What was the point of "falsification" again? — Heiko

It was Popper’s way of showing that he was stuck in a Kantian time warp.

You have a lot of opinions, which is good. But it doesn’t sound like you’ve read a lot of philosophy.

Reality becomes visible when theories do _not_ hold. I doubt you can "construe" a vase out of thin air. — Heiko

not according to KUHN. He says that reality appears differently under different scientific accounts. It is up to the scientist to choose which account appears more useful. There is no account of reality which is truer than any other. Sounds like you prefer Popper.

There it is again. "You can construe". This is not the relation between you and a vase. — Heiko

What about the relationship between me as a scientist and an empirical realm? A construct is like a scientific paradigm. Do you think Kuhn’s paradigms describe the relation between the scientist and the vase? If not, tell me how you critique Kuhn’s approach.

It is not me who doubts the vase is a vase until it isn't anymore. — Heiko

Who said anything about doubting it is a vase? I can construe something as a vase but there are many, many different ways of doing this. Remember, to construe something is to compare and contrast it along dimensions of similarity and difference with respect to something else. The purpose of a construct is to anticipate patterns within changing events. So the aim of my construal of something as a vase is to anticipate a regularity in an ongoing flow of experiences. The criterion of success for a construct is its usefulness in guiding my interaction with the world such that I am. it being surprised at every turn by changes in my world.

I could construe a vase as having fixed properties and attributes that is nonetheless breakable. This construct is quite useful up to a point, but there are always alternative ways I could construe the events that I am calling a ‘vase’.

Say the vase is a construct. That is deemed of missing something therefor you should reflect on the construct "construct"? Doesn't that miss something? More than that: I could not convince myself the vase was a pile of glass. So, taking the vase as a vase means there was no contradiction. But now there is a construct "construct" because constructs were deemed to not tell "the truth"? Please.... — Heiko

I’m nit sure I understand why a construct is ‘missing something’ or doesn’t ‘tell the truth’. Missing what? What truth?

The idea that it "has" a fixed identity is an abstraction from its identifiability. — Janus

What would it mean for it to have a fixed identity? If we say
that it is composed of subatomic particles , do these particles have a fixed identity? Let’s say a quark exists for a millisecond. Does it have an identity that endures for this span of time?

No, that is a supposed identity of the object. If the object crumbles into pieces the identity is lost. The identity certainly does not lie in the thing. — Heiko

What if the object doesn’t crumble into pieces? Does it have an identity up till the time it crumbles? If the identity doesn’t lie in the thing , where does it lie?

The "in-itself" is a speculation. The "thing" will negate any phantasm you might have about it by itself. This is what is called reality. — Heiko

Built into your model of reality is an ‘in-itself. You wouldn’t call it reality otherwise. How else does what happens negate or correct if not by the effect of something that persists or endures as what it ‘is’, independent of the context of your expectations and background of undersranding , and independent of social context of use?

What makes an apple real? How would you define it ? Does it endure over time as what it is, does it have properties and attributes? Is it the same apple regardless of who is interacting with it or how they are using it?

The interesting question: If the world, the things, just everything is the real production of "being", why should we not concern ourselves with them? The mysticism is of a kind that says "Okay, these things _are_ but beyond those, if you try hard, there is the world of being." But being "mediates" itself towards itself by those things. When shifting view away from the things as they _are_ towards "being", you are hunting a mere abstraction. The absolute nothingness. — Heiko

One of my favorite psychologists says that every experience we have of the world is a construct. To experience anything is to construe it. And he defines a construct as a referential differential. Specifically, a construct is a dimension along which to perceive an event along dimensions of likeness and difference with respect with a prior meaning in our construct system. Furthermore, every new moment in time must be construed, so our construct system is changing from
moment to moment.
Let me ask you , is a construct an ‘object’? Is it something that just ‘is’? Or it it a way that we are changing? Does it make sense to point to a content of the construct , what it ‘is’ , apart from the way it makes a
change over what went before? If we try to point to what it supposedly ‘is’ in itself , it vanishes, because it isn’t anything ‘in itself’. It is only what it is as a comparison, and we need both sides of the comparison in order to have the event, the construct. The event is this thing that is what it is by differing in a very specific way from what it changed from. So it is not a thing, it is a difference , a xomparison, an edge , a hinge, a ‘from there to here.
So what we have here with a construct is a change, a transition, a movement , a difference, a becoming, that doesn’t consist of something that simply ‘is’ what it is in itself as a static state or inherence or substance or res extentia before being changed or moved. The change (consisting inseparably of a ‘what was’ paired with a ‘what is’) prior to the supposed stasis, the ‘pure content’ of an in itself.

I would argue it isn’t ‘being’ that is the abstraction , it is the idea of a thing in itself as static state,

"Fantasy" [ ... ] is indispensable for thinking – the greater part of which is ex post facto confabulation (e.g. Nietzsche, Lakoff, Kahneman, Metzinger). But "fantasy" can be, at its best, playing with counterfactuals (i.e. "what if?" daydreams – gedankenexperiments) ... — 180 Proof

Let’s not forget Derrida. “ To pretend, I actually do the thing: I have therefore only pretended to pretend.”

“ Writing is irresponsibility itself, the orphanage of a wandering and playful sign. Writing is not only a drug, it is a game…”

If we are parts of the world (universe) along with everything else, including (as I believe) our thoughts, values, feelings, culture, conduct, societies, institutions, biases, prejudices...all being human is...what would that mean regarding "Being" and ontology? Are they, along with other non-ethical philosophical questions, dependent on a belief that we, and what we think, do, feel, etc. aren't parts of the world? — Ciceronianus

There is a more fundamental thinking that penetrates beneath the idea of a world as a container with ‘parts’(existing beings) of which we are just one more. Rather than the world being just object beings that are presented before a subject being ( who is also an object within that world), the world ( including the subject) is enacted , produced , synthesized rather than just mirrored and represented. From this vantage , ‘being’ isn’t the existing parts, it’s the synthesizing, enacting , producing activity that creates and recreates the subject and object poles. The being of this world is in its becoming, and our own indissociable becoming. ( Is that obscure enough for ya?)

“...Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience—colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability—the body will then vanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori....”
(CPR B6) — Mww

What Kant fails to do is to take away his notion of space
as and idealized abstract geometry in order to reveal how it is produced by primordial acts of synthesis.


“The consciousness of its [the object’s] existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present.

The object is “a unity which “appears” continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego.” “The "object" of consciousness, the object as having identity "with itself" during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself and thus as an "intentional effect" produced by the synthesis of consciousness.”(Husserl, Experience and Judgement).

“If we think of monadic subjects and their streams of consciousness or, rather, if we think the thinkable minimum of self-consciousness, then a monadic consciousness, one that would have no "world" at all given to it, could indeed be thought - thus a monadic consciousness without regularities in the course of sensations, without motivated possibilities in the apprehension of things.”(Husserl, Ideas II)

“Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated.”(Heidegger, Being and Time)

“It was long held that what exists must be self-identical. Since self-identical things have space and time locations, it was assumed that only what fills space and time can exist.” (Gendlin)

n English, that’s a field, and that it is a field, is a fact. For speakers of English, the fieldhood of that field is as neutral as it gets.

“In English, we call that a ‘field’, but who knows what it really is.” What could that possibly mean? **

Conventions don’t block neutrality; they create it. — Srap Tasmaner

Applying this to Goodman’s example of points and lines, one would have to extract from the various accounts he offers of them a single word to unite all these descriptions. But there may be no single word uniting the accounts. A single word, however, can describe one of the accounts. So, one could say that , in English, each one of the accounts describes what the points and lines together produce with a unique word, and within the bounds of that account , the thingness of that word is as neutral as it gets. So the convention established by an account doesn’t block the perceived neutrality within the account , it creates it. If we apply this analysis to the word ‘field ‘, there would be different accounts, with their own English words to match them , of the space that , within one account, might be called a ‘field’. But to be more Wittgensteinian, the same word would be used in an infinity of different senses( there are force fields, fields of grass, baseball field, fields of study), each sense expressing a different account , a different convention, a different ‘as neutral as it gets’.

But we can all agree, no matter what our interests might be, that it is a field. That commonality seems to be more than a mere account. — Janus

In other words , is agreement that it is a field due to its being a neutral fact or thing, or is agreement on its being a field an example of one of many possible accounts, beyond which there is only an empty core?

Is the above example different from below?

“If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.”(Nelson Goodman)

The field is there; we didn't "construct it". — Janus

If a fact of the matter has no status outside of an account which gives it its structure and sense, then there can be no facts independent of accounts. We can say that ‘something’ is there to act as affordances or constraint on our accounts, but we can’t identify it as a field , since that’s already an account.

In short, anything that paints what's going on when two people 'see different things' is going to come up short of it treats them as isolated beings confronting the world on terms that are theirs individually, uniquely, and alone. — Srap Tasmaner

Interpreters go back and forth about where Heidegger stands with respect to the self and the social. For instance,

Zahavi is among those thinkers who interpret Heidegger's ‘we-self' of every day das man as taking precedence over his authentic self of ‘ownmost' possibilities. As das man , Zahavi claims

“group belongingness, rather than being founded upon an other-experience, preceded any such experience.”

“...an everyday being-with-one-another characterized by anonymity and substitutability, where others are those from whom “one mostly does not distinguish oneself” (Heidegger 1996: 11)

He surmises that Heidegger would approve of Schmid's(2005) assertion that “...the we, the “sense of us” or “plural self-awareness,” precedes the distinction between yours and mine, is prior to any form of intersubjectivity or mutual recognition, and is itself the irreducible basis for joint action and communication.”

Zahavi is far from alone in interpreting Heidegger's discussions of the discursive practices of Das man as assuming an introjection of norms by a socially created self or a socially conditioned self-affecting subjectivity. Heidegger's critique of Husserl's model of empathy was taken by many interpreters as evidence that the primacy of being-with for Dasein functions as the conditioning of a self by an outside.

On the other hand, other writers take the exact opposite stance.

“Gallagher(2010) says: “In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.”

Gadamer(2006) writes:

“Mit-sein, for Heidegger, was a concession that he had to make, but one that he never really got behind. Indeed, even as he was developing the idea, he wasn't really talking about the other at all. Mit-sein is, as it were, an assertion about Dasein, which must naturally take Mit-sein for granted..."Care" [die Sorge] is always a concernfulness [ein Besorgtsein] about one's own being, and Mit-sein is, in truth, a very weak idea of the other, more a "letting the other be" than an authentic "being-interested-in-him."”

So who’s right? I think they are both right and both wrong.Heidegger shows that it’s possible to model being in the world for me as interaubjective from
the start, but at the same time it is ‘the world for all of us’ as seen from my unique vantage.

Even the rituals surrounding pumping gas reflect the superordinate differences in worldview between people
— Joshs

Except that they really don't seem to. You can work alongside someone for years, or see them at the grocery store every few days, and never have any idea what their political or religious (or ...) views are. — Srap Tasmaner

Getting back to the gas station example, notice what our empirically oriented way of thinking causes us to miss or tuck under the rug. When you and I go into a BP to fill our tanks, notice the difference in our ‘choreography’. My routine is different than yours. I pull in to the pump closer than you. I pick up the nozzle and hold it differently . I may purchase the gas using a different sequence than tou. We think of these behaviors of ‘use’ as peripheral to the objects that we both see Ao we speeder empirical object from our interactions with the object. Of course , Wittgenstein as well as Heidegger wouldn’t make such a separation. If I ask you not just i. general terms what one does when they fill their car with gas , but get i to these behavioral differences , they are sloughed off as irrelevant to the facts of filling a car with gas. If I then ask you what you think I might do when I leave the
gas station , and you know me only slightly, you will have no idea. Even if you know me well ther are many details of my day to day behaviors that you can’t anticipate but I can. So we treat these behaviors in a different category than what we mean by the facts of daily life(getting the train, working on the computer).

We put many behaviors into the category of randomness , whim, arbitrary desire. So when we say that we can be in overwhelming agreement about the ‘same’ world, we tacitly assume that the arbitrariness of behavior doesn’t count. It is instead built into the model of ‘agreement ‘.
This is not unlike the claim of a theory of everything in physics to be able to eventually model all future behavior on a computer( with limitations provided by quantum uncertainty).
The predictiveness that physicists pat themselves on the back for conveniently leaves out the mountains
of arbitrary randomness that is left unexplained in so many aspects of life. This is becuase the randomness is built into the model as a presumed
irreducible feature of the world rather than a limitation of
the theory.

Pre-determined is not the same as determined. — Wayfarer

You’re right. ‘ Determined’ implies a notion of causality. Empirical causality , because it presupposes enduring, self-identical objects, allows for something to remain as itself throughout a series of changes. This is what allows for the translation of a causal sequence into a formula that predicts future outcomes. Heidegger abandons empirical causality in favor of a model in which causes
can only be determined by what is ahead of them , a d are altered by this interaction.

Honestly, I do not see why you come up with memory in this context. — Heiko

My agreement here doesn’t rest on my sense of my self
being a memory. It could be a non-reflective intention. My point remains that you are treating ‘self’ here as an object in the world.

But who was talking about that? We talked about the intention for chosing that term — Heiko

Being-there comes from being in the world. The central focus for Heidegger has always been Being. That is, a questioning of the word ‘is’ that we stick between subject and predicate as some sort of neutral glue.

So Heidegger was a determinist — Wayfarer

Self is determined by its world , and the world ‘worlds’. That is, the world for me ( AS me) is an intricate unfolding of continuous change. There is no pre-determined plan for this unfolding It is not a dialectic.

So... Heidegger says "We need to get rid of predeterminations and hence use the term 'Dasein'" that is a difference to Hegel — Heiko

A huge difference , when you add what else he says about Dasein.

As I read Hegel "Dasein" is just some "completely undetermined something" (for lack of better words). I — Heiko

That’s Hegel , not Heidegger. Big difference between the two here. Nothing undetermined about Heidegger’s Dasein.

They'll both put the car in park, turn off the engine, get out, stick a card in the machine, put card back in wallet, pump gas, replace the gas cap, blah blah blah, even if one is headed to a Trump rally and the other to a Sanders rally. That's what I mean — Srap Tasmaner

Exactly. And that’s what I mean by subordinate details of life that are informed , organized, guided and defined by the superordinate aims , goals, concerns and meanings that each of us carry with us each moment. Even the rituals surrounding pumping gas reflect the superordinate differences in worldview between people , but these activities are so general
as to mask those differences until an issue arises conceding how to fix a broken pump or something like
that.

Or it can be what you see in a mirror. For me reflection is more like self-description, self-observation or anything where you are "your own object". You cannot write about yourself without reflecting. — Heiko

When you look in a mirror in order to reflect on yourself you are studying an object ( the image of yourself) and comparing it with your memory of another object( your recollection of your sense of your self. Here you’re using self to refer to some substantive thing in the world.


For Heidegger , the self isnt one object among others in the world. when you look in the mirror what you see is no more or less your ‘self’ than when you experience anything else in your world. Why is this? Because your ‘self’ consists of two indissociable features. First, it all of your past as a single unified totality of relevance as it participates in the present. Second , it is whatever you are experiencing in the world. What you are encountering makes a change in this past ‘self’ and that ‘being changed by’ is the only site of your ‘self’ for Heidegger. There is no self outside of this pairing. So reflection for him is not one self-object studying another self-object (the image in the mirror). The self is nothing but the way I myself
in the world.

The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things.”
— Joshs
So, which things, do you think, told Heidegger that about his Dasein? — Heiko

All things tell us about our Dasein , because Dasein is nothing outside of this ‘being thrown into things’. ‘Reflection’ is being changed by the world every moment.

". If that is not a reflection, then what is? — Heiko

Reflection is considered to be a turning back of consciousness to draw an experience from memory in order to examine it. It is generally distinguished from intentional acts that deal with present objects rather than objects from memory. So how does Heidegger’s ‘reflection’ differ from this model? First of all , Heidegger doesn’t make such a distinction between remembering and experiencing something new. All experiencing is of something new. That being the case , when Dasein turns ‘back’ to itself , it is not encountering a previously existing self that it then examines. Instead, it is experiencing something utterly fresh and new. One could say that it gets its sense of ‘self’ always from a new experience of its world.

“The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things.”

The subject reflects on itself as Dasein, — Heiko

Let’s talk about what a subject is for Heidegger or for you, so we can see what exactly is going on in this structure of ‘reflection’. How do you think the concept of reflection differs for Heidegger from the ordinary understanding of it , or from a Kantian understanding of it?

Heidegger calls "Dasein" an "existential title" - it is an objectivized form of the subject with strong connotations to Hegel. It is literally a "being there" and at it's core a reflection. — Heiko

There is nothing objectivized about Dasein. It is not an. object or a subject. It is between the two as transition. ‘Being there’ isn’t a stasis or state or object, it is a becoming. Dasein doesn’t ‘reflect’ back to itself as a pre-existing subject, it It is always beyond or ahead of itself.

How much of the difference between one person’s world and another’s is down to the choices someone (or many someones) made, perhaps neither of them? — Srap Tasmaner

I’d say very little. This is a temptation. we are drawn to when we cannot rethink
how on earth someone could
possibly seriously brice something f without being brainwashed, irrational or pathological.

It’s not just ‘different worlds’ to me; one of them has had a toxin deliberately introduced into their system. — Srap Tasmaner

Toxin is an other name for brain washing , conditioning , irrationality , etc.

As for Heidegger ‘dasein’ doesn’t mean anything as far as I can tell. — I like sushi

Dasein is inextricably linked to his model
of temporality. Do you see how his model of time differs from Husserl’s internal time consciousness? For
one thing Husserl says that retention holds
the just past in front of us as aril part of the present. Heidegger days the past, as the having been , is created by the present. It is a past already changed by the present.

I think this is expressed in the biggest difference between Heidegger and Husserl. Husserl says intended objects of perception don’t bring into play the entire history of our experiencing as a unified whole, but they do for Heidegger’s

Davidson, among many others for different reasons, has made the same point, that people overwhelmingly agree about the world, and we fight over our differences against this backdrop of agreement. — Srap Tasmaner

Davidson wasn’t ever able to shake off a ‘same world’ realism , as Rorty showed. Do you think a fight between a rightwing supporter of Trump and a far left supporter of critical race theory occurs against the backdrop of overwhelming agreement about the world? Do you think that Descartes and Derrida, or Aquinas and Kierkegaard would view their philosophical disagreements against a backdrop of overwhelming agreement about the world?
If I show you an optical illusion where the picture of the old woman becomes a young woman with a gestalt shift of perception, are the details of the world of the first picture in overwhelming agreement with the details of the world of the second picture? Notice that what constitutes a line or a nose or a leg in the first picture becomes something different in the second picture.Let’s say that, no matter now hard we try, I can only see the old woman and you can only see the young woman. If we stand very close to the image, we seem to be in overwhelming agreement on what we’re seeing, a bunch of abstract colors and lines. But the greater the breadth of perspective , the more divergent our worlds become.

Of the words tho at you wrote me and that I am
reading now , the simpler , more concrete words ( the , will produce the greatest agreement between my construal and what you intended. As the words become more abstract , and as I move from
individual word to the the larger context of the sentence and the even larger content of the paragraph , overwhelming agreement morphs into an reading that is increasingly disparate from what you had in mind , which can be demonstrated by the questions that will
flow back and forth between us over the sense of the ideas. So do we determine sameness of ‘ world’ on the basis of subordinate details and simple words , and conclude because we seem to agree on these that we live in an overwhelmingly same world, or do we determine the sameness of this world in the basis of the most superordinate concepts and values that each of us make use of to make determinations of meaning?

I guess it depends on whether you buy into the idea that each of us do in fact organize our interpretation of events in this hierarchical, functionally unified manner.

Your talk of worlds makes them seem so separate. — Srap Tasmaner

People are already profoundly separated fro each other
according to the ‘same world’ thesis. Their separation is a function of arbitrary desire, value, will. My notion of individual worlds sees the interrelationships among them to be much more intimate than is possible with a ‘same world’ view which rests on the capriciousness of iintent and desire.

Our individual worlds share some ‘sources’, it seems to me. We didn’t have to intersubjectively construct that commonality, since we filled our plates, at least partly, at the same cultural salad bar, and we took some of the same stuff. — Srap Tasmaner

We have to subjectively construct the objects as well as intersubjectively construct them. The sources are never the same , only similar. A ‘ spatial object’ is constructed by me out of a flow of constantly changing senses of what appears, and those changing sense never repeat themselves as the same. I convince myself
that this flow is emanating form a self-identical
object because I fill in from expectation and memory what I don’t actually see in front of me. The empirical
object that is the same for all of us is constructed in a similar manner , by a coordination of multiple perspectives of multiple participants. We turn what are similar worlds into the ‘same’ world in this way, by an idealization. So the point is that when we reach agreement on the basis of ‘sameness’ , it is more primordially a question of similarity.

I see a mouse. You see a mouse. What is the different appearance I see, compared with the different appearance you see? Do I see if from the side, and you see if from the front? Why does this indicate we see a "different reality"? Why doesn't it merely indicate I'm seeing the mouse from the side, and you're seeing it from the front? — Ciceronianus

Why does there have to be an ‘it’ independent of my perspective and your perspective if we can reach agreement? Isnt that the usefulness of the idea of ‘same thing’ or ‘same world’? These concepts of perspective-independent things don’t do a damn thing for us unless they contribute to our getting along with each other and cooperating together. It’s not an identical world that allows us to do science and create complex culture, it’s an intimately reciprocal network of intersubjectivitely connected subjective worlds that accomplishes this.

Our differences arise from the fact that we live in the same world but have different desires, different thoughts, different resources which sometime conflict or provide some of us with advantages or disadvantages others don't possess in competing with one another for resources or opportunities existing in the same world we all inhabit. If we lived in different worlds, there would be no conflicts. If they conflict, how would they be different from one another? — Ciceronianus

If someone disappoints you, violates your moral
principles , rejects you, humiliates you , embraces political views you find dangerous and cruel, acts in seemingly irrational, incoherent or inappropriate ways, ‘same world’ means there are external sources of standards of rationality . ‘Same world’ provides the basis of norms of empirical correctness , which we can then use to determine individual rationality. Since everyone is experiencing this ‘same world ‘ , everyone has the opportunity to test their understandings of the facts of the world using this external existing ‘same’ world as the universal yardstick of truth. This leaves no room for the idea that the facts we perceive are determined by a larger network of values, so that , try as we might, we cannot get your sense of meaning of the facts to align precisely with mine.

The more complex and important the facts are, the deeper they penetrate into what is most vital to our being as social beings , the less your sense of meaning of the facts will align with mine. We’re not talking perceiving mice here, we’re talking political, spiritual, moral and philosophical ‘facts’. We’re talking about our core concept of ourselves, what we stand for, our sense of how those we care about perceive us. Even though those values and concepts that are most precious to who I am as a person belong to a world which is different for me that for every other person , our individual worlds are never completely separate from those of others. On the contrary, they are related at some level even among those from the most disparate cultures. And they can be very closely related indeed among lovers and friends. In fact, only when we recognize this perspectival basis of individual worlds, are we able to achieve a form of mutual
understanding, intimacy and empathy with others that is impossible when we begin from the assumption of a ‘same’ world.

With the latter belief , we are stuck with an explanation of others behavior that relies on arbitrary drives, motives and personality quirks that we can’t get beyond , such as that others have different desires, thoughts and resources( “Our differences arise from the fact that we live in the same world but have different desires, different thoughts”). There is no recognition here that the most important source of conflict is a differences in the way that people interpret socially relevant facts (different worldviews) completely independent of motive.

You ask “If they conflict, how would they be different from one another?”

The conflict between worldviews is two conflicts. That is , it is perceived as one kind of conflict from the first participant and another kind of conflict from the second participant. What makes it a conflict of worldviews is that the two parties can’t agree on the nature of the conflict. Each ascribes it to different set of ‘facts’. They talk past one another , as we see in today’s polarized political world. You would say they simply have different desires, and leave it at that. It’s a short distance from that conclusion to choosing one ‘desire’ over the other as more socially beneficial or moral or rational, and then suppressing the unwanted ‘desire’ or its products.

Realizing this can allow us to bridge the gap between worlds by construing the other’s way of understanding their world in their terms , from our own perspective. Failing to do this leaves us with only motive and intent-based ways of making sense of others, which drives us to punish, blame and condemn with no real insight. So the supposedly dependability and solidness of a ‘same world’ has the opposite effect of what one might think. Rather than allowing for mural understanding, it reifies disagreements by forcing the participants to blame each other’s motives as arbitrarily capricious, malevolent, irrational , lazy, thoughtless , and prevents the creation of a bridge between worldviews.

Not only do each of live in our own ‘world’ with respect to others, but from one moment to the next our own ‘world’ changes into a néw one. We need never notice this because the transformation of sense is subtle enough as to go unnoticed by us most of the time. Only after a long period might we look back at our prior self and find its interest and beliefs to be unrecognizable reprieve to who we are now. So each of us moves into a subtly different world every moment , and that means the gap between us and others is only a variation on the gap from
moment to moment between who we are now and who we were yesterday, how we understand our world today and how we did yesterday.

Certainly there are cases where we disagree, and for various reasons. Those become problems we may or may not be able to solve. But if we can't resolve them chances are it won't be because what we think is something we use every day turns out not to be real. — Ciceronianus

I don’t think it’s a question of meanings not being real but of meanings not being fully shared, being perspectival.
What we call physical objects are intersubjectively constructed. No two people ever see the exact same ‘object in the same way, so we say that each of us perceives a different appearance of the ‘same’ object. In everyday life this leads to no major misunderstandings because the objects we interact with are defined in very general terms. The problem with positivism comes to the fore when we deal with each other every day in social situations. Every misunderstanding, frustration, annoyance, disappointment we experience in dealing with one another reveals the fact that we are not living in the same world, but interpret according to different vantages and perspectives. When we rely on positivism here, we assume a person-independent reality, and attempt to explain other persons’ intransigence or failure to meet our expectations as a result of irrationality, stubbornness, malicious intent. etc. , rather than an outlook on the world which we are unfamiliarity with.

Does Aristotle come across as deliberately unclear if we haven't read Plato; does Hume if we haven't read Hobbes; does James if we haven't read Peirce? I don't think so. Perhaps it's merely a personal preference, but if I philosopher can't even produce sentences one can read without referencing the work of other philosophers as a kind of dictionary or thesaurus, I don't think that speaks well for the philosopher. — Ciceronianus

If we dont intuitively understand the philosophical background to a set of ideas, it will appear incoherent. Today we don’t need Plato to read Aristotle , although it would help. The reason is the social , technological and intellectual foundation of our contemporary Western culture is based on two thousand years of philosophical insights, all of which i’m turn are founded on the Greeks. So a member of our culture already implicitly understands the philosophical background to Aristotle without having to read Plato. The same cannot be said of philosophy of the past 100 years. Our wider culture is really subcultures within subcultures . The philosophical background that most far right social conservatives have does not go beyond 18th century authors.This is why Breitbart and the right-wing Claremont institute pointed to essentially all philosophy after Hegel ( Marx, postmodernism, critical theory, etc) as being wrong-headed.

Much of what is produced in the art world today is difficult to appreciate without background in the philosophical , institutional and cultural framework that it arises out of and speaks to.

When I read Being and Time , I had not read Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl or Wittgenstein. I was able to understand it because I had assimilated the ideas that these other authors put forth from other sources, mainly psychology, which had been influenced indirectly by Heidegger and Husserl through the human potential movement, client centered therapy, Sartre , gestalt and existential psychology. After all, philosophy is just one mode of expressing a worldview. One can find parallel ideas in the social sciences and the arts and literature. So what is key to understanding the work of a particular writer isn’t necessarily having read previous authors in their field , but having assimilated the background ideas in some from from one’s culture.

I'm not sure what you mean by "value-laden" but suspect that it's the equivalent of saying everything that human beings do is value-laden because human beings are human beings, and everything which human beings do is necessarily value-laden, which doesn't strike me as a useful insight. — Ciceronianus

Are you familiar with the fact-value distinction in analytic philosophy, and the critique of it by Quine, Putnam, Sellers and others? Or the myth of the given?
These were the beginnings of a recognition that facts only exist within accounts , and there is no fact of the matter that can settle differences between accounts. This contributed to the downfall of positivism. An account is another word for value-system, a scheme of meaning that interprets and makes sense of phenomena in a certain way.

Here’s an example of fact-value inseparability:

“To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.

A point in space seems to be perfectly objective. But how are we to define the points of our everyday world? Points can be taken either as primitive elements, as intersecting lines, as certain triples of intersecting planes, or as certain classes of nesting volumes. These definitions are equally adequate, and yet they are incompatible: what a point is will vary with each form of description. For example, only in the first "version," to use Goodman's term, will a point be a primitive element. The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length:

If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.”

Here is another argument against positivism:

“Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned.”

I've always maintained that the law is, quite simply, the law, and nothing else. It's not morality; it's not justice. I'm a sort of legal positivist — Ciceronianus

One might think that positivism of any sort is the farthest one can get from morality. But in actuality , positivism presupposes a moralism. Positivism believes it can separate the knower from the known, and as a result it fails to see that all empirical facts are value-laden, leading to a perpetuation of the status quo. This is why positivism tends to be associated with a certain range of political views.

Which is to say that the extent to which a philosopher's adherents believe him/her to be surpassingly insightful is significant in determining whether a cult exists. — Ciceronianus

Or maybe the philosopher happens to be surpassingly insightful and claims of deliberate obscurity and unclarity are rationalizations on the part of those who simply don’t have the philosophical background to read them.
Xtrix and I both think Heidegger is a profound thinker. We don’t interpret him exactly the same way , which is as it should be , but we agree on the most important general
features. of his work. Is this because we have both drunk the Kool-aid? Or is it because there really are key insights Heidegger contributed that a large community of philosophers can agree on, and can also agree that these insights are not delivered ( at least in his work up through Being and Time) in a particularly obscure manner. Rather , the style reflects the originality of the ideas. It is almost a guarantee that he will come across as deliberately unclear if the reader has failed to comprehend a host of necessary precursors. This includes Hegel, Nietzsche. Wittgenstein and Husserl ( a background in Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard wouldn’t hurt either ).

Why don’t you let Xtrix and I show you why ‘The Question Regarding Technology’ is not “so Romantic as to approach silliness”, and in fact has nothing to do with Romanticism.

Notice that transcendence of the ego is early work. Perhaps you find Husserl because you are looking for him.

But even if that were an accurate account of Sartre, it is open for us to still reject that part of his account while accepting the other... — Banno

I think the paper I linked to draws from Being and Nothingness, too. I should mention that I dont agree with those who talk about a pre-reflective self-awareness as some kind of feeling of for-meness or what its like-ness. I don’t think there is such a constant self dimension lurking in the background of all expereinces of objects. And I think Zahavi misinterprets Husserl as holding such a view. For Husserl the pre-reflective ego is nothing but a zero point of experiencing, the intersection of the streaming of retentions, primal impressions and protentions. It has no content in itself, no feeling of what it’s likeness or anything like that. I don’t believe there is a for-itself for Husserl, at least not one opposed to an in-itself. His whole approach is based on associative synthesis, the way a sense of meaning is created on the basis of similarities with respect to previously formed meanings. Empirical objects , as well as our concept of the self, are constructed out of such syntheses of similarity.

For Sartre, the self (the subject in subjective) is not found through introspection, but is manifest in the fact of choice and the presence of the other. — Banno

From what I’m reading, Sartre makes a
distinction between positional and non positional , and between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness.
Pre-reflective consciousness is pre-supposed by introspection, and accompanies rather than is for me strobing choice and the presence of the other. Only positional consciousness is determined by the other, consistent with Husserl.



“Of course, Sartre describes this self-awareness as an immediate relation to my interiority rather than a special kind of perception directed towards the inner; however, the difficulty, here, is exactly the same Husserl was trying to avoid when he criticized Brentano’s distinction between inner and outer perception in the appendix to the Logical Investigations. Sartre’s reasoning lies on a metaphysical rather than a descriptive distinction between on the one hand an immediate and non­intentional access to myself, and on the other hand a mediated and intentional access to objects, among which is to be located the empirical ego.”

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Pierre-Jean-Renaudie/publication/257620150_Me_Myself_and_I_Sartre_and_Husserl_on_Elusiveness_of_the_Self/links/579da60b08ae5d5e1e14c74d/Me-Myself-and-I-Sartre-and-Husserl-on-Elusiveness-of-the-Self.pdf?_sg%5B0%5D=QL6CcHrC190dNoNl0DP4zTwStecV7FFHmbxq02vTvO7jHVs_PvLF1Z4PODn5beu6tT957ul1-nfGhxnh9C6Dkw.3_-yLxT1VW3lCqukwsfo3foY2GPfnbR5zCID1hTCo5InCRSBugzt3K6-ncGct7EyJMnCyaBiTa0Ck7W7YX-crQ.s6zdDZusqwj02MU_oo0Rz1yGbF7fLZPOfbOyBUpveFrQN9yRmLTuqeDFWCLfGLCdeRi2DnlwbiQj5Pfelp1Bbw&_sg%5B1%5D=1MiSbLg0KODtUig5qYd0oz5Yu8CBxvGkzhQrsscJ0Zir0dKe0PLWY4oYqGgHZ4ac0CeyNouw7LCxWmpszs2a-8pahGUaXmHD1WCunzNt6SrJ.3_-yLxT1VW3lCqukwsfo3foY2GPfnbR5zCID1hTCo5InCRSBugzt3K6-ncGct7EyJMnCyaBiTa0Ck7W7YX-crQ.s6zdDZusqwj02MU_oo0Rz1yGbF7fLZPOfbOyBUpveFrQN9yRmLTuqeDFWCLfGLCdeRi2DnlwbiQj5Pfelp1Bbw&_iepl=