So what is an example of intuition operating in this way? — Tom Storm

The simplest sense impressions; color , sound ,touch sensation, are examples of basic intuitions for Husserl prior to their being synthetically connected into higher order objects.

I’d just like to point out that within phenomenology intuition means something quite different than the way it is being defined in the OP.

“Husserl’s brand of intuition has nothing to do with a view of intuitions as mere sensations of a strictly subjective nature with no real objective reference, no matter how strong the sensations are. An intuitive experience is not a revelation of a hitherto hidden reality to a passive consciousness, a sort of mundane annunciation in which one is impregnated with truth without really knowing how.

For Husserl, the concept of intuition is required on both the ontological and epistemological levels in order to ground the concepts of truth and knowledge, and it is nothing more than a generalization of the notion of perception.”(Jairo Da Silva)

Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno

I’m not sure how to answer this. If we equate space with ‘use’ as contextual performance and interaction we can clearly see the fundamentally temporal nature of a language game , given that it rests on change, that a move ina game is itself a transformation.

So the being of this armchair extends back to when to was constructed, and forward to when it is destroyed. But also sideways to the bookcase and downwards to the floor. — Banno

Whether you want to view the origin of spatial localization , and space itself , in empirical or ideal terms, it is determinable as having an essence independent of time. But is this still the case if we construe the spatial relation between myself , the bookcase and the floor ( ‘sideways’ and ‘downwards’) as contextually useful and contingent doings? What then is left of what would be required to retain a concept of space as anything outside of contingent sense? Perhaps we could talk instead about space as space or horizon of possibilities.

Is there a preference for temporality, or is that a misunderstanding on my part? And if so, why? — Banno

I think of neuro-cognitive models of the development of concepts of spatial relations which reveal perceived space as a product of a progressive process of coordinated activities between my body and objects in my environment. These activities are sensory-motor processes taking place over time , out of which we form the idealized abstractions of geometric space.
We are reminded of the temporal , embodied and subjective basis of space in studying the effects of brains injuries and pathologies like Schizophrenia, where fundamental aspects of spatial
concepts fragment.

Philosophy is more than one game. Hence, what counts as a core depends on what one is doing. — Banno

I don’t see a contradiction here with either Wittgenstein or Heidegger. They are both talking about ‘doingness’ and ‘use’ in general, as you are.

Is that a lost "not"? — Banno

Yes, thank you for finding it. Hard to type and hike at the same time.

go on and explain why he appears to nevertheless use existence as a first order predicate: Beingness. — Banno

He does t say beingness or existence are predicates. Or subjects. They mark the original relation between self and world before we idealize this binary into a for-itself
subject encountering an in-itself object.

Nature is what is. We can call it anything we like, impose on it rules and symbols, think about it this way or that way. Language is a human faculty, like seeing. There’s every reason to believe, and no reason not to believe, that the brain is involved in these systems. — Xtrix

Formal language , as a capacity humans possess due to brain structures , is one thing , but language understood in a much broader sense has been claimed as an ontological a priori For instance, Heidegger considers discourse as equiprimordial with mood , understanding and temporality. Derrida was famous for his phrase “there is nothing outside the text”, which was often misinterpreted as claiming that there was nothing outside of formal language. Derrida had instead a a priori notion of text and writing as context, following upon Heidegger’s formulation of Dasein.
Pansemitotics after Peirce offers an a priori integrating physics biology and psychology. Piaget also offers an a priori organizing principle that ties together physical nature , biology and culture on the basis of a kind of ‘coding’.

it is apparent from an examination of the history of philosophy that clarification is the very bread and butter of philosophy. — Banno

If this is true , then one can be justified in saying no more than this about the accomplishments of science. Newtonian physics did no more than clarify Aristotelian physics, Relativity and quantum theory did no more than clarify Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology did no more than clarify fixed-species doctrines, Chomskian linguistics did no more than clarify behavioral models of language acquisition.

Philosophy is about clarifying concepts rather than making up a neat story. — Banno

Isn’t that what stories do?

The world, the sky and the stars, on the other hand, have a mode of being which is not grounded in a process of reflected reasoning. Their existence is, in a stronger sense, revealed rather than "planned". — Heiko

Not for Heidegger. He has a very particular understanding of ‘world’ that is neither planned nor just ‘revealed’ , and not a product of reflective reasoning. World for Heidegger is projected out from a pragmatic background

I take this passage to mean that Heidegger really does make such a distinction. A speculative reason is given above. — Heiko

Yes, he makes the distinction between the ready to hand and the present to hand ( objectively present ). But he derives the present to hand from the ready to hand as an extreme modification of it. His discussion of the statement and subject-predicate logic shows how a thing which just ‘is’ is derived from the hermeneutic structure of concernful dealings, rather than use and value being attributes just added onto an objectively present thing.

“The kind of being of these beings is "handiness" (Zuhandenheit). But it must not be understood as a mere characteristic of interpreta­tion,* as if such "aspects" were discursively forced upon "beings" which we initially encounter, as if an initially objectively present world-stuff were "subjectively colored" in this way. Such an interpretation overlooks the fact that in that case beings would have to be understood before­hand and discovered as purely objectively present, and would thus have priority and take the lead in the order of discovering and appropriating association with the "world." But this already goes against the ontological
meaning of the cognition which we showed to be a founded mode of being-in-the-world. To expose what is merely objectively present, cogni­tion must first penetrate beyond things at hand being taken care of. Hand­iness is the ontological categorial definition of beings as they are "in themselves. "

take this to mean that the hammer was manufactured with a certain, known intention and therefor it's being is in-itself when we understand that intention. But note that this happened in an act of human work and is different to a mere relevation of being in that the hammer was invented by reflecting over use, need and purpose. — Heiko

One doesn’t have to know why it was manufactured or for what purpose. Heidegger’s larger point is that , not only when we use something as a tool , but when we simply see something like an apple , our seeing of it occurs in the context of an ongoing relevance and significance it has for us in relation to our goal-oriented activities. He is saying that the identification of the apple as what it is is derivative of a more primary role that the apple plays for us in relation to our ongoing concerns , and this is the fundamental meaning of the apple for us.

“ The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act. The non-explicitness of this “as” is precisely what constitutes the act's so-called directness. Yes, the thing that is understood can be apprehended directly as it is in itself. But this directness regarding the thing apprehended does not inhibit the act from having a developed structure. Moreover, what is structural and necessary in the act of [direct] understanding need not be found, or co-apprehended, or expressly named in the thing understood. I repeat: The [primary] as-structure does not belong to something thematically understood.

It certainly can be understood, but not directly in the process of focally understanding a table, a chair, or the like. Acts of directly taking something, having something, dealing with it “as something,” are so original that trying to understand anything without employing the “as” requires (if it's possible at all) a peculiar inversion of the natural order. Understanding something without the “as”—in a pure sensation, for example—can be carried out only “reductively,” by “pulling back” from an as-structured experience. And we must say: far from being primordial, we have to designate it as an artificially worked-up act. Most important, such an experience is per se possible only as the privation of an as-structured experience. It occurs only within an as-structured experience and by prescinding from the “as”— which is the same as admitting that as-structured experience is primary, since it is what one must first of all prescind from.” (Logic,The Question of Truth,p.122)

You can instead, in a vaguely Wittgensteinian way, see that juggling apples and pretending to juggle apples are different language-games. It's not a difference that can be summed up by saying that the apples being juggled are in the 'exists' box or not. — Srap Tasmaner

Here’s a phenomenological way of putting it:

“ “Equipment is “in order to.” This proposition has an ontological and not merely an ontical meaning; a being is not what and how it is, for example, a hammer, and then in addition something “with which to hammer.” Rather, what and how it is as this entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its functionality. A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality, functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity upon functionality relation.”(Heidegger, Basic Problems of phenomenology 1927)

I believe the separation between what you call "the vulgar conception of time", and the modern conception of time, is initiated by Hegel. He's the one who firmly rejected Aristotelian principles, offering an alternative starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover

One doesnt have to accept Heidegger’s reading , but his analysis of Hegel’s model of time concludes that:

“Hegel's con­cept of time presents the most radical way in which the vulgar under­standing of time has been given form conceptually…”

modern mathematics allows an infinity of points within a continuity. This also provides the foundation for Heidegger and phenomenologists to portray 'being', and consequently 'beings', as forms of becoming. — Metaphysician Undercover

Husserl and Heidegger derive mathematical continuity from the idea of enduring objective presence, on which the vulgar concept of time is based. They deconstruct the idea of objective presence and determine that authentic time can’t be likened to a mathematical continuity.

Why not just say Time isn’t something we can readily atomise? The ‘Now’ is merely a way of framing time appreciation just like a second is a measure of physical time a ‘moment’ is merely a human reference to unregulated and vague demarcation of felt time. — I like sushi

Now that’s what I call garbled. It’s garbled but I can still recognize the traditional notion of time dating back to Aristotle in it. This is what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time and Husserl calls constituted or objective time.

Heidegger, in a move similar to Husserl, traces the origin of the mathematical and of empirical science to the concept of enduring objective presence undergirding constituted time (what Heidegger calls the vulgar concept of time).

“What does it mean to be "in time"? This "being-in-time" is very familiar to us from the way it is represented in natural science. In natural science all processes of nature are calculated as processes which happen "in time." Everyday common sense also finds processes and things enduring "in time," persisting and disappearing "in time." When we talk about "being-in-time," everything depends on the interpretation of this "in." In order to see this more clearly, we ask simply if the glass on the table in front of me is in time or not. In any case, the glass is already present-at-hand and remains there even when I do not look at it. How long it has been there and how long it will remain are of no importance. If it is already present-at-hand and remains so in the future, then that means that it continues through a certain time and thus is "in" it. Any kind of continuation obviously has to do with time.”(Zollikon)

“Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being.

Heidegger explains that the fundamentally undiscussed ontological foundations of empirical science since Descartes are based on his formulation of objective presence.

“Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to
present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.

Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.”(Being and Time)

Heidegger shows how the common notion of time dates back to Aristotle’s derivation of time from motion.

“The thoughts of motion, continuity, extension—and in the case of change of place, place—are interwoven with the experience of time.”(basic problems of phenomenology) “ So far as time is kineseos ti, something connected with motion, this means that in thinking time, motion or rest is always thought along with it. In Aristotelian language, time follows, is in succession to, motion.” “Because the now is transition it always measures a from-to, it measures a how-long, a
duration Time is making present according to Aristotle, (the present at hand) and in so doing is a counting
of time as now, now, now. “And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly "objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time. Time is understood as a sequence, as the "flux" of nows, as the "course of time.”(Being and
Time).

“The succession of nows is interpreted as something somehow objectively present; for it itself moves "in time." We say that in every now it is now, in every now it already disappears. The now is now in every now, thus constantly present as the same, even if in every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show at the same time the constant presence of
itself as this changing thing.”

Compare this to Husserl on time and objective presence:

Husserl, Heidegger and Gendlin have shown in different ways that a quantifiable, mathematizable nature presupposes the kind of time which consists of self-presences transitioning from future to present to past in sequential movement (existing ‘in’ time).

The consideration of the conditions in principle of the possibility of something identical that gives itself (harmoniously) in flowing and subjectively changing manners of appearance leads to the mathematization of the appearances as a necessity which is immanent in them.”

“A true object in the sense of logic is an object which is absolutely identical "with itself," that is, which is, absolutely identically, what it is; or, to express it in another way: an object is through its determinations, its quiddities [Weisheiten], its predicates, and it is identical if these quiddities are identical as belonging to it or when their belonging absolutely excludes their not belonging.”
“ “Every thingly being is temporally extended; it has its duration, and with its duration it is fit within Objective time in a strict manner.”

The time of constituting subjectivity corresponds to a more primordial time that consists not of self-identical objects which endure for a ‘period of time’ but a flow of qualitative change that forms no process of continuous succession. Without the concept of continuous succession to ground them, notions like ‘faster’ and ‘slower’ lose their sense. It is never precisely the same noematic object that is filling out the temporal duration from moment to moment. The meant sense is that of an enduringly identical tone because of the noetic idealizing unification of the varying sensations that it encompasses.
For Husserl, primary sense data represents a more fundamental form of temporality than adumbrated ‘real’ spatial objects . Notions of nowness as a countable duration occurring IN time, occupying a moment of time, correspond to Husserl’s apperceived time of real spatial
objects, but underlying this level of constitution is a more primordial temporality.

Bah. I'M not the one who believes in the unknowable, lurking beyond us, forever a mystery. You throw a blanket between us and the world. — Ciceronianus

Those are the Kantians. We phenomenologists don’t buy that unknowable stuff. Our motto is ‘To the things themselves!’.

You're such a tease... :razz: — Tom Storm

I felt bad for threatening to take away his security blanket.

I know that apokrisis has gone on record as being anti naive or direct realism

If that's true, in what sense, and to what extent, should we be doubting ourselves and our ability to understand and interact with the world in which we live? How does it prevent us from doing what we do everyday, every moment? — Ciceronianus

Relax. Giving up naive realism doesn’t mean simply doubting what you know and preventing you from doing what you previously thought you could do in the world. On the contrary, it puts you in more intimate contact with the world, and allows you to understand it in a more richly predictive manner , but in a different way than you’re used to.

So the chair I see (and sit on) isn't or may not be the chair I see (and sit on)? — Ciceronianus

You should ask @Isaac how the predictive processing model of perception treats naive realism.

Here’s Lisa Barret , one of the proponents of predictive processing, on naive realism.

“ Changes in air pressure and wavelengths of light exist in the world, but to us, they are sounds and colors. We perceive them by going beyond the in-formation given to us, making meaning from them using knowledge from past experience, that is, concepts. Every perception is constructed by a per-ceiver, usually with sensory inputs from the world as one ingredient. Only certain changes in air pressure are heard as trees falling. Only some of the wavelengths of light striking our retinas are transformed into the experi-ence of red or green. To believe otherwise is naive realism, as if perceptions were synonymous with reality.”

“ The history of science, however, has been a slow but steady march in the direction of construction. Physics, chemistry, and biology began with in-tuitive, essentialist theories, rooted in naive realism and certainty. We pro-gressed beyond these ideas because we noticed that the old observations held true only under certain conditions.”

Naive realism simply isnt backed up by recent research in perceptual psychology or the more sophisticated thinking in A.I.

Dasein is temporality. Being "here" (da-sein) is being the present moment, but only if we don't define the present exclusively as a present-at-hand now-point (that is, thought abstractly) -- but instead as the experience from which all time tenses arise. That's my understanding. — Xtrix

Mine too.

You’ve tried to define dasein before and failed. Not surprising as Heidegger failed too. That is my point. — I like sushi

A weak point. Xtrix and I have differing readings of Heidegger , but they’re not that different. We both grasp in our different ways what makes Heidegger’s work an important advance over what came before it. Both of us were able read read and grasp Being and Time without too much difficulty , probably because we already had the background ideas. There are large communities of Heidegger scholars who , despite their disagreements , reach a general consensus over the most remarkable ideas in his work. Why dont you find one of these communities and enroll in a class so you can get the background and method for making your way through his work , as many others have done?

Btw, Dasein is the relation of a self to its world before we make a split between subject and object.

With regard to the awkwardness and 'inelegance' of expression in the analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 'grammar'. — Xtrix

I can add to that :

If we were to be shown right now two pictures by Paul Klee, in the original, which he painted in the year of his death-the watercolor "Saints from a Window," and "Death and Fire," tempera on burlap -we should want to stand before them for a long while-and should abandon any claim that they be immediately intelligible.
If it were possible right now to have Georg Trakl's poem "Septet of Death'· recited to us, perhaps even by the poet himself, we should want to hear it often, and should abandon any claim that it be immediately intelligible.
If Werner Heisenberg right now were to present some of his thoughts in theoretical physics, moving in the direction of the cosmic formula for which he is searching, two or three people in the audi­ence, at most, would be able to follow him, while the rest of us would, without protest, abandon any claim that he be immediately
intelligible.
Not so with the thinking that is called philosophy. That think­ing is supposed to offer "worldly wisdom" and perhaps even be a "Way to the Blessed Life." But it might be that this kind of thinking is today placed in a position which demands of it reflection that are far removed from any useful, practical wisdom. It
might be that a kind of thinking has become necessary which must give thought to matters from which even the painting and the poetry which we have mentioned and the theory of math·ematical physics receive their determination. Here, too, we should then have to abandon any claim to immediate intelligibil­ity. However, we should still have to· listen, because we must
think what is inevitable, but preliminary.”(Time and Being, Heidegger)

Where does Heidegger say being is a “happening”? Or that being is anything at all? — Xtrix

I wanted to add a comment on the Heidegger quotes I took from the introduction to Being and Time. He begins the book saying his aim is to answer the question of the meaning of being in general. But by the end of the book, he says he still hasn’t quite answered it.

Instead he leaves us with the following questions:

“The existential and ontolog­ical constitution of the totality of Da-sein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?”

Personally , I don’t need to know the meaning of being in general, although I believe that it is closely linked with temporality, as his 1962 book, On Time and Being suggests.

In the 1972 work he writes “ Time, which is addressed as the meaning of Being in Being and Time, is itself not an answer, not a last prop for questioning, but rather itself the naming of a question. The name "time" is a preliminary word for what was later called "the truth of Being." “ Being and Time is on the way toward finding a concept of time, toward that which belongs most of all to time, in terms of which "Being" gives itself as presencing. This is accomplished on the path of the tempo­rality of Dasein in the interpretation of Being as temporality.”

I am satisfied with knowing Dasein’s kind of being ( the ontological difference , the in-between , happening , occurrence , the ‘as’ structure , projection).

“ Something like "being" has been disclosed in the understanding of being that belongs to existing Da-sein as a way in which it understands.”

The ontological difference is the distinction between being and beings— it is not a description or claim about being itself. — Xtrix

It is a claim about Dasein’s kind of being.

Where does Heidegger say being is a “happening”? Or that being is anything at all? — Xtrix

The ‘is’ is a happening, and the ‘is’ is another word for being.

“ As a seeking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way. We intimated that we are always already involved in an understanding of being. From this grows the explicit question of the
meaning of being and the tendency toward its concept. We do not know what "being" means. But already when we ask, "What is being'?" we stand in an understanding of the "is" without being able to determine conceptually what the "is" means. We do not even know the horizon upon which we are supposed to grasp and pin down the meaning. This average and vague understanding of being is a fact.

No matter how much this understanding of being wavers and fades and borders on mere verbal knowledge, this indefiniteness of the under­standing of being that is always already available is itself a positive phe­nomenon which needs elucidation. However, an investigation of the meaning of being will not wish to provide this at the outset. The inter­pretation of the average understanding of being attains its necessary guideline only with the developed concept of being. From the clarity of that concept and the appropriate manner of its explicit understanding we shall be able to discern what the obscure or not yet elucidated under­standing of being means, what kinds of obfuscation or hindrance of an explicit elucidation of the meaning of being are possible and necessary. “


“ The question to be formulated is about the meaning of being.”“Hence what is to be ascertained, the meaning of being, will require its own conceptualization, which again is essentially distinct from the concepts in which beings receive their determination of meaning.”

“ If the question of being is to be explicitly formulated and brought to complete clarity concerning itself, then the elaboration of this ques­tion requires, in accord with what has been elucidated up to now, expli­cation of the ways of regarding being and of understanding and con­ceptually grasping its meaning, preparation of the possibility of the right choice of the exemplary being, and elaboration of the genuine mode of access to this being.”

Occurrence, so far as I’ve read, is another term for the present at hand. That’d be like saying Heidegger agrees with the western tradition. — Xtrix

“...projection is an occurrence which, as raising us away and casting us ahead, takes apart as it were;-in that apartness of a raising away, yet as we saw, precisely in such a way that in this process there occurs an intrinsic turning toward on the part of whatever has been projected, such that that which has been projected is that which binds and binds together. Projection is that originarily simple occurrence which-in terms of formal logic-intrinsically unites contradictory things: binding together and separating. Yet-as the forming of the distinction between possible and actual in its making-possible, and as irruption into the distinction between being and beings, or more precisely as the irrupting of this 'between'-this projection is also that relating in which the 'as' springs forth.“

“Man is that inability to remain and is yet unable to leave his place. In projecting, the Da-sein in him constantly throws him into possibilities and thereby keeps him subjected to what is actual. Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence.”

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general.”

I suspect time only enters in a secondary sense, since use occurs over time. But it also occurs over place — Banno

I’d have to think about how Wittgenstein would distinguish place from time , but my sense is it would be secondary and derivative from context, which is temporal.

I am suggesting that an examination of the language of being looks more productive than musings about time. — Banno

Except that if you examine the language of being primarily via predicate logic you’ll have Wittgenstein rolling over in his grave. Witt didn’t write about time but I think it’s an important element implicit in his concept of use as radically situational and contextual.

Husserl seems to be saying that there is a primordial act of consciousness wherein something is first seen as something. Would you say this is still working within a metaphysics of presence, whereas Heidegger would say that the seeing as is derived from the pre-conscious pragmatic awareness of the ready-to-handedness of things? — Janus

It sounds like that from the quote , but for Husserl there isn’t a primordial beginning of consciousness in terms of a particular content that all higher acts of constitution are built on. The primordial beginning for him is the formal
structure of associative synthesis that he call internal time consciousness, the structure of retention-presence-protection that associatively connects one moment to the next as a unified synthetic flow.

The difference I see with Heidegger is that Heidegger takes pragmatic awareness as a totality of relevance that unifies our total past as background ‘framing’ of every disclosure of a ready to hand thing. Husserl begins instead with the perceptual object that only indirectly links back to a larger totality of our past experience.

Yes, being is a happening.
— Joshs

I don't agree with this. — Xtrix

I’m getting this from Heidegger. He uses lots of similies for Being. Happening, occurrence, the in-between , the ontological difference, the ‘as’ structure are some of them.

“Understanding as the Dasein’s self-projection is the Dasein’s fundamental mode of happening. As we
may also say, it is the authentic meaning of action. It is by understanding that the Dasein’s happening is characterized—its historicality. Understanding is not a mode of cognition but the basic determination of existing. We also call it existentiell understanding because in it existence, as the Dasein’s happening in its history, temporalizes itself. The Dasein becomes what it is in and through this understanding; and it is always only that which it has chosen itself to be, that which it understands itself to be in the projection of its own most peculiar ability-to-be.”(Basic Problems of Phenomenology)

It is very much like nothing. We interpret this "nothing," but that's all we can say about it. — Xtrix

As you know , Heidegger has lots to say about the nothing, authentic angst , the uncanny, absence. These are not the totality of what he has to say about being, but one aspect of it. Heidegger closely links projection , temporality , the ‘as' structure, the ontological difference and ‘Dasein as absent’. There is no Being without beings and vice versa. They are inseparable as the ontological difference between Being and beings , otherwise referred to as the in-between , occurrence, happening , the ‘as’ structure and projection.

I'm not aware of that idea deriving from Husserl, but in any case it is abundantly clear in Heidegger. — Janus

This is how Husserl modeled the pre-interpreted basis of experience:

“Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given beforehand- for example, the already-given everyday world- every apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a "primal instituting", in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. Even the physical things of this world that are unknown to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. We have already seen like things before, though not precisely this thing here. Thus each everyday experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense.”(Cartesian Meditations, Husserl)

But Heidegger didn’t simply copy Husserl’s approach. There are important differences , and they go way behind Davidson’s grasp of the pre-interpreted.

setting the game up is not playing the game; we need to keep track of which activity we are involved in.

Or if you prefer, setting the game up is usually a different language game to playing, although of course one can imagine a game in which setting up the game is aprt of the game. — Banno

Is ∃(x)f(x) to be understood as a relation between things that f and existence? — Banno

Existence would be the way that the particulars ( a thing that is f) alters the sense of the subject that they are particulars of. Formal logic supposes that the subject and predicate sit still as self-identical contents , while we cobble them together in an external relation. Existence as subject-object relation claims
instead that taking the predicate as the subject ( taking this apple as an apple) isnt just a neutral cobbling of already fixed contents. Rather , when we deal with a particular , we are altering the original context of the subject. The subject morphs in such a way that it freshly frames the particular.

Putting the pieces on the board isnt just prelude to the game. It establishes a fresh context out of which the context of game is dependent and shaped.

Does being happen? — Heiko

Yes, being is a happening.

Just as putting the pieces on the board sets us up to play, but is not part of the game. — Banno

It depends on the context in which they’re doing it. If someone who never played chess puts the pieces on the board the sense and purpose of what they are doing can’t be part of the game. If they are a chess player, then this act already presupposes and belongs to the context of playing just as every subsequent behavior they make throughout the actual game. Same is true of a pool player racking up the balls.

An existing thing, whether material or conceptual, is a road map to somewhere else. — ucarr

How about, a thing is a dimensional construction which we create in order to organize and anticipate future events?

Existence is a predicate. — Cuthbert

to be is to be the subject of a predicate. — Banno

Alrighty then. Anyone for the idea, expressed to the OP I think, that existence is in the relation between subject and predicate rather than inhering in one or
the other?

Imagine going on and on about an apple that “doesn’t exist.” — Xtrix

Or having one’s life changed by a novel whose characters ‘don’t exist’.

Existence is a predicate. — Cuthbert

I would say instead that Western philosophy of a certain stripe and era treats existence as a predicate( we can trace this logic back to Aristotle), but that wasn’t always so, and it isn’t the case for Wittgenstein or the phenomenologists( or for the OP).
A predicate isnt something simply added onto a subject as an additional piece of information that can be correct or incorrect. A predicate pragmatically and contextually transforms a subject in a certain direction. Not only the redness of an apply, but the nature (the sense) of the connection between the predicate and the subject are understood within a unique context of sense. We ignore all this and pretend that we are dealing with a picture of an apple and potential attributes or properties that transcend the context of their invocation.

There’s a difference between pretending you’re a lion, and pretending you’re really a lion.”

Is that like pretending you’re a president , and pretending you’re really a president?