Though Freud did make some interesting contributions, it must not be forgotten that he was quite critical of philosophy as he was of religion. — Apollodorus

He wasn’t critical of all philosophy.
Ernest Jones, a close friend and dedicated follower of Freud, recalls that Freud told him in conversation about that time [i.e. 1908] that Nietzsche was one of the 'authentically great men of all time' and that 'Nietzsche developed a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived.'

Freud [in his published 'Autobiographical Study':] "[Nietzsche's] guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the labourious findings of [my work]."

Fantastic. Or maybe all value systems are appearances of truths! — Xtrix

This could be , but it would be more consistent with Kerkegaard than Nietzsche.

True, we can deny it by having academic discussions about the nature of "truth", and talk of "alternative facts," etc. That seems to be the popular strategy these days. Glad to see you're helping to spread it. — Xtrix

I do my best.

Not all perspectives are right. Some further values better than others, according to him. By "truth" he means the ultimate truth of philosophers and theologians. — Xtrix

All ‘truths’ are mere appearances which emerge out of value systems. I agree that within a particular value system , there are normative conventions and constraints , but value systems continually change and do not become closer to any final truth. Furthermore , one might argue that conservatives are thinking from
within a different value system than liberals. Within the conservative value system, some ideas further values better than others. This is also true of the liberal value system. But what furthers conservative values is not the same as what furthers liberal values.

Will to power marks this endless relativity and flux of value systems. The only ‘truth’ for Nietzsche ( and Heidegger , Derrida, Foucault , Deleuze and others who follow Nietzsche) is this incessant , non-progressing flux of becoming.

it proves that some perspectives are WRONG. Yes, I do believe in truth
— Xtrix
— Joshs

Yes, because that's such a controversial statement.

Even Nietzsche would be laughing at you. — Xtrix

He certainly was laughing at something.

“It is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance; in fact, it is the world's most poorly proven assumption.”

“The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power)

in any case, you're just changing the subject. I never once said there needs to be a "single universal perspective." — Xtrix

No, I think your statement below articulates what I had in mind more clearly than ‘single universal perspective’.

it proves that some perspectives are WRONG. Yes, I do believe in truth — Xtrix

There is 97% + agreement on what the problem is -- from those in the field. That's good enough for me. — Xtrix

That’s good enough for me, too, but this thread isnt talking about us, it’s talking about the large number of people who are doubtful it’s as big or immediate a problem as the scientists claim it to be.

I'm not interested in the minority who have been brainwashed into denialism by the fossil fuel propaganda juggernaut, — Xtrix

First of all, this is a very large minority. Secondly, believing the opposition is simply ‘brainwashed’ rather than operating from an entirely different frame of understanding than yours will keep you tied up in knots.


“Who mentioned anything about a "single universal perspective"? You're arguing against self-created phantoms.”

Assuming that those who disagree with you on this issue are brainwashed pre-supposes that facts can be separated from perspectives and values.

what's needed is wide-scale awareness and prioritization of the particular problem (climate change). — Xtrix

My point is that there will never be precise agreement , nor does there need to be, on what exactly the ‘particular problem’ is. There is already wide-scale
awareness of something called ‘climate change’ , but what exactly this means varies widely according to political affiliation , etc. More scare tactics from the left will just backfire.

What issue one considers worth prioritizing is a function of how seriously one considers the threat , which is itself a function. of how one construes the issue. You will not get right wing conservatives to see the issue in the way climate scientists do , because this is t about facts, it’s about complex worldviews within which the facts appear as what they are. Complex worldviews are extremely resistant to change. If you want to influence climate skeptics and others who are slow to act , you have to connect with their worldview and work with them from within those bounds rather than trying to get them on the same page as the climate scientists. Without your help, conservatives will eventually arrive at the realization of the necessity to act. Will it be too late?No. It would obviously be preferable from our vantage if they felt a greater sense of urgency right now , but I suspect they are going to have to be pushed to the precipice in order to act. That will be costly financially as well as in terms of lives and quality of life, but I don’t see any alternative.

can't see a way we survive unless there's wide-scale awareness and prioritization of this particular problem. — Xtrix

One could make the same argument about World war 1, World war 2 and the Cold war. People make accommodations to alien cultures ( peace treaties) and adjustments to perceived threats from within their own way of seeing the world , not by melding into a single universal perspective.

For me, the leading problem is one of values held and aspired toward by the majority of humans inhabiting this earth: both those in power and those who grant them their power.
— javra

Well said. This is also what I mean by awakening. A paradigm shift, a revolution -- all similar: a major, far-reaching event that happens relatively quickly. — Xtrix

The dream of a global awakening is an age-old wish. But I think it’s wrong-headed , and comparable to wishing that all species of animals were to awaken and begin exhibiting the same behavior. But just as animal species occupy diverse niches for a reason, so do human communities identify with diverse worldviews. Not only will we never get these communities to ‘awaken’ to the same understanding on any issue , we shouldn’t consider it a desirable goal. I think we will eventually overcome our climate challenges, but it wo nt be because our interpretation of the issues involved , the validity of the science or the means of resolution. will have achieved some sort of planetary consensus.

that the sky is objectively above the earth can be appraised to so be due to such a reason. Now, I take this to be hinting at a possible metaphysical interpretation of space in large, rather than expounding on how space in general can be construed to be contingent on observers. — javra

whether or not time is deemed contingent on mind, it can nevertheless yet be objectively real. — javra

Let me connect these thoughts with our previous conversation in which I associated the self-identity of a form with Cartesian substance as res extentia(which
led to your remark that I apparently didn’t want to engage seriously in the discussion). It was actually Husserl and Heidegger who who traced modern
science to the mathematization of nature , which proceeded by taking pragmatically constructed shapes and turning them into idealized geometrical abstractions. Objective space emerged from this idealization, a mathematical form supposedly existing independent of all observer perspectives.

Husserl, in Ideas II, says duration is a property of transcendent (real) spatial ‘things’, and real
spatial objects are presumed to exist in the pure mathematical ideality of geometric space-time..
“Every thingly being is temporally extended; it has its duration, and with its duration it is fit within Objective time in a strict manner. Thus with its duration it has a fixed place in the one world-time, which is a universal form of existence for all thinghood.”

“A true object in the sense of logic is an object which is absolutely identical "with itself," that is, which is, absolutely identically, what it is; or, to express it in another way: an object is through its determinations, its quiddities [Weisheiten], its predicates, and it is identical if these quiddities are identical as belonging to it or when their belonging absolutely excludes their
not belonging. Purely mathematical thinking is related to possible objects which are thought determinately determinately through ideal-"exact" mathematical (limit-) concepts…”

“In his view of the world from the perspective of geometry, the perspective of what appears to
the senses and is mathematizable, Galileo abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life; he abstracts from all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis. The result of this abstraction is the things purely as bodies; but these are taken as concrete real objects, the totality of which makes up a world which becomes the subject matter of research. One can truly say that the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. A consequence of this, along with mathematization, which was too quickly taken for granted, is [the idea of] a self-enclosed natural causality in which every occurrence is determined unequivocally and in advance. Clearly the way is thus prepared for dualism, which appears immediately afterward in Descartes. In general we must realize that the conception of the new idea of "nature" as an encapsuled, really and theoretically self-enclosed world of bodies soon brings about a complete transformation of the idea of the world in general. The world splits, so to speak, into two worlds: nature and the psychic world, although the latter, because of the way in which it is related to nature, does not achieve the status of an independent world.”

Heidegger says:

“Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the
justification of which has not been demonstrated. Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that detennines his ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well
suited to grasp.*“

I've actually wondered about the role of drugs. Look at the movements of the 1960s and look at what drugs were being used there versus say the 1980s. I personally think there's a lot to gain from psychedelic substances. — Xtrix

The idea that dosing world leaders with lsd would lead to peace was popular within the counterculture and one that lTimothy Leary fervently believed in. In fact, he thought that every major advance in human culture was associated with with use of a drug of some kind.
He found , however, that chemicals alone do not determine imagination. In his autobiography he recounted the story of trying to turn on Jack Kerouac and Arthur Koestler, only to be disappointed by their underwhelming reaction to the lsd experience.

Page 89 of Stambaugh.

The appearance and the real turned into the appearing doesn't get us out of the original desire, which Heidegger falls back on only in the later work. — Antony Nickles

For Heidegger, that which ‘appears’ is not an outside which shows itself to a self, an inside. In the first
place , Heidegger does not view Dasein from the vantage of a subject-object binary. If one instead speaks of self and world, then Dasein belongs to both poles. Specifically , the self is constantly changing creation. It exists in unveiling itself by projecting itself on a possibility. What it projects itself on is its world. So the self is its world as the possibility that it projects itself into. Put differently , the self is the tripartite structure of temporality as the past anticipating itself into the future.

“The phenomenological con­cept of phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings-its meaning, modifications, and derivatives. This self-showing is nothing arbitrary, nor is it something like an appearing. The being of beings can least of all be something "behind which" something else stands, something that "does not appear”.”

For me this ties in with the principle/law of identity: any identity we can be aware of is itself an eidos and, as such, is cognized by us to be a whole give that, most always if not always, can be abstracted as being constituted of parts, with each identifiable part then itself, again, being an eidos. — javra

This is indeed a different understanding of whole, part and their relation in comparison with Husserl’s phenomenological approach. Your method, which is consistent with much empirical thinking going back to Aristotle, assembles larger wholes out of parts which maintain their own identity as they are joined together to form larger totalitites. Thus, your notion of form, eidos, whole is linked to identity as persisting presence to self, substance and res extentia. Husserl and Heidegger unravel the concept of self-present identity.

Note: I wrote this before seeing Xtrix’s comment. It sounds like we’re on the same page.

It seems here it doesn't matter the way we conduct ourselves (or the ways there are to conduct ourselves) as long as we are aware (present). But I think we are in the weeds already when trying to pin down Being either as knowledge or source, etc. — Antony Nickles

Being means: presence.
— Joshs — Antony Nickles

In this quote, Heidegger is distinguishing between the traditional understanding of Being and Beyng. In the mid 1930’s he began using this term ‘Beyng’ to further differentiate Dasein from being as presence.

“beyng occurs essentially not as cause and never as ground.”

Awareness for Heidegger isnt presence , it’s transit, an absencing, precisely a not being present to oneself. It is thrownness.

“Thus thrown in this throw, man is a transition, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence. Man is history, or better, history is man. Man is enraptured in this transition and therefore essentially 'absent'. Absent in a fundamental sense-never simply at hand, but absent in his essence, in his essentially being away, removed into essential having been and future-essentially absencing and never at hand, yet existent in his essential absence. Transposed into the possible, he must constantly be mistaken concerning what is actual. And only because he is thus mistaken and transposed can he become seized by terror. And only where there is the perilousness of being seized by terror do we find the bliss of astonishment-being torn away in that wakeful manner that is the breath of all philosophizing.”

Derrida declared his indebtedness to Heidegger for inspiring his project of the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence.Early on in Being and Time Heidegger takes on the genealogical history of being as presence in Western philosophy.

“ Mathematical knowledge is regarded as the one way of apprehending beings which can always be certain of the secure possession of the being of the beings which it apprehends. Whatever has the kind of being adequate to the being accessible in mathematical knowledge is in the true sense. This being is what always is what it is. Thus what can be shown to have the character of constantly remaining, as remanens capax mutationem, constitutes the true being of beings which can be experienced in the world. What enduringly remains truly is. This is the sort of thing that mathematics knows. What mathematics makes accessible in beings constitutes their being. Thus the being of the "world" is, so to speak, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of being which is embedded in the concept of substantiality and in terms of an idea of knowledge which cognizes beings in this way. Descartes does not allow the kind of being of innerworldly beings to present itself, but rather prescribes to the world, so to speak, its "true" being on the basis of an idea of being (being = constant objective presence) the source of which has not been revealed and the justification of which has not been demonstrated. Thus it is not primarily his dependence upon a science, mathematics, which just happens to be especially esteemed, that determines his
ontology of the world, rather his ontology is determined by a basic ontological orientation toward being as constant objective presence, which mathematical knowledge is exceptionally well suited to grasp.* In this way Descartes explicitly switches over philosophically from the development of traditional ontology to modem mathematical physics and its transcendental
foundations.” (Being and Time)

Comparisons, differentiations, additions and subtractions are actions performed on already constituted formal objects
— Joshs

I want to call that out too. I think the qualification ‘formal’ is key here. Use of the qualifier ‘formal’ denotes this as a specifically philosophical expression. — Wayfarer

Not sure what you mean. How would you define a formal
object in Husserl’s sense?

There's a resemblance to Kant's 'synthesis', isn't there? — Wayfarer

Husserl from Philosophy of Arithmetic:


“Already Kant used the word "synthesis" (combination) in a double sense: first, in the sense of the unity of the parts of a whole, whether these parts are properties of a thing, parts of an extension, units in a number, and so on; second, in the sense of the mental activity (actus) of combining. Both significations are intimately related in Kant because, in his view, every whole, of whatever kind it may be, is developed from its parts by means of the spontaneous activity of the mind.

"Synthesis" therefore signifies simultaneously, for him, com­bining and the result of combination. That we presume to observe combinations in the phenomena themselves, and to extract them therefrom by means of abstraction: that is only an illusion. It is we ourselves who have furnished the combinations, and, of course, by means of the "pure concepts of the understanding," the categories.

“The theory of synthesis with which we have just become ac­quainted is untenable and is based upon essential misunderstand­ings. Kant failed to notice that many combinations of content are given to us where no trace of a synthesizing activity that produces connectedness of contents is to be found. Lange, again, pays no attention at all to those cases where composite representations owe their unity solely and only to synthesizing acts, while in the primary contents a combination is not present or does not come into consideration. According to him all combination is supposed to occur in the content, and of course in virtue of the form of space encompassing all content. This is false. The very concepts mul­tiplicity and number resist this view. The combination of the colligated contents in the multiplicity, and of the enumerated ones in the number, is not a spatial combination, just as little as it can be taken for a temporal one - and, we can immediately add, just as little as any other combination within primary contents.

…it also is to be emphasized that the entire underlying intuition, for Lange as for Kant - according to which a relational content is the result of an act of relating - is psychologically untenable.
Inner experience, and it alone is decisive here, shows nothing of such 'creative' processes. Our mental activity does not make the relations. They are simply there, and, given an appropriate direction of interest, they are just as noticeable as any other type of content. Strictly speaking, creative acts that produce some new content as a result distinct from them are psychological monstrosities.

Certainly one distinguishes in complete generality the relating mental activity from the relation itself (the comparing lfrom the similarity, etc.). But where one speaks of such a type of relating activity, one thereby understands either the grasping of the relational content or the interest that picks out the terms of the relation and embraces them, which is the indispensable precondition for the relations combining those contents becoming observable. But whatever is the case, one will never be able to maintain that the respective act creatively produces its content.

One may perhaps reply to us by pointing precisely to those synthetic acts which we have above verified in representations of number, and which, as we will yet see, are identical with our “collective" combinations. In their case it is indeed the act alone that is supposed to procure the combination. - In a certain sense this is quite correct. The combination of course subsists solely and only in the unifying act itself, and consequently the represen­tation of the combination also in the representation of the act. But there does not exist besides the act a relational content different
from the act itself, as its creative result, which the view we are attacking always presupposes.”


…it is clear that designation of numbers as purely mental creations of an inner intuition involves an exaggeration and a distortion of the true state of affairs. Numbers are mental creations insofar as they are results of activities which we exercise on concrete contents. But what these activities create are not new, absolute contents which could then be found again somewhere in space or in the "external world." Rather, they are peculiar, relational concepts, which can only be produced again and again, but which absolutely cannot be simply found somewhere already completed.”

the regularity would still exist even if we took our blinders off and the question would remain why the regularity persists. — litewave

The seemingly mathematically exact regularity would make way form a more complex pattern, What’s most valuable in the relation between the apple and gravity is that two previously unconnected phenomena were unified via an empirical explanation , not that a certain number (the gravitational constant ) resulted. In and of it self the constant, this ‘law of nature’ is not connected to anything. It is arbitrary. The most profound progress in science isn’t about arriving at arbitrary constants but showing the interconnectness of the world. As an example, a multiple universe hypothesis that makes the gravitational constant in this universe just one point in a spectrum of evolving universes, each with their own constants, changes the constant from an isolated and arbitrary number to part of an interconnected process of development. It could be that in a hundred years or so the physical laws have been replaced by a probabilistic , process -oriented physical model that puts unidirectional time at this core . We already are hints of this thinking with Lee Smolen and Ilya Prigogine.

So there are many kinds of models of regularities, and each has its drawbacks as well strengths. A strictly mathematical ‘lawfulness’ has as a drawback that everything that doesn’t fit into the model is rendered as chaos, randomness and chance. Prior to chaos theory, many physical behaviors were treated
that way ( cloud and smoke formations).

So if our sciences didn't do this, we would not experience the apple as falling down every time we drop it? — litewave

It’s not that the sciences are wrong, it’s that they operate with blinders on. So rather than just defining what is in front of me as this object moving in space according to a mathematical rule, we could embed this restrictive formulation within a much wider, richer and more interconnected experience that recognizes the contribution of my subjective schemes to what appears in front of me , and acknowledges the contribution of an intersubjectivity community of the construction of what we call ‘external’ reality.

It may be hard to see how this way of seeing improves physics , but it makes a profound difference to the social sciences and psychology, which have suffered under the rule of the methods of the hard sciences.

It is a spectrum of behaviour not a spectrum of gender. You don't change sex or gender by just being a man who is not violent — Andrew4Handel

You can change the gender -related behavior of animals with hormone replacement. This is an effect on the brain, not the sex parts or genes. Male mammals and birds behave differently than females. Have you ever owned a car or dog? Why’s isn’t this behavior a spectrum of gender?What is it that is at the very core of what we mean by gender, vaginas and penises or behaviors such as sexual attraction, masculinity and femininity? If I put you in a time machine and took you back to the womb , and then altered the hormonal environment to change your psychological gender , it wouldn’t change your biological
gender but every aspect of you style of interacting with your world would change in a gender -related way.

why do causal relations ("the constant conjunction between causes and effects", as Hume put it) persist in time? — litewave

Because our sciences substitute idealized abstractions for a more immediate and intricate experiencing of our world. The way we have carved up the world rigs the deck by forcing our experience into over-generalized channels such as objective causation and universal natural lawfulness. Then we mistake the peculiar constraints our models impose with the world itself.

If you’re arguing from the position that specific behavioral and affective dispositions are associated with biological gender, are you also making a distinction between chromosomal gender and biological gender? For instance, are there gay men who belong to the extreme effeminate end of a Kinsey behavioral scale and who consequently are likely to lack the aggressivity traits you are pointing to in trans women? If so , would you concede that there are intermediate psychological genders that the male/ female binary doesn’t capture?

I don't see logic as empirical in the sense of being 'dependent on experience' — Wayfarer

I see logic as innate to the structure of the mind, an innate capacity. In that sense, I'm sympathetic to the generally platonist view. — Wayfarer

Husserl wrote a book called Formal and Transcendental
Logic. In it he attempts to untangle centuries old
confusions concerning the origin and nature of formal logic.

“ Its naive presupposing of a world ranks logic among the positive sciences. We were saying above that logic, by its relation to a real world, presupposes not only a real world's being-in-itself but also the possibility, existing "in itself", of acquiring cognition of a world as genuine knowledge, genuine science, either empirically or a priori. This implies: Just as the realities belonging to the world are what they are, in and of themselves, so also they are substrates for truths that are valid in themselves — "truths in themselves"”.

logic or reason, the capacity to understand terms such as 'the same as', 'greater than', 'because', and so on - are based on the mind's ability to grasp the relations of ideas. Those abilities can't be explained in materialist terms. — Wayfarer

Husserl argues that the above terms are not irreducible primitives of mind but are in fact products of higher levels constructions based on interaction with a world. ‘The same as’, ‘ greater than’ and ‘because’ are no more innate, world independent capabilities than the understanding of causality is a Kantian category of mind. When he performs the transcendental reduction, every sense associated with interaction with real or ideal
objects , such as ‘same as’ and ‘greater than’ , vanishes along with these objects What remains as irreducible is the structure of intentionality , the appearing of something in consciousness as what it is in the particular mode of givenness by which I intend it. Intentionality is neither the province of the mind in itself nor that of the material world . It precedes both of these derivative and inadequate ideas. It is the inseparable mutually dependent relation between a subjective (egoic) and objective pole of the intentional act.

“ Experience is the performance in which for me, the experiencer, experienced being "is there", and is there as what it is, with the whole content and the mode of being that experience itself, by the performance going on in its intentionality, attributes to it.”

Comparisons, differentiations , additions and subtractions are actions performed on already constituted formal objects. But how is it that we are able to experience an object as a singular unit , separated out from a
multiplicity of which we deem it to belong , such that we can proceed to perform these feats of logic? Husserl’s fist published work , the philosophy of arithmetic, offers a fascinating genesis of such seemingly irreducible concepts as that of the discrete , self-persisting object from mix more basic acts , wherein there is as yet no concept of formal object.

For instance, according to Husserl, the basis of any sort of whole of independently apprehended parts(a whole in the pregnant sense) is the collective combination, which is an abstracting act of consciousness uniting parts.

“Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in order to be able to arise at all, collective combinations of partial phenomena. There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations (e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as unified. This 'psychical' relation is, thus, an indispensable psychological precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever.”(p.78)

He conducted these researches under a psychological rubric , leading to accusations of psychologism from Frege and others. Ten years later he understood his method to be phenomenological, correcting the impressions of psychologism without affecting the substance of his description of the constitution of totality. In Experience and Judgement, he conducts a similar investigation under the heading of apprehension of plurality.

In any such whole the parts are united in a specific manner. Fundamental to the genesis of almost all totalities is that its parts initially appear as a temporal succession.

“Succession in time constitutes an insuppressible psychological precondition for the formation of by far the most number concepts and concrete multiplicities - and practically all of the more complicated concepts in general.”(Phil of Arithmetic, p.29) “Almost all representations of multiplicities - and, in any case, all representations of numbers - are results of processes, are wholes originated gradually out of their elements. Insofar as this is so, each element bears in itself a different temporal determination.”(p.33) “Temporal succession forms the only common element in all cases of multiplicity, which therefore must constitute the foundation for the abstraction of that concept.”(p.30)

While the first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed” , the collective combination itself only emerges from a secondary act of consciousness. This higher order constituting sense changes what was originally a temporal succession into a simultaneity by ‘bringing' back ‘ the previous parts via reflecting on them in memory. Husserl says that a combination of objects is similar to the continuity of a tone. In both cases, a temporal succession is perceived through reflection as a simultaneity.

“For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of second order.”(p.77) “It is essential that the partial representations united in the representation of the multiplicity or number be present in our consciousness simultaneously [in an act of reflection].”(p.33)

the principles of logic are discovered, not invented; however the brain evolves, it has to conform to them, it doesn't produce them out of itself. — Wayfarer

I may have misunderstood you. I thought you were arguing that logic is grounded in a transcendent platonic category of mind. If you are saying instead that logic is an empirical endeavor( discovered rather than invented) then I agree. But then this is consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s account of the basis of mathematical logic in embodied interactions( not physical
causation but higher order intentionality).

Shirley, philosophers should be dismantling cultural myths, not mantling them, or encouraging psychiatrists to mantle them. — bongo fury

There are nothing but myths. To dismantle one is to erect another. Sometimes , for the purposes of certain discussions, it can be useful to offer an alternative myth to a particularly play-out one, even if the alternative being offered is not one’s own preferred myth. Translation: in engaging with someone who has no concept of psychological gender and its infinite possible varieties, it may be more productive to offer as alternative the concept of brain wired gender. Why? Because this particular myth presents the idea, absolutely foreign to the traditionalist about gender , that gender is a rich web of perceptual , cognitive and affective style of interaction and behavior rather than physical body parts.
Putting it in the form of ‘brain wiring’ is more likely to connect with traditionalistic ideas of gender as physical parts than leaping ahead to the more challenging postmodern myth.

Schuringa sees the challenges - or failing - of analytic philosophy as developing from its fained apolitical stance; the challenges come from those ignored political stances; feminism, critical race theory, decolonisation and so on. — Banno

While he’s at it , he may as well add analytic philosophy’s failure to address in a primordial way values, affectivity and the body.

. I don't think Hegel thought God was a person. Heidegger seems to share this agnosticism. — Gregory

I don’t see Heidegger as an agnostic. It seems to me that God is only a coherent concept if it implies the good, and the good is only coherent if it can be located as a a stably self-identical sense. But I don’t see that the good is any particular sense, feeling, meaning that continues to be itself over time for Heidegger. The basis of Being is difference , difference destroys the ability to locate the ‘good’ as a coherent notion whose meaning we can locate, and this makes the notion of god , whether as a person or force or energy or inner self , incoherent.

why do some - SOME - gay men act in ways a normal woman would never ever act?
I do not know... it looks exaggerated and utterly silly to me. And our behavior is something we can control - so if they are not out of control they must act it and play it. — Iris0

I suggest you tell these homosexual men you know who act effeminately that they look exaggerated and silly, and that you think they are deliberately acting this way. This is what I think they will tell you: They remember acting this way since early childhood, they believe they were born this way and have no control over these behaviors , and they are insulted and hurt that you think this is just a performance. This is what I think you don’t understand: masculinity, femininity and sexual attraction are strongly influenced by brain organization. You think you are attracted to men because you have a vagina, but your physical sexual parts have nothing to do with it. You are attracted to men in large part because of brain factors that you cannot control and were present from the moment you were born. These gender-related brain factors invoke much more than just who you are sexually attracted to , they shape the way you perceive your world , the way you walk and talk , you affective style.
If one were to alter this brain structuring in you while you slept, you would wake up astonished at how many of the things about you you thought you had complete control over were actually inborn.

have friends who are homosexuals - and not all who are gay have that sort of behavior --- women do not normally have that sort of acting. — Iris0

Do you mean lesbians do not normally act that way?
Why do some gays act that way?You never answered my question.

there has never in my life even been curiosity for that because the males are - entirely - attractive for me.
I was born like that and still am and will not change because there is no attraction in a female body for me. At all. — Iris0

Yes but why are you attracted to men but some
women are attracted to other women? Can the brain be ‘wired’ to produce same-sex attraction? Can the brain be wired to produce masculine or feminine behavior. Have you ever met a man who’s behavior , gestures, walk or way of talking sounded extremely feminine to you? Do you think this was a deliberate act , or is it possible that they were born this way and cannot help their behavior?

Women just got the right to vote in the US 101 years ago. And that was not the beginning — T Clark

That’s right. So what’s all this fuss about homosexuals demanding equal rights? People just aren’t ready for it. Oh, wait…

they are at the very depth of who we are it is more than just an identity it is the entire being we are — Iris0

Do you believe that your vagina makes you attracted to men rather than women , and makes you feel and act feminine? Or do you think this happens in the brain? I. other words, do you accept the concept of psychological gender , apart from physical gender?

It's taken decades, centuries to start changing the political and social status of women. Then this comes along and muddies the waters. — T Clark

Of course, this came along a while ago , with works like Butler’s Gender Trouble more than 30 years ago.

The world has seen what I think is an unprecedented technological boom starting in the 19th Century, but particularly escalating in the 1980s. — frank

A number of current economists argue that compared to the industrial revolution, the digital revolution has produced paltry results in terms od the raising of living standards and labor productivity.

https://dailynorthwestern.com/2016/02/09/campus/famed-northwestern-macroeconomist-robert-gordon-predicts-end-to-life-changing-innovation/

human societies that maximize individual satisfaction and empowerment will become stagnant. — frank

I don’t see how promoting individual satisfaction and empowerment is at odds with economic innovation. In fact I think they are inseparably linked.

a loss of a society's ability to marshall resources and labor toward a small number of goals. — frank

How do we as a society determine which goals are most worthy of focusing resources on? Isn’t that where an open marketplace of innovation is most important , to maximize the potential for the quirky and unnoticed genius to give us what we didn’t realize we needed, as Steven Jobs put it? And why is it necessary to make a choice? The U.S. has a long history of supporting individual empowerment( public university system) alongside investing in focused projects (transcontinental railroad, interstate highway system).

The key phrase is “beyng occurs essentially not as cause and never as ground.”

Heidegger on God:
GA 73.2: 991

2. Of Being

The lightest of the slight is beyng.

The most entity-like of entities is God.

In beyng, the distinction between beings and being (in the sense of beingness) comes into its own.

Being means: presence.

Seyn never lets itself be identified with God. It also always remains doubtful whether the proposition, God is the most being-like of beings, speaks of God according to divinity.
As the most being-like, God is the first cause and the last goal of all beings. God is represented as the most being-like of beings, and so God essentially occurs out of beyng. Nevertheless, God is not primordially linked to beyng; because beyng occurs essentially not as cause and never as ground.”

So the universe that our species evolved in is an advanced simulation running on some sort of "computer" in a "higher" reality.

What would you call that? — Count Timothy von Icarus

a) an episode of the Twilight Zone
b) Classic Cartesian thinking

One kind of property that minds have, that matter does not, is the subject of logic. Such principles as ‘the law of the excluded middle’, and by extension, many of the mental operations common to thought, abstraction and language, such as ‘like’, ‘not like’, ‘equal to’ and so on, are internal to the nature of thought - they are purely the relation of ideas — Wayfarer

They are idealized constructions derived from perceptual interaction with a world. They would. it be possible without our first having constructed the concept of a self-identical object. The construction of the object is dependent on our embodied interactions with our perceptual environment. Thus logic originates in embodied interactions between organism
and environment.

the self/mind is unknowable (although not in the way the 'new mysterians' mean it.) That's why I referred to the Bitbol paper, 'It is not known but it is the knower', — Wayfarer

But however unknowable to us the self/mind is , can we assume that it is constant in itself , unlike intentional objects which are contingent , relative and fleeting? Or is this self constantly change alongside objects of experience?

Being distances itself from itself in ways that create myriad, unique, fleeting perspectives from which to experience itself, and each person is one of these perspectives. — charles ferraro

If we correct the last line to read each person is all of these myriad perspectives , then it applies to numerous philosophies , starting with Nietzsche.