As if in the T-sentence, 'p' (on the left) is a truth-bearer, and p (on the right) a truth-maker. What would that tell us? — Banno

By values I mean things like democracy, secularism, scientific evidence (e.g., medical treatment versus prayer), feminism, etc. — Tom Storm

To attempt to pigeonhole all propositions into T and F is to miss almost all the nuance of actual communication. — hypericin

It seems obvious that for every true contingent proposition there must be something in the world (in the largest sense of “something”) which makes the proposition true. For consider any true contingent proposition and imagine that it is false. We must automatically imagine some difference in the world. (Armstrong 1973: 11)

This much is agreed: “x makes it true that p” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker. But it isn’t generally agreed what that something else might be, or what truth-bearers are, or what the character might be of the relationship that holds, if it does, between them, or even whether such a relationship ever does hold. Indeed sometimes there’s barely enough agreement amongst the parties to the truth-maker dispute for them to be disagreeing about a common subject matter.

Of course. It could be false. — Luke

So... that's partially true? — Banno

That language can be ambiguous is obvious. At issue is, what should we do about it? — Banno

If truth can admit to degrees, which it does, then it must be a property. — hypericin

What distinction do you make between truth and values and do you consider it preferable (or even possible) for one's values to be mostly determined by true things? — Tom Storm

Truth is just one property of P. It's semantic contents, its aesthetic appeal, the number of words, the language and dialect, are other properties of P.

P is the proposition, 'P is true' is a comment on P's property of truth. — hypericin

But truth, like most things, is not binary. — hypericin

Sentences have degrees of truth. Absolute truth is an edge case. — hypericin

I think a large part of the problem is that we have different ideas of what philosophy is about. I hold to the ancient idea of philosophy as a way of life. This does not mean making, defending, and attacking arguments, although that is a part of it. — Fooloso4

It is requisite to reason’s lawgiving that it should need to presuppose only itself, because a rule is objectively and universally valid only when it holds without the contingent, subjective conditions that distinguish one rational being from another. — Kant

Is it sufficient to say that it is true that a car knows how to drive itself iff a car can drive itself? Or can we dispense with this and simply say that there are cars that drive themselves? — Fooloso4

Your responses seem to indicate otherwise, but I am not going to rehash this. Time for me to move on. — Fooloso4

I think it is a mistake to think that we have fixed concepts of such things as knowledge and awareness — Fooloso4

I would argue that a self-driving car knows how to drive. It is evident from the fact that it can drive. — Fooloso4

She showed him that what he said about the contents of the fridge did not correspond to the contents of the fridge. In her doing so, she shows us that we need not be able to use the terms so often used in philosophical and normal everyday discourse in order to intuitively know that 1.)some meaningful statements are false, 2.)what makes them so, 3.)how to check and see for ourselves, or 4.)how to show someone else. — creativesoul

You could also check the icebox for plums. I later started speaking about ‘our’ reasons for saying that a statement is true or false. — Luke

Is this in reference to Gettier examples? — Luke

There is still some reason why we would ultimately say that the statements are true or false, and it still looks correspondence-y to me. — Luke

“There are plums in the icebox” is false because I looked in there and found none — Luke

That begs the question. You're assuming anything does. — Isaac

An important question for AI, but I would say that the ability of an animal to distinguish between two colors is a form of knowledge, even though it may be excluded by a favored theory of knowledge. — Fooloso4

What are the odds, I wonder... — bongo fury

I'm hoping the picture will help us agree whether your P is truth bearer or truth maker or both or neither? — bongo fury

Why the insult? — Fooloso4

This much is agreed: “x makes it true that p” is a construction that signifies, if it signifies anything at all, a relation borne to a truth-bearer by something else, a truth-maker. But it isn’t generally agreed what that something else might be, or what truth-bearers are, or what the character might be of the relationship that holds, if it does, between them, or even whether such a relationship ever does hold.

Fine, but it’s not much of a theory of truth if it doesn’t offer an account of what makes a statement true. — Luke

You may buy into Hegel's metaphysics, with everything wrapped in a nice teleological bundle with not only man but Hegel himself playing a key role in the unfolding of reality, but I don't. — Fooloso4

For all its cosmopolitanism it is more than a bit provincial. — Fooloso4

While knowledge is, for human beings, a part of being in the world, that is not the whole of it. — Fooloso4

"Just then, they discovered thirty or forty windmills in that plain. And as soon as don Quixote saw them, he said to his squire: “Fortune is guiding our affairs better than we could have ever hoped. Look over there, Sancho Panza, my friend, where there are thirty or more monstrous giants with whom I plan to do battle and take all their lives, and with their spoils we’ll start to get rich. This is righteous warfare, and it’s a great service to God to rid the earth of such a wicked seed.”

“What giants?” said Sancho Panza.

“Those that you see over there,” responded his master, “with the long arms—some of them almost two leagues long.”

“Look, your grace,” responded Sancho, “what you see over there aren’t giants—they’re windmills; and what seems to be arms are the sails that rotate the millstone when they’re turned by the wind.”

I must be able to see that the patch is red in order to classify it as red. Other animals can see and respond to colors without naming or classifying them. Do they "know" it is red or green? — Fooloso4

If the deflationary theory takes truth for granted, then it leaves unexplained what makes a sentence true. — Luke

There must be a reason that not all statements are true, no? — Luke

If the deflationary theory takes truth for granted, then it leaves unexplained what makes a sentence true. Is it correspondence, coherence, something else or nothing at all? — Luke

We have to choose between both competing modeling approaches (Lysenko) and competing theories (Russia, Covid, Climate Change..to name a few controversial ones). More often than not, this cannot be done with empirical evidence. — Isaac

"I believe that p is true and p is not true" is, in a sense, consistent and possibly true, but in another sense an absurd thing to say. — Michael

I’m trying to get clear on your use/mention analogy. Is this correct:

Mention = “It’s true that P”
Use = “P”

Is that it? — Luke

For Sellars, inference itself is always a normative affair, a matter of the judgments one ought to or is entitled to make. He defuses the circularity which threatens such an account by arguing that our knowledge of what implies and follows from various claims is, in the first instance, a practical ability to discriminate, that is, to respond differentially to, good and bad inferences. Rule-governed linguistic behaviour develops out of multiple repertoires of ‘pattern-governed behaviour’, behaviour which exhibits a pattern because the propensity to produce behaviour belonging to that pattern has been selectively reinforced and contrary propensities selectively extinguished (see language, social nature of; Meaning and rule-following). The pattern-governed behaviour characteristic of language includes ‘language-entry transitions’, propensities to respond to non-linguistic states of affairs (such as sensory stimulations) with appropriate linguistic activity; ‘language-departure transitions’, propensities to respond to a subset of linguistic representings (for example, such first-person future-tensed conduct-ascriptions as ‘I shall now raise my hand’) with appropriate corresponding behaviour; and ‘intra-linguistic moves’, propensities to respond to linguistic representings with further linguistic episodes (only) in patterns corresponding to valid theoretical and practical inferences. Linguistic roles or functions, Sellars suggested, are ultimately individuated in terms of the structures of positive and negative uniformities generated in the natural order by such pattern-governed activities.

In the Kantian tradition Sellars insisted that, in contrast to the mere capacity to be sensorily affected by external objects, perception of how things are requires not only systematic differential response dispositions but also the ability to respond to sensory stimulation with a judgment, that is, the endorsement of a claim (see Perception, epistemic issues in). Sellars went on, however, to propose that reports of how things look or seem, rather than employing ‘more primitive’ concepts, result instead from withholding these characteristic endorsements. This account enabled him to explain the incorrigibility of ‘seems’ judgments that Cartesianism takes as its fundamental datum. Their incorrigibility is simply a matter of their tentativeness; a ‘seems’ judgment expresses a perceptual ascription without endorsing it. It follows that ‘seems’ judgments do not express a special class of immediate cognitions. Applying the concept ‘looks red’ requires the same mastery of inferential articulations, the same inferential ‘know how’, as does applying the concept ‘is red’.

Sellars’ analysis of the Cartesian incorrigibility of perceptual ‘seemings’ is one strand of the philosophical dialectic most frequently associated with his name, his comprehensive critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’. Basic to this critique is his insistence on the irreducibly normative character of epistemic discourse. Characterizing an episode or state in epistemic terms is not giving an empirical description of it but rather placing it within a social framework of justifications, of having and being able to give reasons for what one says. All knowledge that something is the case – all ‘subsumption of particulars under universals’ – presupposes intersubjective learning and concept formation. It follows that the ability to be (epistemically) aware of a sort of thing rests upon a prior command of the concept of that sort of thing and cannot account for it – and this holds equally true for concepts pertaining to ‘inner episodes’. The first-person reporting role of such concepts, a use Cartesians interpret as evidencing the ‘privacy’ of the mental and one’s ‘privileged access’ to one’s own mental states, is necessarily built upon and presupposes their intersubjective status.

There cannot be a complete collapse of faith and a complete collapse of meaning, because the lie loses meaning at the same rate as the truth. But people stop listening - they stop listening to the media, to the government, even to each other. — unenlightened

there can be wolves in sheep's clothing, but as a rule it must be sheep in sheep's clothing, otherwise we would call it 'wolves clothing' wouldn't we? — unenlightened

We really, really want others to adhere to our solutions.

The simple (eagles and snakes) version of 'truth' is secondary because we don't believe what we believe about those matters because we've done the equivalent of looking in the fridge, we do so because of who we trust, our faith in statistics, beliefs about the intentions of institutions... — Isaac

the vast majority of societal functions and meanings depend overwhelmingly on concepts and belief so complex that 'truth' and 'lie' just don't really apply. — Isaac

Lysenko forced farmers to plant seeds very close together since, according to his "law of the life of species", plants from the same "class" never compete with one another.[4] Lysenko played an active role in the famines that killed millions of Soviet people and his practices prolonged and exacerbated the food shortages.[4] The People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong adopted his methods starting in 1958, with calamitous results, culminating in the Great Chinese Famine of 1959 to 1962, in which some 15–55 million people died.[note 1][4]