The solipsist claims that it's wrong to think there's something we can be wrong about. — Pie

But this goes for realism and every other type of ontology.

You can't use externalism as a weapon against solipsism. Externalism and realism are forms of nonsense as well. If you're going to embrace any kind of ontology, you'll have to give solipsism it's due.

But this goes for realism and every other type of ontology. — Tate

Wait a minute. Are we on the same page ?

Anyone who makes claims about our world-in-common (such as what's in it or claiming 'it's all water' ) presumably aims at getting something right about it.

If you're going to embrace any kind of ontology, you'll have to give solipsism it's due. — Tate

I confess that it's a toy issue, but I maintain that solipsism, asserted philosophical/rationally, is incoherent.

Wait a minute. Are we on the same page ?

Anyone who makes claims about our world-in-common (such as what's in it or claiming 'it's all water' ) presumably aims at getting something right about it. — Pie

I'm sure they do. Care to do a reading of the Tractacus?

I confess that it's a toy issue, but I maintain that solipsism, asserted philosophical/rationally, is incoherent. — Pie

Again, you're trying to deploy externalism against it. That's only satisfying until you realize you are your world, as Witt states.

Again, you're trying to deploy externalism against it. That's only satisfying until you realize you are your world, as Witt states. — Tate

It'll help me if you spell out your general view. I don't think 'I am my world.' My position is that we humans are radically-primordially social, that 'I' is a token in a game that transcends the individual meat that utters it (but not the community as a whole.)

It'll help me if you spell out your general view. — Pie

I agree with Witt about metaphysics, it's fun to play with (speaking of toys :razz: ), but it's beyond the limits of informative language use.

My position is that we are radically primordially social, that 'I' is a token in a game that transcends the meat it's applied to. — Pie

I get that. For me, this is one of many views. I understand it, but I also know it's 'language on holiday'.

I get that. For me, this is one of many views. I understand it, but I also know it's 'language on holiday'. — Tate

Fair enough, but I'd argue that it's incoherent to deny the sociality of reason. To be sure, the details are endlessly debatable, but it's absurd to deny the debate within the debate, no?

Fair enough, but I'd argue that it's incoherent to deny the sociality of reason. To be sure, the details are endlessly debatable, but it's absurd to deny the debate within the debate, no? — Pie

It's not a matter of details.

Note the meaning of "sociality". Like left and right, north and south, it only means something relative to it's opposite. You tried to used that trick against solipsism. Now use it against externalism.

It's not a matter of details.

Note the meaning of "sociality". Like left and right, north and south, it only means something relative to it's opposite. — Tate

But consider, sir, you are reasoning with me. Am I bound to regard your logic ? If so, why ? And do I not (mostly) understand your words ? I agree that 'sociality' is caught in a network of differences. Is this not a claim about norms for concept application that apply to both of us ? Was it not inferred implicitly through the examples you offered of North and South ?

But consider, sir, you are reasoning with me. Am I bound to regard your logic ? If so, why ? And do I not (mostly) understand your words ? I agree that 'sociality' is caught in a network of differences. Is this not a claim about norms for concept application that apply to both of us ? Was it not inferred implicitly through the examples you offered of North and South ? — Pie

Of course. Externalism is great. Let's say it demolishes solipsism. By that same method, solipsism will slay externalism.

There is no sociality without privacy. There is no 'we' without 'me'. You're doing the same thing solipsism is doing: you're saying yes to the two-sided coin, but then declaring one side to be illusive.

There is no sociality without privacy. There is no 'we' without 'me'. You're doing the same thing solipsism is doing: you're saying yes to the two-sided coin, but then declaring one side to be illusive. — Tate

'Privacy' is a public concept, else you could not make a point about it (could not be right or wrong.) I don't claim that privacy is illusion, just to be clear. It has a use in our language ('don't make private phone calls on company time.')

On the 'I' or 'me' issue, do you not recall our previous conversation ? The self does indeed play an important role. You and I as individuals are 'tracked' and evaluated for logical consistency, for instance. I am responsible for defending the implications of my claims but not yours. We both ought to keep our story straight, not call the same thing white and black, public and private, etc.

I quote again:

There will indeed be cases in which only the agent can say whether she is pondering, imagining, dreaming, letting her mind wander, calculating, solving, planning, or rehearsing. But the sort of privacy in which only she can say whether she was doing any of these or other particular things is not the sort of privacy that gives rise to philosophical conundrums like the problem of other minds and the problem of necessarily private languages.

The 'sane' or 'ordinary' concept of mind does not exclude it from the explanatory nexus that includes sense organs and electrons and arguments. The metaphysical version features the ghost/mind on another plane entirely, so that even the scientists in 6098 couldn't predict a sneeze.

The following brings home meaning as use, in my view.

For Brandom, sentient beings, such as the cardinals, react differentially to their environments. But they do not count as sapient because they are incapable of the kind of responsibility and authority for their acts that is characteristic of being obliged, prohibited, and permitted, (and being committed to a certain course of action or entitled to something), and which, on his view, is necessary if an agent’s inferences are to be appropriately appraisable. The cardinals’ behavior amounts to an implicit categorization of the features of their environment, but this behavior does not depend upon the birds performing inferences to or from the applicability of those categorizations. It is his distinctive analysis of the nature of inference and of the practice of drawing and evaluating inferences that forms the core of Brandom’s understanding of rationality. An agent is rational in Brandom’s preferred sense just in case she draws inferences in a way that is evaluable according to the inferential role of the concepts involved in those inferences, where the inferential role of a concept is specified in terms of the conditions under which an agent would be entitled to apply, or prohibited from applying, that concept, together with what else an agent would be entitled or committed to by the appropriate application of the concept. This articulation of the content of concepts in terms of the inferential role of those concepts, and the specification of those roles in terms of proprieties of inference, is combined with a distinctive brand of pragmatism. Instead of the content of a concept providing an independent guide or rule that governs which inferences are appropriate, it is the actual practices of inferring carried out in a community of agents who assess themselves and each other for the propriety of their inferences that explains the content of the concepts.

So 'private' would get its meaning from the inferences involving it that we (in an ideal sense, a community making its own new rules in terms of the old) license and forbid.

One more piece might be helpful.

Rejecting the myth of the given is not yet a positive epistemology. Sellars can abandon the myth of the given only if he gives us a positive theory of non-inferential knowledge to replace it. (There must be non-inferential knowledge, that is, knowledge that is not acquired by inference, even if its epistemic status depends on its inferential connections to other knowledge.)

The paradigm cases of non-inferential knowledge are introspection, perception, and memory [IPM] beliefs (see MGEC). According to Sellars, such beliefs have epistemic status because, given the processes by which language and beliefs are acquired, they are likely to be true. IPM beliefs are reliable indicators, like the temperature readings on a thermometer. This is a reliablist or externalist condition on such knowledge. A chain of empirical justification can properly start with IPM beliefs because they are noninferential reliable indicators of the truth of their contents.

We can trust Jerry's claim that Martha was wearing a red dress at the funeral because Jerry has never failed us. The boy knows his colors ! But Tim is colorblind and Jethro's a liar. Individuals exist and matter.

On the inferential/abstract level, we might notice that Billy is shit at logic, albeit otherwise honest. So we are more inclined to trust his premises than his conclusions, even before following the argument itself. Then Karen makes a big deal out of everything. So we translate her claims into their less surprising versions.

Privacy' is a public concept, else you could not make a point about it (could not be right or wrong.) I don't claim that privacy is illusion, just to be clear. It has a use in our language ('don't make private phone calls on company time.') — Pie

For some reason you're evading my point.

The solipsist says, "The word 'public' has a use in my language. It's related to my exchanges with my fictional friends, which give rise to so much in terms of rationality: logic, language, my concept of self, and of course, my fictional friends are hilarious, so it's fun talking to them."

None of this is new, by the way. "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." The idea of the Great Solipsist in the sky has been around for a long time now, inspiring all sorts of questions about evil and so forth. It's very well explored territory.

On the 'I' or 'me' issue, do you not recall our previous conversation ? The self does indeed play an important role. You and I as individuals are 'tracked' and evaluated for logical consistency, for instance. I am responsible for defending the implications of my claims but not yours. We both ought to keep our story straight, not call the same thing white and black, public and private, etc. — Pie

You aren't following me. Just stop and evaluate the meaning of "social." What is its opposite?

So 'private' would get its meaning from the inferences involving it that we (in an ideal sense, a community making its own new rules in terms of the old) license and forbid — Pie

Of course. You don't seem to want to believe that I understand externalism. I do. I really do. It just doesn't give you any leverage against solipsism for the reasons I gave you. In the same way, solipsism can't attack externalism. The externalist can just say, "Yes, I use the word 'private', it's such a great word, but nothing beyond that."

For some reason you're evading my point. — Tate

Not intentionally !

The solipsist says, "The word 'public' has a use in my language. — Tate

To whom ? Himself ? For what else is there ? To what norms could he refer ? About what world could he be wrong or right ? You basically put a world in a vat, pretend a community shares a language, but make that community a mirage at the end.

Consider the difference between 'I'm not sure if I'm dreaming right now' and 'we ought not assume that we're not dreaming.' The second is a claim about norms that apply to all rational agents.

In the same way, solipsism can't attack externalism. The externalist can just say, "Yes, I use the word 'private', it's such a great word, but nothing beyond that." — Tate

I find this leap so problematic that it's hard for me to believe you see where I'm coming from. You keep mentioning externalism, but that's not quite it (and not my word.) I'm interested in the cluster of the following concepts : the subject among subjects, the target of claims, and community norms that bind those subjects govern concept application and inferences. I contend that the epistemological solipsist makes a claim about community norms, invoking that which transcends him in order to deny it.

To whom ? Himself ? For what else is there ? To what norms could he refer ? About what world could he be wrong or right ? You basically put a world in a vat, pretend a community shares a language, but make that community a mirage at the end. — Pie

Imagine a snake that turns around and meets its own tail. It thinks it's met the Other, and it has for all practical purposes, but all it's met is Rumi's grand illusion.

Yes, solipsism says the other is an illusion. Externalism says the self is. It's just a game.

Consider the difference between 'I'm not sure if I'm dreaming right now' and 'we ought not assume that we're not dreaming.' The second is a claim about norms that apply to all rational agents. — Pie

The solipsist tries to reason with his fictional friends. It's fun.

You keep mentioning externalism, but that's not quite it (and not my word.) — Pie

What do you want to call it?

I contend that the epistemological solipsist makes a claim about community norms, invoking that which transcends him in order to deny it. — Pie

The community is made of fragments of one entity, like a stage where all the characters are products of one playwright.

The solipsist tries to reason with his fictional friends. It's fun. — Tate

Perhaps I've found the issue. Let me emphasize that I don't deny that a madman can believe he's all alone in a dream. I could even be a dream right now.

Here's my primary target:

In epistemology, epistemological solipsism is the claim that one can only be sure of the existence of one's mind.The existence of other minds and the external world is not necessarily rejected but one can not be sure of its existence.

This 'one' is implicitly universal. A rational person ought to recognize that the existence of something other than the mind (like other minds) cannot be certainty established.

In other words, the epistemological solipsist claims that it's wrong or irrational to assume that there's something one can be wrong or irrational about.

This 'one' is implicitly universal. A rational person ought to recognize that the existence of something other than the mind (like other minds) cannot be certainty established.

In other words, the epistemological solipsist claims that it's wrong to assume that there's something one can be wrong about. — Pie

That's a substantial step back from 'solipsism is wrong because the self needs the Other for the sake of rationality and language.'

Plus it's an all-purpose caution for skeptics of all stripes, including those who are skeptical of solipsism.

That's a substantial step back from 'solipsism is wrong because the self needs the Other for the sake of rationality and language.' — Tate

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you aren't quoting me there, just paraphrasing.

Here's what I said yesterdayish:

I will say that our social situation is logically primary, simply because saying otherwise is incoherent. If we aren't in some underspecified sense in the same world with the same concepts, then rational conversation is impossible.

We debate claims about our world. Any beginning 'less' than that seems to be nonsense, though we can and do endlessly explicate what we mean by these keywords.

We might say the self has two others, one being the target of claims (the world) and the other being those in the community, sharing a language, subject to the same norms. One could present the self-others dynamic as part of the self-world dynamic, I suppose.

I don't see how binding claims (the conclusions of sound arguments, for instance) make sense apart from this minimal situation (hence the thread I started.) One person claims that the others are bound to acknowledge that a belief about their shared world is warranted or true.

Which is your point, that solipsists are inappropriately searching for certainty? Or that solipsism is incoherent due to a lack of "real" social interaction?

Which is your point, that solipsists are inappropriately searching for certainty? Or that solipsism is incoherent due to a lack of "real" social interaction? — Tate

The epistemological solipsist is making a claims about norms that transcend him, about what any rational person ought to assume or not, about a world beyond him.

(It's also seemingly incoherent for a self without a world (typically with others) to be able to be right or wrong in the first place. What can that even mean ?)

It's also seemingly incoherent for a self without a world (typically with others) to be able to be right or wrong in the first place. What can that even mean ?) — Pie

Solipsism isn't a self without a world. It's that the world is the Self.

Solipsism isn't a self without a world. It's that the world is the Self. — Tate

Six of one, half a dozen of the other. Does it make sense for worldself to be wrong about a worldself ?

Let's say you go Freudian and give this blob an unconscious...then you are creating something it can be right or wrong about, something it knows indirectly. A (second, breakaway )world for the world to guess about.

Consider also that my primary target is epistemological solipsism, so this is a bit of tangent (not without its fun, to be sure.)

I never understood duality. Sorry Heraclitus. — Agent Smith

Do you understand the difference between an instance of something being good, and the ideal good, the best thing?

Consider also that my primary target is epistemological solipsism, so this is a bit of tangent (not without its fun, to be sure.) — Pie

:up:

I never understood duality. Sorry Heraclitus. — Agent Smith

Apparently. (He probably wouldn't accept your apology.)

You're missing the point, though.Our whole lives consist in streams of imagery, a unique stream to each person. From out of those concrete streams we abstract the fictive things which remain timelessly the same, which make up the world of familiar objects, about only which is it possible to derive a world of facts, a world consisting totally of facts, a world that is the totality of facts. But this world is never experienced; it is a lifeless attenuated world of the mind.

There is nothing interesting in that pedantic world of facts except the science and math it makes possible. For me there is nothing interesting in chasing your tail trying to establish how our propositions are to be justified; because they can never be justified by the rich streams of imagery which constitute our actual lives. So, for me the best course for those who love science and math is to "shut up and calculate" and enjoy the richness and artistry of math and science (which logic totally lacks).

I just give priority to the poetic [private] mind over the intellectual or discursive [public] mind. — Janus

Why?

The next few remarks show the poverty of the subject/object distinction.

That's where becomes confused.