Nuh. Instead of worrying about meaning, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to burn their book, just that they not to use it as an excuse for abominations. — Banno

Nuh, instead of worrying about using a book as an excuse for abominations, worry about what folk do. I'm not asking folk to use anything as an excuse for abominations, just that they not commit abominations.

(Cleaned it up to avoid special pleading, so as to remove the suggestion that there's some rule particular to the Bible that doesn't apply universally).

Is wisdom found in the book, — Banno

Meaning is in your head. Squiggly symbols are the book. Authorial intent is irrelevant.

Let us suppose you read a book, used it to form moral analysis, to form charitable works, used it to form community, used it to form positive identity, do you destroy all that you created if you later learn it was meant as nothing more than a book of humorous tales?

And you needn't point out all could have been done without it because that doesn't justify removing it.

Agree, although Dan McClellan argues that the earliest layers of the Hebrew Bible are supportive of human sacrifice. I mention this because McClellan is prominent in biblical scholarship today. — BitconnectCarlos

Interesting, but not surprising. In the earliest passages, it wasn't monotheistic and gods procreated with humans to form monsters, so God wiped out the planet with a flood.

So you could have written the Bible in a way that better represented God, a blown opportunity by the author to have described God as a testing being, teaching by temptation. I'm not sure that's consistent with the greater story line of our sometimes flawed protaganist Yahweh.

I don't take the Bible as the inerrant word of God, and so pointing out better ways it could say things doesn't prove much other than we don't have a divine document.

As to the question of whether it is the source or horrors, less so than other laws documents, maybe more so than others. What is the bigger point you wish to make? Do I discard the wisdom extracted over the millenia because you can show me it's not the perfect book?

No, I am merely distinguishing between murder and the institution of sacrifice. God lets us know very early on that murder (including the murder of animals) is wrong. Yet animal sacrifices were offered throughout the Second Temple era and were offered by many of the forefathers. Giving an animal as a sacrifice is not the same as murdering it, even though the animal is slaughtered in both. — BitconnectCarlos

This is just legalistic stuff, but for what it's worth, retzach is the type of killing forbidden in the Torah. It is not a universal prohibition against killing humans (as killing in war and self defense are examples of lawful killing). That word does not relate to the killing of animals. That is, you can't "murder" an animal, but it is forbidden to kill an animal for the purposes of causing it suffering.

There are laws against sacrifice (referred to as "passing through fire"), but I'd think sacrifice would be a form of retzach, but also a particularly forbidden type. I'm not saying the distinction isn't relevant, but I do think that human sacrifice is a form of retzach, among other things.

The Isaac story is generally viewed by Jews as further support that human sacrifice is forbidden. There are other passages that forbid human sacrifice. There is not a reasonable interpretation that it is supportive of human sacrifice.

Christians see it similarly, but also as foreshadowing Jesus's life, death, and ressurection, a human sacrifice of a child directly of God, brought to earth to purge humanity of its sins. A metaphorical sacrificial lamb.

This strengthens the idea that Isaac was a willing participant. — BitconnectCarlos

Kierkegaard's focus wasn't as much on Isaac's acceptance of his fate as it was on Abraham's pure faith in not resisting or questioning God. Since I see the story as metaphor, what is it that is added by concentrating on Isaac's complicity? There is no evidence Isaac knew the sacrifice was God's will, so what do we say about Isaac that he did whatever his father asked without question? Abraham was over 100 years old at the time. Isaac would have easilly taken him.

It's not murder, it's ritual sacrifice. Nothing in the text suggests Isaac resisted or didn't cooperate. Many interpretations portray him as a willing participant. — BitconnectCarlos

I don't understand this comment. Are you suggesting that ritual sacrifice by wililng participants is ok? Seems like something we would want to eliminate. Whether it falls within the purview of "murder" is a very legalistic concern that ignores the fact that it's highly immoral regardless of how we pedantically classify the act.

If, though, you want to go down the path of drawing factual distinctions (as in Isaac might have wanted his throat slit), there's also good argument Isaac was in his 30s at the time, meaning he wasn't even a child.

Notwithstanding all of this, the best argument is that under no hermeneutic has any Abrahamic religion used the binding story to suggest infanticide or sacrificial killing was morally justified. In fact the story is typically used as the opposite, which explains why Abrahamic religions prohibit human sacrifice clearly and historically, without exception. Infanticide has been more common in secular societies (although still largely forbidden), particularly Victorian Britain in the 1800s and China very recently, meaning we as a people have found all sorts of ways to do horrible things. In this instance of infanticide and ritualistic killing, the Abrahamic religions happen to have a much more admirable history though.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infanticide

But generally I read the comment your responded to more innocuously, as in it was indicating that child murder is condemnable under any scenario, which I'd agree to.

It appears like you understand this quite well, now try to convince Banno of this. Banno does not admit that incompatibility, and this is what supports fatalism. Yet Banno also denies fatalism, and that is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright, I'll set out the basics and tell me where we disagree:

The fatalism issue arises in classic logic and is cured by modal logic. As in:

Classic Logic:

1. If it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It rains tomorrow
I get wet

The fatalistic issue arises from fixing #2 as certain

Modal Logic (assuming both premises apply within the same possible world):

1. It is necessary that if it rains tomorrow, I will get wet
2. It is possible that it will rain tomorrow
It is possible I will get wet.

There is no fatalism because #2 is possible, not necessary.

Modal logic adds in two new qualifiers ((1) it is necessary, and (2) it is possible) that allows for the avoidance of fatalism. This cures the limitation of classic logic.

Are you saying that Banno is denying fatalism within classic or modal logic? I'm just trying to figure this out because you referenced Banno's other comments generally and I have no way of really figuring out what that refences because I've been bouncing in and out of this thread.

Let's say you were up with Moses on Mount Sinai. What would need to transpire for you to become a believer? — BitconnectCarlos

This conflates two sorts of faith: (1) faith in God's existence and (2) faith in God's guidance.

Recall the biblical account. The Israelites were present at Mt. Sinai, and they had seen the miracle of the plagues, water from rocks, bushes burning unconsumed, manna from heaven, and seas parting. Despite this evidence, they became restless at Moses' absence while in the process of receiving the 10 Commandments and built a golden calf.

They lacked "faith," but they never questioned God's existence. How could they? He was as obvious as anything before them.

They lacked faith in his guidance and so they disobeyed.

Today's lack of faith, doubting the very existence of God, would be absurdly anachronistic in a biblical setting.

My point is asking why faith #1 is at all worth having without #2? What do you do with this cosmic discovery? You've found a new planet, you've found God, and you found your missing keys. Seems like there's a whole lot more to this faith thing that has us all talking about it.

If you insist that modal logic fails because of its failure to adhere to classical logic standards related to ontological status, then you will be de facto rejecting modal logic. Modal logic admits to the incompatibility noted by Aristotle and responds to it, so I don't know how to respond other than to say if you want modal logic to act like classic logic you can't have model logic.

In any event, give me a syllogism in modal logic you feel fails by giving an illogical result due to its adherence to modal logic standards and not classical so I can see concretely why you object.

How are you finding The Lonely Man of Faith? Would you recommend it? — BitconnectCarlos

It's good. It's heavy on Western philosophy which is unusual for a head of an Orthodox yeshiva. It also relies upon biblical metaphor, which gives it greater appeal than more strict literal readings would (although no doubt the Rav is a strict believer).

In sum, the two creation stories reveal two different Adams, the first a scientific acheiver and builder, the second an internally driven person seeking meaning. Man is both Adams, but society values only the former, resulting in lonliness, with meaning given no value.

David Lewis appears to argue differently than me in my response to @Metaphysician Undercover above, where Lewis asserts that modal possibilities are real. Do you take this position or do you accept the position I've submitted where they are just abstractions (which seems to the be predominate view from what I've seen). I can't see what Lewis' approach adds by creating these empirically unprovable extra worlds.

I'd also wonder what Lewis' response would be to counterpossible worlds, as in are there ontologically real impossibilities? Not only are there worlds where I wear a green hat, but there are worlds where I wear a green hat and not a green hat.

I think this kind of thinking does a disservice to the enterprise by inserting hopelessly confusing notions, but maybe it can be explained to me why modal realism beats modal abstractions.

I think musical forms represent a people's history. Like let's say things are tough, then their music might be melancholic, but then once they get drunk, they start singing along nonsense lyrics at bars.

The question is less about why the Egyptians don't sing like us than it is why we don't walk like them.

This future scenario, of me carrying an umbrella at 7AM tomorrow morning, is neither true nor false, and Aristotle described it as a violation of the law of excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is classic logic, not modal logic, though, correct? I understand that if we're referrring to what might be we can't set it out in terms of what it currently is. The antecedent is conditional, and it is useful to logically determine an outcome on a possible world because we require that sort of logic to make our decisions.

I believe this is because the object, as thing spoken about, has no temporal extension into the future, and therefore has no identity in that direction beyond the present. To say that there is an object, with an identity, in the future, is a false proposition due to the reality of future possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your objection is that the hypothetical possibility is not ontological in existence and so you therefore cannot logically consider it? This I don't follow. Why can't we logically assess possible worlds that aren't actual worlds? This is the point of modal logic.

I have no problem with modal logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

You say this, but your objections are directed straight at it. You demand ontological reality upon your propositions prior to performing logical functions on them, which is an outright rejection of modal logic. You have a metaphysical demand you're placing upon a linguistic/logical function. You're playing the language game of classic logic and refusing to speak modal logic. That's fine, but it's not an objection about anything inconsistent with modal logic. It's just a refusal to accept it as a mode of reasoning.

This is just to say that if you insist upon actual worlds for the conditions to exist in to perform logic upon them, then you're refusing to consider possible worlds, which is what distinguishes classical and modal logic from one another.

My thoughts on this have returned to our A -> ~ A discussion, distinguishing the vacuous from the semantically meaningful.

One example I came across was Goldbach's Conjecture, which states " that every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers." This theory is not proven, thus a "conjecture."

So, consider this statement, "if Goldbach's theory is false, there is an even integer greater than 2 that cannot be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers."

This is a potentially impossible antecedent that offers a logical piece of information in the consequent.

It is modal in the hypothetical form, yet an impossible antecedent, yet not a vacously true consequent.

To the extent it might be suggested that an impossible world antecedent renders a meaningless or a vacuous consequent, I think has to be reconsidered.

The counter to this is perhaps these impossible antecedents are only resulting in definitional consequents and are obscured tautolgies, but, honestly I haven't thought long enough on it. But that feels like a possible lurking response and goes back to my prior comment about the seeming analytic quality of these statements.

That is, is the Goldbach consequent stated above synthetic or just analytically derived from the antecedent?

I'm sure someone has hashed this out somewhere.

An unusual phrasing, but I supose modal logic apples to impossible worlds and is what shows them to contain the contradictions that render them impossible. — Banno

There's an article on everything:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/#CouRea

Well it's not my original thinking. I got this from a Catholic Priest friend of mine and it sounded reasonable. I can't do much about your seemingly sour reaction to it. — Tom Storm

OK, then the Priest provided an ad hom, and you responded to my comment about an ad hom with another ad hom, suggesting it wasn't that it was an ad hom, but that i was just sour. Like I'm at all upset.

I actually think if theists feel this way, it is entirely understandable. No irony. — Tom Storm

The irony is that theists justify their judgment upon others based upon concern for their souls. You offered a similar concern for the souls of theists but from an atheist perspective.

My suggestion is that we stop being so concerned for each other's differing views. I trust wholly in the sincerity of your atheism, have no desire to modify it, and don't believe that but for some unfortunate circumstance you'd be different. Different strokes.

Speculating: I think some theists believe they have read all the right philosophy and theology and have many of the answers and that modern secular culture is debased and decadent. They're probably angry about the state of the world, and when they encounter people with views they've identified as the cause of contemporary troubles, they lash out. — Tom Storm

Explain how this isn't pure ad hom.

I say this because even if you're entirely right, it might be they're theists because theism is true.

It'd be like me opining that atheism is borne from trauma and alienation and whatever else sounds right. Wouldn't your response simply be, sure, all of that, but that you're atheist because that position is correct.

Not to mention it sounds like you care for the souls of the misguided. Ironic.

that was pornography — frank

You saw it too?

Who in their right mind would want to be a plumber? — frank

They make really good money and according to some videos I saw online, women really enjoy when they come over, but something seemed off about it.

The answer is simple: I read it years ago and my taste has changed, so instead of continuing to say I don't like it I ought to see if maybe I do like it, because Tom is wise. — Jamal

You're right. I feel like shit now. Just read and hopefully enjoy.

Quite persuasive. I might try it again. — Jamal

Is this really a thing? I mean I get how tastes can change over time, but can it happen by persuasion? Like, this wine is delicious now that you point out it has hints of cinnamon.

I suppose if you learned something you didn't know that made the book meaningful (like did you know it had to do with American vacuous excess? No, I didn't realize that, so now I like it because it feeds into my bias about America, or some such (hah!)) you could better appreciate it then.

But that's not what happened here. You agreed to reconsider on his arguments from subjective taste alone.

I'm not going to allow a pro Gatsby rebellion to take place without a fight.

Can you see another way to save Meta from modal collapse? Is p(x)⊃☐p(x) too strong a rendering of his account? — Banno

Alright, I'm following along here.

If all we wish to do is save any aspect of modal reasoning so as to avoid absolute collapse, we have to show such a thing as modal reasoning exists in impossible worlds.

This is so because under the hyper-essentialsm advanced "if I were wearing a blue shirt" is logically equivalent to 2×2=5.

So, if 2×2=5, then i am the king of France.

Or, if God is not omni-benelovent, then there is no problem with evil (assuming we are taking a classic definition of God here).

That is, we've entertained what might happen in the impossible world, which is modal reasoning.

Clearly something feels different here, as our hypothesizing is purely analytic. This differs from me saying "If I were wearing a blue shirt, it would better match my pants."

This strikes me as what we discussed a while back regarding if a then not a, the vacously true. But is this modal reasoning? Maybe in some form. We're entertaining hypotheticals, but not in a world that exists.

At a minimum, this does show that extreme essentialism limits modal reasoning to the logical fringes at best.

is a possible object, and this means that it cannot have a true identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it rains, I'll get my umbrella is modal logic, and it may or may not be raining at the moment or ever again in the future. Why do these temporal issues of what is happening now or later interfere with our ability to logically assess? That is, can I not logically reason based upon the antecedent without the antecedent being true in this world? That seems what modal logic is.

The upshot is that while in Meta's system we might be able to say "Meta might have read Kripke", this cannot be more than a string of words. We cannot make any deductions therefrom, like "If Meta had read Kripke then we might not be having this conversation". — Banno

I'm not sure about this. We make deductions from hypotheticals where we openly acknowledge loss of identity. As in, "if I were you, I'd have read Kripke." Can't I make deductions therefrom while admitting me being you is not something that could exist in a possible world to the extent it contradicts identity of objects?

Or, ironically, isn't your analysis of Meta's argument a contradiction of your argument. You asked "if Meta is correct, what would the consequence be?" Do you suggest you were only able to assess Meta's statement if Meta were correct in a possible world, even though Meta says he can't exist but in this world?

Not that I agree with Meta's other thoughts on hyper-strictnesss of identity, but I don't know a consequence of it is the inability to assess hypotheticals entirely. And I do agree there are consequences to modal practice if one accepts @Metaphysician Undercover, but maybe not as severe as stated.

It has very extensive commentary, which is very good. . Sample page:
Artscroll is the Orthodox shul version.

I'd be interested to hear more about these, especially the JPS commentary. I take it that it draws from thinkers like Rashi and Nachmanides, as well as the Talmudic rabbis and others? — BitconnectCarlos

I'd describe the commentary as scholarly and academic, with some references to traditional sources, but no expectation the reader is Orthodox or necessarily a believer. It's not like the Artscroll chumash.

Yeah, but did you care he died, like were you at all invested in him as a character, or was it just pretty prose?

As explained, I'm not so keen on such theological meanderings, to what may have began here: — Banno

You recited Christian theology and all I did was note it. I had no deeper purpose, as if to spread the love of Christ, as if I have any personal attachment to such theology.

The debates here are minimally substantively theological. They generally ask the question whether theology is stupid. Those who don't think it's stupid get pissed and start defending their religion, leaving them prey to further antagonism.

The OP here didn't answer what faith was as much as whether faith is stupid or dangerous or foolish.

Since faith is the centerpiece of religion, it seems its answer would lie somewhere in a theological discussion that preceded our conversation.

The Great Gatsby.

Beautifully rich writing though a little too rich for my pedestrian tastes, I guess. — praxis

I place that book among the most over-rated books of all time.

The Lonely Man of Faith by Joseph Soloveithik. A dicussion of spiritual man versus obedient man. Interesting dichotomy.

Deuteronomy - The JPS Torah Commentary - by Yahweh Almighty. A retellling of a tale of a people. Questionable fact wise.

Slaughterhouse Five by Kurt Vonnegut. A war fucks everything and everyone sort of story. Point made.

The Art of Experience by John Dewey. A pragmatist"s essays on aesthetics to provide fodder in the Shoutbox. A bit boring.

I blame ↪Hanover... And of course you are welcome to your views. — Banno

Very well, but for someone so averse to conversations of God, you're omnipresent in these threads.

I, for one, have never begun such a thread, but I'd like to think I keep them balanced, since theism does not entail reliance upon any particular written document, any particular hermeneutic, or actually any scripture at all.

Totally irrelevant and a classic example of resorting to denigration when no argument can be found. — Janus

No, your statement was just categorically wrong, so I provided a similar statement to mirror yours, hoping to point that out, but you just got mad.

There are thousands of years of theological debate, consisting of hundreds of millions of pages. And then you say "there's just no way to rationally debate it."

I'm just saying maybe rethink your post, which is really not a major event. I'm truly not trying just to piss you off.

There seems to be no rational way to argue that when it comes to scripture — Janus

There are no books providing argument in support or against Wittgenstein either.

I just thought I'd write a post as bad as yours so you could see how bad it looked when you read it.

I don't agree. It will suffice to point out that "bad" philosophical arguments include those that rest on authority, divine or otherwise. — Banno

Debating the meaning of original philosophical sources is common here and in academia. There must be some reason you read and debate Wittgenstein for example which goes beyond just trying to put a random puzzle together. That is, you sympathize with his views, believe he has something significant to say, and think he carries a certain knowledge beyond yours worth pursuing.

Does that mean you blindly accept anything be says? Of course not, but there's probably built in deference.

We can both pretend that we've arrived at our fundamental positions after worldly search. I coincidentally found meaning in Judaism, it having nothing to do with my environment, and you having found meaning in the leading anglo-analytic thinkers, that too having had nothing to do with your environment.

Sure.

We're all looking for meaning, and you must begin with some source you're willing to grant credibility to. There are enough legitimate means to finding that meaning that we need not force each other to any particular one. It is the intolerant proselytizer that smugly arrives that we can do without because he lives under the illusion his brand of wisdom is best and that he'll change someone's mind who's not looking to change.

If someone has found meaning in John Smith's interpretation of gold plates stumbled upon supposedly in the Adirondack for example, and he has full buy in to all that due to his upbringing, why would I suggest it's bullshit? That i don't get.

Again, philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom.

I'll stand by that. — Banno

Okay, but that's not what you said in the post I responded to.

In summary there are three things that identify a move from a philosophical enquiry to mere theology:
claiming that god is the answer to a philosophical question
using scripture, revelation or other religious authority in an argument
entering into a philosophical argument in bad faith. — Banno

I wish you'd number your three elements for clarity. You also don't attach an "and," or "or," so I don't know if you have to have all 3 or just 1 to be in bad faith. I only understand lawyer speak, sorry.

Two responses: (1) Not all theological systems require scripture be the word of God, which would mean your objection is to only certain theologies, and (2) you need to define what "philosophical argument" rightly is to explain why your criteria are necessary to remain within in it.

It sounds like you view philosophy as pursuit of truth, with only certain types of justifications permissible to reach that truth.

I submit that sophy means wisdom, not truth.

Almost. I've writ about it at some length. What's philosophically illegitimate is dependence on divine writ. — Banno

It makes no sense to deny the philosophical import of divine writ. Why would you deny a writing from God himself?

What you mean to say is one shouldn't justify one's belief in a document based upon their false belief it is from God.

Yet that does not mean the writ is false. It just means the basis for accepting it is invalid

This therefore means one shouldn't justify one's disbelief in a document based upon their correct belief it is not from God.

Would that the race were so provincial that one could opt out of it -- as it is I'd bet on convincing the guys at the back it'll be easier to just take the prize than win the race. — Moliere

The game may be immoral or objectively unfair, which could be a reason to opt out, but, saving those concerns, victory favors the competitive. If being stronger wins, they get stronger. If playing the victim wins, they play the victim.

Perhaps. I'm not so keen on such theological meanderings. Thanks. — Banno

You mention trinity and the primacy of love as a value in a thread about faith and think no one will notice the consistency with Christianity?

An argument could be made that you're just making the argument that Christianity would be fine if Christians would just adhere to their creed.

I think most Christians would give an Amen to that.

The physics of the toilet is also fascinating. The sudden release of water from the tank causes the pressure build up and release and you get that classic flush. If you were to take a large bucket of water and dump it in the bowl, you could create the flush effect without flipping the handle.

A partially empty tank from too frequent a flush results in that disappointing non-flush we all know of.

I would assume if your bladder burst and copius amounts of urine flooded past your loins, it would be theoretically possible to gain the flush hands free, the ambition of every schoolboy. I say boy, not girl, because girls curiously have less interest in such things. No idea why that is.

Were I writing in opposition to myself here, I might be pointing out that faith is one amongst at least a trinity, and that when set in the context of hope and love it shines, and my arguments fall away. — Banno

So this is a complicated statement, crossing categories with strong Christian allusions (lthe trinity and primacy of love (John 4:8 "Whoever does not love does not know God, because God is love)).

So, faith and hope I'd classify as epistemic categories. It describes the way we know our reality. Faith falls into the certainty class, and should we say we have fauth of something we indicate in our speech as it is. To hope (as to wish, to dream) we don't indicate it is, but we state it as a hypothetical or aspired for reality. The point being that I place hope and faith as ways of qualifying our knowledge of the Good., but not the Good itself

But love, as you use it, sounds like tthe Good iself, the thing we wish to achieve.

Your comment could therefore be interpreted as saying faith in something other than love is dangerous, which is consistent with saying that faith in something other than God is dangerous, if we equate God with love, as John did.