I think when he says "taking care of the world" he means love, plain and simple — Gregory

our most fundamental ability psychologically, ontologically, and spiritually is love. — Gregory

Heidegger isn’t talking g about love or any other particular sentiment but of the pre-condition for any sentiment , or experience, whatsoever.
Care is the pragmatic relational structure of relevance that holds between self and world at all times. We o lu experience anything in the extent to which it matters to us, is significant to us relative to our ongoing concerns.
Care is just as much about hate and indifference as it is about love. If you want to locate a primordial ‘affect’ underlying all others for Heidegger, it’s anxiety, not love.
Love as you mean it is an ‘ ontic’ concern, shears Care is an ontological theme. What’s the difference. The o rival level has to do with how I relate to specific objects in my world, including how I feel about them. The ontological perspective has to do with what makes possible the relation between self and world in general.

Heidegger in Zollikon seminars:

“ would Binswanger's "psychiatric Daseinanalysis" form a section of Heidegger's analytic of Dasein? But as Binswanger himself had to admit a few years ago, he misunderstood the analytic of Dasein, albeit by a "productive misunderstanding," as he calls it. You can see this from the fact that there is a "supplement" to Heidegger's "gloomy care" [diistere Sorge] in Binswanger's lengthy book on the fundamental forms of Dasein.t It is essentially a treatise on love, a topic that Heidegger has supposedly neglected.

What was Binswanger expressing in his endeavor to develop a supplement? What is lacking in reference to the thinking in Being and Time, when Binswanger attempts to make such a supplement? In Being and Time it is said that Da-sein is essentially an issue for itself. At the same time, this Da-sein is defined as originary being-with-one-another. Therefore, Da-sein is also always concerned with others. Thus, the analytic of Da-sein has nothing whatsoever to do with solipsism or subjectivism. But Binswanger's misunderstanding consists not so much of the fact that he wants to supplement "care" with love, but that he does not see that care has an existential, that is, ontological sense. Therefore, the analytic of Da-sein asks for Da-sein's basic ontological (existential) constitution [ Verfassung] and does not wish to give a mere description of the ontic phenomena of Da-sein. The all-determining projection of being human as ecstatic Da-sein is already ontological so that the idea of the human being as "subjectivity of consciousness" is overcome. This projection renders manifest the understanding of being as the basic constitution of Da-sein. It is necessary to look at it in order even to discuss the question of the relationship of the human being as existing to the being of beings (of the non-human being and of existing Da-sein itself). But this question is a result of the question of the meaning of being in general.”

There is no past. The present has passed but the pass does not exist. Existence is moving forward, — val p miranda

If thats the case how so we hear a piece of music as a unity? We would only know each present note but not the previous flow of notes that creates the mellody. This was a problem for the old model time as punctual now points. The solution, offers by William James, Husserl
and others , was that we experience the just past note in the present alongside the current note. It is not. past that is gone but a past simultaneous with the present , appearing alongside it in the same moment.

you don't need most of your body to be conscious. Therefore, embodied consciousness has to do with content. That's an issue far downstream from a basic theory of consciousness. — frank

You don’t need most of your brain to be conscious either. But I don’t think your argument has to do with how much of our body is necessary for consciousness but, correct me if I’m wrong , some kind of distinction that’s important to you between what the brain supposedly is and does, and what the body is and does. To you this thing called the brain has special properties that make consciousness possible, and the body doesn’t have these special properties.

This is where the enactivist argument is important. They follow Piaget in focusing on properties of self-organization in living organisms that link simple creatures without a brain with human consciousness. For them consciousness and cognition are just more complex emergent elaborations of the self-organizing character of all living things. Piaget begins with the organism functioning as a system of exchanges with its environment oriented toward certain goals , where it assimilates material into its processes and accommodates it’s organization to the particularities of those materials. Consciousness and cognition are just internalized symbolic forms of this goal-oriented system
of material exchanges with an environment.. That’s why Evan Thompson can refer to the behavior of single celled organisms as a form of cognition. In a sense, everything that is interesting about consciousness ; motivation and goal orientedness , integration of information, memory and affect , is already present in the simplest organisms without brains.
I think this is the real import of the word ‘embodiment’ It doesn’t just refer to anatomical parts outside of the brain, but a way of understanding the organization of cognition and its relation to the organization of living systems in general. I’d go so far as to say that there is no magical point where consciousness emerges from non-consciousness in evolutionary history. There are just different degrees of consciousness. Proto-sensation is present in all living systems.

The things that are clearly innervated, like your mouth (there are three big fat nerves keeping watch there), don't appear to be necessary for consciousness. You don't need a mouth to enjoy Beethoven. You don't need your digestive track. We can put the right chemicals straight into your blood.

You don't need a heart or lungs. We can bypass those with machinery and you can remain wide awake. — frank

You may be missing the point. It’s not a question of what’s necessary for the very existence of consciousness, but of how feedback from nerves in the mouth or the other organs contribute to the particular way in which consciousness functions. You can keep a heart alive outside of the body , but not without changing its functioning significantly. The heart will never function exactly the same way it did when it was part of the body, no matter how many apparatuses you hook it up to, and especially if you transplant it into a different body. What if we transplanted a brain to it a new body? Would this profoundly alter conscious experience : what we think and how we think and feel? It would certainly have an effect , but a minor one , because the brain is essentially most of what the body is in terms of functional complexity, not just in terms of number of neurons but what the neurons do, how intricately they interact with each other.

The functioning body , and consciousness itself , is not the result of a a concatenation of essential and inessential anatomical parts. The lungs, heart and all other organs make no sense understood in isolation from the functioning of the organism as a whole to which they contribute. Certainly you can eliminate subprocesses or individual organs. Depending on their contribution to the total functioning of the body-mind-environment system their absence will have a minor or or major effect on the whole functioning , including consciousness. We can remove a lung or a kidney with only minor impact, but not both without replacing their function somehow. We can destroy individual neurons with imperceptible effect, but with enough destruction eventually the impact will be significant. Notice that when damage to any organ is severe enough, the effects on the body are systematic, potentially affecting metabolism, concentration, appetite , balance, etc, since these are intercorrelated. That’s because the function of every organ system takes into account every other aspect of the organism’s functioning, and is designed for the sake of the whole.
. In theory , a biologist could deduce all of the functional properties of an organism from just its heart or liver, such as the size of the animal, it’s environment , diet, form of mobility, etc. But the part would only tell you all this if you already knew the relationship between it and all of these other aspects of an animal’s body-environment functioning, that it is a functioning whole that we can artificially separate into parts ina second step , rather than it being an assembly of parts that exist as parts first and only later belong to the totality. We can treat machines this way , like an auto engine , but even here, we didn’t begin with isolated parts later brought together. The original conception began from a functional whole and derived the parts from
the whole.



I’m not arguing that the organism is an undifferentiated whole. Of course there are differentiated subsystems. The brain cannot pump the blood , the lungs cant think, the liver cannot hear. But alterations to any of these processes ( circulatory blockage, liver toxicity , renal failure, copd, Alzheimer’s) changes the functioning of all the other processes in some fashion, including consciousness.
As far as the brain not being able to feel itself , the sensations from the receptors cannot be consciously felt in isolation from other brain contributions no matter how healthy they are , because conscious feeling is not simply receptor stimulation but a complex
, differentiated process of perception, most of which takes place far away from the sensory source. This is also the reason for phantom limb syndrome , the real feeling of sensation arising from an amputated limb. The receptors are no longer three , but the brain processes of sensory perception are still active.

In sum, we can’t treat organ systems and other subprocesses of the body as interchangeable , but neither can we understand what they are in themselves without understanding what they do, and we cannot understand what they do without knowing how they interact in reciprocal fashion with all other systems of the body for the sake of a total functionally unified system. And this total body system cannot be understood without knowing how it forms a body-environment process. You remove the environment for which it was designed and is continually being shaped and you fail to understand the body.

It's not any sort of presupposition. It's anatomy. — frank

What is the anatomy of a sensation, a perception, a memory, an affect? What are the anatomical
boundaries of the body? Does the body end with the skin, the hair? Or does it extend into the environment? Is the air part of the lungs?

When you say "embodied" what part of the body are you talking about? — frank

Admittedly, embodiment is an amorphous concept, and has been used in a wide variety of often incommensurable ways by different writers. The approaches that I am most interested in argue that we cannot treat the brain as though it exists in a vat. That is what the original information processing approaches to cognition do. They take the brain as a symbolic computation device modeled after the computer. Affectivity is treated as separate and secondary from cognition and perception, and perception is treated independently of the subject’s movements and physical interaction with objects. In opposition to this thinking , enactivist perspectives do not split the brain off from the body and the environment. All three are iinseparably entangled in each other. Affect, the body and interactive movement are considered as intrinsic to perception and cognition. In this way the brain is ‘embodied’ in a body and embedded in its environment.
In short , we have a single brain-body-world system which functions as an integrated whole. Focusing on anatomy apart from function or isolating ‘sensation’ from perceptual interpretation is artificial and an attempt to separate what is inseparable.

The stuff you can't do without isn't sensory innervated.

A fair amount of the stuff that is sensory innervated can be lost without any significant change in consciousness. — frank

And underlying ‘sensory innervation’ is what sort of set of pre-suppositions? That the brain constructs representations out of raw sense data that come from an outside existing entirely independently of the subject, but can never be directly accessed as what it is in itself?

“ In advance, as though this were obviously correct, one misinterprets conscious life as a complex of data of "external' and (at best) "internal sensuousness"; then one lets form-qualities take care of combining such data into wholes. To get rid of "atomism", one adds the theory that the forms or configurations are founded on these data necessarily and the wholes are therefore prior in themselves to the parts. But, when descriptive theory of consciousness begins radically, it has before it no such data and wholes, except perhaps as prejudices."

“Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world about which I have always had ideas and spoken about meaningfully, has meaning and is accepted as valid by me because of my own apperceptive performances because of these experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those performances—as well as other functions of consciousness, such as thinking. But is it not a piece of foolishness to suppose that world has being because of some performance of mine? Clearly, I must make my formulation more precise. In my Ego there is formed, from out of the proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my “representation of the world, ” my “picture of the world, ” whereas outside of me, naturally enough, there is the world itself. But is this really a good way of putting it? Does this talk about outer and inner, if it makes any sense at all, receive its meaning from anywhere else than from my formation and my preservation of meaning? Should I forget that the totality of everything that I can ever think of as in being resides within the universal realm of consciousness, within my realm, that of the Ego, and indeed within what is for me real or possible?” (Husserl, Phenomenology and Anthropology)

There are limits to the computer metaphor for modeling brain processes. It sounds like you’re summarizing the representational computational view of brain functioning, which is consistent with neo-Kantian philosophy. I prefer approaches which jettison computationalism in favor of relational embodied ideas. These draw their inspiration from phenomenology.

From a paper I wrote:

“psychological processes unavailable to explicit consciousness are nevertheless implied by and belong to it (and vice-versa), not in the sense of a content that arbitrarily contributes to awareness in the manner of interactions between independent regions, but as an integral bodily background intrinsic to, but not directly articulated in, each moment of awareness. In this view, the ‘hidden hand' of the unconscious conditions awareness not as a separate outside, but rather exceeds conscious control from within each experienced event, as the hidden hand of integral background context (intra-noetic rather than pre-noetic). Gendlin(2000) puts it this way;

“The puzzle about the body knowing our decisions before we consciously know them might make us miss the fact that there is an inwardly experienced body, and that the reflective and bodily-sentient person is much wider than conscious control”(p.110).

It’s not a question of conscious vs unconscious but explicit vs implicit consciousness. What is implicit isn’t
hidden from consciousness but unarticulated background , which is why even though we are not paying attention to all our body movements or perceptions of the vehicle when driving ( except as a beginner) , such implicit awareness can come immediately to the fore if a problem with the car arises.

Hmm, by “truth filtering” I was referring to forsaking certain truths that don’t cohere into one’s system of explanation in favor of those truths that do. — javra

But if one’s system of explanation functions as a unity, like a scientific paradigm , then it wouldn’t be a question of seeing certain truths and then making a decision to foresake them , but of not having a coherent glimpse of them in the first place. Kuhn said that events that fall
outside of the scope of a paradigm are not experienced as evidence.

To the latter, teleology is bogus, fictional, illusory, and so forth, even though they have goals in mind in so conceiving. — javra

I would say that what is meant by teleology isn’t properly grasped in the first place by the group rejecting it, because they have no framework in which to make it coherent.

Things outside this worldview are 'entirely invisible' to me. Well, some are and some are not. Some are shadows and shapes — Tom Storm

It’s an interesting issue. Negative emotions like fear, threat and anger mark our response to events that we are not able to comfortably assimilate into our existing worldview. In other words, ideas and ways of being that are just beyond the frontiers of our thinking, which represent opportunities for personal growth , are precisely what we instinctively flee from. We can’t just force ourselves to embrace such unassimilables, at least not without some way to make what appears incoherent understandable. Otherwise personal chaos results. The best one can do is to believe in principle that there are many equally valid ways of construing situations , and to approach what appears threatening in a piecemeal fashion.

Often the matter of truth does not seem to be quite clearly distinguishable from the matter of taste. — spirit-salamander

Nietzsche would suggest that’s because there is nothing to distinguish. Truth is nothing but valuation masquerading as a universal.

if philosophy is to be a logical enterprise then philosophy can just as easily act to correct tendencies to be governed by our guts. — magritte

The last thing philosophy needs to be is a ‘logical enterprise’. That would divest it of everything meaningful it could say about the world.

And here various truths are filtered in favor of maintaining the system of explanation that most assists oneself in making sense of existence. Thereby, that system of explanations which best helps one to live. I’m by no means any exception to this bias. — javra

Are you saying there is an alternative to this ‘bias’? If sense-making is a bias , what is the alternative to sense-making?

If there were to be a theory of everything in philosophy, it would need to explain everything to a t: both real and fictional, both metaphysical and physical, and so on. Thereby holding complete explanatory power for everything - for that which our own temperaments value as well as that which we find no great value in, though it be valuable to others. — javra

I thought that every comprehensive philosophy in history, from Plato through Kant and Heidegger, did just that, explaining everything to a t. As Heidegger and Nietzsche would argue, all forms of understandings are value systems. A value system isn’t based on ephemeral ‘temperament’ , but represents a qualitative gestalt that organizes all the details of our experience in a meaningful way. There is no such thing as a value-independent fact.
The reason that theories of everything end up getting replaced is that ‘the ‘ everything’ they are describing isn’t a static set of facts but is constantly evolving, because we are a part of this everything and are constantly evolving

ut to Banno's point - this ain't a brilliant thing for the philosophical enterprise if accurate.

If true, it raises follow up questions - can this be overcome or dealt with in some way? How is it identified?

Can we make an effort to read and understand thinkers we are not drawn to? What should matter is the quality of the content, not whether it appeals, but I guess it could be argued that even our ability to sit with some ideas and not with others may rest with personal taste. — Tom Storm

You’re missing the very essence of understanding. You’re mistaking the pre-condition for comprehending anything with some sort of flaw, which is the point Nietzsche is trying to make. But you’re not alone here. There are never ending laments on this site about ‘prejudice’, ‘bias, the appeal of ‘emotion ‘ over objectivity. What you’re calling ‘personal taste’ is the result of the fact that the understanding of anything new must be based on compatibility with a pre-existing frame of reference. What makes us drawn to certain thing s over others is our ability to relate to them, to find them relevant and significant to our concerns. Something appeals to us because it matters to us, and it matters to us because it is comprehensible and meaningful in relation to how we see the world. Things and events completely outside of our worldview not only don’t matter to us, they are entirely invisible to us. This isn’t something unique to philosophy, it’s how scientific knowledge functions as well, which is what Kuhn was getting at.

Colonization by China is another possibility if Western economies decline. — Apollodorus

I’m not talking about a declining economy. I’m talking g about the paradoxical , contentious proposition of an increasingly roboticized and thriving economy run by progressively fewer people.

Not decline, intellectual stagnation. No one is moving on from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger or Derrida . Instead, the
leading edge of philosophical thought is regurgitating ideas from 140 years ago ( James, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard) and that passes for ‘new’ thinking. Since philosophy is the crystal ball pointing to the future of other cultural modalities we see the same stagnation in literature, music, the visual arts , film and dance, political theory. Lots of activity and passion but mostly centered around recycled ideas( news flash: physics is no longer the queen of the sciences). Why is this happening? One can point to slowing birth rates, especially among progressives, and an aging population. When life expectancy was only 55 years and there was an explosive birth rate in the West a rapid transformation of ideas took place from generation to generation.

I suspect populations will noticeably shrink over the next decades , which is a good thing. I think not only will economies survive this but in the long run it will allow them to thrive. We’re simply not going to need the numbers of workers we have now. But I think this trend is already impacting intellectual culture. Going forward I don’t think we will see the creative movements in the arts and theoretical fields we have been accustomed to in previous eras. Instead it will just be a tiny handful of individuals scattered around academic departments around the world. Meahwhile, rest of the culture will accelerate the current trend toward a lowest common denominator, with more and more derivative and bland product in the arts and ideas.

A perception is illusory to the degree that its reality does not match its appearance — hypericin

Its reality does not match its appearance because its reality IS its appearance, and the hallucination here is the belief that there is a reality separate from the subjective appearance of the world to an individual, and the intersubjective coordination of appearances within a language community.
A perception can be deemed illusory if a subsequent perception does not validate what has been anticipated based on a previous perception , but this invalidation takes place relative to the subject’s own prior experience , not in comparison to some presumed Cartesian ‘real’ world entirely independent of the subject.

So, you are correct that Meta-physics is a legitimate science of Possibilities and Probabilities -- things that "are not", but "could be — Gnomon

I am more familiar with Kant than with Plato. Would you agree that for Kant the the physical exists but is unknowable in itself , the mental exists in itself but is empty without sensations from the world ('concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind‘). So Kant’s metaphysics shows us that the physical is an ideal , not an actuality. It is an ideal in a different sense than the mathematical concept of zero, yet still an ideal. Therefore his metaphysics is showing us that ‘what is’ ( both as fantasized concept and as physical ) is the product of an indissociable interaction between external reality in itself and subjective mental process.

Meta-physics is the science of "what can't be — Gnomon

I thought metaphysics was the science of the conditions of possibility of ‘what can be’. As such it includes within itself things and concepts.

I think Hume's account of causality is self-refuting: — Noisy Calf

Any philosophical approach that utilizes a notion of refutation courts skepticism.

what does "fiction" mean in " kinds of useful fictions" - not true? — Banno

It means true in the context of a contingent and relative value system.

Why shouldn't the world that is relevant to us – be a fiction? And if someone asks: “But doesn't fiction belong with an author?” – couldn't we shoot back: “Why? Doesn't this ‘belonging' belong, perhaps, to fiction as well? Aren't we allowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers rise above the belief in grammar? With all due respect to governesses, isn't it about time philosophy renounced governess-beliefs?” – The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (1901/1967 Will to Power) — Joshs

I don't doubt the cat's on the mat, or that gravity doesn't apply the next county over, but as I move from the set of things certain toward the Great Uncertain, I arrive at some point that is somewhere in the middle. — csalisbury

What does it mean to say that the above are ‘certain’ , that they correspond to a subject independent reality? Is that how you are reading Nietzsche?

There isn't any contradiction (though, yes, there is when Nietzsche is too casually cited as a cheat-code for Pure Relativism — csalisbury

If Nietzsche argues for the notion of truth as contingent and relative to continually changing values systems , is that a form of ‘pure relativism’? Or is it a relativism of temporary stabilities?

“The belief in “immediate certainties” is a moral naivete that does credit to us philosophers: but – we should stop being “merely moral,” for once! Aside from morality, the belief in immediate certainties is a stupidity that does us little credit! … It is no more than a moral prejudice that the truth is worth more than appearance; in fact, it is the world's most poorly proven assumption. Let us admit this much: that life could not exist except on the basis of perspectival valuations and appearances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and inanity of many philosophers, someone wanted to completely abolish the “world of appearances,” – well, assuming you could do that, – at least there would not be any of your “truth” left either! Actually, why do we even assume that “true” and “false” are intrinsically opposed? Isn't it enough to assume that there are levels of appearance and, as it were, lighter and darker shades and tones of appearance – different valeurs, to use the language of painters? Why shouldn't the world that is relevant to us – be a fiction? And if someone asks: “But doesn't fiction belong with an author?” – couldn't we shoot back: “Why? Doesn't this ‘belonging' belong, perhaps, to fiction as well? Aren't we allowed to be a bit ironic with the subject, as we are with the predicate and object? Shouldn't philosophers rise above the belief in grammar? With all due respect to governesses, isn't it about time philosophy renounced governess-beliefs?” – The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (1901/1967 Will to Power)

Really? Is that true? — Banno

True as in conforming to an unchanging standard or true as in describing and embodying an irreducible
complicity between appearance and transformation?

Useful fiction=metaphor — frank

It certainly does

So, it is not my intention to say that we can distinguish between the real and personal, the process of narration blends them together so well that although it is surely true that these two components are what is being blended together, once they have been blended, it not a simple matter to undo what has been done, or to even recognise what has been done. — Judaka

Can’t we just agree with Nietzsche that the ‘real’ and the ‘true’ are themselves only kinds of useful fictions?

In ‘ Human Immortality: two supposed objections to the doctrine’, William James offered a creative ‘empirical’ hypothesis concerning the possibility of life beyond death.

“It is true that all this would seem to have affinities rather with preëxistence and with possible re-incarnations than
with the Christian notion of immortality. But my concern in the lecture was not to discuss immortality in general.
It was confined to showing it to be not incompatible with the brain-function theory of our present mundane
consciousness. I hold that it is so compatible, and compatible moreover in fully individualized form. The reader would be in accord with everything that the text of my lecture intended to say, were he to assert that every
memory and affection of his present life is to be preserved, and that he shall never in sæcula sæculorum cease to be able to say to himself: "I am the same personal being who in old times upon the earth had those
experiences.”

https://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/JamesHumanImmortalityTwoObjections1898.pdf

Gödel was trying to find a way to make a line in between what can be known and what can not — Gregory

According to Roger Penrose Godel was a “very strong”mathematical platonist, so even if proof leads to an infinite regress, you can read Godol’s theorem as perfectly compatible with an absolute god-given grounding for. math.

Reality exists independent of us. We have no way to perceive the majority of things around us — Don Kotlos

I’m going to self-plagiarize here and re-post a comment from an earlier thread.

Here’s Husserl’s critique of representationalism, the idea that reality exists independent of us:

Representationalism notoriously courts scepticism: Why should awareness of one thing (an inner object) enable awareness of a quite different thing (an external object), and how can we ever know that what is internally accessible actually corresponds to something external? On Husserl's anti-representationalist view, however, the fit and link between mind and world – between perception and reality – isn't merely external or coincidental: “consciousness (mental process) and real being are anything but coordinate kinds of being, which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become ‘related to' or ‘connected with' one another” (Husserl 1982: 111

“For Husserl, physical nature makes itself known in what appears perceptually. The very idea of defining the really real reality as the unknown cause of our experience, and to suggest that the investigated object is a mere sign of a distinct hidden object whose real nature must remain unknown and which can never be apprehended according to its own determinations, is for Husserl nothing but a piece of mythologizing (Husserl 1982: 122). Rather than defining objective reality as what is there in itself, rather than distinguishing how things are for us from how they are simpliciter in order then to insist that
the investigation of the latter is the truly important one, Husserl urges us to face up to the fact that our
access to as well as the very nature of objectivity necessarily involves both subjectivity and
intersubjectivity. Indeed, rather than being the antipode of objectivity, rather than constituting an obstacle and hindrance to scientific knowledge, (inter)subjectivity is for Husserl a necessary enabling condition. “

My point isn’t that bias exists as the opposite of impartiality but that the dichotomy bias-impartiality is incoherent. It is not that pure lack of bias is an unattainable ideal , but that truth as correspondence with a fixed external reality is an inadequate philosophical position.

I think PC and woke ideas are new or rehashed biases. — Andrew4Handel

Give me an example of a position or feature of philosophy that is not a bias of some sort or other.

A theory that explains everything explains nothing.
— Karl Popper (Philosopher Of Science) — TheMadFool

As the good Kantian that he was , Im sure all we’d need to do to please Popper is adjust the TOE so that it acknowledges we can never reach the thing in itself, and instead aim to approximate absolute truth as asymptotic limit via progressive falsification.

It leaves me wondering if it will get to the point where philosophy is seen as an appendix of knowledge, especially that which is developed in science.

My idea of a deadend is like a cul de sac, or point in a maze, where there is no way out, or no obvious way forward. It is equal to coming to stagnation, or a standstill. — Jack Cummins

From my vantage , the opposite is the case. It is the sciences that are in a kind of stagnation relative to philosophy, especially the physical sciences that are beguile so many on this forum as the ultimate authority on questions such as the nature of time and reality. The enslavement of physics to metaphysical, or at least empirical , realism keeps it frozen in late 19th century philosophical territory. The most promising developments in the sciences are coming from scholars who are being inspired by recent philosophy ( ‘ recent’ meaning beginning more than 100 years ago ) .

The nervous system does not allow us to perceive reality. It tries to reconstruct the part of reality that is important for its survival. A tiny fraction that is. — Don Kotlos

Sure it does. Reality is what appears to awareness as it appears to awareness. Reality isn’t a thing in itself out there that we try and ‘fit’ our representations to. It is the interaction itself between organism and environment.
Francisco Varela and other researchers integrating enactive cognitive neuroscience with phenomenology have embraced dynamical systems models of time perception which emphasize the interactive no -linear element over the linear computational representationalist approach of classical cognitive science.

Varela writes:”In fact, we have inherited from classical physics a notion of time as an arrow of infinitesimal moments, which flows in a constant stream. It is based on sequences of finite or infinitesimal elements, which are even reversible for a large part of physics. This view of time is entirely homologous to that developed by the modern theory of computation. […] This strict adherence to a computational scheme will be, in fact, one of the research frameworks that needs to be abandoned as a result of the neuro-phenomenological examination proposed here” ( The specious present: a neurophenomenology of time consciousness p. 112)
The traditional sequentialistic idea is anchored in a framework in which the computer metaphor is central, with its associated idea that information flows up-stream . Here, in contrast, I emphasize a strong dominance of dynamical network properties where sequentiality is replaced by reciprocal determination and relaxation time.”

Check out the following link. It introduces Husserl’s phenomecological model of time consciousness and integrates it with neuroscientific research.

https://fdocuments.in/document/the-specious-present-a-neurophenomenology-of-time-the-specious-present

sentiment appears to have no place in philosophy, as well as personal bias.
Knowledge does not equate to preferences or sentiment. — Andrew4Handel

You appear to believe that the striving for absence of bias is the ‘correct’ role of philosophy. Others will suggest that this view is just one among competing notions of what philosophy is about. A substantial community of philosophers today rejects the idea that there could be such a thing as an unbiased perspective , or that such a goal was even desirable. From their vantage your aim is what they call a god’s eye view, or a view from nowhere. It seems to me that you’re taking notice of these truth relativists now that ‘wokism’ is spreading such ideas to the general public like never before. ‘Wokism’ is a big category, including on it’s conservative flank believers in moral absolutes and on its liberal fringe those who completely abandon notions of absolute moral and empirical truth. What all points on the wokism spectrum have in common is the belief that implicit bias can never be eliminated, which likely conflicts with your view. Not only does it likely conflict , but the ‘wokists’ will push hard to expose your view as ‘oppressive’.

Would you class nietzsche and dostoevsky as phenomenologists? — Zenny

Neither of these are phenomenologists in Husserl’s
sense.

I don’t think he actually changed his mind. His intent all along was to found an absolute grounding in subjectivity for science , logic and math, not an empirical one. This is in the best tradition of continental philosophy: dig deep down beneath the assumptions of math and science to those truths that are indubitably true for all, everywhere, at all times. This is something that Nietzsche tried to do, but not Freud. That for me is the difference between psychology and philosophy. The former is a conventionalized, conservative derivative of the latter.

Psychologism is the view that all true knowledge comes from feelings of certainty rather than "objective" truths independent of subjectivity. — Zenny

Psychologism, in the pejorative sense in which it was used to critique Husserl’s work, for instance, refers to a confusion of contingent and relative empirical facts with an a priori grounding. Husserl made claims for the origin of arithmetic in mental processes which were universal and ‘apodictic’, which was read by critics as an attempt to make contingent empirical psychological processes absolute and certain. He later changed his ‘psychological’ grounding of mathematics to a transcendental grounding, so that his model could not be misinterpreted as psychologistic.

Does not every object of experience I encounter in the world that surrounds me, from the most simple to the most complex, have something inherently "mysterious" about it that has nothing to do with me or my ways of trying to describe, explain, or getting to know it; something that goes beyond, and will always transcend, whatever kinds of simple or complex interpretations I might give to it, or any ways I might claim to participate, epistemologically, in its partial or complete creation (e.g., Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel)? — charles ferraro

Absolutely. But experiences can be utterly novel in one sense and yet be recognizable as similar to what one has known. A new experience can belong to a prior theme and at the same time subtly redefine that theme. Events can surprise us and yet be identifiable.

Husserl actually began in vol. 1 of Logical Investigations as a "realist" or even as an "objectivist". — waarala

Husserl may have changed his terminology over the years but I don’t believe he ever treated reality as mind-independent.

Is there instead in each case only what appears to me in the mode in which it appears to me and nothing behind it, no thing-in-itself?
— Joshs

No, I think the relational nature of the universe would exclude such a view (epistemic solipsism). There is a thing in itself, but we have no direct access to it, needing to conceptually construct the thing in terms of the information we have about it ( idealism ). We get closer and closer to the thing in itself but can never have perfect understanding, perhaps because the thing in itself is an evolving process, as are we. — Pop

That’s pretty much the default position on this site , but it isnt the view of phenomenology or post-structuralism.
Their position isn’t epistemical solipsism, since the subject cannot simply imagine any reality they want and have it be pragmatically useful to them. Some construalsare more ‘valid’ than others, because the world which is in inseparable interaction with us imposes affordances and constraints, but those affordances and constraints are reciprocally shaped and transformed by our construals. These are the ‘things in themselves’ but only as appearances which become new ‘things in themselves’ as my experience changes.

If you want to say that the thing in itself is an evolving process that co-evolves with us in inextricable fashion , then I would agree.

In the process of integrating external information, and conceiving a world view ( status quo ), it also adjusts and aligns a self in relation to that information. — charles ferraro

This is just one side of the equation. The environmental ‘information’ is reciprocally adjusted and aligned in relation to the normative aims of self-organization. Making it a one way street in which only the organism adapts to environment is the neo- Kantian realist move.

You might find this comparison of the phenomenological position with representationalism interesting:

https://www.academia.edu/34265366/Brain_Mind_World_Predictive_coding_neo_Kantianism_and_transcendental_idealism

Are you in agreement with Putnam and Husserl, re: the representational human cognitive system, or are you using them just as some informational response to the OP? — Mww

I am in agreement with them. I was too lazy to write my own response.

Our minds are not able to create the existence of a naturally occurring objective fact, but our minds are able to interpret, in a variety of ways, the meaning of the existence and nature of a naturally occurring objective fact. — charles ferraro

A ‘naturally occurring objective fact’ implies certain consequences, properties and relations, and all of these only make sense i relation to a body that interacts with them. Put differently, it is impossible to think about a so-called objective fact about nature without that fact implying and specifying systems of interactions between us and the object. That in fact is what an ‘object’ is , a system of correlated interactions between us and it, both actual and anticipated. When we change our thinking about the object, we are producing a new system of actual and anticipated interactions. To say that it ‘exists’ independently of us is to say nothing at all.

“To be objective, the interpretationist points out, one would have to have some set of mind-independent objects to be designated by language or known by science. But can we find any such objects? Let us look at an extended example from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.

A point in space seems to be perfectly objective. But how are we to define the points of our everyday world? Points can be taken either as primitive elements, as intersecting lines, as certain triples of intersecting planes, or as certain classes of nesting volumes. These definitions are equally adequate, and yet they are incompatible: what a point is will vary with each form of description. For example, only in the first "version," to use Goodman's term, will a point be a primitive element. The objectivist, however, demands, "What are points really?" Goodman's response to this demand is worth quoting at length:

If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.”

Francisco Varela, Embodied Mind