And the anti-realist will say that this is how our everyday conversions work. The anti-realist's position is an accurate representation of truth and statements as we ordinarily use them and the world as we ordinarily understand it. — Michael

There is a belief among ultra-religious Jews that the name of a person defines the person in a particular way. I suppose this comes from the fact that within the Bible certain characters have their names changed when major events occur in their lives. Jacob, for example, became Israel when he wrestled with an angel. So in current day ultra-orthodoxy a treatment for the dying is to change their name as that will change the person.

Anyway, was Jacob the same person after he was named Israel or the sick person the same person after he was renamed if the community of meshuggenehs all think he's changed identities.

But I've made this point already, I just thought I'd do it with a citation this time. — Isaac

I miss your point. I've not argued for naive realism. It was very far from it. I argued for reality mediated by perceptions, with an assertion there was an objective underlying reality that was dubiously knowable. To hold otherwise is anti-realism, which sounds like idealism of a sort. I also don't follow how the placebo effect disproves naive realism even if it were held. Typically the direct realists argue from a linguistic or pragmatic perspective and tend to be anti-metaphysical.

Anyway, maybe I misunderstood your post.

This "metaphysical definition" is useless then. The ship becomes a new ship every instant, atoms rubbing off in the wind or water, electrons absorbing photons from the Sun, etc. And it's still not entirely clear which material stuff is referred to when you talk about "the ship" in this metaphysical sense; there's no objective cut-off point that says that this particle is part of the ship and this particle is just passing by. — Michael

If the world is in the flux you suggest, then are you asserting a lack of identity of any object without a perceiver?

@Srap Tasmaner@Michael

Do you guys think it would be possible to match your avatars even closer just to make this more confusing?

On the one hand we have the realist who says that statements are made true by objective features of the world, but what objective features of the world must obtain for the ship that leaves to be the ship that returns? Presumably that the mind-independent material stuff that leaves is the mind-independent material stuff that returns. Which in this case doesn't obtain, and so the realist must commit to "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being false. However that might not be a commitment the realist is willing to make, and so they must accept an anti-realist account of "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being true; that it's true because we think of the ship that leaves as being the ship that returns. — Michael

The realist does commit as you've said they would (and as I've bolded). The realist defines the ship as the specific matter that was there originally because he's offering a metaphysical definition within the context of that conversation. That is, the ship is exactly what it is.

In the vernacular however, "the ship" is a social construct, subject to whatever definition the speakers want it to have. We call it the same boat because it maintained a sense of apparent identity through time and continued its same function. Regardless of why we keep calling it the same name has no metaphysical impact. We're just identifying something consistently because we happen not to care what its material composition is through time for our definitional purposes.

So, yes, the ship (defined as a ship of material composition X) that leaves is not the ship that returns, but the ship (defined as a boat that serves the same function through time) that leaves is the ship that returns.

As long as we know what we mean by "ship" and don't equivocate, this can remain clear.

So truth is only --- not even "also" but "only" --- a matter of our choices.

That's not much of a realism. It looks like idealism + "Oh yeah, and there's some stuff, I guess." — Srap Tasmaner

This is consistent with my comment to @Banno, which was was:

What part of the planet do you propose is restricted by the world? — Hanover

Maybe my point was missed or not well stated, but it asks how does reality restrict anything we do, perceive, or believe? We can say it does, but exactly how? How does the noumenal affect the phenomenal? Maybe not at all, but somehow?

This is the quandary, and there isn't an adequate answer, thus leaving philosophers with plenty to talk about forever and ever.

Our choices: (1) idealism and just declare everything is just imagined, and then are left wondering what causes us to imagine in such a way, (2) direct realism and declare the world is just as we see it to be, ignoring the fact the different beings perceive in different ways, or (3) indirect realism, declaring we can interpret reality, but we have no idea how that interpretation is consistent with reality.

The other solution here is to ignore things as they are, admitting that such is an impossible inquiry and then to talk about word games, pretending that ignoring the problem resolves the problem. Or maybe pragmatism, which asks why even ask when we're going to do what we're going to do anyway.

Does it? As I brought up the Ship of Theseus then let's consider that. The ship that leaves is the ship that returns but the material that leaves isn't the material that returns, therefore the ship isn't the material.

Or would you commit to saying that the ship that leaves isn't the ship that returns, which it would appear the realist must. If so, then how much of the material is the "true" substance of the thing? If only half the parts are replaced does it remain the same ship? A quarter? A tenth? — Michael

Whatever of the same returns is what returns. If a single atom of the old boat returns, then we have a single atom of the old boat.

Whether you wish to call the boat Theseus isn't a metaphysical question. If I have a jar of 100 marbles that I call "Tommy" and I replace 99 of them with new marbles, whether I still have Tommy is a definitional question, not a metaphysical one. What I can say is that I have one original marble. If we decide I no longer have Tommy, we haven't defined that single marble out of existence to where we can now say since Tommy is dead there's nothing left of him.

Whether those marbles are Tommy isn't the question. Which marbles might exist is the question, and if you want to call them Tommy or not isn't part of that question.

We split up the world into so-called objects, on such a view, and thus all statements that presuppose there being multiple objects are strictly false, just a manner of speaking. — Srap Tasmaner

That we split the world into arbitrarily assigned objects doesn't challenge the fact that there is external existence. Any object and any particle theoretically can be subdivided and grouped with other objects, but there is something in existence and we can choose to grab an arbitrary bunch of that stuff and call it X.

X designates what is in existence, but assigns no particular property to that existnece.

What makes Pluto one thing, and not trillions of different things? What we call "Pluto" is "really" a mass of particles in close proximity. Which of those particles are part of Pluto, which are part of some separated rock, which are a passing photon from the Sun? — Michael

Existence is not an attribute or property of an object.

To say an object exists is different from saying an object has certain properties. Pluto exists as a random allotment of particles (and the particles in themselves are also a random allotment of smaller particles, thus an infinite regress). Whether Pluto is a planet is a question about what specific properties we assign to the term "planet" and whether the object of Pluto has them.

In the event of a prolonged shut down, Defcon 1 would be declared and TPF would execute its Emergency Readiness Protocol. Rest assured, the mods and admins here are committed to philosophical interaction regardless of circumstance.

Cheers. Hence my puzzling about direction of fit. Consider Srap's planet example - what counts as a planet is imposed on the world, and yet restricted by the world. That same process is in place for maths. and perhaps for ethics. — Banno

What part of the planet do you propose is restricted by the world?

We could look at ancient Athens, employ our abstraction, and say that there are buildings there; but those are not buildings in the same way that our buildings are buildings, are they? — Srap Tasmaner

I'd say there are things and there are categories. Pluto was a planet, then it was not, but it was always there. All sorts of criteria must be met for us to call Pluto a planet and we can choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have, but Pluto remains regardless of what we call it and regardless of what category we assign it. That I take to be the fundamental tenant of realism. There is an independent substance sustaining the thing; otherwise the thing exists as a pure construct of our imagination.

Moral realism requires that good and bad exist, just as Pluto exists, but good and bad don't exist in just the form that planets exist. That is, I can decide if Pluto is a satellite or a planet, but I can't decide it's not there. Pluto exists whether there are people to categorize it or define it.

Moral realism posits goodness and badness at the ontological level. It claims that it is the moral that is real (ergo "moral realism"), not just what we happen to call it. So, rape is bad. It doesn't become bad depending upon our purposes. That goodness and badness exist outside of us, offering it a place in reality, apart from our imagination.

To state otherwise, I contend, leaves us in a subjective state of morality, which is what you either accept or you accept what I've stated above. Both are fairly difficult to swallow, to be sure, because moral relativism and subjectivism require an admission that abhorrent acts are bad until we decide they're not. Moral absolutism is bizarre in that it has concepts floating about, truly existing, seeking a god to hold them firmly in his bosom.

If nothing else, God's Bosom is a pretty good name for a punk rock band.

No, I'm not saying that bad buildings are akin to bad acts. As I said above, I'm saying that the use of the word bad is not always subjective, it depends on what our point of reference is.

I do, believe rape is bad or morally wrong because of the objective nature of the harm done. It's just as objective, in my view, as the existence of the building. And ya, rape is bad regardless of what anyone thinks. — Sam26

This is moral relativism.

A building is "bad" if it does not fulfill its purpose, contextualized to the needs of the person building the building. The key here is that the "bad" judgment of the building is relative entirely upon human needs. A building designed to collapse under minimal strain for experimental purposes is a good building under that context, but if it fails to fail, it is bad. We can agree then, it's a matter of context when talking about good and bad buildings. We judge the building based upon pre-agreed criteria, and once those criteria are agreed upon, we can be objectively right or wrong in saying whether those criteria are met.

It's the criteria that aren't objective here, and that's the problem I'm pointing out. The criteria are relative to our needs and possibly arbitrary.

Turning to moral realism: Rape isn't bad relative to the needs of society. It's absolutely bad. It is bad not like the Leaning of Tower of Pisa is a bad building. It is bad like the Leaning Tower of Pisa is over 50 feet tall. It's just part of reality that rape is bad. That's what moral realism means. If you want to say that reality is entirely subjective, created by humans for humans, that's not realism, that's idealism. If you want to say that what we designate as morally bad is a human creation, that isn't moral realism either. That's subjectivism.

I don't think that quite addresses the anti-realist's position, though. Let's say that we in the UK abolish the monarchy. Does the Queen of England exist? Well, Elizabeth Windsor exists, but as there is no monarchy there is no Queen of England, and if there is no Queen of England then the Queen of England doesn't exist. — Michael

This just seems to be indirect realism, but maybe that's what's meant by anti-realism, I don't know. If you're committed to the idea that there is some underlying structure that makes it real (i.e. having some independence from the observer) then that is realism to me. I accept that everything is interpreted within a person's mind and don't believe there is some sort of raw feed of data into someone's consciousness. So, you can interpret Ms. Windsor as queen, as just a kind old lady, or as a pounds of flesh and bones for whatever your purposes you might have, but that's realism to me. It's not direct realism, but I wasn't arguing for that.

As to moral realism, I'd hold to the same rule, which is that there must be something separate from the observer for the moral to be real. If I say "there is a building" and all I mean is that I see what appears to me a building, which may or may not exist at all, I am not a realist. If I say "rape is wrong" and all I mean is that its wrongness is only what I feel and believe, then I'm not a moral realist.

If a poorly constructed building fails to meet certain criteria, we call it bad. We decide for ourselves what those criteria are depending upon the utility we seek from the building. There are no objectively good or bad buildings. It's just a matter of preference. On the other hand, the building itself exists regardless of my preference or opinion.

As to morality, are you claiming that bad buildings are akin to bad acts, and saying that rape (for example) is bad if it meets our criteria for badness based upon whatever social objectives we might have,? Or, do you subscribe to the position that rape is bad regardless of what I think, much like the building exists regardless of my opinion?

The "badness" IS the suffering. — Sam26

No, there are two things (1) badness and (2) suffering. #2 is an emotional state. #1 is a judgment about that emotional state. If I say "you are suffering," that will be true if the event of your suffering is occurring. If I say "your suffering is bad," that will be true if your suffering is bad. What is "bad" here other than an opinion? Your suffering is occurring (or not) regardless of my opinion. Why doesn't this apply to "bad"?

I can't dictate whether your pain is real, but can I dictate whether your pain is morally bad? If I can't, how do I know?

science is discovers, ethics created? And we can work our way on from there. — Banno

The fact that we can even ask the question "what if our ethical creation is unethical?" sensically proves this wrong. The ethical exists as it is regardless of what we wish to think might be ethical.

Well, there's subjective, and then there's subjectivity. Perhaps we might look for something more than your intuitions. I had assumed you would adopt an anti-realist approach, given you think
"the false can be true"
— Hanover — Banno

The apparent contradiction is clarified by pointing out that the literal proposition may be false but the principle elucidated true. If I spin a tale to teach a moral lesson, it doesn't make the moral lesson untrue just because the tale is. I see this as a literary device especially prevalent in religious, spiritual, moral, and wisdom writings, but not as a comment on whether morals exist separate from us. My point in other threads was that if you read those writings literally, you will reach absurd results of otherwise foundational writings and will see nonsense where others find wisdom.

As to whether there is an objectively dechiperable moral truth, I say there is, which entails there be a referent beyond intra-subjective agreement as to the metaphysical existence of "good" when I say it is good to care for others. This embodiment of the good is the god element. There is no other way around it, which is why those who contend objective moral truths without reference to any divine being ultimately are unable to support their position.

Here, and wherever some one/thing suffers. — 180 Proof

But where is the moral judgment? I get that the suffering is occurring in the world as an objectively identifiable event, but where is the badness of it except in your opinion?

Is this undemocratic? Can this be justified in that it protects people and actions that are unpopular? — Down The Rabbit Hole

It's not just the Bill of Rights that limits the power of the majority, but it's the entire structure of the document itself, particularly with the upper and lower houses, the division of votes by state and district, the executive powers and limitations, and the role of the courts. The document is designed to limit government power generally, which is why traditionalists typically argue ideologically in favor of limited government in all regard.

The US system does place ultimate authority in the voter, so that does make it democratic, but the control of the masses is fairly tight.

Is it that anti-realism applies to ethics and aesthetics because we seek to make the world as we say, while realism applies to ontology and epistemology because we seek to make what we say fit the world — Banno

Strange to posit a psychological basis, implying a subjectivity even in the theories we choose.

I'd say simply that we are ontological realists by default because it is intuitively obvious the stair we just tripped on is actually there independent of us. Only through (too) much thought will we question that.

As to why morality isn't the same, I'd say because we don't trip over good and evil and we realize we create all sorts of social norms. If the morally real is out there, where is it?

And Aesop meant to explain the lack of resolve foxes had in securing grapes.

You're right. But "the man" was only warned of death, not everything else--working, sweating, experiencing pain, sickness, inclination towards evil, etc., for himself and all his descendants. So, "the man" wasn't fully informed. — Ciceronianus

But see, Genesis 3:17, "To Adam he said, 'Because you listened to your wife and ate fruit from the tree about which I commanded you, 'You must not eat from it,' 'Cursed is the ground because of you; through painful toil you will eat food from it all the days of your life."

I take this to mean that Adam was punished not just for what he did but "because [he] listened to [his] wife." It's one thing I guess to defy God on your own, but to do it because your wife tells you to seems just a bit too much for even the good Lord to tolerate.

Were Adam and Eve informed of the consequences of the choice they made? I'd say no, they weren't, but could have been, by God. So, God is arguably responsible for the harm which resulted. — Ciceronianus

Sure he did. Genesis 2:15 to 2:17.

15 The Lord God took the man and put him in the Garden of Eden to work it and take care of it. 16 And the Lord God commanded the man, “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; 17 but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die.”

Note the wording of 2:17 where it says "when," not "if." Much has been said of this wording, indicating it was going to happen, not that it was something that might not. Had it not, would there have been no Jesus, considering his necessity arose from this original sin and he became necessary to save the souls of all future humans?

God is arguably responsible for everything, so when your tire blows out, you should properly thank God for that. Also, God does answers all prayers. Just a lot of times he says no.

isn’t that you have to agree with them (or me), Banno, but in your fullness of meaning in the absence of community (especially those communities feasting on putrifying deity), you can’t pretend as if your judgment (your aesthetic preference) is the necessary judgment. — Ennui Elucidator

I take your definition of "truth" then not to be a correspondence theory (to say the least), but a pragmatism that states the truth is that which is most helpful, not from a predictive perspective, but from a psychologically pleasing level. You anchor truth to subjective value, while, at the same time, admitting there exists an objective method of distinguishing truth from falsity (i.e. whether it corresponds to reality), but you just insist this objective method is "uninteresting" (your word, which I best understand as meaning "does not provide useful results" else you're just informing me it bores you).

To break this down to what I'm saying: If you say God created the world in 6 days, you claim that's a fact because it gives your life meaning, all the while knowing the actual world out there evolved over millions of years, correct? That is, you recognize clearly what is true out in the world, but your focus isn't in learning that, but in figuring out what you need to believe to get you mentally to the next day? What then to do with what you know the actual world to be like? Do you pretend it not to be? Does it obtain the status of all falsehoods, no different than theories that the world is flat for example?

That is: You call X a "fact, " and it is defined as a belief that succeeds under your utility theory even if it fails under correspondence theory. But what do you call belief Y that succeeds under corrrespondence but fails under utility? And, what do you call Z that fails under both?

Surely X, Y, and Z are deserving of different terms, with X and Y being metaphysically different. If you view Y and Z differently, you have to explain why, and that might erode your pragmatic theory if you are forced to admit it's because Y is a "fact," yet Z is not.

Also, how do meaningfully debate @Banno if he obtains psychological satisfaction from demanding that facts correspond to reality? How can you tell him he's wrong in his objections to you in this thread? Mustn't you afford him the same latitude as you did the starving man who needed to believe his apples weren't rotten and tell Banno all he has said is exactly right?

I do see our tacks being distinct here. I an committed to declaring there was no Noah's ark, that those who claim there was are wrong, but that the story itself is metaphorically true.

Have I understood correctly?

I wonder what 12,021 will look like. — James Riley

Duh.

They were fine until the neighbors moved in. Now they fare as well as their prey base. Not so good. What, with all the clear cutting, strip mining, over-grazing, damming, paving, subdividing, developing and commodification of natural and human resources. It's not looking good for them, but it's not looking good for the culprits either. — James Riley

I'm thinking the land demands per capita for hunter gatherers exceeds that of industrial societies by several hundred fold at least.

Hunter gatherers lost the Darwinian game. https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/hunter-gatherer-culture/

How are modern day hunter gatherers faring these days?

For the life of me, I'm not really sure what you guys are going on about with this "what is a fact" conversation. If the terms have different meanings in different contexts, can we not create two words for the purposes of this conversation so that we don't have to accuse one another of misusing a term?

The statement "fiction is true" is paradoxical, and honestly, when that claim was first presented to me it provided a bit of an "aha!" moment. It made room for religion in a scientific world, where everything was either considered true or false in a lab experiment sort of way, but this paradoxical statement allows that meaning could be known though entirely fictional means.

How the statement "the false can be true" can only make sense if we're using two different epistemologies when we say "false" and another when we say "true" in that sentence. In that sentence, the term "false" means false in the scientific sense, as in there was not really a talking fox in the fox and grapes parable. But "true" means true in the metaphorical sense in that parable, as in it explains how humans find meaning in the world.

When I say "the Bible is false, but it is true," that statement makes sense and is not contradictory because that sentence does not use "false" as a negation of true within the specific confines of that sentence. So, Christianity can be false and true at the same time, if false references literalism and true the metaphorical.

On another note, I took for granted the validity of your claim that the Christians destroyed much of Classic literature, but upon looking it up, I see that claim is disputed somewhat:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Darkening_Age I truly don't have a dog in that fight and am no more or less concerned if the ancient Christians did or didn't do as alleged, but it does seem to be an issue of scholarly debate.

And finally, I do generally have an objection to punishing someone for the sins of his ancestors, and I'd apply that also to organizations, like religion. That is, if ancient Christianity (or any religion) did all sorts of brutal and evil acts, that doesn't mean that the modern day form of the religion must inherit that guilt.

So, it appears that the extent to which the Christians actually burned classic literature is in dispute among scholars: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Darkening_Age

There does appear to be a factual question as to this, using the term "factual" in the usual ordinary way.

A person is supposed to do something, and then they will attain something — baker

Educate me on the eternal rewards provided to the righteous followers of Judaism denied to the sinners. This should be interesting.

No, it requires more than that. Belief in the historicity of Jesus is essential to Christianity. One has to believe that Jesus literally rose from the dead, or else the whole project of salvation becomes moot. — baker

Are you citing to some particular Protestant dogma that prescribes the particularities of the faith required for salvation, or are you just telling me your basic understanding or what you think ought be the case?

The point in religion is that particular moral tenets have to be believed for the right reasons. Ie., e.g. you have to believe that stealing is bad not because your mommy told you so or because you don't like being stolen from, but because God said that stealing was wrong. — baker

Now you're just making things up. It is not a universal tenant of religion that intent matters regardless of impact, and it is not universally considered sinful to do the right thing for the wrong reason.

It sounds like I'm just hearing a recitation of your recollections from Sunday school at this point and
you're presenting it as if they are universal axioms.

The type of problem you point to comes from reading literature primarily in a didactic, ideological sense, from reducing literature to a didactic, ideological message. It's a moralistic approach typical for American literary theory, but it is far from universal. It's not how we would read literature in continental Europe, for example. — baker

The story was originally in Greek I suppose, but do enlighten me how they read the fox and grapes story in continental Europe? Do they get held up when the fox starts talking and start looking for archeological evidence for talking foxes? Could you itemize those European nations for me that don't understand metaphor?

But this didn't do away with interreligious competition. On the contrary, it made it worse, far worse. — baker

Religions don't compete. People do, so it's hard to blame the idea over the person. But in any event, ideological differences lead to conflict, whether that be religious, political, or just general worldviews.

Why close our eyes to the obvious? Why not consider the possibility that religion is the way it is precisely because it is intended to be that way? — baker

Intended by whom? Do you envision a committee having met thousands of years ago and arriving at all sorts of explanations about the universe, packaging it up into a concise book, and then peddling it to the masses so that thousands of years later they could use it to control the world? If that is what happened, then my hat's off to them, and I think they ought to control the world, considering their seemingly divine intelligence and foresight.

I also don't know what you mean by "religion is the way it is." How is religion? What is the essence of "religion" that you claim exists across the board, from the Wiccans to the Greek Orthodox to the Chasidim to the Amish to the Mormons and to the Hindus that makes them all so terrible? I suppose you mean the caricature religion where they yell at you about going to hell and then take all your money? Suppose that isn't religion as it must be, but is just one really bad form?

If you don't like the church you're going to, go to a different one. If you don't want to go to church at all, that's fine too, but I don't see where you have this great insight and knowledge into where I go and can make comments on it. All this talk about facts, yet here you're just factually incorrect.

There are those on this thread - and it turns out that you are not amongst them - who choose to deny the facts of early Christianity. They render themselves irrelevant to the main discussion here.

That's why Ennui Elucidator and @Metaphysician Undercover find themselves advocating telling lies. — Banno

I don't actually read them that way, but they can defend themselves. I'm a mouthpiece for a living, so I'm on break while here.

Just my observations, but among non-believers, there is often passionate negativity towards religion. Maybe it's borne in trauma, maybe it's a challenge to a competing worldview held dear, or maybe it's actually anger over ancient misdeeds as you've presented.

My view here is just to accept there have been and currently are truly fucked up stewards of our religious traditions. Like it or not though, the human quest for meaning and spirituality hasn't evolved away. We're still going to want to take a sabbatical from our Sisyphusian existemce occassionally (perhaps weekly) and sit back, contemplate, stop from our creating and working, and ask ourselves what is important and celebrate our creation from the past week.

That is to say, yes, I believe in the creation story (and the above only scratches the metaphorical surface of it), but it has nothing to do with the origins of the cosmos. It has to do with meaning, and it is most certainly true. The book is only about existential meaning. It's not an encyclopedia of worldly facts. That simple minds simplify it or malicious minds misuse it, doesn't make it simple or abusuve, and it surely doesn't give someone cause who is neither simple nor malicious to reject it.

But enough of my sermon. Reject it because it holds no allure for you, but that's really the only legitimate reason I can see for its rejection. That fucked up people saw the sway it held and used it for their advantage says something about them, not it.

Ironically, the use of 'faith' to describe believing despite the facts comes from Augustin of Hippo. He thought it a virtue. — Banno

Can't speak to how others use the term, but it's something I'd suspect has had a meaning that has varied greatly over the years.

The Bible doesn't reference disputes between atheists and theists, but disputes over whose god reigned supreme. It was a given there were gods, magic and the like. Back then, what we take as "faith" was taken for granted. They were not wedded to the scientific method like we are today.

In the early portions of the Bible, there would have been no need for "faith" as we understand the term today. They saw splitting of seas, manna from heaven, and all sorts of violations of physical laws. They had empirical evidence for the existence of God.

What we call "faith" today, I'd submit is an entirely separate epistemology that can co-exist with a scientific one only insofar as it doesn't attempt to respond to scientific questions. How the world works is a scientific question, but how I should live my life is not. There are obvious oversteps that occur when people attempt to offer Biblical interpretations to explain our origins for example, but I'd submit that is the fault of an unreasonable literalism.

Religion also tends to maintain that it holds the truth, while government rarely gets any more totalizing than expressing broadly held community values. — Tom Storm

I think you greatly over-simplify things when you attempt to draw a clean break between government and religion. This concept of secularism is fairly new, and it's hardly complete.

But to the idea of mythology, it's no secret that the original Pilgrims were less than open and giving to the Native Americans, despite what we might have learned about Thanksgiving. The American founding fathers were also not as interested in equality of man, considering they were actually part of an aristocracy who used a servile class of black slaves and white indentured servants to do their dirty work. The value in the myths we learn of government (like religion) is to advance an ideal and their deconstruction does leave a void. Obviously no myth should be advanced that denies another's suffering or that continues his or her oppression, but, properly understood, we need not go around screaming that the US (and likely every other nation) was built upon a lie. What it was built upon was an ideal that the people fell quite short of and that should now be better advanced.

That it is to say one can believe in American ideology, but be disappointed in American behavior. The same can be said of any particular religion.

If one allows religion not to be factually correct, to consist in metaphor and allegory, for the betterment of mankind, then does that mean it need not be honest? — Banno

I concede your every point when you claim that horrors were committed in the name of religion, but blame always lies at the feet of people, not religions, not governments, not corporations, and not whatever mechanism they weaponize. The horrors people have commited in the name of religion go far beyond destroying literature and culture. Such is child's play in the scheme of things.

But I see the same horrors at the hands of government. How can you participate in government knowing what a past it has had? Might your response be "not the government I believe in"? Substitue "religion" in there for me.

And of course that's obvious, since the entire internet is flooded with them, and often are even crappy moderators that ban people for bullshit reasons, as is the case on reddit, and well you know so many others. — AlienFromEarth

I was just sittimg here innocently minding my own business and you hurl an insult at me. Evil.

The destruction of 90% of classical literature is swept away, denied, and those who point to it castigated. — Banno

I acknowledge it's some serious sad shit. I cry with you. What do you need me to say?

As to the question of whether the pain they brought was because that's what religion do, especially the monotheistic ones, that's where we disagree. I'm also not sure the Romans were all kind folks either.

Well, they probably won't open a church, but there are people who worship the ancient Greek and Roman gods even today. — Ciceronianus

Thus erasing the tragedy brought about by the Christians by resurrecting the demolished ancient Roman culture.