Stumbled upon it again. So far above the rest IMHO.

I actually heard them say it. — baker

Click on the website. It responds to your question.

You've got to be kidding. — baker

No, there actually are studies on animals that show the addictive quality of chemical substances, which control for social pressures related to the addiction, since animals aren't subject to human social pressures.

You have a negative initial response to alcohol. Yet unlike so many other people who also have a negative initial response to alcohol, you don't override this initial negative response and so you don't drink. In contrast, many people do drink, despite their negative initial response to alcohol. — baker

The desire to look nice in high heels isn't as compelling as the desire the drug addict has for drugs. It's a matter of degree of such magnitude it's not really comparable. People are not dying of high heel wearing.

What Perry is saying here is a stance that I describe as "typically American". — baker

No it's not. Perry simply pointed out there is empirical evidence supportive of alcohol's measurable effect on people's personalities and Hitchens ignores the science in an effort to support his poliltical narrative. A typically American response is to do exactly as Hitchens has, which is to start with an opinion and end with that opinion no matter what if it challenges his worldview.

It's not much an issue for debate if you take science seriously. The question of whether addictive behavior is a product of physiology as opposed to sociology is easy enough to see by looking within certain family lines and gene pools. And then there are thousands of studies on mice that show exactly what I'm saying, which obviously controls for social pressures that might be faced by humans since mice don't feel those social pressures.

You can Google for these studies, or just click here: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C11&q=addiction+studies+in+mice&btnG=

Of course, adherents of 12-step philosophy will say that these people are then "not really alcoholics". — baker

They absolutely don't say that. They never dictate who is an alcoholic and who isn't. https://aa.org.au/new-to-aa/frequently-asked-questions/

Why is it you suppose that people cannot give them agency? — schopenhauer1

Well, that actually was my point. I was ultimately placing blame on actual bad actors, not on prior histories that might lead people to bad, but understandable decisions. For example, we can all recite the difficult economic and social situation Germany was in prior to the rise of Hitler, and that certainly had much to do with his emergence, but that doesn't absolve the Nazi regime of the horrors it caused.

It's the distinction between explanations and excuses. The fact that I can find an explanation for why a murderer murders doesn't mean that serves as an excuse for his murdering.

a larger persepective, this was the curse of decolonization: how could you even think of 'capitalism' that your colonizer had, as surely the part of being a colony wasn't so great? Socialism seemed a perfectly viable answer back then. How would Palestinians think about "American democracy" after having lived under occupation that the US supports? Hence the "back to original roots" -movement with islamism is now the 'viable' option. Unfortunately. — ssu

And how can you expect the Israelis to support a two state solution given their experience with the Palestinians?

How can we explain the US alliance with Germany and Japan given their WW2 experience?

How can we explain the US alliance with the UK given the history of colonization and indentured servitude.

Why do Muslims live in the US peaceably, but not in their ancestral homelands?

My point here is that if we want to widen our scope to figure our why people act as they do, the variables are limitless, and are not simply explained by focusing on the select events that satisfy a narrative that evil is explainable as being reactionary.

Another possibility is that bad people assumed power and imposed their will on what might otherwise have been a better society.

That comes to mind as the cause in China, N. Korea, Nazi Germany, Pol Pot's Cambodia, Stalin's Russia, maybe even Putin's as well.

And Hamas

Intentional, malicious leadership.

More to the point, though, can the moral argument for supporting the right of both sides to exist, with a permanent ceasefire, be opposed? — FreeEmotion

Suppose Hamas says it'll commit to a ceasefire, but then it'll build its forces and tunnels back during that lull in the action, and then it'll send people on parachutes over to rape and kill children like it did the last time it broke a ceasefire on October 7?

Then it'll operate out of a hospital and subject its own wounded and dying to more misery so it can blame the Israelis of violating the rule that says you can't attack your enemy when it hides behind an incubator filled with premies.

So sure, I'm in favor of the Garden of Eden you envision. It's unfortunately a myth.

This is almost verbatim from a conversation with a female acquaintance: "I hate high heels. My feet hurt in them. ... But what can one do. Women must wear high heels."

Clearly, she has such a philosophy of life that enables her to override the pain; whereas some women don't. While both groups of women experience wearing high heels as painful. — baker

The enjoyment of wearing high heels at the expense of the pain of the high heels is not at all equivalent to the desire a heroin addict experiences for his drug. That should be obvious from the fact that the heroin addict will steal from his loved ones, break into homes, hold up stores, share infected needles, lie, cheat, and destroy every one of his relationships, and sleep in dark alleys with needles in his vein in order to get his fix.

The finest rehab facilities and the most oppressive of prisons have not eliminated drug abuse.

Anyway, watch this 50 second video:

https://www.tiktok.com/@bbcnews/video/7295729395971427616

I think this is an American thing, although made popular via 12 Step philosophy.
It has that American black-and-white, all-or-nothing thinking in it. There is a culturally specific element in how people will interpret their urges. — baker

It's not black and white at all really in that they never claim you're recovered. It's just the basics of things like Alcoholics Anonymous. It's an ongoing program.

I'm cautious of blaming "genetics" for anything, because blaming "genetics" tends to be a way to absolve the blamer for any responsibility for how they treat the blamed. — baker

It's not an all or nothing proposition, but it's just obvious that people react differently to different chemicals. Pollen has no effect on me, but it does my wife, for example.

Genetics doesn't absolve the person of anything. Some use genetics to argue inferiority, for example.

But anyway, how people choose to weaponize information has no bearing on the question of what the facts are, and the facts are that some react in an addictive way to intoxicants and others don't.

A quick and topical video about what it means to be in control of one's decisions as it relates to alcohol.

https://www.tiktok.com/@bbcnews/video/7295729395971427616

So my question to you is: do you think that it is the case for alcohol? That it is mostly genetics and there isn't much we can do about it. — Skalidris

I indicated that 12 step programs seem to be effective and I know that many people are able to deal with their alcoholism effectively.

That there might be a genetic predisposition to certain types of cancer, for example, doesn't mean there are no treatments for it.

What is your point exactly? That society and education are mostly helpless about alcohol consumption and that it's mostly genetic and there isn't much we can do about it? — Skalidris

The OP asked why alcohol was imbedded in our society, especially in light of the fact that it can harmful. You even suggested it had no benefits.

My response was that some of the pull towards alcohol consumption is genetic as is some of the push away from it. I think a good number (how many I don't know) who fall into the problem drinker class, which is the class we're interested in here, have a genetic driver for their behavior and it's not just a matter of being weak willed.

I never offered a solution to alcoholism or said it shouldn't be addressed. From what little I know, I've heard 12 step programs and the like tend to be helpful.

But for the case of native Americans, it's not necessarily because of mental disorders but it could be because of their culture, their lack of information about the dangers of alcohol, or because what happened to them is pretty terrible... — Skalidris

It is the result of genetics. As the study notes, generally, 50% of the cases of alcoholism are inherited. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3603686/

One can control for environmental influences because not all alcoholics reside with the alcoholic relative.

My guess is that Hamas has diverted a large percentage of material imported (or smuggled in through tunnels) into Gaza for its own use, rather than for the benefit of average Palestinians. — BC

The building of the tunnels itself is part of their diversion of resources meant for the building of civilian infrastructure into terrorist infrastructure.

They have a network of tunnels said to be larger than the NY subway system designed for Israel's destruction and the cries for a cease fire are supposed to be taken seriously prior to the elimination of those underground tunnels.

Remembrance day is a thing in the UK, stemming from WW1 and folk like to stand still and quiet for 2 minutes, to 'remember the dead'. — unenlightened

Remembrance Day is meant to remember those who died in war, but I doubt it was meant to remember the enemy combatants, like the axis power soldiers who lost their lives in commitment to the destruction of Britain. That is, it is not just a day to lament death, regardless of who has died, but those who died in war defending Britain.

And so the day gets hijacked by those with a political message, contrary to the intent of the day, with the express message of a moral equivalence of these past wars with the Palestinian resistance, under the guise that all they mean to say is that death of any sort is a bad thing.

I'm opposed to chucking stuff at police, and do hope they, like their political opposites who often do the same, are properly charged.

seriously doubt that someone can be resistant to all kinds of drugs. It's not just about alcohol but about any mind altering drug. — Skalidris

I'm not suggesting immunity to intoxicants. I'm describing the pleasurable reactions varying among individuals, leaving some finding little pleasure and others more. Those who have more pleasure are subject to a greater likelihood of addiction.

What I've heard of alcoholics describe as a lifelong urge that has to be suppressed every waking moment not to drink that first drink or that will result in a complete lack of control is not a struggle I have.

It's unrealistic to think my resistance to that first drink is because I've got greater mind control and not acknowledge I just don't have that predisposition.

The desire one has for alcohol moves from very low to very high, with a thousand points between. It's not as if Native Americans, for example, who have extremely high rates of alcoholism, are just weak willed. It's part of their genetic response to the substance.

What is interesting to me though as a non-drinker is the sociological reaction to the non-drinker. I think non-drinkers make drinkers uncomfortable. I'm not sure if they feel judged or something or if they feel guilty for doing something that they'd feel less guilty about if everyone around them were joining in.

It's like I need to walk around with a glass of melting ice and a skinny little straw so that people can see I am one of them. Walking around a party without a drink is like walking around without a shirt on or something where everyone notices and wants to get you a blanket or something.

Coffee. Another thing that makes me drowsy. If I drink coffee in the morning, I'm likely going to be tired and drowsy the entire day, without getting much done. — baker

This describes me as well, as does your description of how alcohol makes you feel. It's for that reason that I don't think this really is a philosophical difference as much as it is a physiological difference. Some people just don't have the genetic disposition to react to chemical substances as others, which also explains the alcoholic who seems compelled to drink. I haven't drunk any alcohol in probably months. It's not like I think about it any more than drinking a grape soda. It's just not of interest to me, which makes me probably really odd to someone who takes one day at a time (as the saying goes) trying to stay sober just one more day.

The only connection I can make with the people who speak of the wonders and impulse towards alcohol is perhaps sexual pleasure or something like that, where the impulse in me is there. I suspect that there are people who have no sexual drive at all and who would not think that going long streches of time without is any great challenge.

I don't think I can offer any great insight to someone who tells me he has amazing romantic relationships without sex nor would I suggest to that person that sex would enhance anything in his life if he were telling me that he simply lacked that ability to obtain that pleasure but he was otherwise content.

You have the story of King David and Solomon where their riches are written of positively. — BitconnectCarlos

David was a piece of shit. He impregnated another guy's wife and then sent him to the front line in battle to have him killed.

He excused his son when his son raped his sister.

Among many other things.

I never read him in overly positive light. I mean, he was a good king I suppose, but I'd agree with you. He was not a Jesus like figure. Although Jesus was supposedly from his paternal line, because he Bible says the messiah must be, but Jesus had no paternal lineage, being the son of God and all. I never understood that

Does religion perpetuate and promote a regressive worldview? — Art48

Do you suppose there might also be educated Christians and uneducated atheists?

I think the more appropriate question is, does God learn something new if Mary sees red. It appears necessary that God must learn something new every time a person learns something new, because God must learn that the person has learned. — Metaphysician Undercover

This only works if free will is knowledge itself, but I don't think God can't know everything, including what is not known by any person currently. That is, God wouldn't necessarily know if Mary was ever going to choose to step outside and see red under your argument, assuming that was purely a function of her free will, but he would know what Mary will learn upon seeing red, even if Mary never does see red.

God could know the result of every unrealized hypothetical, though. He just couldn't know which choice we're going to make if you believe pre-knowledge entails determinism and therefore negates free will.

I don't see the critical problem of free will to be how we can make it compatible with omniscience (which is really the free will/determinism debate recast), but how it makes sense at all as an uncaused cause. I also don't see how it makes sense to say we don't have free will either, so I just hold it fundamental to the understanding, like time and space.

The crux of my disagreement is that you make order synonymous with simplicity
— Hanover

It's not my theory. It's Shannon's. — unenlightened

Where you say "Maximal order is minimal total information," it implies information is an element within a system as opposed to an element within a person's understanding. A more correct statement is that maximum order has a maximum level of predictability and therefore requires fewer binary bits of questions to accurately predict outcome, and thus demands less information. That is, the higher the entropy level, the less predictable the next result, therefore a person is less informed of what will happen next based upon the information he has?

It's not that ordered systems are composed of less underlying causes or actions than an entropic one. It's that entropic ones just require more information to predict results of that system.

This is where I think we're disagreeing, which was in what I took (perhaps mistakenly ??) to be meant by your term "simple," as if something inherent in the composition of ordered systems was less dynamic than in entropic ones.

I think it would be accurate to say that an observation of a chaotic event would yield less information to the observer in terms of what is needed for accurate predictability than an ordered one, not vice versa.

This discussion of entropy therefore doesn't lend itself to the evolutionary debate as I think you suggest, which I took to be that evolution was just another iteration of law of entropy in that it revealed more complex systems from simpler ones.

My position is that complexity in evolutionary biology references the organism's higher levels of organization from a functional level and employs concepts like "organization" and "complexity" quite differently. We would not say a human is more complex than an amoeba because the human is more entropic.

What I'm willing to concede is irrelevant. My whole point was that none of us have the authority or power to impose our moral outlook on people who don't share it. — Vera Mont

I didn't make any reference to imposing anything on anyone. I indicated what would and would not be ethical. If you lie, you are unethical. That doesn't mean I have the power to stop you from lying.

Governments and churches can levy taxes and tithes on their membership, and pass laws for minimum civil behaviour. Beyond that, we are pretty much free to decide our degree of participation in the human race. — Vera Mont

And we are free to disobey our governments and our churches and endure whatever consequences result from that. Sometimes we even have to endure penalties from our governments when we've been ethical because our governments are unethical.

Those are exactly the situations in which the state and the community intervene, because collectively, we have decided such an attitude is unacceptable. — Vera Mont

Intervention might or might not have anything to do with morality. It might just be a rule of covention, like we drive on the right side of the road and not the left. None of this has anything to do with what is demanded us of in order to be ethical people, and none of this is what provides the basis for legitimate governmental authority.

And you are entitled to that opinion, as am I, since I happen to share it. Sure, the world would be better if we all cared for one another. The fact remains that neither of us is in a position to impose it on others. — Vera Mont

I'm not sure where we're disagreeing if you're acknowledging that we should help others in need, with "should" designating that which is ethically demanded of us. I've not suggested that a person who watches a child drown ought be arrested. I just think he sucks. Any by "sucks," I mean he's unethical.

At some point this conversation turned from "what is ethical" to "when is authority properly exercised"? I'm just talking about who are good people and who are bad people. Bad people listen idly by while children are raped in adjacent bathroom stalls.

As to whether that obligation extends to people other than one's own family, community or nation, that is a matter of individual world-view. — Vera Mont

This is a subjective ethic though, meaning that you're willing to concede it's ethical to ignore others if that happens to be your own personal viewpoint. If that is the case, I see no reason not to attach that subjectivism to everything, meaning if I personally don't believe caring for my own children is necessary, I don't mind murdering, and I think lying is perfectly fine, then so it is.

My position is that if you are ethically obligated to help others regardless of your worldview.

How this is sorted out will require you adopt some sort of ethical theory. If you're faced with the question of watching a child drown in the pool or bending down to lift him out, some responses might be:

Which response would result in the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people? (Utilitarianism).
Which response should I choose if I were to will it to be a universal law? (Kantianism)
Which response would be most promoting of personal virtue (like courage, kindness, and charity) (Virtue ethics).
Which response would I choose to be most consistent with traditional religious teachings (love thy neighbor, do unto others, etc. (Divine Command theory).

Knowing Euclid's definitions and axioms does not entail knowing Pythagorus' theorem even though it 'follows' from them. The information of the theorem has to be 'unfolded' from the axioms by a particular series of steps that are not specified by the axioms themselves. Similarly, the unfolding of physical processes in time produces new information even if that information is predetermined. If you like, existence is the unfolding of God's omniscience. — unenlightened

Interesting. Would Mary learn something new when she saw red if Mary were God?

I'll have to think about that one. Omniscience entails knowledge of everything and if certain knowledge is only knowable through experience, then we'd have to say that omniscience entails omni-experience, meaning you'd have had to experience everything to know everything, but it seems a limitation on God to require he do something to know something.

As to the logical implications entailed by certain axioms, I do think they'd be immediately known to an omniscient being. I also don't see that as an example of an unfolding because it's just the drawing out of logical deductions, not the revelation through empirical means.

Everything starts simple and gets more complex and order is simplicity. — unenlightened

The crux of my disagreement is that you make order synonymous with simplicity and chaos synonymous with chaos. Under this view, the primordial pre-bang mass woudl be the most perfect example of order and what followed the big bang would be that of increasing chaos. My position is that order is not simple, but within it all possibliites are contained.

What increases with complexity is the amount of knowledge we have because we can learn observable changes as opposed to having to rely upon theoretical extrapolations. Information though does not increase with complexity. All the information within the system was there during a state of equilibrium. The chaos that resulted from the interaction did not increase the information. It simply increased the amount of knowledge the system contained prior to its revealing that to us.

An omniscient being would gain no information from the removal of the barrier because he would know from the layout of the molecules exactly what would occur once the barrier is removed. The information contained in the divided state would therefore be no different from the mixed state because the expected result of the mixture would inform from the divided state.

We learn from dividing an atom the explosion that would follow, but we can also be said to have known some the result prior ot the division. This would seem to be the crux of the intelligent designer's position, which is that impregnated into every simple system is that complexity will emerge, leading some to the conclusion that the result of the interaction was knowable, predictable, and therefore (and this is the questionable part) planned.

Even assuming indeterminism, I think you're still left with the idea that prior to a chaotic state you have the same complexity as a controlled state, simply because we don't challenge that State A (equilibrium) caused State B (chaos), even in an indeterminate way.

I just see State A as describing a predictable pattern of variable interaction and State B as not, but both have just as much information.

I’ve always struggled to understand the appeal for mind altering substances. Whenever I tried it, it just felt like a dream where I wasn’t fully in control of my thoughts, and I never liked it. Why do humans want to escape their mind and avoid reality? How is it an advantage? — Skalidris

You can't discount genetic factors when assessing your reaction to drugs and alcohol. Some find it very pleasurable and addicting and others not. I fall into the latter category. Alcohol does lower my inhibitions, but it isn't relaxing or pleasurable. It mostly makes me tired and gives me a headache. For others, they can't seem to control their intake because it's apparently so wonderful.

I have seen studies correlating ethnicity to alcoholism, where those ethnic groups with early historical exposure to alcohol have lower rates of alcoholism than those with more recent exposure. Native Americans have extremely high rates of alcoholism perhaps due to this recent evolutionary exposure, versus Ashkenazi Jews which have very low rates due to the first exposure being long ago.

This isn't to say your response to intoxicants might not also be personality driven, but I have no question with myself that my physiological response is very different from what is typical.

I suppose it's a good thing, but you won't find me at a party very late. Nothing is more boring than being the sober guy at 1:00 am.

What actually fascinates me even more is the evolutionary role of alcohol in human mating rituals where it is introduced in highly organized ways (in terms of where it is served, to whom it is served, how it is prepared, the time of day it is served, the environment (particularly with music) in which it is served, etc.). Since alcohol is correlated to mating, it has a profound impact on evolution I would think.

This is what I think about at 1:00 am when having to watch drunk people slobber over each other.

Given the limited access people have to 'the truth', what would such a moral obligation even look like? Does answering "I don't know" to every question fulfill the obligation? It would be truthful. — Tzeentch

This comment makes me regret ever having begun this conversation with you. You now don't know what a lie is. Super. I can't be sure there are other minds than mine either. This isn't a profound observation. It's just nonsense.

keep in mind that 'telling the truth' is an action one undertakes, and as I said one bears responsibility for their own actions. — Tzeentch

Your sentence could end with the words "to others," meaning how you treat others matters for ethical analysis, including whether you watch them suffer while you stand idly by.

Maintain a bit of class. Assuming the other side is morally bankrupt is intellectual poverty. — Tzeentch

You said there is no ethical problem with watching a child get raped while eating a bowl of popcorn. If you do that from time to time, you would only be ethically bankrupt if that was unethical, but you've told me it's not.

The truth is I don't think you think that, which means I don't take your position seriously. It's nonsense.

Why society should provide police forces and prosecutors? Your guess is as good as mine. I don't really care either way — Tzeentch

It's not a guess. It has to do with providing public safety. I also don't believe you don't care if your community has law enforcement.

Your arguments aren't persuasive, believable, or even intriguing.

Once a Jew has accepted the divine revelation of Jesus Christ he has placed himself outside of Judaism. — BitconnectCarlos

He'd still be a Jew though, just with really strange beliefs.

If I had to speculate, I would suggest that the language and the Book were central along with a rare tradition of universal learning, (hence 'argumentative'?) aided by a tribal religion with strict rules about marriage and something of an obsession with lineage. — unenlightened

I do think the answer lies in a sociological analysis. Jews are unusual in that they half-way assimilate into the greater culture. They don't remain so insular that they avoid all economic or social interaction with their neighbors, but they do remain seperate in many ways dictated by their religious beliefs. An Orthodox Jew (which really describes all Jews not too long ago) would not eat with non-Jews (because of the rules of keeping Kosher), they would not marry non-Jews, they would only send their children to Jewish schools, and they would live in communities surrounding the local synaguage because they had to be within walking distance (due to rules of keeping the sabbath). None of these decisions were based upon prejudice toward the greater community, but it was due to adhering to their rules.

Add in also the Jews had their own culture that involved distinct dress, distinct language, distinct food, songs, and much else.

Despite these differences, they did involve themselves in commerce, were educated, and could be vocal. And so that made some to think them parasitic or distrusted and that made them subject to scape goating.

The flip side of this is that it made them survive much longer than most, if not all, other sub-groups. It also resulted in a certain amount of disproportionate economic and educational success.

What you see in Jewish culture often reminds me of what you see in the US with regard to recent immigrant cultures, especially Indian and Asian ones. They tend to be insular as well, marry only within, heavily value education, but they still are heavily involved in commerce and that results in economic success. In fact, I had a Asian client who I told that I was Jewish and he said "Oh, you do things like us."

People are responsible for their actions, so they are responsible for their children, so they have moral obligations towards their children. — Tzeentch

You have no moral obligation to me to tell the truth? You didn't create me.

The vast majority of ethical conduct occurs outside family members and it relates to social obligations because you are a social creature living in a social community.

I believe people have a right not to get involved, because without such a right a system of morality simply cannot make sense. — Tzeentch

You have a right to do whatever you want, but the fact you have the right doesn't mean your decision will be moral. I have the right to decide whether to lie or tell the truth to you, but my moral obligation is to tell the truth, and the consequence of my lie is that I will be unethical if I do.

Of course, our use of the term "right" here is not at all the way "right" is typically used when referencing civil rights and things like that.

You believe it is unacceptable to let a drowning man drown. Why do you believe it is acceptable to let people in the third world starve? — Tzeentch

If you see no difference between me sitting on a chair eating popcorn while watching a child slowly die from a fall off a swing and me not flying to Ethiopia to make a meal for a starving child in terms of ethical analysis, then I can't help you.

I also don't think anyone within your community will find your response to watching the baby slowly die very persusive when you tell them they are just as bad as you are because they haven't solved the world hunger problem. The reason they will think you are an unethical person is because you would be, regardless of how blue in the face you argue that they are confused about what makes a person moral and immoral.

In that case 'moral obligation' would be little more than a fancy term for social custom, to make it sound more authoritative. — Tzeentch

A custom and contract are different.

People who claim they have moral obligations and subsequently are not making every effort to fulfill them are just fooling themselves, in my opinion. — Tzeentch

Unless the moral obligation is does not include the requirement we must "make every effort to fulfill them." No one has ever said that other than you (over and over in fact). The rule that I must give to charity can be qualified howerver we determine that moral rule to be, which might be 10%, it might be a certain percentage of discretionary income, it might be limited to helping others after other duties (including those to one's self) are fulfilled.

Your approach to append an impossible standard on the rule is what makes it impossible, but that's only because that's how you've decided to do it. Your system does provide you a convenient way to absolve yourself of all societal responsiblity and to live as selfishly as possible, so it does have that advantage, although your society might fall short of maximizing happiness.

Since you don't think you have a duty to interfere in a child rapist's activities in the bathroom stall next to you, does anyone other than that child's parents have that right? I mean, why should society provide police and prosecutors to interfere in such conduct and impose upon themselves the rights and duties associated with that?

One carries responsibility for their child. Not for their neighbor, at least not by default. — Tzeentch

What is your basis for this rule you just made up?

If you'd like a Utilitarian, Kantian, Biblical, or virtue ethics basis for why I find your rule wrong, I can provide it if you're interested in a philosophical debate.

Other children are not one's responsibility, unless one has voluntarily taken up responsibility to care for them. — Tzeentch

Again, you're just making up rules.

No. It might be a moral good, but it is not a moral obligation. I have already given my objections for why I believe that is. — Tzeentch

No you didn't. You just stated people don't have duties outside their own children, which is just a restatement of your thesis, not a basis for your position.

You are currently aware that many people are suffering in the world, yet you choose inaction towards the vast majority of them. Now you point at a specific instance of suffering and claim that inaction is impermissible. I don't see the basis for it. It seems hypocritical. — Tzeentch

That I can't do everything doesn't mean I am free to do nothing. Again, we all have limitations and all sorts of competing interests, meaning we have to divide our attention among the millions of things that comprise our lives and we can provide reasonable limitations upon what we do.

The ethic you're advancing, which is that we must do everything we can to eliminate all suffering to the greatest extent humanely possible, is not an ethic I subscribe to, nor one that anyone I know does. That is to say, you're presenting a strawman.

Obligation clearly implies coercion - the threat is that of not being an ethical person, which to a lot of people matters a great deal. — Tzeentch

No it doesn't. Obligation and coercion are different concepts even if you don't want to recognize the distinction I drew. I am obligated to tell the truth, but nothing forces me to, so I can lie, oftentimes with impunity. If I am coerced to tell the truth, I am not ethical, even though it was my obligation.

I simply asked you to quantify the obligation, which you couldn't. Your defense was, 'just because I cannot quantify it, doesn't mean it's not a moral obligation'. Well, if you cannot quantify what you consider to be moral obligations, then I cannot take them seriously. — Tzeentch

I never said it was easily done, but in the case of parenthood I think it's quite realistic. — Tzeentch

You can offer specific criteria for what makes a parent a "good" parent to a child, but you can't offer specific criteria for what makes a neighbor a "good" neighbor to a child. Why is that? What is it about parental duty that makes it subject to a differing sort of analysis than neighborly duty? My answer is that there is none. Each is subject to the same sort of analysis, which is a combination of objective factors, probably none of which is absolutely essential, coupled with certain subjective evaluations. That's how we always measure quality. Quality is not reducible to quantitfication, which is precisely what you're attempting to do here. There is not a single set of criteria that assures one they are a good parent or a good neighbor, but there all sorts of variables involved, many of which are subjectively evaluated.

I wouldn't suppose that. It's quite possible for one to do their moral duties in regards to their children without being occupied 100% of the time. — Tzeentch

And the same towards one's duties towards other children. If a parent can satisfy his duty to his own children by spending only a small amount of time doing that, and that parent has a higher duty to his own children than to his neighbor's children, then it follows he could also satisfy his duty to his neighbor's children by only spending a small amount of time doing that.

All you're doing is pointing at a specific instance of refusing to get involved and calling it unethical, when in fact one is doing the exact same thing in less obvious ways. — Tzeentch

My question is whether you have a moral duty to do anything at all when you hear a child being raped in the bathroom stall next to you. Yes or no?

Lastly, I'd like to mention a comment made earlier, which I believe gets at a crucial difference between charity and moral obligation:

Arguing about charitable giving loses sight of the fact that by definition it is voluntary, that is free of moral obligation. If it was obligatory it wouldn't be a charity, it would be a tax.
— LuckyR

When I undertake an act of charity, I do so out of a desire to do good. Not out of fear of being unethical. — Tzeentch

This does not draw a distinction between charity and moral obligation. This draws a distinction between voluntary/discretionary and coerced.

If I perform an ethical act, like telling the truth, that act is ethical if it is "voluntary," but the opposite of voluntary is "coerced." The opposite of coerced is discretionary. So, if I tell the truth with a gun to my head and under such duress that it can be said that I have been relinquished of my free will, so much so that the act is no longer something you will judge me moral or not, then I cannot be said to be moral when I told the truth. The opposite holds true as well, meaning if I lie under the same sort of duress, I would be morally excused from that conduct because it was not the result of my free will.

That I am "obligated" to do something does not mean I have been coerced into doing it. I am obligated to stop at stop signs, but maybe sometimes I don't. When I don't, it has nothing to do with my being coerced to run the stop sign. It might just be that sometimes I choose to be disobedient. The point being, I have the discretion to run the stop sign or not, but I am obligated to stop there, but when I do stop, it is not the result from a loss of free will coercing me to do as I must. That is, an obligation can be accepted or rejected by the person.

As it pertains to morality, I am morally obligated to tell the truth. That is what I must do to be a moral person. It is no coincidence that the ten commandments are commandments, meaning they are obligatory. They are not general guidelines to think about. Kant refers to his standard as the catagorical imparitive. That is, it is what must be done. This is not to say you lack the ability and discretion to do otherwise. In fact, the ability to do otherwise is what makes matters subject to ethical evaluation. If I had no ability but to tell the truth, then I would not be ethical when I told the truth. I'd just be a machine.

agree with that, but the key word here is responsibility. One is responsible for bringing a child into this world, therefore moral obligations may follow from that, and I do believe we could come up with a pretty exhaustive checklist of what that obligation (parenthood) entails. — Tzeentch

You've changed your objection. Your objection was that there was no obligation to help others because I couldn't quantify the extent of that obligation. Here you say my lack of obligation to others is limited to children other than my own, based I suppose on the fact I caused my children to exist. That is, moral obligation at first hinged upon whether that obligation could be quantified, but here it hinges upon one's duty to resolve issues they have personally created.

Your original objection then sort of flutters away and then for some reason becomes easily resolvable. You now claim there will be no difficulty in quantifying one's obligations to one's own children because, well, that's just easily done.

My response is that it is no harder or easier to quantify one's obligations to one's own children as it is to others. In either instance you're going to have to set out what you believe the minimal reasonable requirements are that one has to his own children versus other children, with likely greater responsibility toward one's own than others Since you've now said I do have an obligation to my own children, I suppose I'm immoral because right this second, I'm doing nothing for them. Surely there is some wisdom I might be able to impart that I'm not doing, but yet I fail.

The way out of the quandary for my own children is the same way out for other people's children. I simply come up with what I think is reasonable for the respective children. That you think I have an obligation to persons A, B, and C and not X, Y, and Z is based upon some theory you've not identified, but it is, as I have said, inconsistent with most, if not all, major secular ethical systems and religiously based ones. That is, you stand within a very small group of people who beleive that ethical duty to others ends at the four walls of your house.

You may wish to say that the person who passes by the drowning child without simply bending down to lift him up is ethically neutral, but I don't. I think that person sucks as a human being and is unethical. I recall a case where a man heard a child being raped in the bathroom stall next to him and insisted he was under no duty to do anything at all. Maybe you would see a horrible wreck on an otherwise deserted road and feel no obligation to make an emergency call and then drive home and snuggle up in your bed without any worry about your ethical decision. If that is you, and I really doubt it is, then you are an unethical person.

The best I can discern from what you've written is that you want to limit communal concern to the greatest extent possible and insist that each family unit is entirely responsible for their existence without any expectation from anyone not within their direct blood line. It has this hyper-tribal Randian feel to it, but it's too unworkable to be taken seriously.

If one cannot pinpoint it (or at least give an exhaustive explanation), they have no business calling it a moral obligation. That was my point. — Tzeentch

A standard of reasonableness is a standard even if it isn't quantifiable. That is, I have a moral obligation to care for the children I bring into this world, but because that obligation lacks a specific checklist doesn't allow me to walk away without effort. I must engage in reasonable efforts to fulfill that obligation.

If not, how come you are here writing posts on a philosophy forum rather than fulfilling your moral obligation of helping people who are suffering? There's no shortage of the latter. — Tzeentch

Again, that I can't quantify it doesn't mean I am free not to give to charity. Under Biblical law, there is the law of tithing, which is taken as an obligation that 1/10 of your income goes to charity. Since neither of us subscribe to a divine command theory that provides a diety as the basis for the percentage of charity we must give, we consider 1/10 arbitrary. If you're not going to rely upon God, you must rely upon man, speficially the reasonable man, the hypothetical being that does things in a tempered and thougtful way, for which he can give reasons for his behavior.

Those reasons to give to charity and the amounts considered reasonable can be based upon various logical structures, for example, those provided by the Utillitarians or those provided by the Kantians.

The point though is that we can all agree that moral behavior requires things like kindness, respect, and consideration to others. That my kindness, respect, and consideration of others might look differently than yours doesn't mean it doesn't exist or that I'm free not to be that way.

The person who does less good is worse than the person who does more good, with good and bad being understood in the moral sense. There is some level where we think the person good even if he doesn't give his every ounce of energy to others because he did give a reasonable enough amount of himself to be recognized as good.

On the other hand, should you see a child bobbing up and down in a pool crying out for help, but you don't want to get any water on your new pants, so you let him die, you are a bad person. You had a moral and you breached that moral duty.

While charity is generally regarded as a moral virtue, I think calling donating a moral obligation goes too far.

There are several gripes I would have with that:

- How much should one donate? How often? To what causes?

- What if money can't solve the problem? Am I morally obligated to fly over there and start digging wells?

- What if I am a poor person living in a rich country? Am I obligated to donate? Or are people morally obligated to donate to me?

This idea of donating as a moral obligation raises way too much questions and makes little sense to me. — Tzeentch

Under most ethical theories (Kantianism, Utlitarianism, virtue ethics, most religious based ethical systems), providing some form of charity to others is obligatory. The fact that there is a broad area of choice doesn't diminish that obligation, and it need not be limited to giving money. That you acknowledge charity is ethical (although you think it super-ethical or heroic beyond the call of duty) is an indication that you understand what charity means. That you can't pinpoint the precise amount you might be required to love your neighbor as yourself doesn't mean you are fine to avoid it.

A common idea running throughout this thread is that charity doesn't work, so why give it at all if all you're doing is temporarily postponing the inevitable. I'd just say that because we can't cure the problem is not a reason not to reduce the problem. If we can reduce a person's suffering on Monday only for him to die on Tuesday, I'd think we would be obligated to do that, especially considering how precious and sacred that Monday was, it being his last day.

A step back: do you agree Israel commits war crimes, is illegally occupying land, commits human rights violations or not? You can agree with the facts and not condemn Israel for it because of loyalty, the idea of necessity etc. and I'd disagree but I can find some consistency in it. — Benkei

I'll step it back farther, to better express my fundamental position. A post or so ago, you said I had decontextualized something you said, but what I heard was basically an attempt to offer a justification for Israel's right to the land. You generally fell in favor of Israel having such a right, but the part I found an issue with was that there appears a need at all to provide a justification. Americans, Dutch, Brits and so on don't spend much time thinking about whether they have the right to their land, nor do they believe that their rights to the land are based upon or subject to international approval. If the US explained that it would allow the Dutch their continued occupation of the Netherlands based upon the fact that the Dutch need somewhere to live, that they've been pretty ingenunitive with their dikes, windmills, and daffodils and whatever slew of other justifications the US might think of, I don't think you'd be thankful for its graciousness. You'd actually be concerned that the US thinks it has a say in your continued sovereignty and you'd be especially worried if the US took a single minded focus on Dutch internal politics and how it might be treating its adjacent German neighbors.

What is happening in Israel is child's play when compared to Ukraine. The death toll, the displacements, and the lack of threat Ukraine poses to the Russians pales in comparison with what is happening in Israel. I'm not saying the Russians have been given a pass because there certainly is outrage, but the campus eruptions haven't occured and the marches in the streets haven't occured because no one has any thought that such protests are going to change Putin's mind. He truly doesn't care about international opinion. The same could have been said of the US's reaction to 9/11. Protest as you will, but G.W. was going to be G.W.

The problem is that Israel's existence is linked to international acceptance unlike any other nation on the planet. That's what I have a problem with. The people who protest Israel are doing everything they can to endanger its existence. The only means by which Israel can be defeated is through this political effort. Israel's safety is a matter of Israel's concern, not subject to international approval.

There's no Palestine so no I don't condemn them and in any case, I'm not asking for a blanket condemnation either. I condemn specific behaviour. I condemn Hamas for their last attack. I don't condemn them for wanting to free Palestinians from Israeli occupation - which is a just cause and allows for violent resistance. I don't agree with the repeated claims Hamas still pursues the destruction of Israel and instead that they had a clear change in purpose in 2017. — Benkei

Gaza is occupied by Palestinians regardless of how you want to say the land it titled. The have possession of it and they've chosen Hamas as their representative. Hamas has fired thousands of rockets into Israel and sent in paratroopers for the purpose of not wanting to destroy Israel? I've heard the mantra of freeing Palestine from the river to the sea over and over. Am I misunderstanding that sentiment to mean something other than the removal of Israel from the land?

In any event, I'll take you at your word that you truly think Hamas wants a Jewish state by its side and doesn't want its destruction. I think that's absurd, but we've at least identified that point of disagreement. I think they want to remove every Jew on Arab land, much like every other Arab nation has done.

Before we can have a discussion on this, I need a clear condemnation from you of Israel's ongoing occupation, repeated war crimes, crimes against humanity and illegal settlements. You know, kind of how every discussion with a pro-Palestinian starts with "B-bb-but do you condemn Hamas?" — Benkei

The starting point isn't that we must agree to anything, but it's that we be clear in our positions so that we know where disagreement lies and then being able to offer support for our positions. Neither of us need to prove to the other we have the ethical standing to enter the debate by condemning X, Y, or Z. We have the right to hold contrasting views, even if we find our respective positions deeply offensive to each other.

This thread likely pisses everyone off, but, with the topic, that was pretty much expected.

I made my position clear previously on Israel: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/848309

This is to say, I don't claim Israel without any error, but I don't agree that Israel is an illegal occupier, a committer of war crimes or crimes against humanity, or that they're engaging in illegal settlements, although they push the envelope with the latter.

I don't condemn Israel. Feel free to condemn me for that.

Do you condemn Palestine? You don't have to as a starting point, but you do need to at least tell me if you do and how seriously you do. Do you see them as the warrior rapists and child butchers I do? They hardly dissuaded me from the narrative that they are barbarians with their latest song and dance.

For those interested in the legal precedent for disqualification under the 14th Amendment insurrection clause, see https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-reports/past-14th-amendment-disqualifications/

There were 8 prior instances following the Civil War. It remains debated whether it is applicable to Presidents. The chart lists the mechanism of adjudication, which has included having a state court judge determine eligibility.

If Colorado does remove him, it will only martyr him more, and all for nothing, because Colorado wasn't going Trump anyway.

I place greater moral blame upon those who unnecessarily kill without justification, but I consider self preservation and preservation of one's own people a valid justification.

So, if bombers can destroy a military target from the safety of the sky, they can properly weigh their objective (the eliminatation of the target) against their personal risk of injury against the loss of their enemies' life. That is, it is proper to place one's own safety above one's enemy and it is one's duty to protect one's own people. That is what militaries do. A bomber is therefore not ethically bound to put boots on the ground and go in with an axe in order to achieve his objective even if the result would be to reduce the deaths of opposing civilians if it will (1) place the bomber-turned-axe-wielder at greater personal risk than he'd be in a plane or (2) reduce the efficancy of his campaign to protect his own citizens. I'm assuming the longer the enemy target exists, the more danger is posed.

That is, if the bomber can make his home more safe and not expose himself to great risk, he ethically should bomb and not axe folks.

Supposing one does choose to go at it with an axe, perhaps because an axe is all he has, it would be unethical to axe murder any person unnecessary to achieve their objective in eliminating a target. To the extent a civilian interferes in the axeman's objective, he might rightfully be axed, but then that interferer is hardly just a civilian, but he's now a combatant. An axe wielder in this scenario is particularly unethical if (1) he axes a civilian not in the furtherance of a military objective or (2) his axing has no reasonable way of doing anything militarily, but it is instead just an attempt to evoke terror on the part of the enemy citizenry.

What then might someone do who has only rocks and sticks against an enemy with precision missles? There's not much he can do, but that he's weak doesn't change his moral obligations. If it did, we might just say he can morally butcher, rape, and drag off old ladies as hostages.

Wiki summarizes it into stages well:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_antisemitism