there are cases where emotional impairment is reliably coupled with a catastrophic failure of practical reasoning. — Joshs
This mattering and relevance is the affective or ‘feeling’ aspect of thought. — Joshs
Every word you wrote above was chosen for a purpose , for its relevance in the context of the argument you are trying to advance. So each word is two things at once. It conveys a conceptual content , a ‘what’, and it conveys a relevance, a significance , the ‘how’ of the way it matters to you in the context of the larger argument. — Joshs
I think any major philosophical model implies a psychology. — Joshs
passing alone, incites no emotion in you. Seen one car go by, seen ‘em all. No big deal. Only when some particular cognition about some particular car, or in some extraordinary happenstance involving that particular range of perceptions in general, does emotion arise. Can’t get all excited about a Ferrari Testorosa, without there first being one, right? Even the emotion of hoping to see one presupposes you’ve already cognized which object to hope for. — Mww
. Any word conveys a conceptual content, insofar as words are nothing but representations of concepts, to begin with. It follows that my understanding of the context of the argument should determine the words I chose in response to it, such that the one maintains consistency with the other. So yes, I choose words for a purpose.....dialectical consistency given from understanding.....but the “how” of the way it matters, is already explicit in the choice. Without the consistencies, there are logical fallacies, which are exceptions to the rule and not the rule itself — Mww
Every object I see either fulfills or fails to confirm my prior expectations in some measure. This validation or invalidation is felt, and the feeling doesn’t follow the perception , it is simultaneous with it. — Joshs
You have to destroy the presumed conceptual apparatus, or make affect constitutive of it, to make what you're saying more than psychological obiter dicta. — Srap Tasmaner
But Kant, for instance, isn't telling a causal story about cognition.
hypothesis
— Joshs
And that story isn't open to experimental disconfirmation. If Damasio's theory doesn't hold up in the lab, you have to change your tune, but Kant can ignore the whole process. — Srap Tasmaner
Kant’s metaphysics is telling a causal story. — Joshs
Every object I see either fulfills or fails to confirm my prior expectations in some measure. — Joshs
This validation or invalidation is felt, and the feeling doesn’t follow the perception , it is simultaneous with it. — Joshs
Interacting with our world isnt simply a subject staring at objects. It is a constructive activity in which we anticipate forward into the world and objects reveal themselves
to us as responses to the way we reach out to them via our expectations. — Joshs
This is as true of experiences of things we have never seen before as it is of familiar things. — Joshs
But the affects are the mortar that builds the very things we take as affect-less. — Joshs
. Any word conveys a conceptual content, insofar as words are nothing but representations of concepts, to begin with.....
— Mww
Words don’t just represent content , they enact it. — Joshs
We dont simply choose what we think or say. What occurs to us to say is already shaped and conditioned by the context. — Joshs
It is ‘affected’ by the always fresh way in which it is used. — Joshs
We are always slightly surprised by what we thought we had simply ‘chosen’ to say. — Joshs
Thus emotions and feelings serve to constrain and focus our attention, so that we only consider from a pre-structured set of options. — Joshs
“Neural Correlates in Gratitude”? Really? When was the last time you consulted your neurons? For anything? — Mww
It still looks like Mww can grant whatever you want on the affective side, since goals and preferences get updated too, but he can also stick with the conceptual side and it alone being cognitive. — Srap Tasmaner
Feelings and cognitions are irrefutably separable, not because of affects they have, but that upon which the affects are directed. — Mww
To say that everything has being is a bit like saying everything is. OK. — Manuel
I also think that to think the something else is a kind of psychology misses the point entirely! — Srap Tasmaner
Philosopher A: I went to Grantchester yesterday.
Philosopher B: No I didn’t.
No matter how you slice it, this here is a minority game. Yep, nature loves to be a big tease. I don't know why, not like she cares. — Manuel
Where I seem to differ from some of my friends is in attaching little importance to physical size. I don't feel the least humble before the vastness of the heavens. The stars may be large, but they cannot think or love; and these are qualities which impress me far more than size does. I take no credit for weighing nearly seventeen stone.
My picture of the world is drawn in perspective, and not like a model to scale. The foreground is occupied by human beings and the stars are all as small as threepenny bits. I don't really believe in astronomy, except as a complicated description of part of the course of human and possibly animal sensation.
I apply my perspective not merely to space but also to time. In time the world will cool and everything will die; but that is a long time off still, and its present value at compound discount is almost nothing. Nor is the present less valuable because the future will be blank. Humanity, which fills the foreground of my picture, I find interesting and on the whole admirable. I find, just now at least, the world a pleasant and exciting place. You may find it depressing; I am sorry for you, and you despise me. But I have reason and you have none; you would only have a reason for despising me if your feeling corresponded to the fact in a way mine didn't. But neither can correspond to the fact. The fact is not in itself good or bad; it is just that it thrills me but depresses you. On the other hand, I pity you with reason, because it is pleasanter to be thrilled than to be depressed, and not merely pleasanter but better for all one's activities.
But there’s a serious question here: what does it mean for a philosophical point to depend on a matter of fact? One answer (...) is that you must be doing science not philosophy because philosophy is a priori. — Srap Tasmaner
a priori. Some of us may not really want to say the last part out loud, but it’s there nonetheless. — Srap Tasmaner
Philosophy has to begin not at the beginning but in the middle. — Srap Tasmaner
We know that we will begin from something given to us, whatever that is — Srap Tasmaner
Above all what’s given, as we begin doing philosophy, is that we will start somewhere and go on from there. — Srap Tasmaner
That’s my pitch for what I understand to be Heidegger’s pitch for phenomenological ontology. — Srap Tasmaner
Emotions serve our aesthetic judgements, having to do only with the condition of the thinking subject, whether a thing feels right/wrong or feels good/bad, whether or not it is right or good or not, but not that to which the subject attends, the thing that must be either right/wrong or good/bad.
Feelings/cognitions are nothing but another inescapable duality intrinsic to the human condition. Even if humans operate under the influence of both, that is not to say they are inseparable from each other. — Mww
↪Mww
Emotions serve our aesthetic judgements, having to do only with the condition of the thinking subject, whether a thing feels right/wrong or feels good/bad, whether or not it is right or good or not, but not that to which the subject attends, the thing that must be either right/wrong or good/bad.
Feelings/cognitions are nothing but another inescapable duality intrinsic to the human condition. Even if humans operate under the influence of both, that is not to say they are inseparable from each other.
— Mww
You say that to which the subject attends is separate from emotion. Let’s remove emotion from the equation for a moment , since it’s connotation as florid and intense response is not what I want to focus on. Rather , I want to focus on feeling as not just simple sensation but as intrinsic to the aesthetic judgments you described above. So you are arguing that we can extract the meaning of a word concept that is independent of all feelings that may accompany our experience of that word.
Wittgenstein says that we only ever actually experience a word in its contextual use. That means it is always a different sense of the meaning of that word which we experience in any given situation. What this further implies is that the use of the word isnt something additional to its pre-assigned intrinsic meaning. For Wittgenstein there is no intrinsic meaning to a word apart from its sense ( usage). So how and why it matters to us is the very essence of its meaning. If you are claiming that this pragmatic mattering and relevance is the province of feeling, and feeling can be separated from cognition, then you would seem to be disagreeing with Wittgenstein about the separability of mattering-use from the intrinsic meaning of word concepts — Joshs
he would be motivated by reason generally, but being void of emotion, he would have no use for pure practical reason. In effect, it could be said he was void of pure practical reason and that’s why he had no emotions. There was nothing to inform him of what his emotions should be. Or it could just as well be that he had no emotion so there was nothing on which practical reason could exert itself. — Mww
Hmmm....is it correct to say, then, that Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology is a priori? — Mww
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves ((here he probably means Kant)) which are prior to the ontical sciences and provide their foundation. — B&T, H 11
So you are arguing that we can extract the meaning of a word concept that is independent of all feelings that may accompany our experience of that word. — Joshs
If you are claiming that this pragmatic mattering and relevance is the province of feeling, and feeling can be separated from cognition, then you would seem to be disagreeing with Wittgenstein about the separability of mattering-use from the intrinsic meaning of word concepts — Joshs
Wittgenstein says that we only ever actually experience a word in its contextual use. — Joshs
I intuit a certain object if I already know what the word I heard represents, or I do not intuit a certain object, — Mww
.........I have now extracted the meaning of the word iff I already know the object to which it relates. — Mww
Wittgenstein says that we only ever actually experience a word in its contextual use.
— Joshs
I don’t think so. To experience a word is to treat it as a mere object, by which we first perceive it, then subject the word to the cognitive process, resulting in the experience of it. Better to say we only ever understand a word in its contextual use. — Mww
Your view of feeling and cognition as separable entities
rests on your model of thinking in general in classically cognitivist representationalist terms, inspired by the workings of a computer. — Joshs
We can’t say that world first exists and then we understand it. — Joshs
Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world. — Joshs
Words are not relational at all, — Joshs
In enactivist models, by contrast, there are no inner representations of an outer world..... — Joshs
And that’s very much what Heidegger is up to: before you can do the sort of ontology he attributes to Kant, as a way of grounding the natural sciences, you need to write “The world I find myself in”. — Srap Tasmaner
But what do we mean by ‘a priori’? What did Kant mean? — Srap Tasmaner
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