language games in mind - he had gone to England with the intent of studying with Wittgenstein, but the latter's illness and death led him to Popper. I think he carried something of "language games", or perhaps a "forms of life", into his dealings with Lakatos. In Against Method Feyerabend emphasises incommensurability, but plays it down in later writings, even I racal, denying that incommensurability meant that there could be no comparison. — Banno

I honestly should do the same. My reading on Feyerabend, and Kuhn too for that matter, is old and probably missed some points he made. No promises here yet, because projects are too easy to want to take on relative to how hard they are to actually complete while maintaining employment :D

Seems to me that, that we understand dolphins to be social and communicative shows us that they inhabit the same world we do. If their songs are showing rather then saying, then they are not subject to Davidson's considerations of sentential language. — Banno

Here we might be talking past a bit -- speaks of worlds as language games or forms of life, for instance. But I take your point; same world, due to showing.

And I think it correct, too. I think that if the lion could speak English to us, for instance, I'd simply accept that speech while feeling it's a bit strange rather than saying "Oh, they're a lion, they don't know what they are saying"

Contrary to ↪Joshs, if we commence by assuming that there is no possibility of communication on important issues, then we are throwing out the possibility of "ameliorating" the "violent breakdown in communication".

Again, we can come to understand that the rabbit is a duck-rabbit, and hence to see the point of view of those who only see the duck. Only where there is some potential for agreement is there also potential to avoid violence.

On the other hand I think there is something to be said for an insistence upon an answer as being a problem in finding ways of communicating. At least some of the time. Sometimes, though it is hard to set out when in words (for that is the very problem, so it seems), it's the insistence upon finding out who is wrong and who is right, what is true and what is not -- if we'd just concede this or that or give up on this or that then perhaps we could find ways to talk again. If we're particularly committed to consistency, which I share that fault, then we might make note upon realizing this new way of talking how I was wrong and they were wrong in certain respects, but then we'd be talking about meaningful disagreement instead of... whatever the yes/no assertion disagreement is.

But the metaphor I'd reach for here is...well, Hegel I guess. There's the duck, the rabbit, the duck-rabbit, and whatever that comes after which actually manages to make us click. No guarantees on how that works at present -- Hegel already tried, and was forced, even as a rationalist philosopher, to accept contradiction as the engine, which surely already shows how difficult it is to understand, from a rational perspective, when we create something new that happens to work.

To be fair to you and anyone who has a more charitable read on astrology: I don't find astrology very significant, so my rendition of it is inadequate. While I agree with Feyerabend that my judgment of astrology isn't based in science, for instance, I'm OK with having beliefs that are not-scientific. In fact I think most of my beliefs are not-scientific, really. With astrology the entire enterprise was just so "out there" that I didn't feel the need to explore it at a scientific or philosophic level, to get at the best rendition of the belief and see how I could make it work. It, along with so many other beliefs, is a collection of thoughts I've come across that I don't believe for no real specific reason other than it just sounds incorrect, though I understand that such justification is weak and so I'm not deeply committed to its falsity either. (think here of just how many religions exist, and how many of their beliefs exist -- well maybe you have, but I certainly haven't bothered to go through *all* of them, or even a majority of them, at the most rigorous level)

But among rationalists, at least, astrology is generally viewed as not-scientific. And even those who practice will make caveats with respect to science or some such if pressed, that it's "just fun" or they don't take it that seriously -- so it's not as much a true magical incantation but the words are still worth engaging in for them. (Not for me. I'm on team disappointment, or at least disenchantment if we have to like how the world is going)

And even among non-rationalists they'll understand what I mean when I say "OK, but compare astrology to astronomy. There's a difference there, yes?" -- the important part is that we agree that there are at least some times that when we speak the literal, referential truth isn't what's important -- something else is. That's enough for the worry of error theory to at least get off the ground as a possibility worth considering: since we sometimes believe everything we say is false, so it could be that we've done it again.

But I have to admit that this is a bit afar from incommensurability. Still, I use the example of astrology enough I felt I ought say something.

:up: I'm not a believer in astrology, although I have taken an interest in it in the past due to finding its symbolism interesting. I learned how to do natal charts and was surprised to find how often they seem to fit. I retain an open mind. Anyone who firmly believes, though, I would say must posit the kind of magical correspondence I spoke about, given that there is no conceivable science-based explanation for its efficacy.

Yes, I think all kinds of different fields with different methods, focusing on different topics sould be crucial for understanding. In terms of the ways you talk about, its probably useful for there to be specialists on both the formal and positivist end and simultaneously people who try to mix between. People that will mix it up will depend on the extreme ends where people have created specialized, deep knowledge for those specific topics (e.g. formal or empirical) from which the middle people can make use of to integrate.

I think personally, in this kind of topic of investigation, I am most interested in computational approaches using things like neural networks and dynamic systems which can then be used to explain how we use language in a symbolic way without being explicitly symbolic. Approaches that are broadly enactive/embodied which I think resonate well with Wittgenstein's view of meaning as use. So in my opinion, there are ways you can kind of validate the views late Wittgenstein came on to... at least under my interpretation of Wittgenstein.

I actually think Large language models are kind of Wittgensteinian; these models are working basically through just learning to predict and choose what comes next based on previous context which is kind of similar to how I see Wittgenstein's meaning-as-use. Predictive computational models like these seem to be good at explaining brain responses:

https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2105646118
https://www.nature.com/articles/s42003-022-03036-1
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.01930

Which is interesting because you can then speculate that brains don't need much more than prediction for complex cognitive functions like language (and predictive processing is already very popular in neuroscience). Such a view of language seems very thin though for people used to a view which is strongly symbolic and thickly representational. At the same time, its quite consistent with enactive/embodied views of cognition.

So I think to some extent there are ways to link new empirical findings back to some things philosophers might have said back in the day, caveat being that my interpretation of Wittgenstein is probably unique to me given how difficult he can be to understand.

Obviously, what I find most interesting is just one small area in all the kinds of fields and areas of investigation in language.

That is a brilliant account of the debates. It makes it look as if it just a question of different ways of saying the same thing. The catch is that it's hard to see why it matters which way one jumps — Ludwig V

Aha I think this would create a regress of the same problem as someone else would come along and say that it isn't just different ways of the same thing.

But yes, I have thought about ways of kind of possibly ignoring labels of "real" or "non-real". Ironically, I feel like its very difficult to do this in a way that doesn't just look like normal anti-reaalism.

That may well be true. But that makes his use of "translation" very different from what translation between languages involves. — Ludwig V

Yes, and I suspect maybe this has contributed to misunderstandings when people conflate his translatability of theories with translatability of languages. Languages are so flexible, and the experiences that we are talking about are so rich, that even if a word doesnt have a direct word equivalent in another language, it might be possible to still reconstruct it or make a new correspondence using other words.

For instance:

Gökotta (Swedish) - To rise at dawn in order to go out and listen to the birds sing.

As far as I know this word has absolutely no equivalent in English but its very easy for us to reconstruct the meaning of the word that is more or less the same by using other words. A Swedish person would also be able to do the same in the Swedish because words are rich and redundant *(i.e. I am sure there is a direct translation of "To rise at dawn in order to go out and listen to the birds sing" in Swedish that doesn't use the word Gökotta")*. There's a hundred *(redundant)* ways to describe a table which roughly preserves what I am talking about *when I talk about tables*.

You can't really do that nearly as well in science taxonomy. You cannot use words from Newtonian Mechanics as surrogates for Quantum Wave function in the same way you can for the Swedish word. As far as I know, particles-type things aren't in Aristotelian theory (only *using particles as* a demonstration anyway) and so you cannot reconstruct modern particles either using Aristotelian ontology. Maybe Aristotle could describe them as "points" or something, but he is not using taxonomy from his theory, he is just using other words that he can use everyday to describe what a particle in the other theory is, in an intelligible way. That wouldn't count as a correspondence between the two scientific theories. *(At the same time, I realis, maybe there isn't a sharp line between terminology that is part of theory or not part of the theory, since I imagine all theories must make use of words or concepts or math, etc., that is not unique to the theory.)*.

Kuhn also I think specifies a little more about translation with things like the "No-overlap" principle (kind of similar to the partial matching thing I mentioned in a previous post) to try and specify his criteria for translatability. That obviously has nothing to do with ordinary language translation.
Kuhn's notion of translation (which he explicitly uses to characterize incommensurability) clearly is not supposed to be generally applied to language. He designed it to track when ontologies in different scientific theories don't correspond to each other.

So this is partly why I have tried to be explicit where I am talking about Kuhn specifically in this thread since I think his view is quite different to the idea of generic conceptual schemes in languages. Nonetheless, Kuhn still seems to be a main target of Davidson in his "Very Idea" paper. But I think insofar as Davidson mentions Kuhn as an originator of the idea he is attacking, he has constructed a strawman since Kuhn isn't representative of the idea he attacks

but then the concepts of a theory are inter-related, not defined one by one. — Ludwig V

Yes, I believe establishing that they correspond more or less equates to how a term is interrelated with other terms in the same theory. You can then match the networks of concepts together. I believe it would be something like: some places concepts match because their relation to neighbouring concepts also match. But then in other parts of the networks, these things break down.

Edit: some clarifying *...*

Aha I think this would create a regress of the same problem as someone else would come along and say that it isn't just different ways of the same thing. — Apustimelogist

I would reply that the claim needs to be backed up by a demonstration of the difference. Mere assertion won't cut any ice.

But yes, I have thought about ways of kind of possibly ignoring labels of "real" or "non-real". Ironically, I feel like its very difficult to do this in a way that doesn't just look like normal anti-realism. — Apustimelogist

Yes, it's a common difficulty when one wants/needs to deny the validity of a distinction.

But I think insofar as Davidson mentions Kuhn as an originator of the idea he is attacking, he has constructed a strawman since Kuhn isn't representative of the idea he attacks — Apustimelogist

Yes. One either picks a specific theory, but then has to interpret it correctly. But that's open to "strawman" claims, or devises one's own statement of the issue, which is also open to the same claim. There's no third alternative that I can think of.

You can then match the networks of concepts together. — Apustimelogist

I saw a suggestion somewhere that a third possibility that one adjusts one or other concept (or network of concepts) so that there is sufficient overlap to enable the theories to be compared. That would sometimes be helpful because it would enable people to conduct experiments that will support one theory or the other.

I would reply that the claim needs to be backed up by a demonstration of the difference. Mere assertion won't cut any ice. — Ludwig V

Well sure, I'm just saying that I think if that discussion were opened there would be disagreements, just like with the realism debate. I guess this would be the meta-realism debate.

I saw a suggestion somewhere that a third possibility that one adjusts one or other concept (or network of concepts) so that there is sufficient overlap to enable the theories to be compared. That would sometimes be helpful because it would enable people to conduct experiments that will support one theory or the other. — Ludwig V

Yes, Kuhn mentions this. The relation between all these issues are quite subtle I think. Matching concepts is about how similar theories' ontologies are. This doesn't mean they are not mutually intelligible and scientists may become "bilingual"; however, at the beginning, the differences between theories may make it difficult to compare where scientists talk past each other because they aren't aware (or sometimes just don't agree) of the underlying assumptions and meanings of each other's theories. At the same time, when there is some overlap, especially toward the more empirical parts of the theoretical networks, it makes it easier to immediately compare predictions in experiment in ways where scientists aren't immediately and totally met with disagreements about whether particular methods or interpretations of observations, etc. are valid, which would *otherwise* block scientists seeing the validity of opposing theories.

Well sure, I'm just saying that I think if that discussion were opened there would be disagreements, — Apustimelogist

I think you are confusing two different things. If I say that the last bus goes at 10:30, the fact that someone can say "Oh, no! There's another bus that goes after that" doesn't prove that there is another bus that goes after that. Merely saying that the there's another step in a sequence doesn't prove that there is. That has to be proved, not merely claimed.

Yes, Kuhn mentions this — Apustimelogist

I think I agree with every word of that paragraph.

Well I wasn't making an argument for or against the merits of some view or claim, I was just saying what I think would happen. I was just thinking it would be ironic that a viewpoint attempting to resolve the realism/anti-realism debate might lead to a meta-realism debate. I wonder if there could be a similar middle ground position to that debate as well (maybe not; hard to visualize).

the realism/anti-realism debate might lead to a meta-realism debate. — Apustimelogist

Ah, that's different. The infinite meta- debates. Quite so. That's why I very suspicious of the meta-concept.

I'm thinking on the hoof here. But I think there has to be a way of arguing that the debate is broken.
The referee is not a player, but is just as much on the field as any player. They are not somehow separate and above the game, but immersed in it. Ditto judges.
A dictionary uses the same language that it describes, but is just as much a book as any other.

My line would be that the debate doesn't pay attention to the actual use of "real" vs its many opposites and the muddled idea that "real" is somehow equivalent to ontology. I think J.L. Austin "Sense and Sensibilia" Lecture VII is an excellent reference for the first claim. I'm afraid I don't have a reference for the second.

The referee is not a player, but is just as much on the field as any player. They are not somehow separate and above the game, but immersed in it. Ditto judges.
A dictionary uses the same language that it describes, but is just as much a book as any other.

My line would be that the debate doesn't pay attention to the actual use of "real" vs its many opposites and the muddled idea that "real" is somehow equivalent to ontology. — Ludwig V

Yes, I think this kind of thing is very much in my preferred domain. My inclination right now I think is to just not try to shoehorn my understanding of science into the "real" or "not real", at least not use words like that as the focal point. Rather, I would want explanations of how science works, how people's cognition works, how brains work, how language works and let those things speak for themselves.

My inclination is that how these things all work are in the same way that the scientific instrumentalist does science. Its just about predictions (parallel to predictive processing in neuroscience) or use like tools. For me, words are no deeper representation-wise than how they fit in the dynamics of our experiences. Uses of words like "truth" and "real" are no different. So because they are no more than where they fit as part of our experiences, their ontological significance is kind of deflated somewhat... just in the sense that they are nothing more than how they might fit in the dynamics of experience... because that is exactly what happens, I say words, hear words, read words in the context of other experiences... and thats all there is to it (a lot of help from neuroscience would be required). Obviously knowledge and science are trying to explain our experiences but then, the words / concepts we use as part of "explanations" and "knowledge" are effectively just moving parts embedded in the stream of the very thing trying be explained (experience... as a whole).

Rather, I would want explanations of how science works, how people's cognition works, how brains work, how language works and let those things speak for themselves. — Apustimelogist

Yes, that sounds sensible. But that's an ideal and there may never be answers that are more than provision (see philosophy of science). Can you suspend all judgement while people work out all those answers? And can people work out all those answers without negotiating the issues we are bothered by - just without us? What do we do with our confusions while we are waiting?

So because they are no more than where they fit as part of our experiences, their ontological significance is kind of deflated somewhat — Apustimelogist

Well, I would go further than that.

the words / concepts we use as part of "explanations" and "knowledge" are effectively just moving parts embedded in the stream of the very thing trying be explained — Apustimelogist

That's right. Not merely fixing the ship while we sail in it, but building a new one while we sail in it.
If philosophy was easy, everyone would be doing it. Oh, yes, they are. Most very badly - even worse than you and I.

Yes, that sounds sensible. But that's an ideal and there may never be answers that are more than provision (see philosophy of science). Can you suspend all judgement while people work out all those answers? And can people work out all those answers without negotiating the issues we are bothered by - just without us? What do we do with our confusions while we are waiting? — Ludwig V

Yes, thats definitely a good point. We don't know nearly enough about the brain, cognition, etc. But I do think we know enough about the world to make some general arguments about the kind of manner in which these things should work, maybe some of this being in the field of philosophy of mind, for instance, maybe other areas too. Following from this there's also room for making arguments about why I think its good to let those explanations speak for themselves, why I might want to deflate certain things which I do not think can add anything else substantial or veridical. And obviously philosophers have been making arguments of that kind of nature for a while.

Well, I would go further than that. — Ludwig V

Aha, yes I think I would too. Its one of those things where I am aware that the initial motivation was to make notions of "realness" redundant in this area but also feels like just another form of anti-realism. I think its not that inaccurate to say that I think of myself as a kind of instrumentalist about everything which most would say is just anti-realism. I guess it has just got to the point where the anti-realist becomes anti-realist about anti-realism.

about why I think its good to let those explanations speak for themselves, — Apustimelogist

I think of myself as a kind of instrumentalist about everything which most would say is just anti-realism. — Apustimelogist

LaPlace's famous reply to Napoleon (I think) that he has no need of the hypothesis of God marks the point at which instrumentalism, which had enabled the new science to evade the religious challenges ever since Copernicus, "collapsed" into realism. (I'm gesturing at an argument here but I think you probably know how it goes).

But how about a more radical position? Avoid speaking about "reality", just as one avoids speaking about "existence". (I don't remember whether you ever looked in on the thread about Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia", but the argument is in there.) Suppose we treat concepts as instruments (cf. telescope, microscope, galvanometer, etc.). Instruments do not make claims about particular empirical truths (or the generalizations we derive from particular truths). They enable us to establish empirical truths. You would be a realist and an anti-realist at the same time.

But how about a more radical position? Avoid speaking about "reality", just as one avoids speaking about "existence". (I don't remember whether you ever looked in on the thread about Austin's "Sense and Sensibilia", but the argument is in there.) Suppose we treat concepts as instruments (cf. telescope, microscope, galvanometer, etc.). Instruments do not make claims about particular empirical truths (or the generalizations we derive from particular truths). They enable us to establish empirical truths. You would be a realist and an anti-realist at the same time. — Ludwig V

Yes, this seema actually quite similar to what I mean by being instrumentalist. I will have to take a look at the Austin thread; maybe you have a particular post in mind, or page in the thread?

I'll sort something out for you. But that's only about "real" and "reality". The bit about concepts is my own invention.

Here's a link for a download Austin "Sense and Sensibilia"

Lecture VII pp. 62 - 77.

I hope you find it enjoyable and profitable.

Thanks, I will take a look!