It protects against laws that would limit liberty and privacy and unenumerated rights. It is up to the Supreme Court to decide what counts as a "liberty", what matters are "private". and what those unenumerated rights are, as the Constitution doesn't spell it out. In Roe and Casey they decided that medical procedures like abortion are covered by this, but that the ambiguity regarding personhood warranted some restriction, and that the point of viability is a reasonable time to consider the rights of prenatal life to take precedence over the mother's. — Michael
Consider, though, the other argument, from Justice Scalia in Toxel v. Granville (2002):
“In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the ‘unalienable Rights’ with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims “all Men…are endowed by their Creator.’ And in my view that right is also among the ‘othe[r] [rights] retained by the people’ which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution’s enumeration of rights ‘shall not be construed to deny or disparage.’ The Declaration of Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring powers upon the courts; and the Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly enacted by the people. Consequently, while I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the State has no power to interfere with parents’ authority over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.”
I don't agree with your analysis of Roe or Casey in terms of the Court ever having considered the rights of the fetus.
Roe specifically held:
"The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to 'person.' The first, in defining 'citizens,' speaks of 'persons born or naturalized in the United States.' The word also appears both in the Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. 'Person' is used in other places in the Constitution: in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art, I, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; in the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3;53 in the Migration and Importation provision, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; in the Emoulument Clause, Art, I, § 9, cl. 8; in the Electros provisions, Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office of President, Art. II, § 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, and the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application. All this, together with our observation, supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."
Note as well that the Court's analysis refers to intent of the authors with its reference to 19th century practices (tagging
@Benkei on this, as this is an example of original intent being used by the liberal wing to establish the right to abortion).
My reason for pointing this out is that the Court found no ambiguity with the term "person," and they have never afforded rights to the fetus or even attempted to weigh the rights of the fetus against those of the mother. The Roe Court admitted "If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." That is, the Roe Court indicated that if the fetus were a "person," abortion would be prohibited under the 14th Amendment, which is why it was critical for the Court to find the fetus was not a person.
The analysis of Roe is a bit convoluted, only arguing that the State may regulate abortion to the extent it protects the health of the mother, with no reference to the fetus:
"With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State."
The closest it comes to referencing the rights of the fetus is in the statement:
"With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."
But even here the Court is very careful to refer to it as "potential life", and not "the fetus," which would be a very different statement. The former referencing a general view that the State has the right to encourage life to come about, while the latter would indicate that an actual, particular fetus is endowed with rights.
The Casey opinion didn't change this basic framework of Roe, but instead abandoned the strict trimester framework of Roe with an evolving viability standard based on recent science.
Your phrasing of it seems like a strawman appeal to ridicule. — Michael
I'd call it just snarky, not really attempting to make any important point.