Ah, better. A good comeback. But you've moved over to ethics, and we probably should remain in the area of aesthetics, for the sake of the theme of this thread — Banno

I took though Davidson's critique to be that objectivity is universally muddled thinking. If the point he makes is simply that aesthetic judgments in particular don't lend themselves to objective reasoning, then his is just a platitude that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." That's obvioulsy not what he's limiting himself to when he challenges objectivity.

There are different sorts of judgments: moral, aesthetic, and empirical/ontological for example. I think we must maintain objectivity to morality. I would agree that the aesthetic is largely if not entirely subjective. The empirical/ontological is the most confusing because it asks what the thing is devoid of subjectively imposed attributes, leading us down the Lockean path of trying to distinguish what properties are inherent in the object and what are imposed by the person. It's the whole phenomenal/noumenal debate that leads us to direct and indirect realism conversations.

Again, unless you're in one of the many war-torn countries where such horrors are treated as routine.) — Tom Storm

Then upon what basis do you condemn their acts you find abhorrent? You have your preferences and they theirs.

Where are your jurisdictional boundaries that define your moral community? Am I bound by the consensus of the West, the US, the Southern US, my ethnicity, my religious heritage, my compound of similar thinkers? Can't it be that the entirety of my community could be wrong, yet I am right? If not, must I sacrifice babies to the gods if my community says it is good even if I disagree?

Don't want to clutter with cut and paste, but let me know if this won't open.

It is wrong to murder.

Ice cream tastes good.

Two propositions, both with truth values. Do you ask "to whom?" when answering the first, the second, both, or neither when determining that truth value?

If you answer the first without regard to whom, you are seeking the objective.

No!

The objective/subjective dichotomy is a mistake. Much clearer to use charity and truth, after Davidson — Banno

Yes!

https://chatgpt.com/c/68464d0f-584c-8007-9245-f61243387086

So if someone does not doubt that 2+2 is 4, do we discount this as a belief becasue it is indubitable? — Banno

"Indubitable" summons Descartes, so from Mediations:

“I clearly and distinctly perceive that existence is contained in the idea of God, just as clearly and distinctly as I perceive that the equality of its three angles to two right angles is contained in the idea of a triangle.”

This speaks to the logically necessary and therefore indubitable (which he includes geometry and God), which i suspect is different from a Wittgensteinian hinge indubitable, meaning those things we can't question in a game playing arena. Those would be foundational rules. And I think of Kantian intuitions, also indubitable (e.g. time and space), but only insofar as necessary to provide us any ability to understand the world.

The point is you're asking about "on certainty" and how that is a different category than belief, and this question seems central to Western philosophy in terms of asking what we can debate and what we cannot across different founding father philosophers (as it were).

But nothing is straight forward because some do challenge whether the indubitable can be doubted. Consider transubstantiation, that miraculous concept pondered for thousands of years how the trinity can be a unity, leaving us with a word called 'triunity."

And I do think the major challenges will come from religion because it posits a very different view toward knowledge justifications (i.e. faith versus rationalism/empiricism).

Or do we say instead that because he will not act on what he holds to be true, that he doesn't really believe? — Banno

My father, despite his very scientific background, would not fly on airplanes, would not ride glass elevators, and insisted upon lower floors in hotels so he could make it out before being consumed by the one in a million hotel fire. I truly don't know what he believed. Curiously, he died a fiery death when an airplane struck him on the 40th floor of a hotel while, you guessed it, in a glass elevator (a joke). Phobias don't strike me as beliefs as much as just irrational fear, rooted in the psyche, maladapting to something in the past. I once asked him why he'd get on a ship and not a plane. He told me he could swim but couldn't fly, and he was super proud of that retort. Beats me.

Given her desire to stay with her lover, the decision to trust is rational. — Banno

Playing the lotto is rational if you wish to win because you can't win if you don't play. Believing you will win is a different matter. Maybe some believe they'll actually win, like some believe they'll one day become a princess or rock star or whatever fantasy one might have. And let's not overlook the pessimists who are sure they'll fail despite all they have going for them.

I suspect this has to do with the J of K=JTB, where it is inherently subjective. That is, if I give a justification for my belief, it can count as knowledge, and my justification is valid if I subjectively accept it. If I believe I'll win the lotto because I believe myself God's special creature, then it's belief. I dont think McCormick can deny certain justifications for belief as invalid justvbecause they contain an emotive basis. I can believe for whatever stupid reason i want. . That won't make a non belief. That will just make it a stupid belief. But a belief nonetheless.

David's belief is not to be subjected to doubt. What are we to say here - again, that it's not a proper belief becasue it is indubitable? — Banno

This is faith based belief, the topic of a whole other thread. Those of certain religious worldviews would see this one as so obviously intertwined with the mystical, the emotive, the super rational, that McCormick 's thesis would appear elementary. That is, no kidding, my belief in God relies upon justifications a non-believer would never accept?

The examples of these blended beliefs given in the article are:

"The following examples point to states which are difficult to characterize given the standard view: Anna, who suffers from [1] Capgras syndrome, believes her husband is an impostor even though she has no evidence for it and much against it; she also fails to take the kind of actions one would expect with such a belief such as running away or calling the authorities. [2] Balthasar believes the glass skywalk is safe and yet trembles as he tries to walk on it. [3] Charu believes that their lover will keep their promise to not betray them again even though past evidence indicates that they will, and [4] David believes that the God as described in the Bible exists, though he is aware of the evidence suggesting that such a God does not exist and claims his reasons for believing are not based in evidence."

Breaking then down:

1 appears to be a delusion coupled with irrationality, suggesting general confusion. It's not clear really what she "believes." Perhaps she doubts her delusion. Don't all beliefs contain doubt? We often do speak of the reliability of our beliefs, some more doubtable than others (particularly Descartes).

2 could be considered the same as 1 to the extent he doubts his belief as evidenced by his conduct. On the other hand, I'm not sure this one has much to do with belief. That is, his fear is just an emotional reaction. A person fearing heights doesn't stand away from the rail because he thinks he'll fall. It's just that heights scarec him. Stage fright isn't a belief you'll die. It's just misplaced fear.

3 is hope. It's what makes us take chances, to gamble, to chase dreams. It's the belief that belief makes things possible. Tracht gut vet zein gut as they say (and by they, I mean me). Of course, in the example given, it might be foolish belief.

4 sounds Kierkegaardian as a leap of faith, or perhaps James' pragmatic will to believe. The will to believe is an explicit combination of desire and belief and really forms the basis of his theory as to certain matters.

And Hume explicitly stated that reason is the slave to the passions. As in, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." Which i take to mean emotions set things in motion and we use reason to justify them. This would mean that our reason based beliefs had to start with some emotion.

I suppose my greater point is that I think McCormick is correct in her observation, but what's she's saying is fairly obvious generally and something historically recognized. That it is being treated as a revelation might speak to the rigidity of certain anglo analytic systems, where emotion had been extracted from the hyper logical methodology.

As in, we in the regular world knew all along our beliefs were messy.

Reminds me of Comfortably Numb. Super cool vibe.

I feel like if you don't read every page, then you can't honestly say you read the book. That includes the acknowledgments page, but that's typically very short, usually thanking one's wife for her support while he ignored her while writing the book, but the wife actually liked the time alone, saved from having to hear about the book he's writing. If a woman wrote the book, she probably thanked her friend Emily. I'm not sure why, but that sounds right.

I don't read endnotes, but I feel somewhat obligated to read the footnotes. I won't read the footnotes when they start taking up half the bottom of the page because that feels like they're trying to have a side conversation about something else. Not that I'm big on focusing my attention when I talk about things, but I do expect it from others. It's a do as I say and not as I do sort of thing. My issue with endnotes is that you have to search them out by finding the chapter you're in and then finding the corresponding endnote for that chapter. Sometimes you might read the wrong endnote, and you might end up seeing into the future of what is going to happen which will destroy your sense of surprise and your finger might slip and you'll lose your page to where you were in the book proper. You then have to backfill (I'm pretty sure that's the word I'm looking for) from the endnote to find the place you were at pre-finger slipping.

I got a copy of Brothers Karamazov that is in like 6 point font, which is just over standard microfiche size. It's difficult reading because of that. I ordered an oversized version, but now I fear it will be too large and will crush my chest with its weight. It's a weighty book. The weighty book joke is about as funny as the difficult reading joke. They're of the same genre.

What do you think is happening when a person grasps a concept? — frank

Understanding occurs. It's within the mystical parameters of consciousness which AI lacks yet seems to outperform us on.

I don't demand language for conceptual grasp. That strikes me as contrived to eliminate metaphysical messiness.

Equating cognitive grasp of propositions to an experiential event necessarily eliminates any non-empirically based propositions, with the obvious examples being the analytical and I'd submit also the modal, which was the topic of another thread with @Banno from which I've not yet recovered.

That is, you're going to suggest now that I know of the counterfactual possible world based upon the actual world despite the fact that the possible world is defined as the non-actual not experienced world?

This is just to say propositional truth need not be how-to truth, and taking the position it must be in 100% of the cases seems a task that will fail given the creativity of your opponent in offering counters. If though, as I suspect, there is a hidden tautology here, meaning I am searching for the white penguin when you define penguins as black, I'd like to fast forward to the big reveal so I can see where it ends.

Started Kripke's Naming and Necessity. I appreciate the preface begins on page 1. Often prefaces start with i then ii, then iii and so on and you have to read 20 pages before you get to the first page. I don't feel it gives enough feeling of accomplishment early on when things are most challenging. Someone should write a book on that alone.

. Very much so. Knowledge is embedded in what we do, in ways well beyond the place of information. — Banno

Do you take the assessment of the truth value of a proposition as knowing-how knowledge, equivalent to juggling balls? Seems evaluating statements requires cognitive grasp of concepts.

The Death of Ivan Ilych by Tolstoy. Pow!

That sounds responsive to the question "Hey, Clarky what do you normally do, and what are your thoughts on the word "justified?"

But that's not what I asked.

This is my cross examination, not your chance just to share.

There are sex differences in psychology.

These differences drive the development of gender expression and gender roles in society – expressions and roles which have absolutely nothing to do with karyotype and almost nothing to do with phenotype. — Michael

The article you cited leads with the following sentence:

"Sex differences in psychology are differences in the mental functions and behaviors of the sexes and are due to a complex interplay of biological, developmental, and cultural factors."

This causually relates (i.e. "due to") psychology to biology. This statement seems obvious, so I don't follow your argument that gender behavior "has absolutely nothing to do with karotype." While it's obvious some biological individuals don't conform with typical expected gender roles, the high rate of conformity certainly suggests a causual biological/gender relationship that requires the existence of certain variables (i.e. developmental and cultural factors) to disrupt.

To argue otherwise just seems to create a radical environmental influence position, stating that gender expression and biology only correlate due to social pressure and nothing else. The observable affect of testosterone alone seems to contradict this, which is a direct product of karotype, coming from the XY created testes.

T=K/JB.

That's the formula for Truth because K=JTB.

Here’s my take - get rid of the requirement for truth. — T Clark

So we have two things:

A = justified true belief
B = justified belief

You propose we assign the word "knowledge" to B ( instead of to A).

What word do you now propose we assign for A?

Instead we should split the two.
Knowledge is information that is true.
For example ''Superman can fly in the fictional realm of DC''. Is true if stated as such and thus is knowledge. It doesn't require a belief to be true. It just is. — Jack2848

If knowledge doesn't require belief, then i can know Superman can fly even if I've never heard of Superman?

Instead of focusing on the weight of the information itself, people would focus on the motives of the messenger, questioning why now, why this way, and what else is being hidden. — schopenhauer1

This actually seems to be occurring now. For some reason Fox News and the right have a sudden obsession with UFOs. I tend to think the claims more bullshit because of this partisan leaning.

Either way, it’s the combination of high-level secrecy, the volume of eyewitness accounts, and the long timeline that makes it harder to dismiss the whole thing outright. Something’s going on. The only question is what-and why hasn’t it been fully acknowledged? — schopenhauer1

But this is just poor epistemological reasoning. It says not to look at any specific account for proof, but instead just look at the whole without looking too close. It's like if I brought you into a warehouse with thousands of boxes of evidence for alien existence and every piece I examined closely offered no proof, but you said "yeah, but just look at this warehouse of stuff" as if that's proof enough.

I don't want 1000s of blurred bigfoot pictures to prove bigfoot exists. I want one bigfoot in a cage.

Another possibility is that these aren’t accidents at all but highly controlled incidents, maybe decoys, or maybe a kind of data collection or seeding operation. Because if they’re smart enough to get here, you'd expect they’d be smart enough not to crash into a hillside in New Mexico. — schopenhauer1

If they're playing 4-D quantum mental chess, then sure, they've out foxed us all. But then again, I don't know what that even means.

If anything is being kept, it’s probably technological debris or biological samples-not live aliens. If these beings were as advanced as suggested, would they really just agree to sit quietly in some underground facility? If they’re that capable, couldn’t they have done far more already? Unless, of course, some kind of agreement exists. What the nature of that would be, I don't know. — schopenhauer1

You really believe in this? I think it horseshittery.

There are two bases I can decipher for why I would want to create an amoral system: (1) the imposition of morality within a system is immoral in itself because it imposes a particular morality upon others they may disagree with, or (2) it normalizes amorality, a condition from which you suffer, and so you would be more comfortable in such a system.

If #1, then you are arguing morality, which you've indicated you're not capable of doing.

If #2, then why would I be motivated to accept a position to accomodate someone who recognizes their moral limitations?

This is simply to say that if you are submitting that your position promotes the Good for whatever reason, then you are presenting to me your understanding of the Good, yet you prefaced this conversation with the self-awareness that you are not sure what the Good is.

I am working to construct a new me that is moral, friendly, and overall a chill guy, — Wolfy48

Why? I guess that's my real question. Why do you want morality, friendliness, and being a chill guy?

And if this were your objective, why wouldn't you just directly impose moral standards into the system?

I appreciate that this is a hypothetical, so it's not entirely right to question the premises that you've asserted as given, but we do need to consider the reality that Donald Trump (as an example) is not a reliable means for dispensing and withholding information based upon his reasonable assessment of what information can be handled by the populace.

And where I use "Donald Trump," I really mean anybody. This suggestion that information is controllable, and even if it were, that those controlling it have any idea what to do with it is a dubious notion. At the microcosm level of an office environment, for example, it seems impossible to control gossip, and those in charge of controlling it are particuarly bad at it. It's for that reason I find it hard to fathom how these alien beings have been able to surgically reveal their identity to the earthling leaders without tipping off any random jogger or pigeon feeder and those leaders then kept the information under wraps.

If that could happen, I would have much more trust in my government officials and I would likely be willing to submit to whatever gradual ontological shock process they thought was best because clearly they're playing 4-D chess that I cannot understand.

On the other hand, assuming most people are playing tic-tac-toe and sometimes even checkers, I would rather they just tell me everything at once because as they tried to control the information, all they would actually do is leak things they weren't supposed to and bring about confusion.

I'll go back to quaint adage of "thou shallt not lie," and just expect the people installed to represent the people to tell us the truth. It creates an interesting game to lie and dance around the truth, but the shit is going to hit the fan eventually, so maybe do it in a way that will maintain one's credibility once that happens. That is, I use ancient wisdom to answer your questions about futuristic dilemmas.

you are claiming that under Popper's thesis "that a scientific theory is one that can be falsified by empirical evidence," Logical Positivism and its Verification Principle meet the criteria required to be counted as a scientific theory? How so? How is the Verification Principle able to be falsified by empirical evidence? — Leontiskos

I wasn't arguing that Positivism meets the claim of a scientific theory in fact. I was saying it could in theory. This is a distinction between necessity and contingency.

The argument of the OP was that Positivism fails by necessity. It holds that it must be proved valid by empirical means to be sustained, and since it's lacking, it must fail.

My position is that Pooper's revision allows Positivism to be sustained until falsified, meaning it will survive contingent upon there being no facts falsifying it.

What makes it fail, as I alluded to, might be the lack of predictive value in such things as economic and psychological theories. That is the blow to Positivism I'd think meaningful, less so internal inconsistencies in its logic. That is, the proof is in the pudding of how it works.

I'd suggest, from what you've written, that positivism does not fail under the Popper revision of falsifiability you've described.

In other words, I followed positivism's failure to prove itself positively and affirmatively which was its internal definitional self destruction, but if you alter that to require that you must show where positivism fails to offer acceptable answers to our problems, then it is sustainable under Popper's revision, if the proper evidence can be shown.

What this means to me is that positivism's failure must be tied to its utilitarian failure to yield useful results as opoosed to just a devestating internal logical inconsistency in its basis.

That is, if you can show how psychological or economic models (for example) fail to offer consistently, predictable results, then that counts for me as a substantive blow against positivism as opposed to just an analytic attack on the self consistency of the theory.

agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to end the conversation here because you're shifting to an allowance for modal logic, but now asserting just pragmatic irrelevance.

I simply disagree with this assessment, and I question the thoughtfulness of the comment. If you think classic logic has relevance, then you simply can't dispense with modal logic because modal logic opens itself to logical issues beyond what can be handled in classic logic. Hypothetical counterfactuals result in vacuous truths in classic logic, and that is why modal logic is needed.

I dont pretend there isn't nuance in these positions, but you don't elicit that nuance with your comments. You just hazard objections and see where they land, stubbornly insist upon the validity of your objections, and then eventually concede something or another to keep the conversation meandering.

With Wiiki, Google, the SEP, countless other online resources, and even ChapGpt to sort through all this, we should be able to engage in this conversation at a more elevated level and share among ourselves areas of real confusion. So maybe spend a few days on your own with an open mind toward understanding the basis of the modal logic enterprise before critiquing it.

But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

What of the question: if I'd have missed the train, I'd have never met my future wife.

Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.

We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da!

You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic? — Metaphysician Undercover

There was no ambiguity on my part, and no introduction by me of temporal necessity. That was your doing, and I indicated it had no bearing on our conversation.

My specific question was:

"@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?"

This question is precise. The symbolic form cannot be interpreted as anything other than me asking your view on metaphysical necessity.

If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. If not, then not. If you think there can't be other worlds even if there are other possible outcomes in any given situation, then you make zero sense because that's what an other world is.

If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated — Metaphysician Undercover

You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity.

You're just performing a reductio of your own position and spelling out the consequences. If you're arguing against free will, then just be clear about it.

I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.

Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.

So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.

And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.

But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)⊃□p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence.

I'm extremely aggressive with AI. That includes even when I ask for directions in my car. ChatGpt apologizes when I tell it t's a fucking moron, but Google Assistant chastises me.

I've found no long term repercussions, like neither hold a grudge nor act timid later They are both even tempered and emotionally well adjusted.

On the other hand, if I bump into my dog, I do apologize, although I'm not sure he understands manners like that.

If I bump a door, I never apologize, and I might even curse it, which I think is a good comparison to AI. There is a chance that one day the door will become conscious and it will slam the shit out of me in payback, but I find that probably unlikely.

Once, I kicked the door and I yelled "MOTHER" but I stopped myself because my then 2 year old was there, but he finished with his little kid voice and said "fucker." That just shows that how you treat others, including the inanimate, can reverberate throughout the world, including the corruption of an upcoming generation. Hopefully my son can break the cycle and not damage his children when he has them, but I'm not hopeful.

So his system is consistent, but useless for any sort of modal reasoning, and leads directly to fatalism. — Banno

Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:

@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?

If not, fill in the blank. if something is true, then _________.

Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims.

Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds.

If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, — Metaphysician Undercover

The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds .

Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, — Metaphysician Undercover

Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella.

Maybe this will help:

It is necessarily true that if someone is a person, then they are a physicist.
Einstein is a person.
It is necessarily true that Einstein is a physicist.

This is modal logic. See what just happened? If we necessitate a rigid designator across all worlds onto a non-essential trait, we elevate a contigent statement into a necessitated one and we destroy modal logic by eliminating hypothesizing what Einstein might have been in another world.

What this means is that the law of non-contradiction is not violated when you have an Einstein across different worlds because the entire modal structure demands he be different across differing worlds in non-essential ways.

And you guys feel free to disagree with me as well. I'm sorting it out in real time too.

If we interpret two possible worlds, one with rain, and one without rain, with "I" as a rigid designator, then the law of noncontradiction is violated, because "I" gets wet and does not get wet, at the same time. The qualification of "different worlds" is just a facade to hide the contradiction. If we look at what Banno called "counterpart theory", then we have no continuity of the object "I", from the present time into the future, only possible similar objects in the future, therefore the law of identity is not applicable. — Metaphysician Undercover

The claim that "I get wet and do not get wet" violates the law of noncontradiction misunderstands how modal logic works. These are not simultaneous truths in a single world, but distinct evaluations across possible worlds, which is actually the reason modal logic exists. The law of noncontradiction applies within worlds, not between them.

Additionally, the entirety of the "different worlds" enterprise must be jettisoned and the resultant collapse of modal logic as well if we follow out your logic. The term "different" as applied here by you includes any dissimilarity whatsoever, even the simple fact they are in different locations. That is, it is impossible under your reasoning to have any metaphysically related universes because everything within each one would be relevantly different.

To make my point clearer: Suppose you had Universe #1, and within it you get wet and in Universe #2, you also get wet. In fact, every single thing within #1 and #2 are the "same," they would still not bear any metaphysical relationship to each other because they are all necessarily different since they occupy different time and space. That is, #1 and #2 do not collapse into being the same thing because they are not identical under your view. They are just curiously similar.

When we chart out all possible worlds, under your reasoning, an infinite number could be the same in every apparent regard because you deny the concept of rigid designation in theory.

This is to say that if you deny a rigid designation for "I," you must do it for all things. That means that not only does the fact that you're not the same you in #1 and #2, the rain isn't the same in #1 and #2. They must be different. You can't have a different you in #1 and #2 and share the same rain. When we say it will rain in #1, while that sounds like any old generic rain will do, if we were being more precise, we'd describe the exact identity of the rain that would strike you in #1 versus #2.

This I suggest is the logical consequence of demanding cross universe consistency.

This is why @Banno brings in counterpart theory, which holds there is a similar counterpart in another universe that satisfies the conditions needed to perform the modal logic. It dispenses with the impossible mental gymnastics needed to comprehend what it could possibly mean to have identical entities in different locations at the same time, when location is a component of identity. This concept of possible worlds is injected to expand our epistimological understanding of the hypothetical, but, if taken literally, it cannot be sustained because there really aren't multiverses outside of science fiction.

All of this is just to say:even if we allow for a rigid designator of "I" across multiverses, that does not create a contradiction as long as we assume contradiction applies only intra-universe and not inter-universe.

But back to the classic versus modal logic discussion:

If in classic logic I say:

All glurgs are glogs
I am a glurg
Therefore I am a glog

That is true, despite the fact there is no referent for any of this gibberish. That is why we can use symbols to represent these entities because their existence is irrelevant for the analysis.

Under modal logic we say:

It is necessary all glurgs are glogs
It is possible I am a glurg
It is therefore possible I am a glog

This is true as well, purely from a formal level, despite there are no glogs here, there, are anywhere.

The issue then becomes providing a definition of "possible," as you allow for pure meaningless formality under classic logic but not under modal logic. Since "possible" is the only new thing inserted, that must be the reason you treat these two systems different. What you then do is require metaphysical grounding in order for the possible to occur, but that I challenge. You no more need semantical validity for modal logic to work than classic. It's good to have semantically meaningful statements, but not required.

That is, the same tension occurs in classic logic. Typically those syllogisms do more than just mindlessly maintain truth value through vacuous symbols. Typically they have semantical truth, but not always. I would say the same of modal logic as well. But to demand that modal logic always be semantical results in its collapse, despite its pragmatic value. I think the discussion of impossible worlds makes that clear. You can use modal logic to consider events that did not and cannot occur.

My position is that we must fictionalize the idea of multiverses for the purposes of gaining epistimological clarity, without regard to whether they really exist. Maybe explain what is gained or lost by this approach.

Then that's well clarified. I balk though at condemning my Christian brethren who adhere to a theology that includes a belief in eternal punishment under certain conditions.

As long as we agree that it is the act that defines the person, it hardly matters what supernatural belief motivates it.

They sacrificed them to the gods?

Seems we have broad agreement. — Banno

Since your gold standard is how one acts and we both advocate for the same acts, what else can you do to sustain the tension between religion and secular beliefs other than to (1) insist my religious beliefs are founded upon an overly benevolent misunderstanding of my own theology or (2) just declare me an abberation, an oddly secularly moral theist, a diamond in the rough

It is possible you know that its simply that religion isn't a malevolent force.

It's interesting, as I'd think on a religious forum there's probably an atheist right now who just can't get any theist to accept that his atheism doesn't make him a bad person.

Then continue your conversation with ChatGPT and ask it for Jewish interpretations that it stands for repudiation of human sacrifice and then have it compare that to your other post. Then argue with it and have it change its mind.

It has such poor resolve I find

But then ask it whether the Abrahamic religions prohibit human sacrifice and have it compare those views to secular views over time and see whose history is more admiral.

My point will remain: no strranger in the midst of an Abrahamic community need worry about their kinfolk being burned to the gods. How the Jews in particular might fair in the midst of strangers on the other hand, not always so well.

But I'm not presenting any of this claiming superiority of culture or belief. We all have the same potential for kindness. I'm just trying to make that point, and that intolerance of religion based upon special fear of its brand of evil isn't justified

I'm not sure why you would disregard authorial intent. — BitconnectCarlos

We don't know who the author was. I look at the interpretation of those who've used the document. I'm not discarding historical analysis. I'm relying upon it heavily.

This is a political question, but my answer would be no. Admittedly, my perspective is shaped by my theology, and I can understand how others might disagree. — BitconnectCarlos

Here's my question. If Abraham would have killed Isaac and burned him as an offering to God and that account was consistly interpreted as a prohibition against child sacrifice, resulting in the end of that practice for good, would it matter what other literal translations could have been made?

Meaning is use. And it's for that reason all this contemporary interpretation that decontextualizes the thousands of years preceding say nothing other than if we were the interpreters, we would have come up with pretty evil conclusions.

The interpreters did not do that. They looked for meaning, purpose, and morality. If someone wishes to say they shouldn't have falsely attributed their wisdom to a self-declared holy book in order to provide their wisdom divine status, then I wish that would just be said as opposed to explaining what the right way of interpreting should have been had the interpreters just have been better literalists.