What this indicates is that a very slight, unforeseen change, in the very near future will render any long term model which does not account for it, completely useless. — Metaphysician Undercover
From my POV, it's on you to distinguish this 'limit' from a mere nothingness, a mere 'I think' tag that's added to every fact. — Pie
This is another problem with Descartes. Why is it 'I' think rather than 'we' think or 'it' thinks ? — Pie
To me, he destroys the theory that meaning is private (to name just one result.) I just happen to be interested in clarifying what it means to mean something, how we do and how we ought to settle beliefs, etc. The 'big' insight for me was something like the intrinsic publicity of meaning, what it means to be 'in' a language with others, the way that very notion of the 'I' is a token caught up in a public, worldly 'game.' I think the realization starts around Hegel, and its enemy or the superstition it opposes is the ghost story criticized by Ryle (and the later Wittgenstein.) — Pie
As Witt said, Everything is circumscribed by the subject.
— Tate
Respectfully, that's just about antithetical to the way I understand Wittgenstein. — Pie
The next few remarks show the poverty of the subject/object distinction. — Banno
Consider also that my primary target is epistemological solipsism, so this is a bit of tangent (not without its fun, to be sure.) — Pie
It's also seemingly incoherent for a self without a world (typically with others) to be able to be right or wrong in the first place. What can that even mean ?) — Pie
This 'one' is implicitly universal. A rational person ought to recognize that the existence of something other than the mind (like other minds) cannot be certainty established.
In other words, the epistemological solipsist claims that it's wrong to assume that there's something one can be wrong about. — Pie
You keep mentioning externalism, but that's not quite it (and not my word.) — Pie
I contend that the epistemological solipsist makes a claim about community norms, invoking that which transcends him in order to deny it. — Pie
To whom ? Himself ? For what else is there ? To what norms could he refer ? About what world could he be wrong or right ? You basically put a world in a vat, pretend a community shares a language, but make that community a mirage at the end. — Pie
Consider the difference between 'I'm not sure if I'm dreaming right now' and 'we ought not assume that we're not dreaming.' The second is a claim about norms that apply to all rational agents. — Pie
Privacy' is a public concept, else you could not make a point about it (could not be right or wrong.) I don't claim that privacy is illusion, just to be clear. It has a use in our language ('don't make private phone calls on company time.') — Pie
On the 'I' or 'me' issue, do you not recall our previous conversation ? The self does indeed play an important role. You and I as individuals are 'tracked' and evaluated for logical consistency, for instance. I am responsible for defending the implications of my claims but not yours. We both ought to keep our story straight, not call the same thing white and black, public and private, etc. — Pie
So 'private' would get its meaning from the inferences involving it that we (in an ideal sense, a community making its own new rules in terms of the old) license and forbid — Pie
But consider, sir, you are reasoning with me. Am I bound to regard your logic ? If so, why ? And do I not (mostly) understand your words ? I agree that 'sociality' is caught in a network of differences. Is this not a claim about norms for concept application that apply to both of us ? Was it not inferred implicitly through the examples you offered of North and South ? — Pie
Fair enough, but I'd argue that it's incoherent to deny the sociality of reason. To be sure, the details are endlessly debatable, but it's absurd to deny the debate within the debate, no? — Pie
It'll help me if you spell out your general view. — Pie
My position is that we are radically primordially social, that 'I' is a token in a game that transcends the meat it's applied to. — Pie
Wait a minute. Are we on the same page ?
Anyone who makes claims about our world-in-common (such as what's in it or claiming 'it's all water' ) presumably aims at getting something right about it. — Pie
I confess that it's a toy issue, but I maintain that solipsism, asserted philosophical/rationally, is incoherent. — Pie
The solipsist claims that it's wrong to think there's something we can be wrong about. — Pie
A 'self' (to put it playfully) is something like a set of claims that ought to cohere. — Pie
To me the point is roughly that the self and the other are comanufactured — Pie
I think the challenge is to disprove it to oneself.
— Tate
As Pie pointed out earlier, a proof is supposed to bind everyone, not just oneself. A proof that only you accept is perhaps a faith... — Banno
Yes, the other is constructed, by juxtaposing it to the self; As the old song goes, This I tell you, brother...
If all there is, is self, then there is no other, and hence no self. — Banno
Insofar as "self" is a binary concept: if there are not any others for the solipsist, then there isn't even a/the/"him" self to talk to. — 180 Proof
This assumes he doesn't talk to himself. Why would you think that?
— Tate
Then all he has done is to decide by fiat that I am a part of his self; such a solipsism loses any differentiation. — Banno
The idea is to understand the meaning of concepts primarily through the way we offer and demand reasons, — Pie
your responding to my posts, for example, shows your rejection of solipsism. — Banno
:cool:Instead of the content of a concept providing an independent guide or rule that governs which inferences are appropriate, it is the actual practices of inferring carried out in a community of agents who assess themselves and each other for the propriety of their inferences that explains the content of the concepts.
still can't see how that can be proven. Solipsism is like a funnel we're sliding down, grasping at ropes (theories) that might pull us out of it. But they always break. Without a really good argument, solipsism wins by default. Sad. — GLEN willows
The short, rough answer is that both solipsists and idealists hold that mind alone exists; idealists claim there is more than one mind, solipsists don't — Banno